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Introduction
This is a book about women’s politeness. Why politeness, someone might ask,
yawning—surely we have exhausted all possible angles on eighteenth-century
politeness already? Indeed, politeness has come to be known as the key concept
in understandings of a variety of aspects of the British eighteenth century. It is
not only one of the central idioms of eighteenth-century culture, but it has also
served as an important analytical category in historical studies of the eighteenth
century. In Lawrence E. Klein’s words, politeness has been used to interpret,
among other things, ‘material and visual cultures, the organisation of space, the
constitution of social and political identities, the character of intellectual and
artistic life, and even institutional structures’.1 In a more narrow sense, polite-
ness has been an important tool in research that delves into eighteenth-century
disciplines of social interaction and the cultural codes that regulated appro-
priateness of not only speech, appearance, or bodily comportment, but also
moral and social values. Important works have been written on the speciﬁc
manifestations of politeness, the philosophical ideals behind diﬀerent modes of
politeness, as well as the historical links between eighteenth-century politeness
and early modern norms of civility and courtesy.2 Politeness has, in fact,
become such an important master metaphor for eighteenth-century culture that
scholars have recently voiced concerns that the paradigm of politeness ‘may
have spread too far’, and that since the English were, in reality, more uncouth,
violent, lewd, and, in a word, impolite than scholars have generally envisioned,
politeness presents a distorted picture of eighteenth-century English culture.3
As we seem to have passed the immediate pinnacle of politeness studies, it is
surprising that among the myriad studies examining eighteenth-century politeness
from diﬀerent aspects, there are very few that discuss women’s politeness—even
though eighteenth-century women have been exhaustively researched from prac-
tically all other social, political, and cultural angles by such scholars as Helen
Berry, Elaine Chalus, Catherine Hall, Karen Harvey, Marjo Kaartinen, Felicity
Nussbaum, Deborah Simonton, Kathleen Wilson, and others. In particular,
Amanda Vickery has approached the life and behaviour of eighteenth-century
Britons from a socio-cultural historical perspective, writing extensively on men
and women’s everyday lives and material culture; her work has been followed by,
for example, Hannah Greig and Katharine Glover.4 Even though these writers
analyse women’s conduct books as sources for eighteenth-century feminine ideals,
they do not engage with the scholarly discussion addressing politeness within its
intellectual and philosophical context. Moreover, politeness features rather as a
brief subplot in their books, which are dedicated to a wider analysis of women’s
life and ideals of femininity in eighteenth-century England. Further analyses on
conduct books have been made from a variety of perspectives; they have been
examined as repositories of information on eighteenth-century children’s educa-
tion, genealogies of elite power construction, or sources for cultural practices
either deconstructing or reaﬃrming the creation of ‘separate spheres’.5 Owing to
the fact that an analysis of politeness is not the focal point of these studies, their
representations of women’s politeness are relatively simplifying and tend to
ignore the inherent heterogeneity of the politeness discourse. Moreover, they do
not attempt any rigorous analysis of the relationship between the discursive ideals
of politeness and women’s lives and experiences—something that is the main goal
of this book.
The absence of scholarly analysis on women’s politeness is all the more
conspicuous when there is no lack of research investigating men’s politeness
and the importance of politeness for constructions of masculinity. Historians
have noted that women were deemed crucial to polite culture, but the dis-
courses targeted at women in particular and the impact these had on women’s
daily lives have not been explored. Politeness scholars have tended to either
ignore women when examining politeness as a gendered culture, focusing
exclusively on male politeness, or—which is much more common—ignored
gender as a category altogether. The research conducted by Lawrence Klein,
Markku Peltonen, and Anna Bryson, ground-breaking as it is, has simply left
gender as a category of analysis unused and unproblematised.6 These scholars,
generally adopting an intellectual historical approach and writing in response to
the tradition of Norbert Elias and J. G. A. Pocock, write of politeness as if
gender-neutral, not pausing to mention that the culture they describe can, as
such, be applied only to gentlemen; gentlewomen are rarely mentioned, even to
specify that they are not included in the scope of the research. Then again,
Michèle Cohen, Shawn Lisa Maurer, and Philip Carter have examined intri-
cately the relationship of politeness and the construction of appropriate mas-
culinity in eighteenth-century England, but similar research on politeness and
femininity is entirely missing—with the exception of Cohen’s book Fashioning
Masculinity (1996) which dedicates, despite its title, a chapter to a brief exam-
ination of the accomplishment of the eighteenth-century lady.7 Nevertheless,
while Cohen’s argument on the interconnectedness of women’s polite education
and the construction of Englishness is compelling, there certainly remains more
to be done in the ﬁeld. Indeed, Laura Gowing’s remark that ‘the recovery of
women’s history is still underway’, while ‘the history of men, by contrast, is
ubiquitous, but it has rarely been written with an eye to gender’ thus rings true
also in the ﬁeld of eighteenth-century politeness.8 My book aims to ﬁll this sur-
prising gap in literature by analysing politeness as a tool for gendered identity
construction for women.
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Ingrid Tague’s insightful book Women of Quality (2002) is perhaps the
ﬁrst—and only—extensive attempt to examine Englishwomen’s politeness in
the eighteenth century. Tague’s principal argument does not lie, however, with
the workings of women’s politeness as such; rather, she focuses on demon-
strating that women’s sociability, generally condemned as frivolous in the early
eighteenth century, was an important means through which women participated
in maintaining social networks crucial to the political and social weight of their
families. The goals of this book are quite diﬀerent; whereas Tague takes
politeness as a tool for women’s political participation, I want to examine
women’s politeness itself as a historical and cultural phenomenon within its
philosophical and ideological context. My approach thus engages with and
contributes to research linking politeness with history of ideas and political
thought in ways that Tague’s more social history-oriented study does not seek
to do. Moreover, Tague’s analysis on aristocratic women’s self-representation
and agency oﬀers a very traditional interpretation of women’s possibilities to
defy social norms by utilising the loopholes and inconsistencies of the regime of
politeness, whereas my interdisciplinary approach opens up a more theoretically
informed perspective on the various techniques of the self women could use to
gain freedom within the matrix of politeness.
The fact that women’s politeness has been so meagrely studied has to do,
perhaps, with the curious liminal position of politeness as both a cultural/social
and an intellectual construct. Therefore, intellectual historians examining
politeness have tended to sacriﬁce sociologically informed considerations of
politeness as a system of gendered power to more philosophically oriented
viewpoints, while women’s historians engaged in cultural and social history
have focused more on the more blatantly repressive structures of patriarchy,
thus largely waiving focused deconstruction of politeness as a gendering dis-
course. This study aims to bridge these two approaches and analyse politeness
as a set of gendered discourses and practices while still maintaining a sensibility
for its philosophical framework. Indeed, the very multifacetedness of politeness
makes it an extremely fruitful target of historical analysis. As a pervasive
master discourse, the culture of politeness served as the locus for negotiations
of diﬀerent identities—not only gender, but also, for example, class, rank,
wealth, nationality, race, sexuality, and health. Politeness thus provides an
exceptional vantage point for an examination of eighteenth-century identity
construction, as well as more broadly a window into the ways people con-
ceptualised the world around them and their place in it. Politeness can be read
as a comprehensive culture that operates through signs and symbols that pre-
form the thoughts and actions of the people that live in it. As such, examining
politeness helps us to unravel the relationship between thought and action and,
in Annabel Brett’s words, to understand the ways in which ‘people in the past
made sense of their world’.9 By attempting to understand the conceptual
dimensions of individuals’ behaviour and actions—how they conceptualise,
experience, see, and understand the world around them—this book contributes
to both intellectual and new cultural history.10
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Through these themes, this book also seeks to make wider-reaching points
related to transnational cultural exchange, as well as the eighteenth century as a
transitional phase between early modern and modern societies. Politeness is a
particularly applicable case study for both. As a cultural phenomenon, polite-
ness was simultaneously transnational and national; having originated as part
of Italy’s courtly culture, courtesy and civility travelled to England through the
salons and court of France, only to become rhetorically fashioned as ‘polite-
ness’—a particularly English code of conduct. Indeed, many of the most popu-
lar conduct books were originally French translations, ‘adapted to the Religion,
Customs, and Manners of the English Nation’.11 In fact, even though there was
no great rift between the actual norms of good conduct between England and
its continental neighbours, there was a profound rhetorical diﬀerence, aimed to
serve nationalist purposes. This book also explores the pivotal nature of the
eighteenth century in general by examining politeness as a culture that simul-
taneously carries many early modern beliefs about the body and identity while
actively advocating modern ones. The promotion of mixed sociability is a good
example of this; in the early modern framework where bodies were open to a
wide array of external inﬂuences, the widely debated problem of men’s eﬀemi-
nacy was thought to be a direct result of men’s associating too much with
women, thereupon becoming more like them. Therefore, the new idealisation of
heterosociability in the urban polite context was an incongruous development,
not only linked to ideas of reﬁnement, but actually deeply embedded in shifts in
conceptualisation of gender diﬀerence and the human body—from the so-called
‘one-sex model’ towards the ‘two-sex model’ of scientiﬁc modernity.12
Bluestockings and Conduct Books
More than a decade ago, Karen Harvey criticised existing studies on gender and
sexuality in the eighteenth century for their tendency to focus exclusively on the
discourses of gender norms and their subsequent failure to examine how indi-
viduals actually responded to the normative gender models set to them.13 Little
has changed since the millennium, and therefore, this book is, in its own small
way, an attempt to respond to this critique. Accordingly, rather than attempt-
ing to describe the rules and practices of women’s politeness in exhaustive
detail, I have aimed to examine the diﬀerent ways in which women could react
to the discursive norms of gendered politeness; to negotiate them as a part of
their identity, ignore them, or even to reject them in favour of alternative modes
of behaviour and, respectively, ideals of femininity. My goal is not to oﬀer a
comprehensive survey or to claim that all or even a great part of elite women
put the strategies I analyse into practice. Rather, I wish to chart some attitudes,
conceptualisations, and practices that certainly existed—and, more importantly,
were considered as possible within the culture of politeness.
Women’s means to appraise, react to, comply with, negotiate, and/or resist
the discursive conduct ideals pushed towards them through didactic literature is
examined through the speciﬁc case studies of four women who were all highly
4 Introduction
appreciated by their contemporaries and considered to be ideal examples of
femininity in their own ways—while paradoxically all also falling decisively
short of many discursively promoted gender norms, especially because of their
intellectual pursuits. These women, all more or less connected to the so-called
bluestocking circle, are the court favourite Mary Pendarves Delany (1700–1788),
the bluestocking Elizabeth Robinson Montagu (1718–1800), the moralist author
Catherine Talbot (1721–1770), and the novelist Frances (Fanny) Burney d’Ar-
blay (1752–1840). Through their journals, letters, and other autobiographical
material, I demonstrate that individuals had a complex relationship with dis-
cursive ideals, and that politeness was not a straightforwardly disciplinary
regime that lorded over women’s behaviour and identity. The profound het-
erogeneity of the culture of politeness gave, in itself, individuals freedom of
movement within it. More importantly, individuals could and did engage in
speciﬁc strategies, or techniques of the self, in order to gain freedom from and
within the restrictive norms of polite femininity. These strategies can be seen as
clever utilisations of some of the central aspects of politeness with a subversive
intent. They concentrate on challenging and redeﬁning the naturalised for-
mulations regarding authenticity, identity, femininity, and politeness. Accord-
ingly, I examine Fanny Burney’s journals as the site of self-fashioning where she
negotiated various polite and often also controversial roles into her identity.
Catherine Talbot’s exceptional self-disciplinary practices are analysed as a
means of creating autonomous subjectivity, and Elizabeth Montagu’s chame-
leon-like play with diﬀerent, often hypocritical roles oﬀers a vantage point to
the slow historical change visible in eighteenth-century conceptualisations of
identity and selfhood. Mary Delany’s self-conscious self-display sheds light on
the ways in which women could use (semi-)public polite spaces to gain freedom
from normative feminine modesty and demureness. Examining these women
thus enables me to look at the various individual manifestations of ideal polite
femininity as well as possibilities to negotiate failures to reach it, and thus to
analyse the relation between discursive and ‘real-life’ practices.
I have chosen these four women for various reasons. They represent diﬀerent
social, economic, and cultural backgrounds, as well as diﬀerent time periods of
the long eighteenth century, which enables us to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of elite women’s relationship with politeness. Despite their vari-
ety, these women nevertheless represent a very select group of polite women;
they were all well-educated, well read, and are nowadays generally considered
to have been a part of the network of literary women called the bluestockings.14
They were also more or less based in London, or, at least, partakers of the
fashionable London sociability. In fact, they were connected in many ways and
certainly all knew, if not each other, then at least of each other. Their being a
part of a literary elite is precisely the reason why they are such fruitful objects
of intellectual historical research. Their letters and journals are immensely rich
and detailed compared to less intellectually oriented women, whose correspon-
dence and journalising is often much less abundant both in vocabulary and
volume, and also generally more rarely preserved. Therefore, the letters and
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journals of these learned ladies make up a very suitable source material for
research that examines polite women’s thoughts and conceptualisations. They
were also socially active and had a large circle of correspondents, with whom
they discussed the many aspects of polite society. Moreover, since my goal is
not to provide a comprehensive account of how ‘all women’ behaved but,
instead, to examine what could be seen to be possible, plausible, and con-
ceivable within the matrix of politeness, these women, who all in diﬀerent ways
pushed the boundaries of polite femininity, are very suitable case-studies. In
fact, it could be argued that the very fact that they did not belong to the socially
stable and well-established aristocracy (researched by Ingrid Tague and Hannah
Greig) or local gentry (subjects of Amanda Vickery’s study) but were, rather, a
part of a literary elite that occupied a socially nebulous place in the polite
hierarchy made politeness a particularly important tool of social survival for
these women.15
Many of these women have been subject to numerous biographies; especially
the life of Fanny Burney as a literary celebrity and one of the most popular
novelists of the eighteenth century has been scrutinised from many angles. Eli-
zabeth Montagu has also received scholarly biographical attention, mainly as a
founding member of the bluestocking group. Talbot and Delany remain some-
what less researched, probably because they have not risen to a posthumous
reputation comparable to Burney and Montagu; nevertheless, there is recent
work on both, besides which they are often mentioned in literature examining
the lives and writings of bluestockings.16 Biography is not the goal of this book;
rather, these women’s life writings are examined as a body of texts that pro-
vides clues on their understanding of their identity and place in the world as
female members of the polite society. Neither does this book aim to provide
another portrait of these women speciﬁcally as bluestockings, but to con-
textualise them primarily as members of polite society. Therefore, the details of
their life and social status, as well as their bluestocking connections, are con-
sidered as far as they are necessary to provide an intelligible analysis of their
thinking, but my aim is to draw wider-reaching conclusions based on this ana-
lysis and to suggest that the strategies they engage in can be taken to have been
more generally available to the women of the English polite society—at least to
some of them.
Mary Delany, née Granville, was the eldest daughter of a younger son of the
Tory aristocracy. Her family was widely connected in court and political cir-
cles, but forced to retire to the country for political reasons after the death of
Queen Anne in 1714 and the ensuing Whig supremacy. Delany’s family was
ﬁnancially dependent on Delany’s uncle, Lord Lansdowne; accordingly, when
he wanted to promote his political interests by marrying his niece oﬀ to the
57-year-old Member of Parliament Alexander Pendarves (1660–1725) in 1718,
Delany was forced to succumb. The unhappy marriage ended in Pendarves’s
death in 1725, leaving Mary Pendarves Delany with no resources beyond her
jointure. Despite her lack of funds, her personal charm and vivacity made her a
popular member of London’s fashionable society and courtly circles. She
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married Dr. Patrick Delany (1685/6–1768), an Irish Anglican cleric, in 1743,
and the couple resided in both Ireland and London. Delany was particularly
famous for her talent in drawing, crafts, and design. Delany knew Elizabeth
Montagu and attended her salons in the 1740s, and also met Catherine Talbot
on several occasions. Hester Chapone introduced Fanny Burney as the cele-
brated author of Cecilia (1782) to Delany in 1783; Burney admired the elderly
lady immensely, writing that ‘benevolence, softness, piety, & gentleness are all
resident in her Face’, and that her mind ‘seems to contain nothing but purity &
native humility’.17
Elizabeth Montagu was a salonnière and a celebrated ﬁgure of polite society,
famous for her wit, scholarly merit, and exemplary politeness. Montagu was
born Elizabeth Robinson, the ﬁrst daughter and ﬁfth child of the country gen-
tleman Matthew Robinson and his wife Elizabeth. She received much of her
education from her relative Dr Conyers Middleton, a noted Cambridge classical
scholar. In 1742, she married Edward Montagu (1692–1775), a 50-year-old
bachelor, grandson of Lord Sandwich, Whig and Member of Parliament, and
owner of several coalmines and estates in northern England. Their only child,
born in 1743, died unexpectedly a year later. Elizabeth Montagu became a
prominent ﬁgure in literary circles and hosted informal assemblies focused on
conversation on literary and philosophical topics; the circle that frequented
these parties became known as the bluestockings by the 1760s. In her youth,
Montagu was quite intimately connected to Mary Delany, with whom she also
shared the close friendship of Margaret Cavendish Bentinck, Duchess of Port-
land (1715–1785).18 However, she also knew and corresponded with Burney and
Talbot.
The moralist author Catherine Talbot remained unmarried throughout her
life, living with her mother in the household of Thomas Secker (1693–1768),
bishop of Oxford and, from 1758, archbishop of Canterbury. Talbot’s father
had died before her birth, and she and her mother lived oﬀ the benevolence of
Secker, being ﬁnancially entirely dependent on him. Talbot acted as the bishop’s
personal secretary and housekeeper, which made her life very much wrapped
around Secker’s ecclesiastical position and duties. Accordingly, Talbot was only
rarely able to join fashionable polite sociability. Nevertheless, she was a close
friend of the bluestocking Elizabeth Carter and a member of her social circle,
meeting the bluestockings in London and leisure towns whenever the bishop’s
schedules permitted; in fact, Carter published Talbot’s essays on religious and
moralist topics posthumously in two collections, Reﬂections on the Seven Days
of the Week (1770) and Essays on Various Subjects (1772), which soon became
popular among the polite. Carter also brought Talbot in contact and ensuing
correspondence with Elizabeth Montagu.19
Finally, Fanny Burney was of a somewhat lower social rank from the other
three women. She was the third child of the musician and author Charles
Burney and musician Esther Burney. The Burney family was respectable but
not particularly rich, and certainly not part of the most fashionable segment
of the polite society. Burney’s sentimental debut novel Evelina (1778) brought
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her immediate fame and bought her an entrance to London’s fashionable cir-
cles and literary salons. The salonnière Hester Lynch Thrale (1741–1821) took
Burney under her wings and introduced her to Elizabeth Montagu in Bath in
1780. Burney and Montagu did not, however, become intimate friends, despite
associating through the bluestocking circle; Burney compared the older
woman critically to Thrale, writing that ‘[Mrs. Montagu] is always reason-
able & sensible, & sometimes instructive & entertaining,—& I think of our
Mrs. Thrale we may say the reverse,—for she is always entertaining &
instructive, & sometimes reasonable & sensible’.20 Montagu claimed to be an
ardent admirer of Burney’s two ﬁrst novels, Evelina and Cecilia. Despite
having acquired an entrance to fashionable circles, Burney nevertheless never
felt completely at ease amongst the beaus and belles of high society. After a
ﬁve-year appointment as second keeper of the robes to Queen Charlotte—a
post she disliked but accepted partly on the wish of her father—Burney mar-
ried Alexandre-Jean-Baptiste Piochard d’Arblay (1754–1818), an aristocratic
French emigrant in 1793.
Autobiographical writing has been acknowledged to have a privileged posi-
tion in the process of polite self-fashioning and identity-creation; it has been
accurately remarked that ‘diaries and journals, memoirs and letters were the
ﬁeld in which the confrontation between the diﬀerent interpretations of the self
took place’.21 In fact, eighteenth-century women’s letters and journals are both
the records and means of their negotiation of polite feminine identities. More-
over, textual sources, such as letters and journals, do not only give us infor-
mation on their writer’s actions, but represent, through the use of language, the
relation between action and thought. Therefore, every text is, by virtue of being
constructed through language, a window to its writer’s conceptual under-
standing; it thus operates as a repository of the culture the individual lives and
acts in.22 In addition to the private correspondence and journals of Elizabeth
Montagu, Fanny Burney, Catherine Talbot, and Mary Delany, I also occasion-
ally quote some additional autobiographical material—such as letters of Horace
Walpole, Hester Lynch Thrale, and Samuel Richardson—to further illustrate
my arguments. Eighteenth-century elite women were well aware of the long
tradition of ‘female epistolary excellence’ they were to cultivate with their
letter-writing, as well as of the performative position the personal letter occu-
pied in this tradition.23 Therefore, regardless of the writers’ intentions, polite
society’s women’s letters cannot be read—either by the present-day historian or
the eighteenth-century recipient—straightforwardly as honest declarations of
their true sentiments, but rather as performances that are used to both convey
wanted identities to the audience, and to construct and internalise those iden-
tities in the ﬁrst place. This should also be borne in mind when using women’s
journals as sources, since they, too, were often written to be read by family and
friends. For research that addresses women’s thoughts and understandings of
politeness, this is, of course, rather a blessing than a problem, since their letters
and journals open up a window into the process of their individual negotiation
of polite feminine identities.
8 Introduction
From the autobiographical writings of Delany, Montagu, Talbot, and
Burney, I have identiﬁed four speciﬁc strategies, focused around manipulating
the body in diﬀerent ways, that these women engaged in to acquire freedom
from normative polite femininity—namely, the practices of hypocrisy (Chapter
3), play between exterior and interior (Chapter 4), multiplicity of identity
(Chapter 5), and self-discipline (Chapter 6). Chapters 1 and 2 set the stage for
this in-depth analysis of women’s possibilities to circumvent, navigate around,
and resist the requirements of polite femininity. Chapter 1 brieﬂy outlines the
historiographical and theoretical premises we are facing when we are looking
into women’s eighteenth-century politeness as a tool of identity construction,
while Chapter 2 analyses the discourse of politeness as a producer of gendered
power relations, which were articulated increasingly in modern scientiﬁc terms
of biological diﬀerence rather than early modern hierarchical concepts of
underlying similarity between the sexes.
In Chapter 3, I show that women could have recourse to deliberately dis-
simulative or even hypocritical practices in order to escape the ideals of polite
femininity. In eﬀect, despite eighteenth-century claims of politeness being
somehow ‘natural’ for women and the ensuing emphasis on honesty and trans-
parency, the chapter works from the premise that politeness, in itself, was
necessarily hypocritical to begin with. Chapter 4 examines women’s possibilities
of strategically operating within the liminal space between public and private
spheres, thus destabilising the seemingly rigid boundary between internal iden-
tity and external behaviour. Chapter 5 demonstrates how women could balance
their unorthodox activities—such as literary pursuits—with more acceptable
ones through strategically assuming multiple identities and playing diﬀerent
roles. This enabled them to retain their social prestige while acquiring freedom
from norms of polite femininity. Finally, Chapter 6 examines self-discipline as a
practice through which the subject assumes mastery over her desires, thus
becoming rational and (seemingly) autonomous—characteristics traditionally
depicted as masculine, making self-discipline potentially subversive in a woman.
Throughout the book, women’s autobiographical material is carefully con-
textualised against a variety of eighteenth-century conduct books, periodicals,
and other didactic materials that were used to create the normative ideals of
polite femininity. Women of polite society picked up many of the codes of
politeness from their everyday social surroundings, in addition to being taught
by their governesses, tutors, dancing masters, family, friends, and social peers.
However, there existed also a massive print culture that aimed to discuss and
deﬁne the polite norms and communicate them to the members of polite
society. This textual corpus provides the context against which the case studies’
thoughts on politeness are mirrored. Most of these sources are various kind of
conduct books, which were the privileged medium for communicating ideas and
ideals of politeness to the women of polite society.24 The eighteenth century,
especially its latter half, saw an enormous growth in the number of published
women’s conduct books; in fact, the years from 1760 to 1820 have been play-
fully dubbed as ‘the age of courtesy books for women’.25 In fact, the emergence
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of the women’s conduct book is a phenomenon peculiar to the long eighteenth
century, as early modern conduct manuals were generally addressed for both
men and women. However, the conduct book is far from a uniform category,
but instead ranges from sophisticated texts, written for the upper spheres of
polite society, to all-around ‘Very Useful Manuals’, targeted to those members
of lower middling ranks who wanted to pass as landed gentry.26 In this study, I
have chosen to use mostly the more elite part of conduct books—more or less
those sorts of volumes Delany, Montagu, and other bluestockings might rea-
sonably have been familiar with. Bearing that in mind, I have also strived to
include as much variety as possible in terms of style, content, time of publica-
tion, as well as the authors’ devotional, social, and political background.
Moreover, I have favoured manuals that were relatively popular amongst their
eighteenth-century audiences, generally reprinted several times during the cen-
tury, to gain results that can arguably be thought to represent commonly shared
ideas and notions among the polite.
My didactic source material is not limited to conduct books. A similarly
important function in educating women on proper conduct was performed by
periodicals, such as The Spectator and The Tatler, as well as their Female
counterparts—all of which women of polite society read avidly.27 In addition,
novels and plays were also an inﬂuential medium used to address women’s
conduct ideals—especially for the bluestockings and other literary ladies.28 In
fact, my case studies frequently referred to their favourite books as models for
female behaviour; Catherine Talbot idolised Sir Charles Grandison, Elizabeth
Montagu recommended the perusal of Peregrine Pickle to her sister, and Mary
Delany and Fanny Burney drew lessons on proper conduct from Clarissa. 29
Novels’ relationship to the ideals of politeness is, of course, more complex than
that of conduct books or periodicals; novels do not straightforwardly aim at
educating women on the norms of politeness, but also comment on those norms
and reﬂect on the relations they have to diﬀerent aspects of the society. Even
though moralist conduct book writers denounced novel-reading as a waste of
time at best, and a dangerous instrument of evil at worst, novels do, never-
theless, represent the behavioural values of the society they were written in.
Novels and plays also paint more extensive discursive portrayals of the con-
sequences that both norm-abiding and norm-breaking conduct is imagined to
have within the culture of politeness than conduct books, and thus shed light on
the broader workings of polite society and the shared mentalities of those who
called themselves the polite.
The didactic material written to instruct women on points of behaviour
covers a large spectrum not only of literary forms—from satire to sermon,
educational letter to scandal novel—but also of moral ideology. Conduct lit-
erature can be seen as dispersed on a scale which is, at the one end, occupied by
religious and moralist texts that emphasise the importance of internal goodness
and honesty as the cornerstone of politeness. At the other end, then, stand the
so-called externalist texts that approach politeness as an external, essentially
theatrical mask of good conduct. The latter category quite often also includes
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texts translated from French, adapted to the English audience. These manuals
are also generally quite practical compared to the often lofty moral tones of the
books that stress inner virtues. Most conduct manuals and other texts, how-
ever, stand at neither extreme, but hover somewhere in the middle ground;
moreover, they are generally far from consistent in their approach, and often
promote inconsistent and downright contradictory agendas of politeness. Written
by both men and women, didactic texts reﬂect also their writer’s social, ﬁnancial,
national, and devotional status; therefore, they use the discourse of politeness to
discuss also other issues, such as sexuality, gender, nationality, and class. In the
end, the categories of internal and external should be understood as suggestive
tools for categorisation rather than rigid dividers.
Politeness literature can also be divided along a diﬀerent line, where at one
end are the practical conduct manuals and, at the other, philosophical texts,
where politeness appears as a part of a larger philosophical system. Most
texts, of course, fall somewhere in between the two extremes; for example,
Hannah More and Joseph Addison do not approach politeness as matter-of-
factly as a social performance as, say, The Polite Academy, but neither do
they reach the intellectual sophistication of John Locke or David Hume. My
focus in this study is on the more practically minded texts, but I also use
philosophical treatises that address politeness and sociability; however, my
approach to all sources follows readings generally used in cultural history
rather than those employed in traditional history of ideas. I do not attempt to
map the intentions of the particular authors of privileged texts, but my goal
is, instead, to oﬀer close readings of a variety of material that was used to
communicate knowledge on politeness and, thus, to reconstruct as compre-
hensive a picture as possible of the discursively fashioned ‘ideal polite woman’
with all its inherent self-contradictions and multiplicities. My approach thus
resembles Dror Wahrman’s aim to reconstruct the ‘underlying cultural
soundbox’ that resonates underneath these texts, at the price of ‘leaving out
the full exposition of where and how these fragments ﬁt into the larger wholes
of their individual originators’.30 This method of reading sources has become
common in new cultural history ever since Michel Foucault suggested that
collective discourses, rather than individual writers, should be the proper
object of a historian’s study.31
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1 Framing the Stage
Politeness and the Body
In 1741, the young Elizabeth Robinson—later Montagu—wrote to her close
friend, the Duchess of Portland, to describe a gentry family of great peculiarity in
her neighbourhood in Kent. Montagu draw their picture with biting sarcasm so
characteristic of her. The father of the family, a former Member of the Parliament,
she described as ‘a man of few words, but less meaning’, and his wife ‘an awkward
woman’, always kept ‘in the country to nurse seven or eight daughters, after his
own manner’. This dismal upbringing had ‘answered the design’, Montagu deri-
ded; ‘he has taught them that all ﬁnery lies in a pair of red-heeled shoes; and as for
diversion (or, as I suppose they call it, fun), there is nothing like blind-man’s buﬀ;
thus dressed, and thus accomplished, he brought them to our races’. Montagu then
compared ‘these jumping Joans’ to their overly reﬁned polar opposites whom she
and the Duchess had encountered earlier in Buckinghamshire: ‘they had not one
article of behaviour so untaught as to appear natural; these have not one manner
that seems acquired by art’—and, all in all, ‘the two families would make a ﬁne
contrast’. Montagu concluded with a little panegyric; ‘but you will say what are
these people to you? because you keep the very medium of politeness, must you
be troubled with those that are in the bad extremes of behaviour!’1
As Montagu’s blunt evaluation of ‘bad extremes of behaviour’ shows,
politeness played a crucial role in elite women’s social interaction and self-
fashioning. From Montagu’s letter, it becomes clear that politeness required
more than taking part in polite amusements or receiving a polite education. It
was about keeping the perfect medium of behaviour—controlling oneself and
performing according to carefully prescribed rules. This ﬁrst chapter lays the
conceptual premises surrounding those rules, as well as my methodological
means of analysing them. Questions of what was politeness, who were the
polite, and what did Montagu, Delany, Talbot, and Burney think about polite-
ness, exactly, will be answered—as well as some more theoretical speculations
of polite subjects’ possibilities for agency.
Female Bodies and Performances of Politeness
To get beneath the skin of politeness, so to speak, this book focuses on the
importance of the management of the body to politeness. The body was the focus
of disciplinary discourses and the site of individual practice of politeness—a fact
given little sustained attention in previous research. Women were socially expec-
ted to exercise and discipline their bodies in order to weed out ‘impolite’,
‘vulgar’, or ‘inappropriate’ manners and appearances and thus to appear ‘polite’.
The idealised forms of conduct were strictly tied together with femininity;
‘appropriate’ conduct for women was always weighed against their supposedly
‘natural’ gendered character and inclinations, physical frame and humour bal-
ance, as well as position in society. My Foucauldian-inspired analysis thus
approaches politeness as a regime of power/knowledge that uses discourses to
convey feminine and polite ideals to the women of polite society, with the goal of
producing normative gendered bodies that will, in their turn, participate in
maintaining and further constructing the discourse that deﬁnes them. In this
process, the body can be seen as not only the target on which power is inscribed,
but also as the medium through which it operates. Recent feminist and post-
structuralist scholarship has emphasised the role the body plays in the process of
reiteration and reworking of cultural norms. The body has been seen as an
inscriptive surface on which the central rules, hierarchies, and commitments of a
culture are inscribed and thus reinforced; more than a physical entity, it is viewed
as a set of actions, routines, and exercises that reﬂects discursive ideals imposed
on it as performative deeds, postures, gestures, and appearances.2 Thus, the body
is seen as ﬁctional in poststructuralist thought; in Elizabeth Grosz’s words, it is
actively produced ‘by various cultural narratives and discourses […] not always
or even usually transparent to themselves’. Bodies become ‘emblems, heralds,
badges, theaters, tableaux’ that are ‘marked [and] branded, by a social seal’.3 As I
demonstrate, this is very much what was happening within the culture of polite-
ness, which aimed to regulate women’s bodies by engaging them in techniques of
polite education, training, and supervision.4
Poststructuralist feminist theory maintains that this marking of the body
should not be considered as a simple superﬁcial event; instead, the goal of this
process is to generate psychical interiority, identity, individuality, and sub-
jectivity. Grosz compares this paradox to the Möbius strip, where the outside
changes into the inside without ever actually changing, since the strip is both its
external and internal surface at the same time.5 Thus, to construct a body is to
construct a soul. This way, politeness becomes a performative identity, where
its laws are acted, and through that acting also internalised. Women were urged
to internalise a gendered polite identity by exercising and disciplining their
bodies to meet the norms of polite femininity deemed ‘natural’—despite the fact
that within the heterogeneous politeness discourse, there was no consensus on
what these natural norms exactly were. Nevertheless, certain forms of conduct
were represented as ‘natural’ for women by the virtue of their gender. This
positioned the body in a problematic dual role as both already intrinsically
feminine and continuously under the need to be fashioned feminine through
disciplined exercise.
What about the individual, then? The question of the possibility of agency
has, of course, been a focus of debate and theoretical controversy between
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historians for decades.6 The Foucauldian-inspired poststructuralist approach
has problematised the entire distinction between discourse and reality; since the
‘I’ cannot exist outside the discourse, what kind of agency is left for an indivi-
dual? The attempt to answer this question, in relation to eighteenth-century
elite women, is at the heart of this book. On this score, my study has been
greatly inﬂuenced by Foucault’s later work, which is dedicated to examining the
very question of the relationship between the individual and overlaying struc-
ture. Even though Foucault seems, in his earlier oeuvre, to take the stance that
an individual’s subjectivity is inevitably produced through a society’s power/
knowledge regime, the last two published volumes of The History of Sexuality
signal a major departure from this idea. Foucault himself acknowledges in the
introduction to The Use of Pleasure that he has in his previous works neglected
the proper analysis of subjectivity. He states that in order to analyse ‘the
subject’, one has to look for ‘the forms and modalities of the relation to self
by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject’.7
Another inﬂuential concept has been Judith Butler’s notion of iterative per-
formativity, which has become a standard analytical tool for scholars working
on questions of subjectivity and resistance. Butler has fruitfully approached
power/knowledge as not a deterministic apparatus but a dynamic and com-
plex strategic situation, where resistance appears as ‘the eﬀect of power, as
part of power, its self-subversion’.8
The body plays, again, a central role in the process of negotiating agency,
autonomy, and subjectivity. According to Johanna Oksala, the body is not only
the means through which normativity is enforced but also the locus of resis-
tance to normalising power.9 Therefore, the body performs a double role in the
process of subjectivity construction, as it is both inscribed by power/knowledge
and fashioned into autonomy by individuals. Foucault writes in The Use of
Pleasure that submitting to a code of conduct requires forming oneself as an
ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the
code.10 This requires a speciﬁc kind of working on oneself, something that
Foucault calls ethical work that ‘one performs on oneself, not only in order to
bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to
transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behaviour’.11 In other words,
working on one’s body through diﬀerent techniques of the self is a means of
managing discursive normativity on an individual level and negotiating it into
one’s subjectivity. The goal is to establish the required identity as an ethical
choice and aesthetic self-fashioning. From this perspective, women were not
merely being forced to act according to the rules of politeness, but they actively
worked on themselves in order to internalise the polite feminine identities and
to become true polite subjects.
More signiﬁcantly, working on the body in diﬀerent ways can also be utilised
as a strategy of resistance, with the goal of acquiring freedom from discursive
normativity.12 Johanna Oksala argues that subjects can cultivate and practice
freedom and materialise and stylise the possibilities that are opened around
them through critically reﬂecting on themselves and their conduct, actions,
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beliefs, and their social environment. Oksala states that care for the self as a
practice of freedom means ‘challenging, contesting, and changing the constitutive
conditions of subjectivity’, as well as ‘exploring possibilities for new forms of
subjectivity, new ﬁelds of experiences, pleasures, and relationships, and modes of
living and thinking’. Thus, the quest for freedom becomes a question of ‘develop-
ing forms of subjectivity that are capable of functioning as resistance to normal-
ising power’.13 In other words, politeness could also provide women with enabling
subject positions through diﬀerent practices of the body.
Throughout the book, I trace women’s possibilities to resist the normalising
power of feminine politeness. As Judith Butler and Joan Scott have argued,
identity construction itself creates its own subversion, since the process of
repetitiously performing normative acts is, by necessity, imperfect.14 The goal
of this book is to move beyond this somewhat abstract formulation by identi-
fying speciﬁc tangible strategies of freedom women engaged with within the
context of polite society. Indeed, I suggest that the practices of hypocrisy, play
between exterior and interior, multiplicity of identity, and self-discipline can be
located from my case studies autobiographical writings as actual means they
used to resist dominant gendered behavioural norms. To what extent their
employment of these strategies was conscious, intentional, or calculated rather
than unconscious, unpremeditated reactions to feelings and situations, is diﬃ-
cult to determine with certainty. In the footsteps of Pierre Bourdieu, I would
venture to claim that they could be both, sometimes even simultaneously—that
women could rationalise some of their acts of resistance, while others would
have been engaged in unconsciously, without the intention of forming deliberate
‘game plans’.15
Questions of how power operates within the regime of politeness are central
in my analysis; I demonstrate that politeness was used simultaneously to assert
hierarchical power over subordinates, but also by those subordinates as a sub-
versive means to undermine that hierarchical power. Especially in women’s
case, where open political power was unavailable, politeness provided the
means to achieve power indirectly and clandestinely through these speciﬁc tac-
tics. I do not wish to claim that these possible strategies of freedom applied to
all women of polite society. Rather, my goal is to explore the limits of what
could be conceived as possible subject positions, possible resistances, and pos-
sible tactics of constructing rebellious subjectivity within the culture of polite-
ness. The underlying aim is thus to determine what sort of agency could have
been available for women, when the discursive power/knowledge of politeness
constituted their identity.
All of these strategies were based on the ambiguous position of the body as
both the means through which an identity is produced and worked on, as well
as the allegedly truthful and unerring indicator of an individual’s level of polite
normativity. The body was conceptualised simultaneously as an opaque mask
that needed to be actively fashioned according to discursive ideals of polite
femininity, while it was also envisioned as transparent entity that passively
reﬂected the innate reality of an already possessed femininity. This controversial
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ambiguity of the body is the central common theme of this book, manifesting
itself in the analyses I provide of women’s strategies of freedom throughout the
following ﬁve chapters. The dual role the female body played was, as I show,
the central source for that deeply seated anxiety over dissimulation, inauthen-
ticity, and hypocrisy that surrounded women’s politeness. It also made the
question of self-control—prerequisite of all politeness—highly problematic for
women. Even though politeness was mainly framed with two opposing ideolo-
gies, emphasising either internal virtue or external poise, which on a ﬁrst glance
seem to have radically diﬀerent takes on fashioning the body through discipline,
I propose that an imperative of women’s persistent self-control is the focal
point of both discourses. However, since inward politeness—the dominant dis-
course in eighteenth-century England—was committed to presenting polite
femininity as a natural state of being instead of a learned one, women’s self-
control became an ambivalent practice; on the one hand, self-control was
required to fulﬁl the ideals of polite femininity, but on the other, it needed to be
concealed, since engaging in self-discipline shook the allegedly natural core of
women’s gendered identity. Thus, polite femininity could not be reached on an
individual level without concealment and dissimulation. The culture of polite-
ness forced women to hypocrisy in practice while simultaneously advocating
honesty as the essential emblem of femininity.
Thus, this book is not only an attempt to address women’s politeness in
eighteenth-century England or even politeness within a broader European con-
text; it is also an attempt to engage with more wide-reaching interdisciplinary
discussions concerning identity construction, the possibility of individual
autonomy, and the position of the individual both as subject to discursive truth
and an agent of resistance against that truth. Both Foucault and Butler have
been criticised for reducing agency to passive resistance and all action to mere
reaction, thus making it unclear if the subject can actually ‘do’ anything on her
own.16 While this might be true on a discursive level where subjectivity is con-
stituted non-volitionally and all the choices available to the individual are pre-
conditioned, there may well be agency available for the subject within the
discursive bubble she lives in. Surely there is nothing to stop the individual from
choosing to use the preconditioned tools available to her consciously and crea-
tively for her own personal, sometimes subversive, ends? As Isabel Karremann
writes, the question of discursive structure and individual agency can be seen,
not as an either/or choice, but rather as the two extremes of a continuum; even
though the discourse deﬁnes what sort of subject positions are intelligible, the
subject can ‘decide which oﬀers it will take up in what context, and which not’.
Therefore, identity becomes a ‘“strategic and positional” membership of and
identiﬁcation with particular social groups’.17
The question of the nature of the relationship between the individual and the
surrounding world is also connected to the problematic surrounding the very term
‘identity’, which has been criticised as analytically both too broad and too narrow
a concept. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have even called for the aban-
donment of the whole term in favour of a set of more narrow and precise ones;
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they particularly criticise ‘identity’ for not making clear diﬀerentiations between
personal and social identity, or identity as self-understanding and as an external
category of classiﬁcation.18 However, as scholars have pointed out in response to
this critique, even though it is certainly crucial to be aware of the problematics
surrounding the term, the usefulness of ‘identity’ lies precisely in the way it col-
lates both categorisation and self-understanding and is, in fact, constructed as an
interactive relationship between the two.19
Indeed, in my interpretation, the interaction between individual and society/
culture is dialectical. An individual operates within a regime of power/
knowledge, outside of which there can be no identity as self-understanding or
subjectivity; however, the choices and actions of that individual operate not
only to constitute but also to transform and even subvert that regime. As the
concept of habitus (made famous by Pierre Bourdieu) or the notion of mental
bricolage (employed by David Sabean) suggest, the individual can be under-
stood to appropriate all the resources and meanings that her culture oﬀers
her—but to use them unexpectedly and creatively to construct her own
understandings and manoeuvre in the world.20 Thus, individuals’ thoughts,
words, actions, and appearances are both representations of the culture that
surrounds them and acts that both stabilise and transform that culture.
Therefore, a culture is not a totalitarian force that erases all agency; instead,
it is in a dialectical relationship with the individuals that live in it and shape
it. Individuals are not just saying their lines but writing them, as the cultural
historian Anu Korhonen reminds us; ‘cultural scripts are forever malleable,
forever open to individual reworking’.21 Moreover, discursive power operates
through individuals—it does not exist on its own. Whatever an individual is
able to achieve with her performance is solely dependent on those around her.
In other words, if an eighteenth-century servant girl’s dress was fashionable
enough and her curtsey was elegant enough, she could be (and sometimes
was!) taken for a gentlewoman by her audience. Therefore, any agency an
individual can have must come out of her ability to negotiate herself leeway
among her fellow individuals. By thus deconstructing the relationship between
performance as volitional theatrical act and performativity as unvolitional
iterative practice through eighteenth-century case-studies, this book oﬀers fruitful
reinterpretations of Butler’s concept of performativity while maintaining an
empirical and intelligible historical focus.
Deﬁning Politeness
Politeness […] may be deﬁned the art of being easy ourselves, in company, and of
making all others easy about us. It is the proper medium betwixt the total want
of, and an oﬃcious, over-acted, civility. It consists in a general, indiscriminate
attention; in doing little civil oﬃces, and saying obliging things to all the parties
we converse with; in accommodating ourselves, as well as the conversation, to
their particular tastes, habits, and inclinations; in keeping every oﬀensive subject
and idea out of view; in never glancing at our own aﬀairs, and always paying the
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minutest regard to those of others; in annihilating, as it were, ourselves, and as
studiously exalting all that are about us.
John Bennett, Letters to a Young Lady (1789)22
Much has been written about politeness, its importance, and its limits in the
creation of the eighteenth-century social elite.23 Without going into the intri-
cacies of politeness in detail, it will suﬃce to say that politeness was understood
to be a cultural code that was used to deﬁne normative class- and gender-
speciﬁc behaviour, taste, appearance, and identity. Politeness meant regulating
and reﬁning the ways in which people interacted with each other—or, in
Lawrence Klein’s inﬂuential words, ‘the dexterous management of words and
actions’.24 Its main goal was to make sociability not only pleasing by making
people attentive to each other’s wishes and needs, but also to render social
encounters predictable by a shared code of conduct. However, politeness has
also meanings that go beyond the immediate sphere of behaviour and deport-
ment. It was like a language that was used to interpret and give meaning to a
whole culture, ranging from philosophy and religion to material culture.25 This
should not be taken to mean that politeness was all-encompassing; rather, it
was the pervasive general discourse that was used to discuss and negotiate all
kinds of issues that caused anxiety amongst the social elite. For this reason,
politeness and polite culture played a role in many discourses that in themselves
had little to do with politeness—such as religion, fashion, or politics, for
example—where politeness simply provided the vocabulary to discuss norms
and ideals. For this reason, these discourses cannot be seen as entities that are
entirely separate from politeness; rather, they overlap with the domain of
politeness when they are discussing propriety of behaviour and thus merge
partly but inseparably together.
Politeness is often conceptualised as essentially dissimulative. For example,
David Runciman contends that politeness is necessarily hypocritical, since it is
‘by deﬁnition a dressing up of one’s true feelings’, whilst amiable behaviour
that is ‘sincerely motivated by concern for another […] is being something more
than merely polite’.26 Eighteenth-century English conduct writers, however,
wanted precisely to suggest that politeness could spring out of sincerity, and
that dissimulative hiding of one’s true thoughts was not actually politeness at
all. In fact, they wanted to redeﬁne nice behaviour by calling it ‘politeness’ and
rhetorically distancing it from earlier forms of theatrical courtesy and civility,
and also from the allegedly hypocritical behavioural codes of the Continent—
especially France.27 This politeness tradition was fundamentally inﬂuenced by
John Locke, who in Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693) grounded
good behaviour on moral character and inner goodness. Locke thus preferred
‘inward Civility’ to external good manners, claiming that inner reﬁnement was
enough to make an individual’s external actions pleasing.28 Locke’s views were
shared by several early eighteenth-century writers, most notably the third Earl
of Shaftesbury, Joseph Addison, and Richard Steele. For them, good manners
were an immediate and natural result of a virtuous mind. Moreover, only inner
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virtue would guarantee the easy, free, and unrestrained external manners so
fashionable among the urban elite, since manners as ‘natural Emanations from
the Spirit and Disposition within, cannot but be easy and unconstrain’d’.29
Scholars like J. G. A. Pocock, Lawrence Klein, and Philip Carter have
underlined the close ties English politeness had to virtue; they argue that eight-
eenth-century politeness was a primarily Whiggish project of reconciling virtue
in a novel way with republican urban commercialism.30 Others have, however,
criticised this interpretation and argued that the landscape of eighteenth-century
English politeness was far more complex. Markku Peltonen and Anna Bryson
have emphasised the continuities between seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
codes of conduct; both writers present eighteenth-century politeness as a het-
erogeneous combination of discourses where the deﬁnitions of politeness could
vary greatly, and regardless of party lines. Peltonen has further identiﬁed a
strong reiteration of opaque and dissimulative forms of courtly courtesy in
eighteenth-century England.31
In fact, the inward interpretation of politeness was continuously challenged
by a cynical politeness tradition, which based politeness on men’s theatrical
self-representation instead of their moral virtue.32 This ‘external’ con-
ceptualisation of politeness had its origins in Renaissance courtly etiquette,
where the ‘ability to ingratiate oneself through calculated self-representation’
was considered ‘a necessary element of the courtier’s repertoire’.33 The advo-
cates of external politeness saw man not as virtuous but as essentially ﬂawed
and selﬁsh; therefore, virtue was a mask of calculated behaviour that could be
used to hide one’s true self. For them, politeness was a set of carefully practiced
external appearances, gestures, and postures—a ‘spectacle of marionettes’—not
something that ﬂowed eﬀortlessly from within.34 The body thus became,
instead of a truthful mirror of the inner self, an opaque canvas on which polite
appearance could be painted while hiding the true self carefully from sight.
These early modern understandings and practices continued to inﬂuence men’s
and women’s behaviour still in the 1790s, and even if they were more likely to
favour sincere and sentimentalist forms of politeness, there were always those
who found opaque theatricality the most reﬁned mode of behaviour.
The concepts of inward or external politeness did not remain static during
the long eighteenth century, but were constantly redeﬁned. For example, the
rising culture of sensibility had a profound impact on politeness during the
latter half of the eighteenth century—particularly in formulations of inward
politeness, and especially when women were concerned. Philip Carter has noted
that sensibility had such a strong inﬂuence on post-1740s politeness that the
terms were often even used interchangeably. Similarly, Michèle Cohen has
identiﬁed a shift in the ways inward politeness was discussed by the 1760s;
according to Cohen, English politeness discourse began to question the necessity
of politeness in the ﬁrst place and, instead, to promote unpolished integrity,
plainness, and even taciturnity, perceived as particularly English modes of good
conduct.35 Articulations of women’s politeness and propriety towards the end
of the long eighteenth century were also inﬂuenced by the rising trend of
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domesticity. Political situations, both domestic and foreign, as well as ﬂuctuat-
ing trends of taste, aesthetics, and philosophy also played a role in formulations
of polite ideals, both external and internal. However, even if we can recognise
such general trends during the eighteenth century—the growing inﬂuence of
inward politeness over external show, sensibility and sincerity over insincere
compliments, and domestic pleasures over public sociability—it would be diﬃ-
cult to claim that any totalising or immediate change occurred. Instead, the long
eighteenth century is distinguished by continuity rather than disruption of
politeness tradition.
The neat juxtaposition of internal and external notions of politeness is a
heuristic tool rather than a faithful representation of the ambiguous and con-
ﬂicted rhetoric used by eighteenth-century conduct writers. Their notions of
politeness were more often inconsistent than not, and diﬀerent writers are,
indeed, more suitably placed on a slippery line between the extreme poles of
internality and externality than categorised neatly. Moreover, the so-called
internalists generally stressed the need for external polish to embellish the vir-
tues of a moral disposition just as keenly as the externalists cherished natural-
ness and emphasised the importance of virtue. Roughly dividing didactic writers
into these two camps gives us, however, a general idea of what was happening
during the long eighteenth century, and it seems clear that even though the
dissimulative politeness tradition never disappeared completely, there never-
theless was an unquestionably growing emphasis on internal politeness during
the long eighteenth century.36 However, I demonstrate that the emphasis the so-
called internalist writers placed on rehearsing and controlling the body renders
the diﬀerence between internal and external conceptualisations of politeness
rhetorical only. Individuals needed to deliberately fashion their bodies to reﬂect
polite femininity—but only the externalists admitted this straightforwardly,
while the internalists attempted to disguise it with rhetoric of inward goodness
and natural femininity. Thus, even internal politeness was eventually necessarily
hypocritical.
The hypocrisy of politeness inevitably opens up crucial questions concerning
identity and persona that are central to this book. David Runciman argues that,
rather than simply coincidence with the truth, ‘hypocrisy turns on questions of
character’. It involves the ‘construction of a persona’ that ‘generates some kind
of false impression’. Accordingly, Runciman compares hypocrisy to ‘the wear-
ing of masks’.37 Indeed, as he points out, the idea of hypocrisy has its origin in
the world of theatre, and the original Greek term (hypokrisis) means, according
to the OED, ‘acting of a theatrical part’. The problem of hypocrisy, so funda-
mental to politeness, not only addressed questions of morality and integrity but
also closes on philosophical ruminations on identity. When one is acting a
polite part, who exactly is doing the acting? What is the relationship between
the actor’s self and the role she is playing? Runciman also asks the question
whether hypocrisy needs to be intentional on the part of the hypocrite for it to
count as such.38 If self-knowledge is essential for hypocrisy, is it only the
hypocrite who can have true agency in the context of politeness? The will to
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ask and attempt to answer these kinds of questions has prompted me to frame
this book with considerations of such concepts as performance and performativ-
ity, discourse and practice, power and knowledge, subordination and freedom;
these are questions that Michel Foucault, Erving Goﬀman, and Judith Butler have
grappled with, and to which the foundation they have built provides invaluable
insight.
Polite Identities and Cultural (Ex)change
Who were the polite? This is another question that escapes any clear-cut
answer. The culture of politeness was a powerful tool of social identity con-
struction, as it was used to diﬀerentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’ on various
levels. Therefore, attempts to deﬁne ‘the polite’ certainly revolve around class,
or rather, social hierarchy and power relationships, but not in a straightforward
manner. Politeness has often been seen as a culture of common taste and dec-
orum that was used by the middling sort to distinguish themselves, not only
from those below them, but especially from those above. Politeness has been
described as a tool in an ‘epic battle of commercial versus aristocratic mores’
that took place during the eighteenth century, where the middling ranks forged
a collective identity in conscious contrast to an aristocracy that they deﬁned as
proﬂigate, dissipated, and morally corrupt.39 Some scholars have stretched the
limits of the polite to include the lower middling sort, shopkeepers, servants,
and craftsmen who all aspired towards a polite lifestyle, while others have
argued that the aristocracy, too, certainly saw itself and also was seen by others
to number among the polite.40 Indeed, the heterogeneous class texture of polite
society highlights the ways politeness was used as a tool of both arbitrating and
aﬃrming social diﬀerence.41 Even in situations of apparent equality, social
hierarchy was tangibly present in the very polite rituals. As Laura Gowing has
shown, early modern social interaction between diﬀerent classes was an equi-
vocal situation where the power relations needed to be made explicit through
performative display.42 Thus, both positions of superiority and subordination
needed to be displayed in the seemingly equal polite interaction—and therefore,
politeness served simultaneously purposes of distinction and solidarity.
Often those who were not polite were more easily deﬁned than those who
were; creation of identity is, after all, constructed around the question of the
Other.43 Membership in or exclusion from polite society was not only a question
of social hierarchy, but also dependent on nationality, race, religion, location,
and gender, for example. Neither was non-politeness expressed in simple terms of
rudeness or vulgarity, as Lawrence Klein has shown; rather, politeness could be
juxtaposed with rusticity (underlining the metropolitan–provincial axis), barbar-
ity (contrasting modernity with the past, but also western with non-western), and
usefulness (diﬀerentiating the ornamental from the substantial).44 In addition to
these, politeness was repeatedly contrasted with violating moral and gender
boundaries, especially when women were concerned. However, as this book
shows, failing to match these characteristics by no means automatically resulted
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in a categorical exclusion from polite society, for these categories were not stable
enough not to include exceptions. Rather than a rigid system of categorisation,
politeness can be seen as an inﬂuential but ﬂexible matrix of creating desirability
that could, to some extent, be negotiated by individuals. It was a set of cultural
practices that individuals activated—or did not activate—to diﬀerent extents,
depending on their goals, interests, capacities, and needs.45
Moreover, while claiming that politeness was a central discourse in gender
building I do not mean to imply that there were no other forms of commend-
able femininity in the eighteenth century. Politeness was certainly not the only
discourse used to construct normative gender roles, and women of various
ranks could strive towards ideal femininity through the manipulation of such
discourses as religion, occupation, sentimentality, or motherhood, for example.
However, it is important to note that, ﬁrstly, these discourses were always
partly entwined with politeness, and cannot therefore be altogether separated
from it. Secondly, within polite society, politeness was such a central system of
giving meaning to gendered ideals that it is questionable if a gentlewoman
wholly void of politeness could have been considered admirable—or, for that
matter, if such a woman could have even existed in the ﬁrst place. Even in cases
when women acted against the polite norms—as they often did—their actions
were interpreted and given meaning through the culture of politeness.
Politeness was not only tied to questions of class identity, but national iden-
tity as well. As a cultural phenomenon, politeness had simultaneously strong
national and transnational underpinnings. The norms of reﬁned behaviour
practiced in English tearooms, parks, and assembly halls had long, continental
roots and, in fact, diﬀered very little from the manners displayed in French
salons or Italian opera houses. The cosmopolitan ethos of politeness was not
only the driving force behind the Republic of Letters, but it also enabled the
elite ranks’ travelling and suave interaction with local elite circles in European
metropoles, as the tradition of the Grand Tour indicates.46 Nevertheless, it
prevented neither an English feeling of superiority nor derisive commentary on
the ‘barbarised’ courts of Germany, for example, that retained ‘a great deal of
the Goth and Vandal still’ and, therefore, required ‘more reserve and ceremony’
of behaviour than the supposedly easy and free sociability in England.47 Nicole
Pohl has shown that many of the bluestockings were well-versed cosmopolitans
who travelled across Europe, cultivated pan-European correspondence, and
hosted foreign visitors in their own salons. Nevertheless, they simultaneously
displayed a nationalist particularity that predisposed them critically towards
their continental neighbours.48 Elizabeth Montagu, for example, condescend-
ingly observed travelling through Holland that ‘its soil is mud, its air is fog, its
inhabitants are selﬁsh, & Liberty who is a Goddess in other Countries is a
vulgar shopkeeper in theirs’, and—despite her admiration of French culture and
manners—derided France as ‘a Land of slavery & Superstition’.49 The blue-
stockings were not the only ones who managed to marry ‘polite patriotism with
neoclassical notions of taste and intellectual cosmopolitanism’, but this curious
mixture was paradigmatic for the English polite society in general.50
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Despite its cosmopolitan character, politeness was also eﬀectually used as a
means of forging a homogenous English identity. According to Paul Langford,
the English ‘national character’ came under scrutiny during the long eighteenth
century, and it was predominantly fashioned through manners.51 The English
liked to characterise themselves—and to be characterised by others—through
their customs, which were taken to describe the qualities of the English society
at large. They prided themselves in their plainness, modesty, honesty, tacitur-
nity, and liberty, which were traits fashioned as particularly English and,
accordingly, supposedly natural features of English manners and politeness.52
Moreover, the Englishness thus constructed became increasingly synonymised
with Britishness during the long eighteenth century; English character was ‘the
dynamic force, squeezing out Celtic claims to determine what made Britain
British’, as Langford claims.53 Polite manners were thus a tool for creating
unity of taste, fashion, and behaviour between the Scottish, Welsh, English, and
also Irish elite. Most foreigners used the terms ‘English’ and ‘British’ unsyste-
matically and ambiguously, as often synonymously as not, and even British
subjects themselves grappled with the diﬀerences between the two.54 In fact, to
the foreign eye, the English seemed to have ‘a great uniformity in the manners
and customs’ compared to the sharper diﬀerences in habits between the pro-
vinces of continental Europe.55 London’s inﬂuence had a greater unifying force
in people’s manners than in the Continent, which retained a clearer division
between fashionable courtly and urban culture and provinciality.
Indeed, foreign travellers paid special attention to the fact that diﬀerent
regions betrayed little distinctiveness, and that everyone with any genteel pre-
tentions simply had to visit London.56 Moreover, the fashionable circles of
Scotland and Ireland habitually sent their daughters to stay with relatives or at
a boarding school in London speciﬁcally to polish their manners out of any
rural tint. For example, Elizabeth Montagu congratulated her sister-in-law for
her wise decision to send her daughter to a boarding school—not to learn ‘tri-
ﬂing’ skills, but to ‘unlearn what would be of great disservice, a provincial
dialect, which is extreamly ungenteel’, and which they ‘get in the Nursery’—or,
in other words, learn from servants. For Elizabeth Montagu, the ‘Kentish dia-
lect’ was especially abominable, ‘tho’ not so bad as the Northumberland, &
some others’; but, as she concluded, ‘in this polished age it is so unusual to
meet with young Ladies who have any patois that I mightily wish to see my
neice cured of it’.57 Indeed, a uniform manner of speech played a key role in the
homogenisation of the English polite society and their manners.58 However, this
does not mean that Englishness and the English experience could be unpro-
blematically generalised to represent all of Britain. Rosalind Carr has shown
that women’s presence in polite sociability and Enlightenment culture was more
restricted and complicated in Scotland than in England, and that we should be
wary of drawing unwarranted similarities between diﬀerent national, political,
and religious contexts without careful examination.59
The English took pride in the alleged naturalness of their manners; they
claimed to be honest, sincere, and unaﬀected in their ways, and saw this as
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something that set them apart from other European nations. In fact, there was a
decided attempt to brand the Lockean inward politeness as a speciﬁcally English
mode of good behaviour, while theatrical politeness was associated with the
Continent, particularly with the immoral France. Mary Wollstonecraft, for
example, claimed that in France, boys and girls were ‘only educated to please,
to manage their persons, and regulate the exterior behaviour’, and she called
theatrical politeness ‘an art of pleasing’, practiced only ‘to extract the grossness
of vice’.60 Addison and Steele maintained that aﬀectation—allegedly the deﬁn-
ing quality of French politeness—rendered the French morally inferior to the
English, since artiﬁciality corrupted virtue and morality.61 ‘English’ politeness,
then, was claimed to base itself on open frankness and unpretending simplicity,
and associated with urban sociability of the middling sorts—not the aristocratic
decadence of the French court.62
Even though thus aﬃliated with French thought, theatrical politeness was
popular in England as well, and not only amongst ‘dancing-masters turned
author’ as Philip Carter has claimed, but among such writers as Bernard Man-
deville, Thomas Gordon, and fourth Earl of Chesterﬁeld.63 Moreover, the
external interpretation of politeness had similarly strong links to the English
eighteenth-century urban modernity. Many scholars have argued that public life
in eighteenth-century metropolises, including London, was essentially based on
theatrical principles—‘a play with social masks without any reference to the
performer’s personal qualities’.64 The externalists saw politeness as an external
performance, an artiﬁcial show put on in order to please—and through pleas-
ing, ultimately to forward one’s own interests. Indeed, while the internalist
interpretation of politeness became widely endorsed as a speciﬁcally ‘English’
mode of politeness during the eighteenth century, a theatrical attitude towards
sociability by no means disappeared.
Moreover, recent scholarship has indicated that French politeness was not as
hypocritical as its English critics claimed; rather, the image of French artiﬁci-
ality was a straw man that was necessary for English national self-fashioning.
French ideals of good conduct emphasised the ‘politeness of the heart’ and
aimed to reconcile Christian humility, charity, and natural manners with the
polished exterior of the honnête homme.65 Not only is this the case with
France, but also with Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden—as well as
Britain’s American colonies. Scholars have argued, for example, that English
and Italian intellectual women shared a tradition of cosmopolitan sociability,
and that Enlightenment ideas of transnational commercial civility had a pro-
found impact on the largely European-born population of the Atlantic world.66
Not only were the oﬀspring of the British elite commonly educated in the uni-
versities and boarding schools of France, Holland, and Germany, but conduct
manuals circulated from country to country swiftly in translations and original
texts, spreading a more or less uniﬁed understanding of fashionable conduct
amongst the European and Atlantic elite.67 The education provided for the
young descendants of polite society consisted largely of elements borrowed
from France or Italy, thus promoting not only a uniformly English but a
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distinctively cosmopolitan code of conduct.68 Margaret Jacob argues that by
1750, ‘a polite and de facto cosmopolitanism’ came not only to dominate the
social life of ‘Britain’s educated and aﬄuent upper classes’, but also became a
commonplace in continental Europe.69 Of course, there were provincial varia-
tions on how these ideals were interpreted in practice, but there was no great
rift between the discursive norms of good conduct among the elite between
England and its continental and Scandinavian neighbours.
However, despite this relative uniformity, national variations of manners and
customs were eﬀectively rhetorically emphasised and used to fashion a pecu-
liarly national character. Indeed, eighteenth-century European culture has been
described as a curious mixture of cosmopolitan increase of tolerance and
openness in society on the one hand, and nationalist parochialism, xenophobia,
and feeling of national superiority on the other.70 Even though nations boasted
with their uniquely superior manners, these manners were rarely peculiar for
one nation only. For example, the English were by no means the only nation
fashioning themselves through the honesty and freedom of their manners;
these were also the cornerstones of ideal Swedishness, as well.71 If anything,
there may have been a cultural diﬀerence between more rigid northern and
more lively southern codes of conduct, explained partly through the diﬀerent
climates and humoral compositions of the inhabitants of England and Scandi-
navia on the one hand, and France, Spain, and Italy on the other.72 Never-
theless, the perceived national diﬀerences between manners and customs were
predominantly rhetorical ones, aimed to serve nationalist purposes. This sets
English politeness apart both as a unique case study and an example of a larger
European phenomenon.
Ambivalent Politeness and Questionable Ton
What did such bluestockings and renowned members of polite society as Eli-
zabeth Montagu, Catherine Talbot, Mary Delany, and Fanny Burney think
about politeness in the ﬁrst place? Did they view themselves as ‘polite’? The
relationship between didactic norms and real-life practices is an elusive one.
First of all, it should be noted that these women used the term ‘politeness’
simultaneously in a very speciﬁc and yet ambivalent manner. Especially in the
everyday language and writings of women of the upper middling sort, such as
Burney and Talbot, politeness was generally associated with the beau monde
or the court, and, as such, it acquired a negative connotation as something
formal, opaque, insincere, and rigid. In other words, ‘politeness’ was under-
stood in its external meaning; to this end, it was often used synonymously
with the French word ton, meaning both a fashionable air and people of
fashion.73 For example, Burney described the fashionable society in Brighton
with its baronets and quality ladies as ‘the polite World’—a strange land into
which the success of her ﬁrst novel made her venture—whereas for Talbot,
politeness often spelled court.74 Politeness in this sense was thus associated
with the urban upper class. Describing the crème de la crème of Brighton,
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Burney remarked disdainfully that ‘every body Laughs at them, for their Airs,
aﬀectations, & tonish graces & impertinences’.75 On another occasion, she
wrote about meeting the Grenvilles—‘all 3 mighty tonish folks,—the Mr. in a
common & heavy way, the Mrs. in an insolent, overbearing downing way, &
the miss in a shy, proud, stiﬀ way’.76 Thus, politeness’s connection to form—
that is, to the ‘manner in which actions were performed’—was, as Lawrence
Klein notes, well acknowledged.77 In Burney’s writing, the fault of the ‘tonish
folks’ she disapproves of is, indeed, overbearing rigidness of form and an
inability to adapt the self to diﬀerent social situations and locations. Polite-
ness required, ﬁrst and foremost, the ability to adapt to diﬀerent settings; to
‘be universally liked’, mused Elizabeth Montagu, ‘a person must be able to
take a part in the amusements and employments of the company he happens
to be in’.78 Therefore, tonish manners appeared ridiculous, if not adapted to
the diﬀering conduct norms of the leisure town or country hamlet. As Fanny
Burney claimed, doing ‘[a]ny thing, alike worse as better than other folks, that
does but obtain notice & excite remark, is suﬃcient to make happy Ladies &
Gentlemen of the Ton’.79 Inconspicuousness was, indeed, one of the most
important characteristics of ‘true’ politeness.
Because of its courtly and aristocratic associations, the bluestocking women
also often perceived politeness in its tonish meaning to be antithetical to reli-
gious piety. For example, when dating her letter ‘Ascention Day’ to March-
ioness Grey, Catherine Talbot felt the need to note that ‘Such a Date does not
look whimsical to You my Dear Lady Grey who know how to value one of the
most joyous & least regarded Holydays in the Year. I could excuse myself to a
politer Reader by the frequency of such Dates in Mme. Sévigné’.80 Similarly,
Elizabeth Montagu wrote that ‘the Dutchess [of Portland] and Mrs. Pendarvis
are expecting me [upstairs] to read a sermon, which, as unfashionable as it is, I
have the courage to own amongst friends; but were it known in the beau
monde, what would they say!’81
Because of these negative connotations, many women denied having any
‘politeness’ at all and instead used terms such as cheerfulness and amiability
to describe their own behaviour. Elizabeth Montagu, who was, if not
strictly part of the beau monde, at least hovering on its edges, decidedly
distinguished herself from it in her letters to more sober-minded friends. ‘I
shall return to London without the least concern about the ﬁgure I shall
make there, most happily trusting that I shall not make any ﬁgure at all’,
she wrote to the author Gilbert West, adding that the ‘beau-monde will pay
you respect for not imitating their follies’.82 Montagu made a point of
underlining the distance between her easy-going manners and those of the
ton; instead of ‘making parties at Whist or Cribbage, and living with and
like the beau monde’, she entertained her friends in a more informal
manner, by ‘wandering about like a company of gipsies, visiting all the ﬁne
parks and seats in the neighbourhood’.83 Montagu also denounced the
hypocritical external use of politeness as a means to gain acclaim, preferring
inward goodness:
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Popularity is the vainest of all the things that are done under the sun: I
mean if proposed as the end of our actions. As for that praise which
accompanies actions done for good and great purposes, it is musick to an
honest ear, and the delight of the benevolent; but I had rather be bound to
whistle to the hydra than make it my business to be always speaking and
doing things of courtesy to the grand mode.84
Similarly eager to claim sincerity as a personal virtue over politeness, Catherine
Talbot replied to her newly acquired friend Elizabeth Carter’s letter in humble
tones: ‘I have not the gift of saying ﬁne things, therefore shall not pretend to answer
all those with which your politeness would ﬂatter me […] The most I pretend to is
common sense enough not to deceived by them into a false notion of myself’.85 In
another letter, Talbot compared herself to the Duchess of Somerset: ‘She seems to
me to have one of the best & frankest hearts I ever met with. Has as much Candour
as a poor friend of yours’—meaning herself—‘with much better judgment; she
seems to be in everything wise & reasonable, has all the politeness of Courts with
the Sincerity of the Country’.86 In fact, women of the beau monde who still mana-
ged to be easy and free of formality despite their knowledge of courtly politeness
(like the Duchess of Somerset) were speciﬁcally credited with having ‘all the high
politeness of a Person accustomed to Courts & to ﬁll Gracefully the highest Station;
& all the Friendly Sincerity of the honest Country’.87
However, politeness was by no means used solely in this speciﬁcally negative
meaning. For Catherine Talbot, politeness was also something to aspire
towards, and practically synonymous with amiability. She wrote after visiting a
‘good Clever’ friend that she had ‘learnt many lessons of true Good-Breeding &
Good humour this day’. These lessons made her hanker after the ‘Charm of
Politeness’ and decide to improve her own behaviour.88 In other words, the
word ‘politeness’ could also be used to mean the exact opposite of stiﬀ form—
good humour, aﬀability, and pleasantness. In her Essays, Talbot deﬁned
politeness as ‘the just medium between form and rudeness’.89 Politeness was
also linked to gay and fashionable metropolitan sociability in these women’s
thoughts, but not in a negative way. In fact, Talbot regretted her shortcomings
in urban London politeness, complaining about her tendency to ‘carry the same
stiﬀ face & Uncomfortable Heart into every genteel part of this busy Town’
and wishing ‘with all my Heart I could ﬁt up this parlour of mine’, meaning her
persona, ‘in rather a more gay & fashionable taste’.90 Mary Delany rejoiced
that her four-year-old nephew ‘shows already so much politeness: politeness is
the polish of virtue, and it ought not to be neglected’, and even Fanny Burney,
who so disapproved of ‘tonish folk’, was eager to make a distinction of ton
between her vulgar stepmother and herself. When she was one sociable evening
engaged ‘in a very witty confabulation’ with a gentleman behind a bookcase at
her father’s house, her stepmother’s crude interruption made her blush, as she
later recounted to Samuel Crisp: ‘my mother came up to us, & said “So Fanny,
I see you have got Mr Chamier into a Corner!” You must know I don’t at all
like these sort of Jokes, which are by no means the ton, so I walked away’.91
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Thus, these women could and often did ﬁnd politeness desirable and tempt-
ing. For Elizabeth Montagu, the most ‘extreme politeness’ came nearest to
‘extreme simplicity of manners’, and was thus far from any rigidity or form-
ality. She saw her friend, the bluestocking Elizabeth Vesey as an epitome of this
perfect politeness:
I am glad you are acquainted with Mrs. Vesey, she is a very amiable
agreeable woman, and has an easy politeness that gains one in a moment,
and in reserve she has good sense and an improved mind, to keep up the
approbation she acquired by her manners. She is so entirely polite, that it is
a wonder if one ever reﬂects, that she is polite at all, her behaviour ‘shews
no part of study but her grace’.92
Such women were not rarities among Montagu’s circle of friends. The Duchess
of Somerset with her ‘easiness of manners’ and ‘civility without the intention of
being gracious’ proved to Montagu that she had not been spoiled by her asso-
ciation with the court. Such was also the case with Mrs Anne Pitt, who, despite
being a ‘court lady’ and having the ‘manners […] of a court’, still had senti-
ments of ‘higher extraction’ which made her ‘a most amiable and valuable’
woman.93 As a matter of fact, Elizabeth Montagu herself was widely lauded as
an example of polite feminine behaviour; many of the conduct books written
during the last half of the eighteenth century were, in fact, dedicated to her as
someone who, by her own impeccable conduct, furnished ‘an admirable pattern
of life and manners’.94 And yet, Montagu’s conduct was, according to
many contemporaries, verging on the immoderate show and love of luxury of
the ton. 95 Fanny Burney noted that Montagu was known for her ‘love of ﬁnery’
and ‘parade & ostentation’, for which ‘her power in Wealth, & rank in Lit-
erature oﬀer some excuse for’.96 Therefore, she thought Montagu ‘a Character
rather to respect than love, for she has not that don d’aimer by which alone
love can be made fond or faithful’.97 Thus, even though Montagu rhetorically
embraced the virtues of inward politeness in her letters, in her actual behaviour
she clearly lacked the easy aﬀability and freedom of form that the critics of
external politeness held so dear—and yet, she was considered by many the glory
of her sex. This is an early indication of what will become apparent in later
chapters—that, on a practical level, women of polite society could push the
boundaries of discursive exemplarity while sustaining their polite status.
Emma Major observes that Montagu’s exemplariness started to lessen in
contemporary imaginations during the 1790s, when her ﬂashy politeness was no
longer perceived as straightforwardly commendable.98 Ostentatious politeness
was, indeed, a feature of the ancien régime courtly code of conduct, which
seems to have been rapidly becoming obsolete during the last decade of the
eighteenth century and the rise of the middle class.99 What is notable, however,
is that on a discursive level, there is practically no visible change. The Hannah
More who dedicated her Essays to Montagu in 1777 advocated very similar
ideas of female excellence in her didactic texts as the Hannah More who, in the
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1790s, while writing her Strictures, found Montagu suddenly too ostenta-
tious.100 Politeness as an insincere and formal show had been condemned
already by Addison and Steele, but it seems to have been tolerated in practice until
the very end of the eighteenth century. The shift in the perception of Elizabeth
Montagu’s exemplariness is an indication of the rise of middle-class values that
Nancy Armstrong, for example, has discussed.101 The old aristocratic modes of
politeness had been slowly declining throughout the century, and the French
Revolution acted as a watershed, making them appear old-fashioned and decadent
to the English audience.
Gentlewomen’s equivocal opinions about politeness were also tied to their
need to display their patriotism. Ostentatious, external politeness was, as we
recall, associated with France, with which Britain was at war repeatedly
throughout the long eighteenth century. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated
that politeness was heavily permeated by a patriotic discourse portraying Brit-
annia, albeit inferior to France and Italy in elegance, superior in ‘real polite-
ness’—or, authenticity and sincerity of manners.102 In other words, contrasting
English honesty and inward politeness with the insincere courtesy of the courtly
foreigner played a crucial role in the construction of English national char-
acter.103 And yet, Englishwomen’s relationship with Frenchness was simulta-
neously wary and ﬂirtatious; while rhetorically framing the French as the
debauched Other, the English (like the rest of Europe) still hailed France as
the most reﬁned nation and imitated their manners and looks.104 This ambiva-
lence is discernible in young Elizabeth Montagu’s witty letter to Anne Donnel-
lan, where she enquired after Donnellan’s brother, Reverend Christopher
Donnellan, who was staying in Tunbridge Wells. ‘Does not your brother think
he is in Babel? How does he like English women with French dresses and
French manners? In short, what does grave good sense think of Tunbridge?’105
Montagu recognised the moralist patriotic discourse of English gravity and
‘good sense’, while implicitly representing it as unfashionable and dowdy and
suggesting that English polite sociability was, in fact, based on French manners.
Indeed, Montagu’s ﬂippant collation of Frenchness, women, and immoral leisure
town sociability highlights the uneasy relationship between gender, national
character, and politeness.
Women served an important purpose in the forging of Englishness. In Hilary
Larkin’s words, women’s bodies and minds ‘functioned symbolically and lit-
erally as the bearers of national values and ideals’.106 It was women’s respon-
sibility not only to perform modest English virtues through their appearance
and behaviour, but also to guard their countrymen’s Englishness. According to
conduct writer John Burton, it was ‘in the power of the female Sex to inspire
young Men with maxims of Honour, Virtue, and even Patriotism; or to corrupt
their manners by eﬀeminate pleasures’.107 In national discourses concerning
women, the famous English modesty was mirrored against the equally famous
English liberty. According to Emma Major and Paul Langford, women’s greater
freedom compared to the Continent was often raised as an example of English
superiority, as well as an indicator of civilisation and political liberty as
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opposed to barbarity and despotism. Therefore, the national character of an
Englishwoman was largely constructed on modesty, chastity, and reserve, while
Frenchwomen were imagined in terms of ‘Coquettes’ and ‘sirens’.108 For these
reasons, Elizabeth Montagu—while travelling in France—shirked from likening
herself to a noble, accomplished Frenchwoman, and rather identiﬁed with an
eccentric and slovenly English acquaintance. ‘There is a Comtesse de Rochefort
who is all ye 3 Graces’, she wrote to Elizabeth Vesey; ‘I was told in England
that I resembled her alas! no! I am much more like Peg Wharton, I think indeed
ye best can be said for me is that I am in a medium between them, not a golden
but a leaden mean’. She concluded that she was glad Vesey did not know the
Comtesse, as ‘you would never like me again’.109
The most prominent aspect of alleged French inﬂuence was its problematic
eﬀect on gender. French inﬂuence was accused of making men eﬀeminate and
women masculine. Frenchiﬁed Englishwomen were supposedly abandoning
their English feminine morality and domesticity for immoderate urban luxury,
love for publicity and admiration, and sexual proﬂigacy.110 Joseph Addison
accused women of outright copying Frenchwomen’s masculine behaviour and
appearance by adopting their riding habits and feathered hats, their masculine
assurance and forwardness, and their masculine vices, such as swearing and
drinking. Such shocking manners, while suitable for the French temper, Addison
claimed to be unnatural in Englishwomen:
as Liveliness and Assurance are in a peculiar manner the Qualiﬁcations of
the French Nation, the same Habits and Customs will not give the same
Oﬀence to that People, which they produce among those of our own Coun-
try. Modesty is our distinguishing Character, as Vivacity is theirs: And when
this our National Virtue appears in that Female Beauty, for which our Brit-
ish Ladies are celebrated above all others in the Universe, it makes up the
most amiable Object that the Eye of Man can possibly behold.111
Addison was afraid that the English manners had already been corrupted by
French depravity; that a modest blush and bashful silence had become unfa-
shionable amongst English ladies, and that ‘Discretion and Modesty’, the
‘greatest Ornaments of the Fair Sex’, had been lost.112 Addison’s fears highlight
the fact that there was, in reality, little diﬀerence between the behavioural
norms of the English and French elite. In fact, they were both greatly inﬂuenced
by an old tradition of transnational politeness, stimulated during the eighteenth
century by the massive increase of international circulation of books. Accord-
ingly, Frenchness proved to be alluring to many Englishwomen despite their
condemnation of it. Catherine Talbot, struck by one of her ‘Winter Dumps’
and feeling particularly gloomy, complained that she felt herself ‘grown so
abominably English’ that only ‘a trip to Paris’ and ‘the ease & livelyness of that
Joyous People’ could cure her.113 Similarly, Elizabeth Montagu, who so decid-
edly resigned herself from French femininity, wrote to Elizabeth Carter to
Bristol, enquiring whether she ‘put on rouge’ as a proper ‘belle’; Montagu
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herself confessed letting her ‘frizeuse to put on whatever rouge was usually worn’
while travelling in France, and embracing other similar French customs.114 Thus,
French lightness seems to have been appropriate, if not strictly desirable, in cer-
tain contexts of elite women’s life; particularly when participating in urban
amusements, a certain degree of French-like modishness was even expected.
Likewise, Frenchness was more appropriate for young women than old, just as
public amusements such as dancing were perceived to be appropriate for the
enthusiasm of youth but ridiculous for the old.115 Most of all, Frenchness was
strongly associated with aristocracy, mostly for moral reasons, but also because
Francophilia was most common amongst the upper classes.116 In other words,
despite anti-French rhetoric, the relationship between English and French
national characters was complex and by no means entirely negative.
Notes
1 EM to Margaret Cavendish Bentinck, Duchess of Portland, 5 July 1741, LEM, I,
236–8.
2 See e.g. Bordo, ‘Body and the Reproduction of Femininity’, 90. Feminist post-
structuralist theory, that acts as my theoretical framework, has been heavily
inﬂuenced by Michel Foucault’s understanding of the historical constitution of
the body through the network of power/knowledge. However, because Foucault
himself did not present any coherent theory of the body, or even a uniﬁed
account of it, feminist writers have had to complement and further develop the
Foucauldian theory of the body with their own formulations. (See e.g. Oksala,
Foucault on Freedom, 111.)
3 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 118, 141–2; Bordo, ‘Body and the Reproduction of Femi-
ninity’, 90. Judith Butler explains that the ﬁctionality of the body derives from its
performativity; the gendered body thus has ‘no ontological status apart from the
various acts which constitute its reality’ (Butler, Gender Trouble, 185).
4 On the production of normative bodies, see e.g. Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 146–8;
Butler, Bodies That Matter, 10.
5 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 116–17. Judith Butler calls this process internalisation or
incorporation (Butler, Gender Trouble, 227).
6 See e.g. Fulbrook, Historical Theory, 124–9.
7 Foucault, Use of Pleasure, 6.
8 Butler, Psychic Life of Power, 93. On questions of subjectivity and agency, see e.g.
Hall, ‘Who Needs “Identity?”’. On performativity and early modern identities, see
e.g. Karremann, ‘Mediating Identities’.
9 Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 111, passim.
10 Foucault, Use of Pleasure, 26.
11 Foucault, Use of Pleasure, 27.
12 See e.g. Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 89.
13 Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 12.
14 Butler, Bodies That Matter, xii; Scott, ‘Fantasy Echo’, 291–2. See also Karremann,
‘Mediating Identities’, 4.
15 On the consciousness and unconsciousness of culturally conditioned acts, see
Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 53, 56.
16 Magnus, ‘Unaccountable Subject’, 87; Nussbaum, ‘Professor of Parody’.
17 Karremann, ‘Mediating Identities’, 5. See also Hall, ‘Who Needs “Identity?”’, 2–3.
18 Brubaker and Cooper, ‘Beyond “Identity”’, 6–8.
19 Fisher and O’Hara, ‘Racial Identities’, 19–21.
Framing the Stage 33
20 Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 139–46; Sabean, Power in the Blood, 90–1; Kor-
honen, ‘Witch in the Alehouse’, 191. See also Costa and Murphy, ‘Bourdieu and
the Application of Habitus’, 6–9; Korhonen, ‘Toimivista käsitteistä’, 140–2.
21 Korhonen, ‘Witch in the Alehouse’, 190. See also Fisher and O’Hara, ‘Racial
Identities’, 21–2.
22 Bennett, Letters, II, 8–9.
23 See e.g. Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility; Carter, Men and the Emergence;
Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity; Klein, ‘Liberty, Manners, and Politeness’; Klein,
Shaftesbury; Klein, ‘Politeness for Plebes’; Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpreta-
tion’; Klein, ‘Sociability, Politeness, and Aristocratic Self-Formation’; Peltonen,
‘Politeness and Whiggism’.
24 Klein, Shaftesbury, 4.
25 Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpretation’, 877.
26 Runciman, Political Hypocrisy, 10.
27 ‘Politeness’ itself was an eighteenth-century term, used to denote the peculiar var-
iation of the rules and ideas of sociability that were called civility or courtesy in
previous centuries (Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility, 46–7; Carter, Men and the
Emergence, 21–3).
28 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 126 (§67).
29 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 123 (§66).
30 Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History, 48–9, 195–6, 236; Klein, ‘Gender, Con-
versation and the Public Sphere’, 108–9; Klein, Shaftesbury, 8–14; Carter, Men and
the Emergence, 25. For similar interpretations, see e.g. Sweet, ‘Topographies of
Politeness’; Langford, ‘Uses of Eighteenth-Century Politeness’.
31 Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility, 44–6; Peltonen, ‘Politeness and Whiggism’, 398,
402–6; Peltonen, Duel in Early Modern England, 29–37. For similar interpretations,
see e.g. Kekäläinen, James Boswell’s Urban Experience; Tolonen, Mandeville and
Hume.
32 The conﬂict between the virtues of honest, transparent sincerity and prudent, dis-
simulative theatricality was not new, but had long roots in Renaissance self-fash-
ioning (Martin, ‘Inventing Sincerity’, 1333–4). On early modern theatricality, see e.
g. Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, esp. Ch. 4; Bailey, Flaunting, 124–7,
passim.; Harvey, Little Republic, 130, 182–3.
33 Carter, Men and the Emergence, 57.
34 Kekäläinen, James Boswell’s Urban Experience, 21; Carter, Men and the Emer-
gence, 55; Peltonen, ‘Politeness and Whiggism’, 402–3.
35 Carter, Men and the Emergence, 28; Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity, 26–41;
Cohen, ‘Manliness, Eﬀeminacy and the French’, 53–4.
36 Kekäläinen, James Boswell’s Urban Experience, 5; Carter, Men and the
Emergence, 54.
37 Runciman, Political Hypocrisy, 9.
38 Runciman, Political Hypocrisy, 10–11.
39 Vickery, Gentleman’s Daughter, 13–14; Smail, Origins of Middle-class Culture, 28;
Davidoﬀ and Hall, Family Fortunes, 21–2; Smith, Eighteenth-Century Decoration,
45. Lawrence Klein argues that aristocratic excess and vice became a standing topic
of criticism and satire in public culture from the 1770s onwards (Klein, ‘Sociability,
Politeness, and Aristocratic Self-Formation’, 659).
40 Klein, ‘Politeness for Plebes’, 362–82; Looney, ‘Cultural Life in the Provinces’, 485;
Klein, ‘Sociability, Politeness, and Aristocratic Self-Formation’, 658–60. Lawrence
Klein and Paul Langford have pointed out that the boundaries of social hierarchy
were fuzzy and ambivalent even to contemporaries (Klein, ‘Politeness and the
Interpretation’, 896; Langford, Polite and Commercial People, 62).
41 Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpretation’, 873; Klein, ‘Sociability, Politeness, and
Aristocratic Self-Formation’, 677, 662.
34 Framing the Stage
42 Gowing, ‘Manner of Submission’, 40. See also Korhonen, Kiusan henki, 151.
43 See e.g. Butler, Bodies That Matter, 3.
44 Klein, ‘Politeness for Plebes’, 365–6.
45 Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpretation’, 872–3.
46 On cosmopolitanism and the Republic of Letters, see e.g. Goodman, Republic of
Letters. On the Grand Tour, see e.g. Black, British Abroad; Sweet, Cities and the
Grand Tour.
47 Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterﬁeld to Philip Stanhope, 11 May 1752,
Stanhope (ed.), Letters, III, 256.
48 Pohl, ‘Cosmopolitan Bluestockings’, 74–84.
49 EM to Elizabeth Carter, 2 August 1778, HL MO 3454; EM to James Beattie,
November 1776, HL MO 172.
50 Pohl, ’Cosmopolitan Bluetockings’, 77. See also Major, ‘Femininity and National
Identity’, 904–6.
51 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 7–10.
52 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, passim.; Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity, 1–4,
passim.; Larkin, Making of Englishmen, 25–46, 209–12.
53 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 14.
54 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 12–13; Colley, Britons, 164–7.
55 Prevost, Memoirs of a Man of Quality, II, 130.
56 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 15–16.
57 EM to Mary Robinson, [n.d., 1773?], BL, Add. MS 70493, ﬀ. 37–40.
58 Glover, Elite Women, 103.
59 Carr, Gender and Enlightenment Culture, 73–6.
60 Wollstonecraft, Vindication, 179. See also Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity, 13–25,
48–50.
61 Tolonen, ‘Politeness, Paris and the Treatise’, 23.
62 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 85–90; Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity, 46–50,
passim.
63 Carter, Men and the Emergence, 55.
64 Kekäläinen, James Boswell’s Urban Experience, 5. See also e.g. Withington, ‘Hon-
estas’, 516–33.
65 Tikanoja, Honnête Homme, 22–5, 51–8.
66 See e.g. Rydén, ‘Provincial Cosmopolitanism’, 26–9; Robertson, Case for the
Enlightenment, 25–30; D’Ezio, ‘Sociability and Cosmopolitanism’, 47–57; Morzé,
‘Self-Created Societies’, 101–20; McCoy, ‘Margins of Enlightenment’, 141–62;
Shields, Civil Tongues.
67 See e.g. Colley, Britons, 168; Black, British Abroad, 318–19; Parland-von Essen,
Behagets betydelser, 47–58; Karppinen-Kummunmäki and Kaartinen, ‘Pilatut lapset
ja kurjat kasvattajat’, 9.
68 Glover, Elite Women, 33–6; Colley, Britons, 168.
69 Jacob, Strangers Nowhere, 22; Jacob, ‘Cosmopolitan as a Lived Category’.
70 Jansson, ‘When Sweden Harboured Idlers’, 250–1.
71 Jansson, ‘When Sweden Harboured Idlers’, 253.
72 Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race, 8–19.
73 See e.g. Vickery, Gentleman’s Daughter, 13.
74 FB to Susanna Burney Phillips, [8 November 1782], JFB, V, 160; JCT, 3 November
1753, BL Add. MS 46688, f. 19; CT to Jemima Yorke, Marchioness Grey, 16
November 1752, BLRA, Wrest MS 2962.
75 FB to Susanna Burney, 12 October [1779], JFB, III, 380.
76 FB to Susanna Burney, [post 4 – post 10] June [1780], JFB, IV, 161.
77 Klein, ‘Politeness and the Interpretation’, 874.
78 EM to George, ﬁrst Baron Lyttelton, 28 August 1759, LEM, IV, 231–2.
Framing the Stage 35
79 FB to Susanna Burney and Charlotte Burney (1761–1838), [24] May [17]80, JFB,
IV, 115.
80 CT to Jemima Yorke, Marchioness Grey, 26 May 1756, BLRA, Wrest MS 3275.
81 EM to William Freind, [n.d., 1741?], LEM, II, 46.
82 EM to Gilbert West, 21 January 1753, LEM, III, 227.
83 EM to Frances Boscawen, 21 August 1753, HL MO 564.
84 EM to William Freind, 15 November [1741?], LEM, II, 78.
85 CT to Elizabeth Carter, 7 January 1742, LCT, I, 11.
86 CT to Jemima Yorke, Marchioness Grey, 16 November 1752, BLRA, Wrest MS
2962.
87 JCT, 3 November 1753, BL Add. MS 46688, f. 19.
88 JCT, 19 [June 1751], BL Add. MS 46690, f. 21.
89 Talbot, Essays, I, 13. See also Major, Madam Britannia, 88.
90 CT to Jemima Yorke, Marchioness Grey, 7 May 1748, BLRA, Wrest MS 3151.
91 MD to Anne Dewes, 24 August 1745, CMD, II, 379; FB to Samuel Crisp, 21
November – 11 December 1775, JFB, II, 183.
92 EM to Gilbert West, 13 July [n.d., 1755?], LEM, III, 310.
93 EM to William Freind, [n.d., 1749], LEM, III, 127; EM to Elizabeth Carter, [n.d.,
1759], LEM, IV, 186–7.
94 More, Essays, [ii]. See also Major, Madam Britannia, 72–4.
95 Major, Madam Britannia, 72–4.
96 FB to Susanna Burney, [post 16–21 September 1778], JFB, III, 152; FB to Charles
Burney, 18 April [1780], JFB, IV, 66–7.
97 FB to Hester Lynch Thrale, 8 February [1781], JFB, IV, 290–1. See also Major,
Madam Britannia, 74–5.
98 Major, Madam Britannia, 75.
99 Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self, 164–5, 218–19, passim.
100 Hannah More to Martha More, 25 April 1790, Roberts (ed.), Correspondence of
Mrs. Hannah More, I, 349–50.
101 Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction, 96–107.
102 Major, Madam Britannia, 205; Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 88–9, passim.;
McCormack, Independent Man, 72–3, passim.
103 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 88–9, 175–7; Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity, 34–5.
104 On the English cosmopolitanism and simultaneous xenophobia, see Black, English
Abroad, 1–2, 158–9, 332–5.
105 EM to Anne Donnellan, 30 August 1743, QBS, I, 159–60.
106 Larkin, Making of Englishmen, 8; Wilson, Island Race, 93.
107 Burton, Lectures, I, 73.
108 Major, Madam Britannia, 98, 205–6; Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 79, 163–8,
170; Smollett, Peregrine Pickle, II, 65.
109 EM to Elizabeth Vesey, 15 July 1776, HL MO 6482.
110 On Englishwomen’s idealised domesticity, see Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed,
111; Davidoﬀ and Hall, Family Fortunes, 19; Major, ‘Femininity and National
Identity’, 910–14. On immorality of urban pleasures, see Spectator, No. 435, 19
July 1712, VI, 214–19; Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity, 77. On French eﬀeminacy,
see Cohen, Fashioning Masculinity, 65–78; Cohen, ‘French Conversation or “Glit-
tering Gibberish”?’, 99–100, 107–9.
111 Spectator, No. 435, 19 July 1712, VI, 214–19.
112 Spectator, No. 45, 21 April, 1711, I, 250–5.
113 CT to George Berkeley, [n.d., 176-?], BL Add. MS 39312, ﬀ. 304–5.
114 EM to Elizabeth Carter, 7 June 1759, QBS, II, 160–1; EM to Matthew Robinson,
7/9 June 1777. BL Add. MS 40663, ﬀ. 57–60.
115 See e.g. Burney, Evelina, 222; Spectator, No. 91, 14 June 1711, II, 53–8.
116 Langford, Englishness Identiﬁed, 292.
36 Framing the Stage
2 Gendered Politeness and Power
Politeness was ultimately a matrix of knowledge and power. Scientiﬁc and
medical discourses produced knowledge on the female nature and character,
and politeness provided a convenient vocabulary through which ‘truths’ of
natural femininity were communicated to the members of polite society. Indi-
viduals were thus urged to fashion their bodies and selves into normativity by
representing certain manners and appearances as ‘proper’, ‘civil’, ‘genteel’,
‘feminine’, or—as increasingly happened—‘natural’. In this way, power inter-
twines with the culture of politeness. As Pierre Bourdieu famously argues,
manners are a form of cultural domination; they are used to display power and
diﬀerentiate between the powerful and the powerless, and this distinction is
embedded in ‘the most automatic gestures or the apparently most insigniﬁcant
techniques of the body—ways of walking or blowing one’s nose, ways of eating
or talking’.1 In other words, ‘manners are all about power’.2 This chapter
examines the ways gendered power operates in the culture of politeness, mark-
ing women as both members of a social elite and, simultaneously, subordinate
to men. Polite femininity as both an intellectual construct and lived experience
was fundamentally a power-play, deﬁning who had the right to perform
authority and in what means.
The eighteenth-century polite society that is under inspection here was
manifestly patriarchal by deﬁnition. Patriarchy was embedded in England’s—as
well as its continental and Atlantic neighbours’—cultural, political, economic,
and legal systems, but it was also constantly reinforced through men’s and
women’s daily interaction, which was conducted in the gendered language
and manners of politeness. However, the patriarchal circulation of power
should not be understood simply as male domination and female exploitation,
as many historians have pointed out; instead, male power was ‘frequently
insecure, threatened and contradictory, while women held authority within the
system over their children, servants and those of lower social class’.3 As Ber-
nard Capp and Katie Barclay have shown, subordinate negotiation of power
was also fundamental to the workings of patriarchy. Capp notes that ‘without
challenging the general principles of patriarchy, women frequently sought to
negotiate the terms on which it operated’, seeking ‘an acceptable personal
accommodation that would aﬀord them some measure of autonomy and
space’.4 It is worth questioning, however, whether the small-scale autonomy
women were able to achieve within the framework of polite society constituted
a subversion of patriarchal power. Indeed, Barclay argues that negotiation of
power ultimately served to repair, develop, and maintain patriarchy, as women
were allowed to experience empowerment and agency in their ‘day-to-day lives,
but not in their status in relation to men’.5 To be sure, subversive acts, such as
the strategies of freedom this book examines, did not immediately translate into
women’s political and legal rights, but arguably they sowed the seed for future
change. The bluestockings were an important link in the development that led
women less than a hundred years later to ﬁght for education, suﬀrage, and
property rights. Deborah and Steven Heller have even argued that a line of
bluestockingism ‘led directly to the rise of organized feminism’.6 Surely this
means that their acts of resistance had a subversive impact, and that through
continuous negotiation and redeﬁning of power, patriarchy can be unstabilised,
weakened, and perhaps eventually even dismantled.7
This chapter also maps the shift in scientiﬁc discourses of gender which had a
direct impact on how femininity was conceptualised and, accordingly, advo-
cated as a behavioural norm in didactic writings. The long eighteenth century
witnessed a gradual (if incoherent) move from the ancien régime towards
modernity in terms of notions of identity and selfhood, conceptualisations of
sex and gender, and valorisation of inward rather than theatrical politeness.
These changes were connected to each other; in fact, we could talk about a
growing overall emphasis on the internal, the authentic, and the natural. Then
again, it is vital to remember that these shifts were in no way comprehensive or
linear. The long eighteenth century can perhaps most fruitfully be seen as a
period where old and new models of thought lived side by side, continuously
inﬂuencing each other. In other words, the discourses of gender and politeness
were multiple, uncohesive, and contradictory rather than uniform entities;
therefore, pinpointing any particular point in time as the deﬁnite moment of
fundamental change is impossible.
Women and Polite Sociability: Civilising or Gendering Process?
An exasperated Catherine Talbot chided herself in her journal in 1751 for being
‘monstrously Selﬁsh Arrogant & Unpolite. How can I Continue so When I feel
so strongly the Charm of Politeness?’8 Talbot had good cause to be worried,
because women were thought to bear close and manifold links to politeness in
eighteenth-century England. Particularly the bluestockings, with whom Talbot
was closely associated, were considered to be indispensable for polite reﬁne-
ment. In fact, many scholars hold that women’s central role in polite sociability
was a speciﬁc eighteenth-century feature, and something that sets that period
apart from both previous and following centuries. According to Lawrence
Klein, ‘the enhanced stature of sociability and politeness involved a normative
enhancement of the feminine’.9 In other words, politeness became associated
with femininity, and women became the paragons of ideal politeness.
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The new urban politeness was based on heterosociability, and particularly on
women’s reﬁning inﬂuence on men’s manners. Men and women naturally
engaged in same-sex sociable practices, as well, but an increasing emphasis on
mixed-company sociability and conversation has been interpreted as a deﬁning
feature of eighteenth-century politeness. Michèle Cohen asserts that by the end
of the eighteenth century it had become a virtual commonplace that ‘free com-
munication between the sexes’ was an index of the reﬁnement and polish of a
nation.10 Conversation within a heterosocial setting was deemed crucial for the
civilising process that women were thought to induce on men.11 Indeed, as
Hannah More stated, the ‘rough angles and asperities of male manners are
imperceptibly ﬁled, and gradually worn smooth, by the polishing of female
conversation’.12 An Essay in Defence of the Female Sex (1696) claimed that even
though a man might be honest and understanding, without women’s reﬁning
company ‘he can hardly be a Polite, a Well-bred, and Agreeable-talking Man’.13
Mixed company was universally promoted as the source of social improve-
ment, even by religious and moralist writers who saw the domestic arenas as
women’s primary concern. In fact, moralists were among the keenest advocates
of heterosociability, partly because they believed not only in women’s polishing
but also their moralising eﬀect. Emma Major has argued that women held a
special place in Anglican polite sociability as humanisers of manners; they were
thought to act as beaming lights of Christian morality and goodness, making
people around them more virtuous by their own good example.14 ‘I can hardly
conceive that any man would be able to withstand the soft persuasion of your
words, but chieﬂy of your looks and actions, habitually exerted on the side of
goodness’, wrote James Fordyce, thus suggesting that it was women’s duty to
use their feminine attractions in the cause of good.15 As Major points out,
engaging women’s charms to promote religion presented women as not only
religiously but also sexually alluring ﬁgures, making the dividing line between
virtuous example and sexual display ‘perpetually troublesome’ for women.16
Politeness writers based women’s reﬁning eﬀect partly on their nature, partly
on their respective place in society. Women were, ﬁrstly, represented as the
naturally polite sex. Corresponding to their more delicate bodies compared to
men, women’s natural character was respectively thought to be more soft,
complaisant, and agreeable—which were all qualities essential for politeness.
The supposedly natural feminine sensitivity forced men to control their alleg-
edly hotter tempers and regulate their behaviour in women’s presence. Women
were practically seen as catalysts that needed only to be brought into the room,
and miraculously a civilising process would begin—indeed, they have been
described as ‘the passive agents’ of civilisation, whose agency in Enlightenment
conceptions of the civilising process was limited.17 However, it was not women
in general but feminine women in particular that were deemed essential for
men’s social reﬁnement. Only women who possessed virtue, modesty, and gen-
tleness would lead men into ‘the decencies of life, the softness of love, the
sweets of friendship’ and ‘the nameless tender charities that pervade and unite
the most virtuous form of cultivated society’.18
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Secondly, as the anonymous author of An Essay in Defence of the Female Sex
explained, the sexes’ diﬀerent responsibilities inﬂuenced their habits. Men’s
public and business duties made them habitually aggressive, grave, and pedan-
tic—thus, wholly unsuited for politeness. Left alone in their coﬀee-houses, they
would talk of nothing else than ‘State-News, Politicks, Religion, or Private
Business’.19 Women, on the other hand, were forced to lead a more secluded
life, whereby their manners were less vulnerable to corruption; also, mother-
hood was thought to naturally reﬁne their behaviour and soften their temper.20
Women’s education was their key advantage; since women were thought to
have inferior minds, they were educated less formally than men. Therefore, men
needed to bring their conversation down to women’s level when in a mixed
company. This generalist and non-serious ethos is what came to deﬁne polite-
ness and polite conversation.21 In other words, women were considered to have
a bent for politeness—be it of natural or social origin—and were considered
essential for reﬁning men’s manners. Women’s supposedly weaker mental and
physical frame became their greatest polite asset, and their civilising function
was grounded on their social disadvantages.22
In other words, the ideals and norms of politeness were constructed in a
heavily gender-speciﬁc language, which shows that eighteenth-century politeness
discourse was deeply embedded in gender construction.23 Indeed, one of the
most crucial functions of eighteenth-century polite heterosociability was its
gendering eﬀect; it was required to separate and deﬁne femininity and masculi-
nity. In fact, the civilising and gendering eﬀects of mixed sociability were
mutually constitutive and ﬁrmly intertwined. As Silvia Sebastiani, Jane Rendall,
and Rosalind Carr have noted, Enlightenment stadial theories, attempting to
create an empirical and conjectural methodology for the study of human
society, human diﬀerence, and progress, placed a considerable emphasis on
gender as a category of analysis. In stadial history, European women’s alleged
femininity was a marker of civility, while so-called ‘savage’ women’s supposed
lack of femininity signalled their non-European societies’ barbarity.24 According
to Carr, commercial society was perceived to ‘enable women’s achievement of
the ultimate expression of their “natural” femininity’ by allowing them to exist
as men’s companions rather than idols or slaves. Women and their nature thus
became simultaneously dependent upon and an indication of men’s social, eco-
nomic, and moral progression.25 These theories were particularly inﬂuential in
England and Scotland, and were visibly reﬂected by eighteenth-century conduct
literature—such as Joseph Addison’s double-issue of The Spectator dealing
with the two single-sex countries, ‘Commonwealth of Amazons’ and ‘Republick
of Males’. According to Addison, both men and women were masculine in their
natural state; therefore, heterosociability was needed to make a distinction
between the two sexes.26 Addison used these imaginary countries to discuss the
importance of the gendering eﬀects of heterosociability. ‘Had our Species no
Females in it, Men would be quite diﬀerent Creatures from what they are at
present; their Endeavours to please the opposite Sex, polishes and reﬁnes them
out of those Manners which are most Natural to them’, Addison claimed; ‘Man
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would not only be unhappy, but a rude unﬁnished Creature, were he conversant
with none but those of his own Make’. For women, Addison’s vision of het-
erosociability provided—not wisdom, sense, or knowledge—but the desire to
please men:
[T]heir Thoughts are ever turned upon appearing amiable to the other Sex;
they talk, and move, and smile, with a Design upon us; every Feature of their
Faces, every part of their Dress is ﬁlled with Snares and Allurements. There
would be no such Animals as Prudes or Coquets in the World, were there
not such an Animal as Man. In short, it is the Male that gives Charms to
Womankind, that produces an Air in their Faces, a Grace in their Motions, a
Softness in their Voices, and a Delicacy in their Complections.
Thus, according to Addison, neither single-sex state could produce civilised,
pleasingly gendered citizens; only when they made peace and learned to live
together did the men learn to become cleanly and courteous—while the women,
becoming the object of the men’s attention, developed feminine arts. In other
words, as Addison concludes, ‘the Women had learnt to Smile, and the Men to
Ogle, the Women grew Soft, and the Men Lively’.
According to Addison, mixed sociability was needed not only to polish men,
but to feminise women. Women thus acquired their femininity only through the
dialectical process of constructing gender diﬀerence that took place in the dis-
courses and practices controlling heterosociability. In other words, the civilising
power of mixed conversation was based on continual reiterations of gender
diﬀerence. As Hannah More asked, ‘[w]here would be the superior pleasure and
satisfaction resulting from mixed conversation, if this [gender] diﬀerence were
abolished?’27 This gives rise to the question to what extent did civilising process
in the minds of eighteenth-century didactic writers hinge on assigning pseudo-
natural characteristics on the behaviour and appearance of male and female
subjects. Was civilising process, in the end, ultimately a gendering process?
Even though the aim of heterosociability was to strengthen the gender
boundaries through dialectic approaches to gender, those approaches were not
symmetrical; instead, gender diﬀerence was enforced mainly through deﬁning
femininity and fashioning women’s bodies. Indeed, in Addison’s vision, even
though the women were masculinised in their natural state, the men were not
feminised. It was the Amazon that needed to change her gender into a more
female one—the Male only became more polished. Indeed, as Rosalind Carr
has shown, stadial conjectural histories commonly envisioned male progress
within the scale from ‘savage’ to ‘civilised’, while women’s progress occurred
only in gendered terms of ‘sensibility’, directly caused by men’s stage of civi-
lity.28 For men, the civilising process acquired through heterosociability—
beneﬁcial as it was for polite manners—always also posed a risk of eﬀeminacy
if taken too far.29 For women, however, there was no such risk; for women,
heterosociability was a necessary practice that was needed for their fashioning
into ‘true’ femininity.
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The regulation of femininity served also the goal of deﬁning the norms of
acceptable masculinity. Shawn Lisa Maurer, Joan Scott, and others have
demonstrated that the primary concern of regulation is not the repression of the
subjugated, but, instead, the self-aﬃrmation of the powerful.30 The male gaze
was aimed at women not only to own, dissect, analyse, and admire, but also to
recognise the Other and deﬁne the Self; in this way, conduct book writers in
fact gave birth to those feminine vices, such as love of fashion and luxury, that
they so industriously tried to upbraid and reform. The reproachable eighteenth-
century female stereotype—the ﬂighty, superﬁcial, irrational, luxury-loving
woman, depicted in Addison’s story as well—was thus a necessary discursive
creation, needed to balance out the new sentimental, domestic masculinity that
Maurer and Philip Carter claim emerged during the eighteenth century.31
However, women’s position in the workings of heterosociability did not
merely make them tools of deﬁning gender diﬀerence, or passive instruments of
men’s reﬁnement. Lawrence Klein suggests that women’s crucial role in polite
sociability ties them to the Habermasian public sphere, thus opening up possi-
bilities for social and political action. Katharine Glover similarly views hetero-
sociability as both women’s chance and duty of partaking in nation’s aﬀairs.
Sylvana Tomaselli and Karen O’Brien have emphasised women’s voice and
active participation in the project of Enlightenment through heterosocial prac-
tices.32 Politeness was also a tool of empowerment for women, in the sense that
it also gave women power over men’s behaviour—or, supposedly, even over the
nation’s well-being. However, as Rosalind Carr has noted, women’s abilities to
gain social agency and power in the British Enlightenment culture seems to have
been limited to Englishwomen, who arguably played a more integral role in
polite sociability than their Scottish sisters who were hampered by the strong
emphasis on homosociability of the Scottish Enlightenment.33 More impor-
tantly, the power women used, could use, or were supposed to use over men
was not straightforwardly enabling—instead, it could be a discursive responsi-
bility, aimed at regulating women rather than empowering them. Even though
assurances that women’s behaviour regulated men seem to oﬀer women a
position of power, in their heart lies an endeavour of women’s normative dis-
ciplining. Urging women to reﬁne men of ‘loose morals or impertinent beha-
viour’ by their ‘cold civility’ did more than aim to improve men’s morality; the
ultimate goal was regulating women’s behaviour.34 Placing the task of control-
ling men’s manners, along with their own, on women’s shoulders was thus a
strategic move, since women could only achieve this supposed position of
power by assuming the normative position of demure femininity oﬀered to
them in didactic literature. This process of normalisation ultimately aimed at
isolating women from power by producing ideal femininity—soft, non-rational,
and essentially submissive. Therefore, by assuming the reﬁning power over
men, so condescendingly oﬀered to them, women simultaneously relinquished
their possibility of achieving autonomous agency.
The essentialisation of heterosociability for creating gender diﬀerence is a
forceful indication of a shift from early modern towards modern ideas of sex.
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In the early modern world, a variety of external inﬂuences, or even pure ima-
gination, was believed to have the power to induce changes in the material
world. This had a direct impact also on social encounters; in the early modern
framework, the widely debated problem of men’s eﬀeminacy was thought to be
a direct result of men’s associating too much with women, thereupon becoming
more like them. In other words, heterosocial interaction could make bodies ‘slip
from their sexual anchorage’ and lead into ‘the blurring of what we would call
sex’.35 The idealisation of heterosociability in the eighteenth-century urban
polite context was thus a radically new development, deeply embedded in shifts
in conceptualisation of gender diﬀerence, the human body, and scientiﬁc mod-
ernity. The very fact that men and women were now encouraged to socialise
together indicates a profound change in the ways in which gender diﬀerence
was understood. Indeed, politeness presents us with a discursive showcase of
the ways in which early modern ideas of human nature and identity start to
shift towards modern ones, mixing together and living alongside each other in
the long eighteenth century.
Much has been written about the shift from what Thomas Laqueur has
described as one-sex view of men’s and women’s essential similarity to a two-
sex view of their essential incommensurability. Simplistically put, in pre-
Enlightenment understandings, gender diﬀerence was conceptualised in terms of
degree, not in terms of kind. Men and women were imagined to exist at the
opposite ends of a single scale of gender, where slippage between genders was
not out of the question.36 Women were thought to be deﬁcient men, whose
development in the womb had been left unperfected. Moreover, early modern
gender was not irreversibly ﬁxed by biological sex. All distinctions between
men and women—natural and cultural alike, between which early modern
Europeans did not diﬀerentiate in the way we do—were understood to be fun-
damental because they were part of ‘God’s holy order in nature’.37 Sexual dif-
ference before the Enlightenment was embedded in the Bible, and further
explained with the help of Galenic anatomy and humoral theory. The balance
of humours in each body determined a person’s sex and character; heat and
dryness made men, prone to choler, while cold and wet made women suscep-
tible to melancholy.38 Somewhere around the eighteenth century this all began
to change, and the modern model of biological divergence of the sexes rose to
compete with the early modern understanding of arraying men and women on
the same hierarchical scale.39 This change has been variedly timed as taking
place slowly between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as abruptly
during the ﬁnal two decades of the eighteenth century. Karen Harvey has con-
vincingly argued that the change was very slow and incomplete, and that both
models were always only partly embraced.40 Thus, the eighteenth century wit-
nessed a massive but gradual paradigm change in conceptualisations of gender
and body, manifesting both ideas of the old and the new. In the emerging new
system, sex became a biological fact instead of being a divinely ordained social
and hierarchical category, and the diﬀerence which had been articulated in
terms of gender came to be articulated in terms of sex and biology.41
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Understandings of sex and gender are intrinsically linked to the culture of
politeness. To contextualise the diﬀerent and often contradictory norms of
politeness, it is important to grasp the conceptual tumult that was in progress
regarding questions of sex and gender—something previous scholarship on
politeness has thus far ignored. Indeed, Anthony Fletcher and Shawn Lisa
Maurer have argued that eighteenth-century politeness discourse is distinctively
the discourse of ‘modern gender construction’, and thoroughly marked by a
system that ‘constitute[s] masculinity and femininity as incommensurable
opposites’.42 However, a more careful analysis reveals that since gender diﬀer-
ence was an integral part of early modern thinking as well, the fact that
politeness discourse forcibly promotes gender diﬀerence is no proof of its com-
plete adherence to the two-sex model—especially when one-sex ideas of the
body are blatantly visible on the pages of conduct books and periodicals in
the form of humoral theory and corresponding notions of gender diﬀerence.43
The ongoing paradigmatic shift had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on how female nature
and character were imagined. To be sure, both models emphasised gender dif-
ference, but in diﬀerent ways. In the one-sex model, women’s cold, wet humours
and leaky bodies were thought to make them deceptive, passive, and volatile,
whereas in the two-sex world, their emotional instability was explained through
the nervous system.44 Perhaps the most profound diﬀerence occurred in notions
of sexual drive. One-sex women were thought to be passionate, lustful, and
sexually active, while the two-sex model desexualised women; their alleged lack
of passion became grounded in scientiﬁc ‘knowledge’.45
It is, however, short-sighted to treat the two models as uniform schemas that
dictated the mind-set of individual didactic writers or members of polite society
in general. The eighteenth century is a period which witnessed an overlap of old
and new understandings of sex; therefore, the notions of diﬀerence and simi-
larity were used incoherently and often simultaneously. However, even if the
individuals’ ideas of precise anatomical models were bound to be blurry and
confused at best, frequent allusions to humoral theory and its eﬀects on char-
acter and health, for example, demonstrate that eighteenth-century individuals
had an extensive if incoherent grasp of physiological theories. Allusions to
humours then grew sparse the further the century proceeded, and became gra-
dually overtaken by more vague, proto-biological references to female ‘nature’.
Rather than ascertaining which models existed at particular periods, it is more
fruitful to examine what functions the concepts of bodily diﬀerence and simi-
larity performed, as Ludmilla Jordanova suggests.46 Within the matrix of
politeness, the one-sex and two-sex models were used as complementary tools
of warranting claims of appropriate feminine conduct. For example, the neces-
sity of women’s strict guarding of their chastity could be justiﬁed both by
claiming that women were naturally lewd and passionate (one-sex view) and,
therefore, in greater need of relentless control, and by pleading to women’s
naturally passionless nature (two-sex view) as the instigator of their immaculate
chastity. Similar conceptual ﬂexibility surrounds the whole discourse deﬁning
normative feminine behaviour. Masculine activities and behaviour could, in the
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one-sex view, actually cause a change of sex, whereas in the two-sex view, they
made a woman an unnatural sexless monster. In either case, however, gender
transgressions were to be avoided.
To what extent these shifts impacted women’s lives outside discursive for-
mulations is less certain. Robert Shoemaker, for one, maintains that even
though images of women became more conﬁning in conduct books and other
didactic material, public opportunities for women actually expanded during the
long eighteenth century.47 Nevertheless, the emergence of the two-sex model
has usually been connected with a deterioration of women’s social position and
opportunities, as well as narrowing of acceptable feminine identity positions.
Barbara Duden and Dror Wahrman have claimed that the two-sex model led to
unpreceded gloriﬁcation of wifehood and particularly motherhood as the
only socially and biologically acceptable roles for women—a development
which reached its peak in the Victorian sanctiﬁcation of middle-class domes-
ticity and hyperfemininity.48 In this way, the eighteenth century stands in
between the early modern and the modern, manifesting simultaneously both
pre- and post-Enlightenment conceptualisations of the body and identity.
Discursively Created Natural Femininity
Addison’s story of the Commonwealth of Amazons, while celebrating the gen-
dering eﬀects of heterosociability, also simultaneously raises the question of
how ‘natural’ women’s soft and pliable nature was, in the end. The Amazon
story is liable to an interpretation of the female nature as uncouth and savage in
its natural state, reﬁned only through the culturing inﬂuence of society. Along-
side the eighteenth-century epistemological association between women and
culture, emphasised by Tomaselli and Carr, which attributed women’s civilising
inﬂuence to their natural politeness and sensibility, there ran also a contrasting
parallel story.49 In fact, women were also routinely likened to Nature herself in
the eighteenth century, which meant that they were seen as naturally not polite
but quite the opposite—unruly, passionate, unreﬁned, sensual, and wild. In
Ludmilla Jordanova’s words, women had, in fact, an intricate and multifaceted
connection with nature in eighteenth-century imaginations.50 Women as non-
rational creatures were believed to have a diminished capability to control their
urges and, therefore, to be vulnerable to all sorts of weaknesses of the ﬂesh.
Because of this, women were thought to be in special need of the reﬁning eﬀects
of heterosociability and polite education.
In other words, women were imagined simultaneously as agents of culture
and creatures of nature—naturally polite and naturally impolite. This funda-
mental duality runs through eighteenth-century politeness discourse, making it
self-contradictory and ambiguous. Women’s politeness as both allegedly innate
and carefully constructed is manifested in the most basic truisms of didactic
literature—such as John Gregory’s introduction to his popular conduct book
for women in 1761: ‘from […] your natural character and place in society, there
arises a certain propriety of conduct peculiar to your sex’.51 This somewhat
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trite statement can be read to mean two things: ﬁrstly, that women naturally
behave in a way diﬀerent from men—and secondly, that women ought to
behave in a way diﬀerent from men. These were both valid readings in the
eighteenth century, and by no means mutually exclusive.
Paradoxically, the importance of heterosociability for the creation of gender
diﬀerence in no way called into question the commonly held view that femi-
ninity was a quality which elite women possessed naturally. This ‘natural fem-
ininity’ was also one of the most important ingredients of what constituted
women’s politeness. For Gregory, as for his contemporaries, it was an everyday
commonplace that women and men were bound by two diﬀerent, gender-spe-
ciﬁc sets of conduct norms. Even though the basic principles were the same for
both sexes—both men and women needed to aim to please with their easy,
conventional, and unaﬀected behaviour—all rules going beyond this general
principle were dictated by the sexes’ diﬀerent ‘natural character’ and ‘place in
society’. Accordingly, gender diﬀerence was the organizing principle of
women’s politeness. It was not possible for a woman to be truly polite, unless
she was truly feminine.
In women’s didactic literature, gender diﬀerence in behaviour was mainly
authorised by appealing to nature in various, often contradictory ways. Indeed,
Ingrid Tague has observed that in the beginning of the long eighteenth century,
the rhetoric of nature emerged into women’s politeness discourse, where it was
invoked as a moral and ethical norm.52 As religion had been in previous cen-
turies, nature became a ‘moral category of considerable weight available for and
well suited to the expression of tensions concerning gender’.53 At the same time,
nature played a signiﬁcantly smaller role in men’s conduct books. This disparity
is partly explained by women’s close association to nature, which made any
deviations from ideal femininity passionately condemned as a breach of nature,
‘presented as errors to which women were particularly prone’, as Ludmilla Jor-
danova puts it. Women, who were deﬁned by their identiﬁcation with nature,
became disciplined through what was natural and, therefore, feminine and proper
behaviour. According to Jordanova, the ‘claim that an individual woman was or
women in general were unnatural was particularly eﬀective rhetorically’.54
Naturalness played a considerable role in women’s didactic literature,
starting from The Spectator, which claimed that nothing ‘ought to be held
laudable or becoming, but what Nature it self should prompt us to think
so’.55 The Ladies Calling declared that women were placed under ‘proper and
distinct Obligations […] by the assignment of God and Nature’.56 The rheto-
ric of nature often combined both divine and scientiﬁc authority, operating
between early modern and modern world views. Indeed, despite the emergence
of nature as an authority, religion was still routinely invoked in formulations
of gendered behaviour. Since God was seen to have created the natural order of
things, godly authority and natural authority were more or less synonymous in
eighteenth-century language.
Moreover, there was no clear division between nature and culture in the
eighteenth century, as Jenny Davidson has demonstrated; therefore, what
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counted as ‘nature’ was ticklish at best. The language of natural versus cultural
is a post-Enlightenment construction, whereas in pre-modern thought, these
two entwined together and leaked into each other. When in modern scientiﬁc
understanding the biological—or the genetic, or the innate—is taken to be the
primary category, early modern people saw things the opposite way. Locke’s
tabula rasa is perhaps the most well-known example of the early modern belief
on the all-conquering power of nurture. Moreover, in early modern thinking,
nature did not straightforwardly equal innate or stable, nor did nurture stand
for external or mutable; therefore, characteristics considered natural were not
necessarily inborn, but could result in habituation, as well.57 In conduct trea-
tises, nature, tradition, and custom were often used interchangeably, as is the
case in The Ladies Calling (1673), which claimed that ‘all Ages and Nations
have made some distinction between masculine & feminine Vertues, Nature
having not only given a distinction as to the beauties of their outward form, but
also in their very mold and constitution’.58
Because ‘nature’ and what exactly constituted it was an extremely contested
debate, it provided a ﬂexible and versatile tool for disciplining women into
gender-appropriate performances of politeness. Qualities as far removed from
each other as honesty and deviousness, taciturnity and loquaciousness, chastity
and lustfulness could all be presented as ‘natural’ for the female sex and,
accordingly, either something women should strive to persevere in or strive to
banish from their character. Despite these internal contradictions, the code of
conduct propagated for women was made to appear, not arbitrary, but logical
and indisputable, being based on a person’s natural (biological) sex, and thus
ordained by nature itself. Accordingly, ‘femininity’ was argued to be a woman’s
most important epithet in all manners, behaviour, and appearances. This nat-
ural femininity was perceived as something timeless and pre-discursive—and
through appealing to ahistorical ‘truths’ such as ‘nature’, ‘tradition’, or ‘God’,
gender diﬀerence became irrevocably legitimated. In Judith Butler’s words, it is
precisely through the ‘inﬁnite deferral of authority to an irrecoverable past’ that
authority is constituted.59 Ordained by higher powers, the natural characters of
the sexes appeared unalterable—despite the fact that didactic writers failed to
reach any unanimity on the speciﬁc deﬁnition of ‘natural femininity’. Indeed,
even though writers agreed that women should act according to feminine ideals,
consensus on how exactly these ideals should be performed proved more diﬃ-
cult to ﬁnd. There were as many opinions on how, when, and where to portray
feminine modesty or gentleness as there were attempts to deﬁne it. Some writers
thought that true femininity showed itself in elegant dresses and impeccable
dancing skills, whereas others maintained that it was embodied by modest
blushes and bashful silence. Despite these drastic diﬀerences of opinion, practi-
cally all writers agreed that femininity was a natural female trait, shared by at
least all elite women, and that it was displayed speciﬁcally through the body in
its various attitudes, appearances, and movements.
Since natural hierarchies between human beings became increasingly articu-
lated in terms of gender, polite femininity was forcefully contrasted with
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masculinity. In this sense, eighteenth-century politeness as a gendering regime of
behaviour diﬀers radically from earlier codes of conduct. Renaissance courtesy
books’ diﬀerentiation of the civil and the uncivil was organised around hier-
archies of age and status rather than gender. The status of wifehood, not
gender, made women most clearly subordinate, and women’s demeanour as
inferior was mostly discussed only in relation to husbands. Laura Gowing
argues that as the focus of the literature of manners shifted, in the late seven-
teenth century, to ‘politeness rather than civility, authors began to concern
themselves more explicitly with the manners of the female body’.60 Ingrid
Tague has identiﬁed a seventeenth-century English tradition of non-gendered
good conduct, originated in France, and propagated in England in transla-
tions—only to be overridden by the English national project which rejected
French modes of politeness in favour of English gendered ones.61
The English politeness discourse was, to a large extent, organised around the
dichotomous concepts of meek/passive/femininity and bold/active/masculinity.
Nearly all attributes and characteristics were interpreted through this dichot-
omous, evaluative matrix and given a gendered signiﬁcance. Hannah More, for
example, deﬁned women as naturally concerned more with things that were
brilliant, pretty, pleasing, or shining, being of more passionate nature than men
who were more interested in things of reason and solidity.62 James Fordyce
described ‘Modesty, meekness, prudence, [and] piety’ as the ‘chief ornaments’
of the female sex, which ‘will render them truly lovely as women’.63 Being a
woman elided into acting a woman, making femininity a performative category.
If a woman did not settle into the position thus outlined for her, she became
unfeminine, which made her and her behaviour unpredictable to the members
of polite society. By deviating from her expected role, such a woman compli-
cated well-ordered sociability, as polite norms were created to enable smooth
social interaction. A masculine woman thus became automatically an impolite
one, as well. In this way, women were disciplined to hone their bodies into
discursively appointed shapes and movements in order to communicate their
‘natural’ femininity. Gendered identity was thus produced through the use of
distinct techniques of education, training, and supervision.64
Despite the widespread rhetoric of naturalness, eighteenth-century writers
also recognised the performative and artiﬁcial basis of gendered behaviour. In
the Fable of the Bees, Bernard Mandeville famously stated that—
The Multitude will hardly believe the excessive Force of Education, and in
the diﬀerence of Modesty between Men and Women ascribe that to Nature,
which is altogether owing to early Instruction: Miss is scarce Three years
old, but she is spoke to every Day to hide her Leg, and rebuk’d in good
Earnest if she shews it; while Little Master at the same Age is bid to take
up his Coats, and piss like a Man.65
Mandeville maintained that femininity was constructed through ‘the force of
education’—or, discursive regulation and repetitive disciplinary practices. In
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other words, Mandeville was basically articulating a notion of gender perfor-
mativity, later made famous by Judith Butler, whose claim that gender is ‘the
repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of sub-
stance, of a natural sort of being’ has become widely adopted in gender stu-
dies.66 As it turns out, Butler was not the ﬁrst one to arrive at the conclusion
that ‘natural’ femininity was, in reality, a ﬁctitious construct. In the nineteenth
century, John Stuart Mill argued that ‘[w]hat is now called the nature of
women is an eminently artiﬁcial thing—the result of forced repression in some
directions, unnatural stimulation in others’.67 Similarly, Mary Wollstonecraft
dismissed the idea of ‘gentleness, docility, and a spaniel-like aﬀection’ being in
any way natural for women; instead, she argued that men imposed these char-
acteristics on women to soften their ‘slavish dependence’.68 Wollstonecraft
pointed out that men were allowed to cultivate whatever characters as indivi-
duals, to ‘have a choleric or a sanguine constitution, be gay or grave, unre-
proved’, whereas women were ‘to be levelled, by meekness and docility, into
one character of yielding softness and gentle compliance’. According to Woll-
stonecraft, the reason for this asymmetry was not the diﬀerent nature of the
sexes, but simply women’s subordinate position and men’s arbitrary pleasure.69
However, it is important to understand that the performative acting out of
the feminine role was not a superﬁcial event. Instead, in early modern thinking,
the fashioning of the body was understood to change the inner self in a pro-
found way, as Stephen Greenblatt has demonstrated.70 The eighteenth century
stands in between the early modern and modern scientiﬁc thought; the body
was not yet seen as a closed, immutable biological entity, but it was still open
to a ‘wide array of astral and earthly inﬂuences’, to quote Thomas Laqueur.71
In this sense, early modern and postmodern understandings of identity have a
lot in common, for they both advocate a permeable relationship between the
interior and the exterior. Feminist poststructuralist writers have disputed any
straightforward demarcation of an autonomous, internal self and external
bodily stylisation and argued, instead, that the two are locked into a reciprocal
relationship. At the same time, the body as the exterior surface of the self was
also thought to mirror a person’s internal reality. Therefore, masculine dress or
manners stirred up questions of the physical essence underneath; even though
the ‘science’ of physiognomy had become little more than an amusing game by
the eighteenth century, its inﬂuence lingered in eighteenth-century Europeans’
imaginations well into the nineteenth century, suggesting that individuals’
characters could be read from their physiological traits.72
Understanding these intricate links between internal and external self are
crucial for understanding the overwhelming anxiety eighteenth-century didactic
writers seem to have felt over potential crossings of gender boundaries. For the
post-Enlightenment mind that has been accustomed to the idea of authentic,
essential, immutable inner selfhood, it can be diﬃcult to grasp to how large an
extent performances of gender were still thought to concretely make that gender
in the eighteenth-century European world. Women’s masculine behaviour was
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abhorred because, even if polite society no longer believed that it could actually
change a woman’s sex, they were wary enough of its physiological implications
to call it unnatural. Accordingly, every single conduct writer discussing
women’s politeness addressed the issue of femininity, advising women, as
Hannah More did, to ‘aspire only to those virtues that are PECULIAR TO
YOUR SEX’. According to More, ‘Nature, propriety, and custom’ had ‘pre-
scribed certain bounds to each [sex]; bounds which the prudent and the candid
will never attempt to break down’. These distinctions between the sexes ‘cannot
be too nicely maintained’, More argued, ‘for besides those important qualities
common to both, each sex has its respective, appropriated qualiﬁcations’.73
John Bennett (1789) described the ideal woman in terms of ‘softness’, claiming
that she ‘is (what nature intended her to be,) wholly a woman’. This true
woman’s every quality ‘is the direct opposite to manliness and vigour’; her
‘voice is gentle’ and her ‘passions are never suﬀered to be boisterous: she never
talks politics: she is seldom seen in any masculine amusements: she does not
practice archery. I will venture to prophesy, that she will never canvass for
votes at an election’.74 For James Fordyce, a masculine woman was ‘naturally
an unamiable creature’:
a young woman of any rank, that throws away all the lovely softness of her
nature, and emulates the daring intrepid temper of a man―how terrible!
[…] What though the dress be kept ever so distinct, if the behaviour is not;
in those points, I mean, where the character peculiar to each sex seems to
require a diﬀerence? There a metamorphosis in either will always oﬀend an
eye that is not greatly vitiated. It will do so particularly in your sex. […]
To the men an Amazon, I think, never fails to be forbidding.75
Thus, according to Fordyce, the natural character of the sexes made all devia-
tions from gender-appropriate appearance and behaviour terrible and oﬀensive—
especially if the perpetrator was a woman. Accordingly, such unnatural creatures
needed to be speciﬁcally disciplined to follow, paradoxically enough, the dictates
of nature.
The emphatically masculinised female antitypes—hoydens, Amazons,
romps, and viragos—were didactically used to chastise gender-bending female
behaviour by representing them as unnatural and monstrous. For example,
Joseph Addison reprimanded the horsewoman—the epitome of troubling
masculine energy and strength: these ‘Rural Andromache[s]’ dared to ‘dress
themselves in a Hat and Feather, a Riding-coat and a Perriwig, or at least tie
up their Hair in a Bag or Ribbond, in imitation of the smart Part of the
opposite Sex’, resulting in a ‘Mixture of two Sexes in one Person’, which in
itself was a deviation from nature. ‘Had one of these Hermaphrodites
appeared in Juvenal’s Days, with what an Indignation should we have seen
her described by that excellent Satyrist. He would have represented her in a
Riding Habit, as a greater Monster than the Centaur’, Addison concluded.76
The caricature of Jane Gordon, Duchess of Gordon (1748/9–1812) dressed in
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nothing but an enormous pair of breeches drove the point home with little
subtlety; the duchess’s boisterous and masculinely independent behaviour
made her the one wearing breeches in her marriage, and therefore monstrous
and abnormal (Figure 2.1).77
Several scholars have argued that the move from one-sex to two-sex system
resulted in a sudden shift from early modern ‘ﬂuid’ conceptualisations of gender
Figure 2.1 The Breeches in the Fiera Maschereta (London: Matthew Darly 1775).
Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University
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to post-Enlightenment ‘ﬁxed’ notion of gender at some point during the eight-
eenth century. Perhaps most famously, Dror Wahrman has described the early
eighteenth century as a period of ‘free ﬂoating’ gender, no longer regulated by
divine law, but not yet tethered to sex. Wahrman claims that the years 1700–
1780 were marked by gender ambiguity and accepting attitudes towards gender
crossing.78 This all changed abruptly, according to Wahrman, during the last
two decades of the eighteenth century, when people were seized by a ‘gender
panic’, which rapidly replaced the ﬂexible space between sex and gender with a
mimetic relation where gender necessarily mirrors sex.79 However, a compar-
ison between early and late eighteenth-century didactic literature does not cor-
roborate this interpretation; rather, gender distinction is rigorously upheld in
conduct literature throughout the long eighteenth century. Addison and Steele,
writing in the 1710s, were the most vehement critics of women’s masculine
behaviour, and mid-century didactic writers addressed the importance of
maintaining gender division with just as much gusto as late eighteenth-century
moralists. One of the ﬁrst treatises explicitly organised around women’s
politeness, The Ladies Calling (1673), already bemoaned the present ‘degen-
erous age’ where ‘every thing seems inverted, even Sexes’; where men adopt the
‘Eﬀeminacy and Niceness of women, and women take up the Conﬁdence, the
Boldness of men, and this too under the notion of good Breeding’. According
to the manual, even ladies of ‘the best Rank’ too commonly aim at a ‘perfect
metamorphosis’ of their sex by aﬀecting masculinity in their gestures, lan-
guage, and clothes.80 Both The Tatler and The Spectator were committed to
warning women of masculine behaviour, and repeatedly stated that ‘Men and
Women ought to busy themselves in their proper Spheres, and on such Mat-
ters only as are suitable to their respective Sex’—a sentiment echoed by late
eighteenth-century writers such as Hannah More and John Bennett.81 Indeed,
even though the construction of gender in the one-sex system was more ﬂuid
and open to change in what we would deﬁne as sex, gender diﬀerence in itself
was never ﬂexible. Rather, it was rigorously upheld, perhaps all the more so
because there was no biological sex to lean on. Therefore, regardless of the
understanding of sex, deﬁning gender diﬀerence was always tremendously
important—it was just communicated and authorised in diﬀerent means
within the two systems.
Many of the female antitypes—such as jezebels, salamanders, jilts, and
coquets—were also ambiguously intersectional instead of straightforwardly
gendered, addressing a variety of issues that polite society considered proble-
matic.82 For example, like the coquet, the ‘Jezebel’ from The Spectator—a
woman who deliberately displayed her ‘pernicious charms at her window’ for
men to gape at—can be seen as a commentary on the downsides of urban
publicity.83 The sportswoman was depicted not only as a masculine but also a
decidedly lower-class ﬁgure; Hester Lynch Piozzi compared female cricketers to
‘Poissardes’—the revolutionary lower-class Frenchwomen who stormed Ver-
sailles in 1789, and who Elizabeth Montagu thought had ‘too much of the male
character’, thus breaking simultaneously the acceptable boundaries of gender,
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class, and nationality.84 Indeed, Isaac Cruikshank’s caricature of a French
republican belle underlines her masculinity through her manly pose, use of a
ﬁrearm, and lack of compassion, as well as her utter disregard for her looks,
while her ragged dress highlights her low breed (Figure 2.2). While the tangled
rhetoric of acceptable femininity highlights the intersectionality of gender, class,
and nationality, women were always seen primarily as the representatives of
their gender before anything else, and their failings were attributed to the par-
ticular ﬂaws of their female nature.
Politeness and gender building were thus not only intertwined, but
politeness in fact contributed in crucial ways to a wider regime of truth
delineating gender and sex in the eighteenth century. Complementing, for
example, educational, philosophic, and medical discourses producing
‘knowledge’, politeness shaped gendered ideals regarding taste, behaviour,
and appearance. All irregularities falling outside of the ordained categories
of gendered behaviour were deemed impolite or inelegant; in this way, the
language of politeness was utilised in forging normative femininity. Then
again, the heterogeneity of politeness discourse ensured that the norms of
proper conduct were constantly renegotiated and redeﬁned. Femininity was,
therefore, elusive and contradictory—and because it was in a state of con-
stant ﬂux, reaching ideal conduct-book femininity on an individual level was
impossible. When even in theoretical works the exact deﬁnition of female
conduct in society was, in Emma Major’s words, ‘a vexed question’, the actual
everyday practices women engaged in to achieve perfect feminine politeness
could ultimately be as futile as Achilles’ never-ending pursuit of the Tortoise—
eternally postponed.85
However, the unattainability of polite femininity made it also possible for
individuals to use it ﬂexibly and assume controversial and even anarchistic
subjectivities. Even though politeness discourse seems dauntingly restrictive at
ﬁrst sight, women had means of negotiating freedom within it. Firstly, the het-
erogeneous and self-contradictory nature of politeness discourse manifested, in
practice, in a plethora of feminine subjectivities, many of which could push the
limits of normativity while still tiptoeing the line on the safe side. Indeed,
politeness should not be seen as a uniform or essentialised identity, but, instead,
as Lawrence Klein suggests, ‘rather a set of skills adapted to a range of envir-
onments’.86 This makes polite subject positions, by their nature, strategically
multiple and inconsistent. Secondly, and more importantly, the very process of
polite identity construction simultaneously always deconstructs itself. As
Butler reminds us, the performative production of subjectivity and identity is
in no way a deterministic or mechanistic event. It is not a causal project that
culminates in a set of ﬁxed eﬀects; rather, it is a process that is full of
instabilities and ambiguities, and thereby both produces and destabilises
identity. The very act of iteration is, as Joan Scott writes, echo-like in the
sense that it is an incomplete reproduction of the original.87 Therefore, within
the space between normative discourse and individual iterative practice lies
the potential for distortion and resistance.
Gendered Politeness and Power 53
Figure 2.2 Isaac Cruikshank, A Republican Belle—A Picture of Paris for 1794 (London:
S.W. Fores). Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/
item/2004669789
Subordinate Wives and Obedient Daughters
Design’d by Nature to act but a second part, it is a woman’s duty to obey rules,
she is not to make or redress them.
Elizabeth Montagu to William Pulteney, Earl of Bath, [March? 1761]88
Even though the women of the polite elite were privileged in many ways com-
pared to their social inferiors, they were still a part of a highly patriarchal
society where their position was unquestionably subordinate. Scholars have
pointed out that politeness was a system of asserting an uneven power structure
where social inferiors were put in their place by the established code of con-
duct.89 The power equilibrium of polite society was very much balanced against
not only servants and other economically dependent groups, but also against
the women included in it. The fact that politeness was strictly gendered was in
itself a strategy of distinction, where elite women were prevented from sharing
the social and cultural power that a shared code of conduct would have
implied. At the same time, however, manners were also a means of taking a
stance towards one’s betters; moreover, adopting the manners of one’s betters
could enable the subordinate to take part of the power that lay within the
authoritative gesture.
Women were subjugated not only in the most straightforward manner of
economic and political dependency; their subordinate position was a much
subtler web of unwritten everyday practices of the polite social code they lived
by. By Judith Bennett’s deﬁnition, patriarchy was a ‘familial-social, ideological,
political system in which men’—not only by force or direct pressure but
‘through ritual, tradition, law and language, customs, etiquette, education, and
the division of labour, determine what part women shall or shall not play’.90
The women discussed here certainly did occasionally feel powerless in the face
of their own everyday lives. From a young age, they had been accustomed to
put others’ needs before their own and to quietly submit to the will of others as
an integral part of feminine decorum. The unmarried Elizabeth Robinson found
at the age of 23 that her control over her own life was minimal. ‘Next summer,
it seems, I am to go to York races, but that is no joy to me’, she complained;
‘Obedience has power over our actions; I wish it reigned as despotically over
the will. […] [My papa] is to choose, and I am by duty to approve; and indeed I
intend to persuade myself to like well that which will be whether I like it or
not’.91 According to Betty Rizzo, Fanny Burney had likewise been brought up to
consciously ‘sacriﬁce her own happiness and deny her own inclinations’
for those of others, especially her father’s.92 Of course, women’s relative posi-
tion and autonomy changed as they gained in age, wealth, or status. Married
women were under the authority of their husband, and the position of single
women was heavily dependent on the existence of any independent wealth.
Generally, the unmarried women of genteel families were expected to make
themselves useful in the households of their male relatives, and had, in practice,
little authority over their own comings and goings. Catherine Talbot’s life in
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Bishop Secker’s household is a good example of this sort of extreme female
dependency. She had no possibility to make visits to her friends as she chose,
which meant that her social networks were to be kept up mainly through letter-
writing. ‘[W]hat a pity it is now we are so much better acquainted, that we can
never meet’, she complained to Elizabeth Carter, whom she had gotten to know
mainly through correspondence.93 Indeed, Talbot was forced to abide by Seck-
er’s busy schedule, which generally kept her closely in the bishop’s palace in
Cuddesdon during the summer and in London during the winter. To this she
stoically stated that ‘things must be as they can in this World’.94
Even Elizabeth Montagu, one of the most privileged women in England, had
her superiors. As a married woman, she needed to negotiate her comings and
goings with her husband, who detested city life, and often required her reluc-
tant presence while taking care of his business in Northern England.95 More-
over, the correspondence between the spouses indicates that Elizabeth Montagu
subjected her everyday decision-making, in many ways, to her husband. When
she had been permitted to go to Bath or Tunbridge, she reported to her hus-
band the happenings of her daily social life—or at least the aspects of it she
chose to—for him to inspect and approve. ‘It has been much the turn of the
Society I am in to go out in parties to see places’, she wrote to her husband
from Tunbridge Wells; ‘We went to see an old seat of a Mr Brown’s […] [and]
drank tea yesterday in the most beautiful rural scene that can be imagined’. To
this innocent rural amusement, Edward Montagu gave his blessing: ‘I very
much approve of the excursions you make, and think the more the better, as
they both entertain the mind and give exercise to the body’.96 Similarly, when
Montagu had leave to visit Lady Sandwich in London, she wrote to Edward
Montagu to assure him that her time in the capital was spent accordingly: ‘the
bustle of London does not exclude you from my thoughts, nor prevent my
wishing continually for your company. Lady Sandwich’s spirits were a good
deal revived by my coming to her, and she is very thankful to you for giving me
leave to do it. You may suppose, as she was my sole temptation to come, she is
my sole engagement here’.97
Elizabeth Montagu also presented her considerable intellect in a subjugated
light for her husband to dominate over. When corresponding with the scholar
and clergyman Conyers Middleton, she begged her husband ‘the favour’ to
‘take the trouble to read’ her letters before sending them, as ‘it is with some
uneasiness I correspond with the very wise’; Montagu humbly ascribed herself
only with ‘an understanding of a middle size’ that had ‘a great deal of trouble
in conversation between reaching to those above it’.98 This rhetoric of wifely
submission in matters of polite amusements and intellectual capabilities Eliza-
beth Montagu apparently thought necessary—and indeed, she was able to carry
on her correspondence with learned men and also to participate in the watering-
place sociability regularly while constantly maintaining a friendly and conﬁdential
relationship with her husband. The rituals and vocabulary of politeness thus eﬀec-
tively brought women power over traditional masculine authorities; as Amanda
Vickery notes, men’s authority was—even though formally honoured—practically
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managed through ‘the dignity of genteel femininity’ that ‘demanded respect and
courtesy’.99 Elizabeth Montagu is a case in point. While acting the part of the
submissive wife, she vented her frustration over Edward Montagu’s lordly
manners to her sister: ‘Do not you admire these lovers of liberty! What do the
generality of men mean by a love of liberty, but the liberty to be saucy to their
superiors, and arrogant to their inferiors, to resist the power of others over
them, and to exert their power over others. I am not sure that Cato did not kick
his wife’.100
After her husband’s death, Montagu was at last free to do as she pleased; in
fact, widowhood was the only position available for a woman that allowed her
full self-determination—provided, of course, she had suﬃcient ﬁnancial resour-
ces.101 ‘I rejoyce much that my situation is indeed most perfectly independent’,
she wrote to her brother Morris soon after her husband’s death in 1775; ‘Owing
every thing entirely to the blessing of God & Mr Montagu, I am in no danger
of being controuled or teized, so that I may be as easy from others humours as
they from mine, which is a great felicity’.102 Montagu then proceeded to use her
new-found independence, among other things, to give annuities to her friends,
anxious to demonstrate her freedom of ‘using my own in my own manner’.103
Networks of asymmetrical power by no means only appeared between men
and women. Instead, women often found themselves dependent on other
women in diﬀerent and complicated ways. These hierarchies of power could be
straightforward and oﬃcial, as was the case with servants. The status hierarchy
between mistresses and maids was, again, demonstrated by a code of conduct.
Elizabeth Montagu’s letter puts the implicit hierarchy into words: ‘I like my
[new] maid extreamly’, she wrote; ‘she is very humble, sensible, quick and
diligent, and though her Father and Mother are above the common rate, she has
never presumed to hint she was a person of fashion’.104 Montagu as a wealthy
member of the social elite is a prime example of a woman who used power over
others, as well, and ruled her household with indisputable authority.
However, there were also all kinds of unoﬃcial power hierarchies at play
between the female members of the polite elite, which are more diﬃcult to
decipher. A case in point is the widely adopted custom of taking on compa-
nions. Elizabeth Montagu, for example, usually had a female companion living
with her whose duty was to ‘fetch and carry, to accompany her out’, and to ‘do
her bidding’.105 The exact status of these companions was ambiguously sub-
ordinate, hovering somewhere between a friend and a servant. Fanny Burney
was one such companion, as she lived, for several years, in a curious relation-
ship of unoﬃcial servitude to the Thrale family, and especially to another
bluestocking, Hester Lynch Thrale. Burney spent months at a time with the
Thrales as a sort of combined friend and unpaid companion who, even though
she was sincerely attached to the family, had nevertheless few rights within
their household and whose status was somewhat vague. Betty Rizzo has argued
that Burney’s relationship with the Thrales was mutually beneﬁcial, since it not
only provided Hester Lynch Thrale with a much-wanted female conﬁdante, but
also enabled Burney to escape the tyranny of her vulgar stepmother and to
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create a social network of her own amongst the literate—or, as Marianna
D’Ezio puts it, ‘to distance herself from her role as her father’s secretary and
copyist’.106 However, the issue is far from straightforward, and the manage-
ment of Burney’s time was often a cause of tension and controversy both with
the Thrales and her father, which highlights the fact that Burney was not in
charge of her own doings.
To negotiate the conﬂicting demands of others and to inﬂuence those to
whom she was subjected, not to mention to assert her own will when possible,
Burney resorted to emotive rhetoric. In one instance, Burney wrote to her father
when her stay with the Thrales lingered on far beyond their original agreement.
‘I always meant, according to articles, to have taken my return Home & resi-
dence there as a thing of course upon the conclusion of the Bath Journey’, she
explained, having discovered that the Thrales in no way indicated that she
could go home, but intended to keep her on for another two or three months
‘as if upon the original agreement!’. ‘[I]ndeed I quite die to go Home ser-
iously,—I have almost been an Alien of late,—nobody in the World has such a
Father, such Sisters as I have’, she complained; ‘& yet I seem fated to Live as if
I were an Orphan;—for the World I would not oﬀend this dear [Thrale]
Family, whom I love with the utmost aﬀection & gratitude’.107 The mere fact
that there seems to have been a semi-oﬃcial agreement between the Burneys
and the Thrales on Fanny Burney’s time underlines the complex unequal power
structure involved in their relationship. Burney clearly did not feel herself jus-
tiﬁed in bluntly announcing her departure, or even to bring the matter up with
the Thrales. Hester Lynch Thrale’s comments on the incident in her journal
underline the power she felt she had the right to exert over Burney:
Mrs Byron who really loves me, was disgusted at Miss Burney’s Carriage
to me, who have been such a Friend & Benefactress to her: not an Article
of Dress, not a Ticket for Public Places, not a Thing in the World that She
could not command from me: yet always insolent, always pining for home,
always preferring the mode of Life in St Martins Street to all I could do for
her:—She is a saucy spirited little puss to be sure, but I love her dearly for
all that; & I fancy She has a real regard for me, if She did not think it
beneath the Dignity of a Wit, or of what She values more—the Dignity of
Doctor Burney’s Daughter to indulge it. Such Dignity!! The Lady Louisa of
Leicester Square!108
Nevertheless, Burney’s eﬀorts to procure a permission from the Thrales to
return home did not go unheeded. Even though Hester Lynch Thrale seems, to
some extent, to have seen through her act, Burney’s demonstration of her sub-
servience—both to her father and the Thrales—through a language of aﬀection
and politeness was successful, and within days she was reunited with her
beloved family.
Women’s subjugated position was a topic on which Elizabeth Montagu
mused throughout her life—probably because of her own multifaceted situation
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as one who both had power and was subjected to it. She had acquired early on
a sense of the limitations her gender placed on her, and was openly envious of
her brothers’ greater educational opportunities and freedom of movement.109 At
a young age, Montagu recorded riding to a hilltop with her father to ‘see what
did not at all concern me, a great deal of land which was none of it mine’—
since, as a woman, she did not inherit any of her family’s lands. ‘Is it not a sad
thing to be brought up in the patriot din of liberty and property, and to be
allowed neither?’ she sighed to the Duchess of Portland, another privileged
woman with little formal power.110 Montagu had a grim view of women’s
general status in society that revolved around economic and political inﬂuence,
and where ‘virtue’, women’s allegedly greatest asset, had little meaning:
What is a woman without gold or fee simple? a toy while she is young, and a
triﬂe when she is old. […] we are no body’s money till we have a foil, and
are encompassed with the precious metal. As for the intrinsic value of a
woman few know it, and nobody cares. Lord Foppington appraised all the
female virtues, and bought them in under a 1000l. sterling, and the whole sex
have agreed no one better understood the value of womankind.111
Curiously, the imbalance of power led women to a situation where they were
wholly dependent on their ﬁnancial weight to have any impact, but, at the same
time, had no means of acquiring ﬁnancial assets—aside from marriage. In fact,
as Laura Gowing has argued, marriage was for this reason often ridiculed as a
form of prostitution, where women traded their bodies for wealth and status.112
Elizabeth Montagu, for one, had a materialistic understanding of marriage as a
rational investment in a woman’s future, not to be bundled by foolish passion.
‘Love has a good right over the marriages of men, but not of women’, she
mused, ‘for men raise their wives to their ranks, women stoop to their hus-
bands, if they choose below themselves’.113 Similarly, she thought that ‘Gold is
the chief ingredient in the composition of worldly happiness’, and that—
Living in a cottage on love is certainly the worst diet and the worst habi-
tation one can ﬁnd out. […] For my part, when I marry, I do not intend to
enlist entirely under the banners of Cupid or Plutus, but take prudent
consideration, and decent inclination for my advisers. I like a coach and six
extremely, but a strong apprehension or repentance would not suﬀer me to
accept it from many that possess it.114
Indeed, the unmarried Elizabeth Robinson weighed her own marriage with
Edward Montagu carefully against her ambitions; she wished to ‘live in London
and move in the great world, to be known and acknowledged for her accom-
plishments and social position’.115 She also thought highly of Edward Mon-
tagu’s character, and considered herself lucky to have met with ‘the principles
of Honour and Virtue’ in addition to suﬃcient wealth and status.116 Montagu
took marriage seriously, since it posed considerable risks for a woman as
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wholly subordinate to her husband. ‘There is no end of ye bad consequences of
an improper marriage’, she ruminated in a letter. ‘A Woman runs more hazard
of being render’d miserable by marriage than a Man, as he can controul the
extravagances, & restrain the follies of his Wife, for men plead the right divine
of ruling wrong, & the Woman can not check him in that career which leads to
ruin & disgrace’.117
Despite Elizabeth Montagu’s rational attitude towards marriage, the fact
remains that she, like all eighteenth-century wives, resigned her legal, economic,
and physical independence when she signed the marriage contract with Edward
Montagu, and was obliged to subjugate her choices to his will. However,
women had ways around this. The seventeen-year-old Mary Granville was used
as a pawn in her uncle’s dynastic scheming and forced into a disastrous mar-
riage with the old and abusive drunk Alexander Pendarves, who was compul-
sively jealous of his young, beautiful wife. By the time death relieved her of her
disagreeable husband seven years later, Mary Pendarves had understandably
grown somewhat averse to the institution of marriage. In a characteristically
plain-speaking letter to her sister, she vented her feelings:
Matrimony! I marry! Yes, there’s a blessed scene before my eyes of the com-
forts of that state.—A sick husband, squalling brats, a cross mother-in-law,
and a thousand unavoidable impertinences; no, no, sister mine, it must be a
‘Basilisk’ indeed.118
Her sister Anne she encouraged to ‘display your fan, my dear sister, never spare
it, and make those wretches tremble that would make you a slave were you in
their clutches’.119
When Mary Pendarves then did ﬁnally marry again at the age of 43, she
chose the Irish clergyman Patrick Delany, a man whose inferior birth and lack
of fortune made the marriage vehemently opposed by her family.120 Her
choice of husband can, however, be seen as a highly tactical move; by marry-
ing below herself and choosing a man who appreciated her for her mind and
talents, she secured herself an equal marriage that preserved her independence
and enabled her to distribute her time more or less as she chose—something
that was not possible for Elizabeth Montagu. Lisa Moore has noted that
Delany was free to continue immersing herself in her art, as well as frolicking
with her numerous female friends.121 Indeed, Mary Delany continuously
emphasised the intellectual and emotional freedom she had in her second
marriage. ‘D.D.’ (as she referred to Patrick Delany) ‘takes a particular plea-
sure in our friendship for one another’, she wrote to her sister soon after their
marriage; ‘he knows the human heart was formed for social aﬀections, and
that the friendly communion between sisters and friends no way interferes
with that of husband and wife’.122 Janice Farrar Thaddeus has noted that
Delany’s most emotional and intimate relationships were with her female
friends. Her sister Anne, Catherine Hyde (the Duchess of Queensberry),
Margaret Harley (the Duchess of Portland), Anne Donnellan, and Letitia
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Bushe were the ones she lived, travelled, and corresponded with throughout
her long life.123 After her marriage, Delany often had one of her female
friends staying with her—a circumstance that gave her much intellectual and
emotional stimulation. For example, she regretted having to part with the
‘ingenious and agreeable’ painter Letitia Bushe:
She will be a great loss to me; she is one of the few who is perfectly qua-
liﬁed for an agreeable companion in a domestic way; her sweetness of
temper makes her give into all one’s ways as if she chose to do whatever is
proposed; her other agreeable and engaging talents you have long been
acquainted with; she paints for me in the morning and draws in the eve-
ning, which with reading, prating, walking, backgammon and puss in the
corner employ the hours of the day and evening so fully that we do not feel
how fast they ﬂy.124
Delany described her relationship with D.D. in terms of ‘settled friendship’
rather than passionate love, and commended him for bearing ‘all my ﬂirtations
and rambles with unchangeable good humour’.125 Accordingly, she con-
gratulated herself and her sister on their successful choices of friendly husbands:
I think, my dearest sister, if we are not happy it must be our own faults; we
have both chosen worthy, sensible friends, and if we act reasonably by them
and ourselves, we may hope for as much happiness as this mortal state will
aﬀord: thorns we must all ﬁnd, but if Providence allows us roses to our
thorns we ought to be thankful, and make the best of their sweets.126
In other words, Mary Delany used the institution of marriage strategically to
secure herself an intelligent companion and a comfortable dwelling with a
garden she was probably more passionate about than its owner—all the while
maintaining her intellectual, emotional, and artistic independence, even if
oﬃcially resigning her legal rights.
Interestingly, Delany’s case is not the only example of strategic marriage of
equality within the bluestocking group; in fact, her second marriage bears a
striking resemblance to the nuptials of Hester Lynch Thrale to Gabriele Piozzi
and Fanny Burney to Alexandre d’Arblay some decades later. They all chose to
marry below the expectations of their status, against the express wishes of their
family. In the case of Burney and Thrale, both grooms were, in addition to
being penniless, also foreign and Catholic.127 Janice Farrar Thaddeus has
described Burney’s marriage by her desire to get ‘both personal and professional
freedom—the opposite of the usual eﬀect of marriage for a woman at this
period’. Thaddeus claims that, in choosing d’Arblay (who himself was a poet),
Burney entered a marriage of intellectual equals, and that d’Arblay appreciated
Burney precisely because of her mature, independent mind, as well as her
remarkable literary career.128 A similar desire for independence seems to have
motivated all these women; by choosing below them they were able to gain the
Gendered Politeness and Power 61
sort of equality in marriage that would not have been possible had their hus-
bands been the sort of wealthy and established members of high society like, for
example, Edward Montagu was.
Thus, while women occupied, in many ways, a subjugated position in polite
society—being both under the direct paternal management of their husbands or
male relatives, and also entangled in complex webs of less direct assertions of
power—they had means to ﬁnd freedom. Politeness was not only a means of
asserting power over one’s subordinates, but could also be used by those sub-
ordinates as a means of appropriating power. Women could thus use politeness in
carefully thought-out ways to manipulate the balance of power and to negotiate
their own aims. Indeed, as I will show next, strategies of conscious dissimulation
and even downright hypocrisy provided elite women a means to undermine the
uneven power equilibrium and to assert control over their own lives.
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3 Hypocrisy and Strategic Dissimulation
Despite the rhetorical valorisation of openness and sincerity, women’s polite-
ness was, in practice, ultimately hypocritical. Using women’s everyday lives,
their practices of dress, as well as the cult of sensibility as entry points, this
chapter teases out the implicit hypocrisy that was embedded in the fundamental
incompatibility of the ideal of the transparent female body with the practical
need of strategic self-fashioning. The juxtaposition between rhetorical invoca-
tions of naturalness and real-life practices of dissimulation are patent in the
very division between honest/sincere/inward and dissimulative/theatrical/external
politeness. In fact, as I demonstrate, the relationship between internal and exter-
nal formulations of politeness is more problematic than previous scholarship has
perhaps recognised. Inward politeness as something that would ‘automatically’
ﬂow out of the goodness of one’s soul was, in reality, just as much the result of
disciplined practice and habituation as the theatrical external politeness. This is
nowhere more evident than in the very writings of John Locke, the often-heeded
originator of the concept of inward politeness.
In Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), Locke acknowledges that
the ‘agreeable way of expressing’ inner civility is through ‘that decency and
gracefulness of Looks, Voice, Words, Motions, Gestures, and of all the whole
outward Demeanour, which takes in Company, and makes those with whom
we may Converse, easy and well pleased’. This he calls ‘the Language, whereby
that internal Civility of the Mind is expressed’. And, as all languages, it is ‘very
much governed by the Fashion and Custom of every Country’ and must,
therefore, be speciﬁcally learned through education.1 In other words, inward
civility did not automatically translate into external good behaviour, but
required sustained practice. More importantly, Locke’s understanding of the
actual meaning of ‘inward’ or ‘natural’ is by no means straightforward. When
going into more detail on the education of children, he writes:
by repeating the same Action, till it be grown habitual in them, the Per-
formance will not depend on Memory or Reﬂection, […] but will be
natural in them. Thus bowing to a Gentleman, when he salutes him, and
looking in his Face, when he speaks to him, is by constant Use as natural
to a well-bred Man, as breathing; it requires no Thought, no Reﬂection.
Having this Way cured in your Child any Fault, it is cured for ever: And
thus one by one you may weed them all out, and plant what Habits
you please.2
In other words, Locke describes how repetition of polite habits makes those
habits so automatic that they become ‘natural’. What is more, even the so-
called inner civility of mind turns out not to be innate, according to Locke;
instead, that too needs to be planted at an early age:
Want of well-fashioned Civility in the Carriage, whilst Civility is not want-
ing in the Mind, (for there you must take Care to plant it early) should be
the Parents least Care, whilst they are young. […] Be sure to keep up in him
the Principles of Good Nature and Kindness; make them as habitual as you
can […] And, when they have taken Root in his Mind, and are settled there
by continual Practice, fear not; the Ornaments of Conversation, and the
Outside of fashionable Manners, will come in their due Time.3
As Jenny Davidson has argued, Locke’s treatise on education demonstrates how
blurred the distinction between nurture and nature, or environmental inﬂuence
and (in modern terms) biological qualities, was in the long eighteenth century.4
For our purposes, it shows the artiﬁcially constructed nature of the so-called
internal politeness; even though Locke claims that internal virtue is all that
politeness requires, the concept of ‘internal’ does not necessarily mean ‘natural’
or ‘inborn’ in any straightforward way. Accordingly, when inner virtue and
honest transparency of manners is marketed for women as ‘natural’ to them,
the underlying meanings of inborn versus acquired qualities were not as clearly
delineated to the members of polite society as they are to us. The vagueness of
the concept of ‘natural’ made it a useful rhetorical tool, masking the fact that
all politeness, internal and external alike, was artiﬁcial. Indeed, on closer
examination, it is possible to question the entire division between internal and
external politeness altogether; as this chapter will demonstrate, the diﬀerence
between the two reveals itself to be mostly rhetorical, as inward civility seems
to be, in practice, constantly leaking into theatrical self-fashioning.
The conceptual ambivalence between internal/natural and external/cultivated
made women’s politeness particularly precarious. Internalist and externalist
conceptualisations of politeness were also divided along gendered lines—which
is something that has thus far escaped academic attention. Even though prac-
tical guides advocating theatrical self-fashioning were certainly published for
women as well, the majority of women’s conduct books emphasised moral and
Christian values as both particularly suitable and innate for womankind. Mor-
ality was generally considered an indispensable feminine quality and a much
more crucial aspect of respectability for women than for men; accordingly,
inward politeness was the dominant discourse of formulations of feminine
propriety and good conduct.5 The ultimately artiﬁcial nature of inward polite-
ness was thus a considerable problem for women whose open transparent
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honesty supposedly arose from their gender. Some level of dissimulation and
downright hypocrisy were thus not only constantly present in women’s prac-
tices of politeness, but could and were—as this chapter will show—deliberately
used by Montagu, Burney, and others to create freedom between discursive
norms and actual behaviour by hiding subversive conduct behind a mask of
feminine submissiveness.
Natural Sincerity and Dishonest Aﬀectation
A natural and unconstrained Behaviour has something in it so agreeable, that it is
no Wonder to see People endeavouring after it. But at the same time, it is so very
hard to hit, when it is not Born with us, that People often make themselves
Ridiculous in attempting it.
Joseph Addison in The Spectator (1711)6
On a rhetorical level, the proponents of inward politeness sought to distinguish
themselves from the theatrical politeness tradition, claiming a monopoly on
both pleasing behaviour and morality. This was an attempt to mask the fact
that, despite their diﬀerent premises, the goals of the advocates of both internal
and external politeness were surprisingly similar. Both aimed at pleasing others
with modest, unpretentious, and obliging behaviour. Both also promoted easy
and free urban politeness over stiﬀ country politeness or the mannerisms of
courtly politeness. Naturalness was hailed by both as the corner stone of urban
politeness; Addison and Steele as well as Chesterﬁeld and Mandeville praised
easy naturalness of manners as the prerequisite of good breeding that enabled
free sociability over distinctions of rank and social status. However, even
though the goals of the two camps were thus similar, their means of achieving
those goals were diﬀerent—at least on the surface.
The main internalist objection against theatrical dissimulation was its alleged
incompatibility with truthful naturalness. Internalists saw external politeness as
a mere aﬀectation of true politeness—and ‘Aﬀectation will always be oﬀensive,
because the mind within, and the Actions without, do not correspond’, as John
Burton concluded in his conduct book. According to Hester Chapone, ‘aﬀecta-
tion seems to imply a mean opinion of one’s own real form, or character, while
we strive against nature to alter ourselves by ridiculous contortions of body, or
by feigned sentiments and unnatural manners’.7 In other words, external
politeness was accused of abandoning the ﬁrst and foremost ideals of polite-
ness—naturalness and sincerity—in favour of dishonesty and aﬀectation. These
immoral aspects linked to external politeness made it not only oﬀensive, but
also potentially dangerous. Politeness was intimately linked to public virtue; a
basis of social intercourse, it was thought to lay the ground for the virtue and
morality of the society and English nation as a whole. As Edmund Burke wrote,
‘Manners are of more importance than laws’, for they ‘aid morals, they supply
them, or they totally destroy them’.8 Insincere ﬂattery and theatrical politeness
were thought to be indicative of the tyrannical absolutism of France, whereas
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‘English liberty’ called for corresponding liberty of manners. Inward politeness
was thus seen as a speciﬁcally moral version of politeness, conducive to public
virtue and nation’s morality.
The immoral implications of external politeness made women’s relation to
theatrical behaviour particularly problematic. Women were widely considered
to be the moral backbone of England; an inﬂuential moralist discourse con-
structed womanhood as a safeguard of British religious, polite, and national
values.9 Accordingly, the whole society was seen to be dependent on women’s
morality—increasingly so towards the end of the eighteenth century. ‘The cele-
brated Montesquieu, speaking of the inﬂuence of the female Sex on public
manners, says, that the safety of a state depends upon the virtues of the
Women’, declared John Burton in 1793.10 Women’s virtue was considered to be
crucial because of their much-discussed eﬀect on men’s manners. In the words
of Hannah More,
The prevailing manners of an age depend more than we are aware, or are
willing to allow, on the conduct of the women; this is one of the principal
hinges on which the great machine of human society turns. Those who
allow the inﬂuence which female graces have, in contributing to polish the
manners of men, would do well to reﬂect how great an inﬂuence female
morals must also have on their conduct.11
Thus, not only men’s manners, but also their morals could be either improved
or ruined by women. According to Emma Major, women were urged to act as
beaming lights of Christian morality and goodness, making people around them
more virtuous by their own good example.12 Therefore, inward politeness was
given a special importance in conduct rhetoric addressing women.
However, the externalists did not see the matter in such simplistic light. They
did not disparage virtue; as Lawrence Klein has stated, even the infamous Lord
Chesterﬁeld thought manners ‘less intrinsically valuable than moral virtue’.13
Neither did they appreciate unnatural, aﬀected behaviour; in fact, the external-
ists’ conduct ideal was very similar to the internalists’—that of natural simpli-
city. Chesterﬁeld asserted that learning graceful manners should be started at a
very young age, for otherwise they will ‘never appear easy, nor seem natural’.
He advised his son to attune himself to the company he was in as perfectly as
possible; to ‘be serious with the serious’ and ‘gay with the gay’, but always, ‘in
assuming these various shapes, endeavour to make each of them seem to sit
easy upon you, and even to appear to be your own natural one’.14 In fact, the
externalists were possibly even more occupied with the ideal of naturalness than
the internalists, and denounced aﬀectation in explicit terms. As Chesterﬁeld
declared, to be caught at a lie or aﬀectation—in other words, to be found dis-
honest or insincere—not only made a person ‘wonderfully ridiculous’, but
compromised their honour, reputation, and good character.15 Nor was such
dissimulative advice limited only to men; despite the emphasis given to
women’s honesty and morality, women had their share of externalist politeness
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manuals. One popular women’s conduct book acknowledged that, since
‘Aﬀectation mingles itself with all our Actions, and it requires Perfection to be
entirely exempt from it’, women should concentrate on regulating their beha-
viour to make it appear as natural as possible. Indeed, the advice provided is
strongly reminiscent of Locke’s emphasis of habituating internal virtue, thus
calling to question any strict diﬀerence between the two; ‘Endeavour that
Chearfulness, Sweetness, and Modesty be always blended in your Countenance
and Air, and let them be so habitual to you, that there mayn’t appear any thing
of Aﬀectation in it’.16
Inward politeness was not only marketed as an important conduct ideal for
women because of its links to honesty and morality, but also because simplicity,
artlessness, and unaﬀectedness were deemed essential female characteristics.
John Bennett deﬁned, when describing a ﬁctional Louisa, a paragon of feminine
perfection, truthful naturalness as her most important asset:
The ground work of all her charms, is, […] simplicity; and artless, unde-
signing, unstudied manner, ﬂowing from an innocent and virtuous heart,
which, never seeks concealment, as having indeed nothing to conceal.
Louisa never aﬀects to be any thing, but what she is. […] Her gestures,
attitude, voice, pronunciation are all under the immediate impression and
guidance of nature. […]
It is the very reverse of that absurd aﬀectation, which, by assuming a
thousand, fanciful shapes, renders graces unlovely, and even beauty dis-
gusting. Louisa charms every person because she is always amiable and
obliging, without studying to charm. Her face is always welcome in com-
pany, though she throws no artiﬁcial lightning into her eyes, softness into
her features, nor lisping into her articulation.17
Bennett contrasted natural, transparent, and unaﬀected feminine behaviour with
the ‘absurd aﬀectation’ and artiﬁcial charms of women who, spoiled by con-
temporary education, pretend politeness to please.18 According to Bennett,
women were naturally formed ‘to be innocent and artless’; indeed, as a part of
the changing gender paradigm, women were increasingly thought to be natu-
rally moral and amiable, which made inward politeness easy to feminise.
Women’s supposedly natural ‘softness and sensibility’ not only shielded them
from diﬀerent vices, but also made them ‘particularly ﬁt […] for the practice of
those duties where the heart is chieﬂy concerned’, as John Gregory wrote.19
Thus, inward politeness was not only particularly suitable for women, but also
an innate feminine trait.
Indeed, femininity was habitually likened to artless transparency in eight-
eenth-century imaginations. Fanny Burney’s sentimental novels are a good
example of the idealisation of feminine honesty and transparency, which was
also heavily inﬂuenced by the growing trend of sensibility towards the end of
the eighteenth century. Evelina (1778), as an epistolary novel, works on the—
somewhat perverse—assumption that Evelina reveals the depths of her soul to
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her guardian, Mr Villars, for whom she keeps a minute journal of all her
thoughts and actions.20 In Camilla (1796), Edgar, the young admirer of the
protagonist, reads ‘in the change, yet brightness of [Camilla’s] countenance,
what passed within’—only to fear later on that improper company ‘has already
broken into that clear transparent singleness of mind, so beautiful in its total
ignorance of every species of scheme, every sort of double measure, every idea of
secret view and latent expedient’.21 In fact, Camilla can be read, in its totality, as
a defence of open transparency and its necessity in a woman; even the complex-
ions of the moral heroines appear ‘fair, clear, and transparent’, the permeability
of the sexed body thus further reﬂecting the gendered honesty of the soul.22
Despite this supposedly natural female morality and transparency, women
were at the same time also seen to be particularly prone to lying and aﬀecta-
tion. Vanity, the prime cause of all aﬀectation, was thought to be an especially
feminine sin, since women supposedly had greater needs to please, in order to
get married. The Lady’s New Year’s Gift, for example, cautioned women
especially ‘against Vanity, it being the Fault to which your Sex seemeth to be
the most inclined, and since Aﬀectation for the most part attendeth it’.23
Women were thought to be prone to vanity especially because of their constant
desire to seek men’s attention. Since a woman herself, with her body and soul,
was her own best commodity in the search for a husband, she was thought to
be susceptible to aﬀectation in order to better her appearance in front of men.24
In fact, many externalist writers, such as Lord Chesterﬁeld, deﬁned veracity as a
characteristically masculine virtue and a vital part of men’s honour, but less
inherent or necessary for women. Aﬀectation could even be a becoming femi-
nine quality, especially according to the less morally (and sentimentally) tuned
authors of the early 1700s.25 Thus, women’s relationship to honesty was a
complex one. On the one hand, open transparency was deemed necessary and
natural for women—while on the other hand, they were imagined to be intrin-
sically unreliable and deceitful. Even though women thus needed to aspire
towards inner goodness as a sign of their femininity, aﬀectation was often
thought to be just as feminine a characteristic as honest transparency; even
though it was morally corrupt, it was still, on some level, expected of women,
as a sign of their feminine weakness of character.
However, internalists hurried to declare that dissimulation would defeat its
own end, and that men would only be attracted by a natural, unaﬀected woman.
As early as 1697, John Vanbrugh’s popular Restoration Comedy The Provoked
Wife assured its audiences in the words of the handsome misanthrope Heartfree
that all a woman—in this case, the aﬀected Lady Fanciful—needed to do to win
a man’s heart was to lay down her aﬀectation. In Heartfree’s opinion, Lady
Fanciful’s artful appearance has made her an object of pity and ridicule:
Heart. I mean to tell you, that you are the most ungrateful woman upon
earth.
Lady F. Ungrateful! to whom?
Heart. To nature.
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Lady F. Why, what has nature done for me?
Heart. What you have undone by art; It made you handsome; it gave you
beauty to a miracle, a shape without a fault, wit enough to make them
relish, and so turned you loose to your own discretion, which has made
such work with you, that you are become the pity of our sex, and the jest
of your own. There is not a feature in your face, but you have found the
way to teach it some aﬀected convulsion; your feet, your hands, your very
ﬁngers’ ends, are directed never to move without some ridiculous air or
other; and your language is a suitable trumpet, to draw people’s eyes upon
the rare show.26
Since women had a greater claim and need for truthfulness, aﬀectation was
deemed to be more despicable in a woman than in a man. In fact, gender was
used as a tool to discipline women towards virtue and honesty; since morality
and sincerity were natural female qualities, an aﬀected woman—or, one prac-
ticing external politeness—automatically became a monster of uncertain gender
instead of a true feminine woman. In Richard Steele’s analysis in 1714, an
aﬀected woman was compared to a monkey:
She would have it thought that she is made of so much the ﬁner clay, and
so much more sifted than ordinary, that she has no common earth about
her. To this end she must neither move nor speak like other women […]
The looking-glass in the morning dictates to her all the motions of the day,
which by how much the more studyed, are so much the more mistaken.
[…] She comes into a room as if her limbs were set on with ill-made
screws, which makes the company fear the pretty thing should leave some
of its artiﬁcial person upon the ﬂoor. She does not like herself as God
Almighty made her, but will have some of her own workmanship, which is so
far from making her a better thing than a woman, that it turns her into a
worse creature than a monkey. She falls out with nature, against which she
makes war without admitting a truce […] When she has a mind to be soft and
languishing, there is something so unnatural in that aﬀected easiness, that her
frowns could not be by many degrees so forbidding. […] Her discourse is a
senseless chime of empty words, a heap of compliments, so equally applyed to
diﬀerent persons, that they are neither valued nor believed.27
As these examples from Vanbrugh and Steele—as well as many more
throughout the long eighteenth century—indicate, aﬀectation was thought
inevitably to reveal itself through distorted bodily signs.28 An aﬀected woman
would move in an awkward manner, overdo her looks and feelings, and speak
falsities with a fake lisp. In other words, aﬀectation was thought to make
women reject the guidance of nature, rendering them ridiculous, but also
unfeminine or even inhuman.
Incidentally, despite their assurances that aﬀectation would always be dis-
cernible, the internalists were nevertheless deeply worried that a performance
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skilful enough could deceive even the keenest observer. It was precisely the
identical outcome of both sincere and theatrical politeness despite fundamental
moral diﬀerences that concerned the internalists—not the ridiculousness and
unauthenticity of theatrical dissimulation that they disparaged. The idea that
vice could be eﬀectually hidden behind a mask of virtue was a deeply dis-
concerting one. Despite her belief that regulating features was futile without
inward restraint, Hannah More, for example, still worried that external signs
could be mistaken ‘for the thing itself’:
A low voice and soft address are the common indications of a well-bred
woman, and should seem to be the natural eﬀects of a meek and quiet
spirit; but they are only the outward and visible signs of it: for they are no
more meekness itself, than a red coat is courage, or a black one devotion.
Yet nothing is more common than to mistake the sign for the thing itself;
nor is any practice more frequent than that of endeavouring to acquire the
exterior mark, without once thinking to labour after the interior grace.29
Similarly, Mary Wollstonecraft lamented in her early book on women’s educa-
tion (1787) that many women were only ‘whitened sepulchres, and careful only
about appearances’.30 The blurred content of the concept of naturalness as both
innate and acquired—stable and mutable, truthful and unreliable—makes the
discourse of politeness so challenging to navigate. For internalists, naturalness
meant sincere transparency, laying one’s inner character open for everybody to see
through unaﬀected and unconstrained manners—thus presupposing that men and
women were innately moral and sociable creatures. For externalists, then, natur-
alness was a calculated performance of immaculate behaviour, so honed that it
appeared completely natural; since men and women were by nature selﬁsh, rude,
and unsociable, they needed to mask their inner self with a perfect performance.
These diﬀerences of thought were deeply grounded in eighteenth-century philoso-
phical debates on human nature, morality, sociability, and the social contract,
sparked by Thomas Hobbes’s claim of men’s and women’s natural unsociability
and, thereby, sociability’s artiﬁcial nature. And yet, even though internalists based
their rhetoric on the belief of the inherent goodness of the human nature, they
admitted that the moral, internal self needed regulation as well. As Locke stated,
the ‘Civility [of] the Mind’ needed to be speciﬁcally planted and industriously
cultivated to produce the external marks of truthful naturalness.31
Hypocrisy and Transparency: The Dual Role of the Body
[I]n the present reﬁned or depraved state of human nature, most people endeavor
to conceal their real character, not to display it.
Horace Walpole, Reminiscences (1788)32
The body functioned as the primary scene of constructing and communicating
politeness, regardless of conceptualisations of politeness. Politeness was an
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identity that was constructed through the stylisation of the body, which reﬂec-
ted the ideals of politeness through its appearance, postures, gestures, and acts;
accordingly, didactic politeness literature put considerable eﬀort into specifying
the diﬀerent ways in which politeness should be acted out. However, the ideo-
logical diﬀerences between inward and external politeness inﬂuenced the precise
manner in which the body was deﬁned as the locus of politeness construction
and communication. External politeness viewed the body as a canvas on which
the perfect appearance of politeness could be painted while carefully hiding the
true inner self behind it. ‘Do not mistake, and think that […] you should
exhibit your whole character to the public, because it is your natural one. No,
many things must be suppressed and many things concealed in the best char-
acter’, wrote Lord Chesterﬁeld.33 External politeness was concealing by its
nature, and so was the externalist view of the body; the body was thought to be
separate from the mind, an autonomous entity that could be moulded to reﬂect
desired artiﬁcial identities. The theatrical body was essentially opaque, con-
trolled, and ﬂexible, ready to perform at will. The body was consciously
manipulated to fulﬁl the requirements of polite decorum and sociability;
through impeccable control of the body, all impolite characteristics, feelings,
and thoughts were supposed to be carefully hidden from sight.34
Since inward politeness was based on inner goodness and morality, in this
tradition the body was seen as essentially transparent; it would honestly and
inevitably reﬂect a person’s inner self on its surface for everybody to see—be
that inner self either virtuous or depraved. Therefore, internalist politeness
writers wished to polish people’s manners chieﬂy by urging them to reﬁne their
souls through religion, compassion, and charity. In this way, as John Burton
explained to women, they could appear in their natural character, without fear
of displeasing:
If, then, you wish to behave so as to please, the ﬁrst object of your atten-
tion must be, to cultivate good dispositions and virtuous principles. You
will not, in that case, be ashamed of appearing in your true characters. You
will dare to be what you are. You will neither disguise your real senti-
ments; nor assume any manners but your own. This foundation for a good
character being thus laid, any little embellishments it may afterwards
require, on conformity to the external modes of politeness, may soon and
easily be attained. But the last, without the ﬁrst, will be but a superﬁcial
covering for a depraved or a weak mind.35
Thus, according to internalist rhetoric, the locus of adopting polite manners
was not the body, but the mind. Since the body was transparent to the point of
painful honesty, it would be useless, in the moralist view, to try to polish
external manners without inner virtue.
This apparent tension, extensively debated as it was by eighteenth-century
politeness theorists, reveals itself to be, upon a closer examination, only a super-
ﬁcial, or rather, rhetorical diﬀerence. When we compare the conduct books that
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represent these two conceptions of politeness, we immediately notice that the
externalists were not the only ones to give a tremendous amount of practical
advice on correct bodily movements; indeed, the internalists did just the same—
even though it would be logical to assume that internalist writers would have
seen deliberate manipulation of the body as useless, or even deceitful. Never-
theless, even the most moralist internalist writers engaged in the discourse of
bodily manipulation. Reverend James Fordyce, for example, wished that ‘a young
woman, ambitious of regulating her appearance, as well as her dispositions and
deportment’, would model herself according to Christian principles.36 Thus,
internalist and externalist conduct books diﬀered very little in this respect; they
both focused on deﬁning ideal politeness through bodily practices.
It is crucial to notice, however, that the rhetorical invocation of internality as
the basis of all politeness and the body as its transparent reﬂector was the cause
of an insurmountable paradox and one of the most pervasive concerns of
politeness discourse. The moralist rhetoric of internality caused an unsolvable
contradiction between theory and practice regarding the position of the body.
Contemporary commentators from Locke to Chesterﬁeld agreed that politeness
needed to be physically visible to others; it was created and communicated
through stylising the body into diﬀerent acts and appearances.37 For externalists
this was not a problem, since their conception of politeness was based on the
careful manipulation of the body. Internalists, who had avowed the primacy of
the soul before the body, however, faced the problem of internal inconsistency
and hypocrisy. From this controversy stem, to a large extent, the concerns of
dishonesty, hypocrisy, and dissimulation, so extensive in eighteenth-century
politeness discourse. The internalist problem was that the body had a dual role;
it was simultaneously the active site of polite identity construction and the
passive mirror of individual polite identity. Therefore, it was constantly sub-
jected to two sets of demands. On the one hand, it needed to be mutable and
reshapeable, open to continuous moulding and redeﬁnition, in order to portray
the constantly changing ideals of politeness. On the other hand, it needed to be
an unwavering, truthful reﬂection of the inner self, a non-impressionable indi-
cator of personal politeness and morality. In other words, the body had to be
simultaneously both ﬂexible, cultivated, and malleable—and pristine, truthful,
and natural. For the Chesterﬁeldian branch, the body did not have this dual
purpose; it displayed politeness, of course, but it was never meant to be truthful,
since for the externalists, politeness was simply role play.38 For internalists,
however, the body had become fundamentally problematic, since it was not the
unchangeable mirror of the inner self, but also a means of shaping that inner self.
In other words, politeness required, despite internalists’ demands of natural-
ness, strict control of the body and all its movements, which made politeness
implicitly dishonest. Even if a woman appeared to be naturally open and
honest, this appearance would have been achieved artiﬁcially, through commu-
nicating the designed messages of openness through the body. This problem
was heightened for women by their extensive association with internal polite-
ness. Even internalist writers themselves expressed doubts about the possibility
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of absolute transparency. Hannah More, for example, thought that ‘the exterior
of gentleness is so uniformly assumed, and the whole manner is so perfectly
level and uni’ amongst well-bred women that ‘it is next to impossible for a
stranger to know any thing of their true dispositions by conversing with them’;
even their ‘very features are so exactly regulated, that physiognomy, which may
sometimes be trusted among the vulgar, is, with the polite, a most lying sci-
ence’.39 Thus, a polite and strictly regulated exterior was something that was
habitually expected from all elite women. A failure in this could lead into
public ridicule and condemnation—as in the case of Jane Gordon, Duchess of
Gordon, or Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, both of whose unguarded
behaviour was a popular topic of satire.
Even though the open display of true sentiments was gloriﬁed by sentimental
novels, control was needed to reﬁne those sentiments to meet the class-speciﬁc
requirements of polite society. Even if aristocratic dissimulation, masking cor-
rupt morality, was something that the middling majority of polite society
wanted to separate themselves from, easy transparency and undesigning art-
lessness were, in the end, characteristics associated with the lower classes—and,
therefore, to be held at arm’s length. As The Spectator commented in its issue
on May madness, ‘the Eﬀects of this Month on the lower part of the Sex, who
act without Disguise, are very visible’, urging ladies of quality to rise above
such base instincts.40 Similar identiﬁcation between transparency and low social
standing is made in Jane Austen’s Emma, where the illegitimate Harriet Smith,
an uneducated woman of dubious birth, is characterised by her artlessness and
simplicity, which the more cultivated heroine lacks.41
The question of control versus naturalness was, in many ways, the axis along
which the discourse of women’s politeness aligned. There was an inbuilt
demand for control, which the internalists did their best to try to camouﬂage by
discursive means, causing problems concerning honesty and hypocrisy. In Jenny
Davidson’s words, ‘the dominance of an ethos of self-command produced an
accompanying uneasiness that reveals itself in […] compulsive invocations of
hypocrisy’.42 In other words, hypocrisy was an irremovable, built-in feature
of feminine politeness, since women’s politeness was constructed through a play
of control and un-control, or natural and artiﬁcial, where the discursive need to
hide the organising principles of gendered politeness made hypocrisy obligatory.
The constant conﬂict between the rhetoric of natural femininity and the prac-
tices of constructed femininity created an unavoidable inconsistency between
the said and the done.
Dissimulation and Power: Strategic Opacity
Women’s politeness thus unfolds as an essentially hypocritical set of practices.
It advocated naturalness, even though it was based on conscious self-fashioning;
it positioned the female body simultaneously as the transparent and unerring
sign of an individual’s inner essence, and the canvas on which that essence was
painted and through which it was internalised. The practice of hypocrisy is
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directly linked to the dynamics of gendered and social power. According to
Jenny Davidson, hypocrisy was both a tool for the dominant party for securing
hegemony and, paradoxically, a means for the subordinate to leverage herself
into a more powerful position. Davidson argues that women eﬀectively took
advantage of the political possibilities oﬀered by hypocrisy, and laid claim to
‘the right to be hypocritical: to exert modesty, tact and self-control to a degree
that men could or would not’. Davidson thus discovers a duality in the polite-
ness discourse, which on the one hand advocated openness for women, but at
the same time not only allowed but ‘actively encouraged’ women ‘to cultivate
an unreadable quality in their relations with men and with society at large’.
Davidson asserts that ‘[h]owever desirable openness might be […], opacity is
tactically far more advantageous’.43 Indeed, despite their moralist rhetoric, sev-
eral didactic writers emphasised women’s need for caution and, if need be,
dissimulation. The anonymous Essay in Defence of the Female Sex (1696), often
attributed to Judith Drake, rebutted the notion of dissimulation as a female
‘blemish’, declaring it instead—if not strictly a ‘Vertue’—yet, ‘many times
absolutely necessary’ and a ‘main Ingredient in the Composition of Human
Prudence’.44 Indeed, as Fanny Burney wrote a hundred years later in Camilla—
a professed manifesto of openness, domesticity, and honesty—there were sup-
posedly two kinds of dissimulation: reprehensible hypocrisy and necessary dis-
cretion. ‘The ﬁrst is a vice; the second a conciliation to virtue. It is the bond
that keeps society from disunion; the veil that shades our weakness from
exposure, giving time for that interior correction, which the publication of our
inﬁrmities would else, with respect to mankind, make of no avail’.45 The Essay
in Defence of the Female Sex claimed that women as the weaker sex needed to
‘live with so much Caution and Circumspection, in regard to their own secur-
ity, that their Thoughts and Inclinations may not be seen so naked, as to expose
them to the Snares, Designs, and Practices of crafty Knaves’; otherwise they
would become ‘a Prey to every designing Man’.46 Thus, dissimulation was an
important tactic of sociability, especially for women, whose range of life and
means of managing their person were narrower than men’s, while their reputation
was all the more easily compromised.
Some writers went a step further and recommended unashamed hypocrisy as
a female strategy to power. The Marquis of Halifax, for one, had a very prac-
tical attitude towards clever women usurping familial power from an unsus-
pecting husband. In his conduct book, he presented several diﬀerent cases of
husbands, advising women how best to use men’s weaknesses to appropriate
their traditional patriarchal power, while maintaining the appearance of a sub-
missive wife. A ‘Cholerick, or Ill-humour’d’ husband, for example, was best
handled by manipulating his passions through careful ﬂattery. A drunk husband
was, although disconcerting and tiresome, easily taken advantage on; for ‘where
the Man will give such frequent Intermissions of the use of his Reason, the Wife
insensibly getteth a Right of Governing in the Vacancy, and that raiseth her
Character and Credit in the Family, to a higher pitch than perhaps could be
done under a sober Husband’.47 The type of husband that oﬀered most
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potential power for a clever woman was a ‘weak and incompetent’ one, since
the wife generally appeared all the more to her advantage when compared
against a foolish husband. Moreover, the husband’s lack of intellect would give
his shrewd wife—
the Dominion, if you will make the right use of it; it is Next to his being
dead, in which Case the Wife hath right to Administer; therefore be sure, if
you have such an Ideot, that none, except your self, may have the beneﬁt of
the forfeiture: Such a Fool is a dangerous Beast, if others have the keeping
of him; and you must be very undextrous if when your Husband shall
resolve to be an Ass, you do not take care he may be your Ass.48
Thus, Halifax clearly thought that artful management was not only acceptable,
but absolutely necessary for women to make their husbands ‘content to live
upon less unequal Terms’ within patriarchal marriage, or even to gain the
‘Right of Governing’ altogether.49 Noteworthy in Halifax’s treatise are the
strategies he recommends. ‘There must be Art in it, and a skilful Hand’, as well
as ‘a great deal of nice Care required to deal with a Man of this Complexion’.
The appearance of submission was crucial for a successful coup of familial
power in order not to ‘provoke the tame Creature to break loose, and to shew
his Dominion for his Credit, which he was content to forget for his Ease’.
Therefore, a clever woman would ‘do like a wise Minister to an easie Prince;
ﬁrst give him the Orders you afterwards receive from him’.50 And ﬁnally, ‘when
other Remedies are too weak’, he concluded, ‘a little Flattery may be admitted,
which by being necessary, will cease to be Criminal’.51 Thus, Halifax suggested
that women should unscrupulously resort to opaque tactics—careful ﬂattery
and skilful manoeuvring. This is, of course, essentially the notion of politeness
that Chesterﬁeld came to stand for some decades later—namely, that politeness
is ‘the art of pleasing and thus of advancing one’s own interest in the context of
satisfying that of others’, as Lawrence Klein puts it.52 In this way, women could
use politeness strategically to gain power.
Indeed, as the previous chapter’s discussion on women’s subordinate position
illustrated, women used such means as the rhetoric of submission to negotiate
both their immediate and long-term aims with their fathers, husbands, and
other superiors. However, women used also much more straightforwardly
hypocritical strategies to secure their share of power. Fanny Burney is a case in
point. Her manoeuvring to get her own way in the case of her lengthened visit
to the Thrales, for example, required her to pay lip service to both her father
and the Thrales; after assuring her father that she was more than ready to come
home and having, indeed, managed to secure permission from the Thrales to do
so, she did her best to convince Hester Lynch Thrale of the very opposite in her
next letter:
not the less have I thought of or regretted my ever dear, ever kind & most
sweet Mrs. Thrale!—but, as I am come, after many absences, to a Family
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so deservedly beloved by me, I am determined niether to sour my Friends
nor myself by encouraging a repining spirit, but now to be happy as I can
with them, & hope ere long to be again so with You. 53
Thus, Burney used a certain amount of hypocrisy to balance between the two
authorities who had the power over her immediate future and whereabouts.
Burney’s social position combined with the fact that she happened to be a
woman prompted her into hypocrisy also on other occasions. When writing her
debut novel Evelina, she wanted to escape the notoriety that automatically fol-
lowed a female author, not to mention the possible shame a badly written novel
would bring her and her family, by keeping the writing process and authorship
of the published novel a secret, even from her family; she only divulged it when
the novel was favourably received. ‘To be sure, the concealment of this aﬀair
has cost me no few Inventions, & must cost me many, many more’, Burney
wrote in her journal.54 Her sex was without a doubt one reason behind her
need for secrecy—for a woman, to be talked of very nearly implied notoriety in
itself—and it certainly made hiding her novel-writing all the more diﬃcult,
since she had no chance to claim time for herself without raising suspicions.55
Most of Evelina was, accordingly, written during the small hours of the night.
Elizabeth Montagu’s chameleon-like ability to assume diﬀerent masks according
to diﬀerent settings and audiences—discussed more closely in Chapter 5—is
another example of women’s hypocritical practices to gain freedom and power.
By putting on dissimulative identities, Montagu aimed to promote her aims:
reputation, politeness, networking, pleasing others, and the like.
In practice, honesty and sincerity acted more as rhetorical catchphrases that
women used to construct desired images of themselves than actual guidelines of
behaviour. Openness was presented by them as their true character, and
hypocrisy was vehemently disavowed. ‘What an abominable vice is hypocrisy!’
exclaimed Elizabeth Montagu to William Freind, and expressed a lofty wish to
preserve her heart uncorrupted enough to ‘abhor deceit in myself’ and ‘avoid it
in others’.56 Indeed, none of these women presented dissimulation in a favour-
able light; they despised it in others, and forswore it themselves. In fact, they
went to great lengths to justify their dissimulative behaviour by evoking images
of their natural inclinations towards absolute honesty. For example, Fanny
Burney excused her dishonesty in the matter of keeping her authorship of Eve-
lina a secret by declaring that such falsehood was repugnant to her sincere dis-
position; ‘perhaps no body can have a more real & forcible detestation of
falsehood & of Equivocating than myself; but in this particular case, I have no
alternative’, she wrote.57 Similarly, when Mary Delany chose to hide the nature
of her true (negative) feelings towards her ﬁrst husband, she passed her decep-
tion oﬀ as a one-time exception: ‘As my nature was very sincere, this dissim-
ulation was painful to me, but I think I may venture to aﬃrm that I never
deceived him in anything else’.58 Elizabeth Montagu congratulated the Freinds
for the birth of their daughter declaring that they were now able to educate her
properly by ‘mak[ing] them teach her it is much easier to be what one shou’d
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be, than to seem what one is not’; however, she simultaneously admitted that
the ideals of this feminine transparency were rarely adhered to in real life. In
fact, Montagu stated that girls’ common education neglected the principles of
naturalness: ‘aﬀectation & absurd customs are often made their tutoress, &
their manners are all art’, to the point where ‘Dissimulation is look’d upon by
many fathers & mothers as an Accomplishment’.59
Catherine Talbot was slightly more straightforward in her journal, where she
confessed that the demands sociable decorum posed on women quite often
required hypocrisy. Since women were forced into a stationary life where their
responsibility—as the primary social entertainers of the household—was to
politely receive whoever happened to pass through the door, disregarding their
own present state of mind and occupation, good manners in practice equalled
hypocrisy. Talbot wrote, regarding an instance when ‘some Visitresses came in
very mal a propos & took away a good hour & half’, that ‘However they
meant a Civility, are good sort of Women & Cheerful, had I felt ever so much
out of humour One must have disguised it, so as I hate Hypocrisy I thought it
the Shortest way to be heartily in good humour’.60 Thus, hypocrisy was a
strategy of feminine politeness—perhaps not the most admirable one, but
practical all the same. In Mary Delany’s case, her hypocritical practices were
quite eﬀectual; only the surprising and untimely death of her disagreeable drunk
of a husband prevented her from inheriting all his fortune and walking away
from an unhappy marriage a rich woman (Pendarves died before he had the
time to sign his new will).
In fact, Elizabeth Montagu, despite renouncing all hypocrisy in herself,
nevertheless put women’s need for dissimulation in the face of patriarchal
society into revealing words:
It is said by some writer who honoured women (and perhaps geese) less
than they deserve, that few women have the virtues of an honest man. If it
be so, a little of the blame must fall to the share of the men, who are more
easily deluded than persuaded into any compliance. This makes the women
have recourse to artiﬁce to gain power, which, as they have gained by the
weakness or caprice of those they govern, they are afraid to lose by the
same kind of qualities.61
According to Montagu, women’s need for dishonesty rose out of their sub-
jugated position, aggravated by men’s inconsistency towards them. She also
underlined women’s unoﬃcial power, which was speciﬁcally gained through
putting on deceptive appearances. ‘I imagine Bishops as well as women (both
wear petticoats and a character of gentleness) command while seeming to
submit’, she wrote in a humorous analogy, ‘“and win their way by yielding to
the tyde”’.62
Thus, women’s power was essentially hypocritical, gained through indirect
inﬂuence in circumstances where direct usurping of power would have been a
violation against normative femininity. Having recourse to stealth, women
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could maintain their ideal appearances of passive and honest femininity while
managing their aﬀairs actively behind the scenes. As Jenny Davidson argues,
hypocrisy was a conscious tactic of the inferior ‘to get what they can’—that is,
an important tactic of survival for people in positions of patronage and depen-
dence, and, as such, an inseparable element of women’s social interaction.63
Thus, women, being subjected to a patriarchal order of society, did not have
the luxury of undisguised honesty, but needed to measure their actions against
appearances. By masking their true ambitions, women could use insincerity and
dissimulation as a means to power. According to Davidson, sincerity of com-
munication was possible only between equals.64 John Stuart Mill, arguing for
equality between men and women, pointed out in the nineteenth century that
‘authority on the one side and subordination on the other prevent perfect con-
ﬁdence’, and that ‘the position of looking up to another is extremely unpropitious
to complete sincerity and openness with him’.65 In other words, the patriarchal
social system worked, paradoxically, eﬀectively against the heterosocial ideal of
polite sociability, discouraging the reciprocal openness and honesty in practice
which it advocated in principle.
Problematic Dress: Extension of Body and Mirror of Soul
Lady Pomfret […] honoured me in full Theatre with a Curtsie whose Gracious-
ness is undescribable […]. Her Dress was Grave & Plain & struck me with the
Idea of Propriety.
Catherine Talbot to Jemima Yorke, Marchioness Grey, 13 July 175666
Dress was a crucial part of a proper polite appearance and, as such, a good
example of the manipulation of the body necessary for the production of ideal
femininity. Carefully chosen attire was one of the most important indicators of
eighteenth-century politeness, for men as well as for women. Indeed, clothing,
along with other forms of material culture, was a crucial part of polite self-
fashioning.67 Social status is expressly communicated through clothing, and its
role was accentuated in polite society, which aimed at the sort of social inclu-
siveness where a membership of the polite elite did not depend on rank but
could be acquired through a performance of shared ideas of taste, decorum, and
reﬁnement—in which a genteel attire was naturally included. Politeness writers
generally described the proper gentlewoman’s dress in terms of modesty, easi-
ness, elegance, and naturalness; ‘elegant simplicity’ was the most often used
attribute.68 Clothing was thus seen as a language through which individuals
could create diﬀerent kinds of meanings not only of their polite status, but also of
their internal qualities.69 As John Bennett warned women, ‘though dress, in itself,
is no essential quality, we are induced to judge more of your real character and
disposition from it, than you are apt to imagine’—
We fancy it, in its diﬀerent modiﬁcations, a mark of good sense, delicacy
and discretion, or of the very opposite defects. Every sensible woman,
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therefore, will study it so far, as not to subject herself to unfavourable
constructions. She will endeavor to convince every beholder, that she
knows the proper medium betwixt a ridiculous profusion, and a total
want, of ornament; that she can tissue plainness with elegance; that she
does not wish to seduce by her appearance, but only to please; that she has
cultivated her mind, much more than her person, and placed the highest
value, not on the outward, perishable casket, but the diamond within. 70
In fact, as Jennie Batchelor claims, a woman’s dress was thought to reveal not
only her wealth, social and marital status, and level of taste, but also her
morals.71 Therefore, a woman’s dress was a mirror of her soul, and, as such, an
extension of the internalist transparent body.72 Roland Barthes has famously
argued that clothing always serves a dual purpose: on the one hand covering
and protecting the body, and on the other hand working as a sign, carrying
messages and constructing meaning.73 Accordingly, a woman’s dress was simul-
taneously an opaque cover of her body and a transparent looking glass into her
inner self. In this way, a woman’s apparel reﬂected the same ambiguities as her
body, which also served simultaneously as a means of both constructing and
reﬂecting identity.
However, if dress constituted a language, capable of being manipulated by its
wearers and read by those who observed them, it was a form of language that
was ‘exceptionally unstable, elusive and ambiguous, easy to manipulate and
easier still to misinterpret’.74 The ambiguity of dress is manifest in Mary Delany’s
description of her friends’ ball gowns in a letter to her sister:
Lady Dysart, Miss Dashwood, and I went together. My clothes you know.
I was curled, powdered, and decked with silver ribbon, and was told by
critics in the art of dress that I was well dressed. Lady Dysart was in scarlet
damask gown, facings and robings embroidered with gold and colours, her
petticoat white satin, all covered with embroidery of the same sort, very
ﬁne and handsome, but her gaiety was all external, for at her heart she is
the most wretched virtuous woman that I know! The gentle Dash was in
blue damask, the picture of modesty, and looked excessively pretty.75
Delany unceremoniously read her friends’ moral qualities from their garments,
but while the gentle Catherine Dashwood was a ‘picture of modesty’ in her blue
dress, Lady Dysart’s embroidered ﬁnery Delany deemed ‘external’ only. Thus,
clothes could be read as both a direct indication of internal qualities, or as a
mask-like disguise of one’s inner personality. As Delany described Lady Cov-
entry later, she ‘is a ﬁne ﬁgure and vastly handsome’, adding that her ‘dress was
a black silk sack, made for a large hoop, which she wore without any, and it
trailed a yard on the ground; she had on a cobweb laced handkerchief, a pink
satin long cloke, lined with ermine, mixed with squirrel skins’, but ‘her person
at present is under disguise’.76 Indeed, semiotic ambiguity plagued especially
severely the eighteenth-century debate over dress, causing anxiety particularly
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when women’s attire was concerned.77 The possibility for multiple interpreta-
tions both aided and vexed women in their performances of normative polite-
ness, since the fact that the readings of their dress could vary greatly from one
interpreter to another meant they had only a limited control over the meanings
their dress conveyed. Accordingly, the same dress could be taken to be either
too modest or too frivolous—an indication of moral purity or of false prudery.
The concern over the capacity of clothes to deceive grew as the eighteenth
century progressed, when the discourse of inward politeness became more
inﬂuential while fashion became ever more pervasive and accessible.78 In the
context of inward politeness, based on the expectation that appearance was a
direct guide to an individual’s personality, the inherent unreliability of clothing
was, of course, deeply troubling, especially since it rendered women’s moral
status practically impossible to determine from the outside. Therefore, writers
called for honesty in dressing. Honesty in clothes was interpreted as dressing
according to one’s gender, wealth, social status, nationality, and especially
morals. According to James Fordyce, there ‘ought ever to be a manifest diﬀer-
ence between the attire of a virtuous woman, and that of one who has
renounced every title to the honourable name’.79 Dressing virtuously, however,
proved a diﬃcult task, since the dissimulative potential of modest clothing
could easily lead to accusations of hypocrisy. Indeed, as Fordyce complained,
‘the most unchaste dispositions’ so often hid ‘under the mask of an attire the
most modest’ that it was no longer possible for a virtuous young woman to
dress modestly without getting accused of aﬀectation.80 Modest female attire
was thus simultaneously deemed to be both ideal and deceptive.
Moreover, modest dress was thought to tell such a moral and virtuous tale of
a woman that it was, paradoxically, viewed as a potential allurement. Samuel
Richardson’s Pamela illustrates this belief; Pamela deliberately puts on a
‘homespun gown’ and an ‘ordinary cap’, wanting to reﬂect her lowly status,
emphasise her chastity, and discourage the advances of her employer, Mr B. Mr
B., however, ﬁnds her even more enchanting in her new garb which he inter-
prets as a sign of her innocent femininity.81 Contemporary critics of Pamela
accused Pamela of false humility; they thought that Pamela dressed down
deliberately to seduce her master by her seeming modesty and faked virtue.82
Modest dress thus carried both meanings of female chastity and sexual enticement,
and could be construed in either way.
In addition to faked morals, social status and wealth could also be counter-
feited by a clever outﬁt.83 The increasing availability of aﬀordable fashion not
only enabled the creation of a polite society that was not dictated by rank; it
simultaneously posed a threat to polite society and the middling sorts by ﬁnding
its way to the wardrobes of the lower classes, as well. Indeed, one of the most
common complaints of the eighteenth-century was the bitter observation that
the mistress and her maid dressed so alike that they were practically indis-
tinguishable.84 Accordingly, dressing above one’s class was vigorously con-
demned; John Burton claimed that it would ‘be absurd for the Tradesman to
put on the habit of a Nobleman; or the Woman, whose fortune is small, to
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aﬀect the appearance of a Lady of rank’.85 Polite dress code thus showcases the
use of politeness as simultaneously a means of creating a shared polite identity
and maintaining a hierarchical diﬀerence of rank; even and perhaps especially
amongst the polite themselves, hierarchical diﬀerence in dress was to be scru-
pulously maintained, and lavishly luxurious dressing by women of the middling
sort was particularly strongly disapproved.86 The requirement for honesty
applied also to age. The Ladies Calling warned that all ‘superannuated virgins’
who endeavoured to ‘disguise their age, by all the impostures and gaieties of a
youthful dress and behaviour’ would unfailingly be exposed ‘to scorn and cen-
sure’.87 The Female Tatler joined in the ridicule of old women in bright clothes,
claiming that ‘nothing is more disagreeable and ridiculous’ than seeing old
women ‘aﬀect the gay, youthful airs of their daughters’.88 In this way, the
power to deﬁne the ‘propriety’ of dress was used to try to discipline women
into modesty and humility, the emblems of feminine submission.
Dressing according to gender boundaries was, of course, the most important
polite requirement. This was also seen as a question of honesty; women dres-
sing in masculine clothes were displaying qualities they did not, in reality, pos-
sess. ‘Why should the lovely Camilla deceive us in more Shapes than her own
[…]? The Dress and Air of a Man are not well to be divided; and those who
would not be content with the Latter, ought never to think of assuming the
Former’, reproached The Spectator women who ‘dress themselves in a Hat and
Feather, a Riding-coat and a Perriwig, […] in imitation of the smart Part of the
opposite Sex’.89 Addison and Steele were amongst the most vociferous critics of
the ‘follies’ of female dress, and were particularly keen to advocate gender-
appropriate clothing. The Spectator regularly attacked women’s riding habits
featuring breeches, mocking female riders as ‘Amazons’, ‘Hermaphrodites’,
‘Female Cavaliers’, and ‘Monsters’.90 Similarly, John Bennett complained that a
masculine habit unsexed women to an alarming degree:
The nearer you approach to the masculine in your apparel, the further you
will recede from the appropriate graces and softness of your sex. […] The
riding habits, particularly, that have been so fashionable, and even made
their appearance at all publick places, conceal every thing that is attractive
in a woman’s person, her ﬁgure, her manner, and her graces. They wholly
unsex her, and give her the unpleasing air of an Amazon, or a virago. […]
we [men] daily feel the unnaturalness of the [garb]. We forget that you are
women in such a garb, and we forget to love.91
Thus, masculine garb made women’s gender questionable, rendering them unna-
tural and inhuman. Indeed, according to Addison, ‘[a]ll that needs to be desired
of [women] is, that they would be themselves, that is, what Nature designed
them’.92 Of course, the equation between fashion and nature eﬀectively reveals
the artiﬁcial and arbitrary nature of polite gender construction. Clothes are as far
removed from nature as possible; being entirely fashioned and artiﬁcial, they are
wholly un-‘natural’. Thus, assigning clothes, empty of all gendered meaning in
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themselves, any sort of naturalised gendered essence showcases the artiﬁciality of
gender construction; similar to the ‘inherent’ femininity of a piece of clothing, the
essentialised characteristics of femininity—softness, meekness, modesty, and
chastity, for example—were ﬁctitious, discursive fabrications.
The anxiety provoked by dressing stems to a great extent from the complex
role dress played in eighteenth-century notions of identity—and especially
gender identity. Laura Gowing has argued that clothes were a strong feature of
complaints against women, since ‘[h]ats, hair and clothes were fundamental to
early modern demeanour’ and contemporaries understood them to be ‘part of
the embodied self’.93 Indeed, early modern ideas of gender and sex were still
inﬂuential in the eighteenth century. Since the division between sex and gender
was not biologically aligned, many such qualities that modern people would
deem cultural expressions of gender were, in fact, considered eﬀectively to make
gender in the same way as physical features do. As Will Fisher argues, clothes
played a key role in the process of early modern gender construction, and were,
therefore, meaningful in ways beyond mere external expression of sex, status,
or wealth. Indeed, clothing was often seen as ‘integral to a person’s identity’.94
According to Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass, clothes were thought to
have the power to ‘deeply’ make an individual—to ‘permeate the wearer, fash-
ioning him or her within’ and, thus, to ‘inscribe themselves upon a person who
comes into being through that inscription’. Jones and Stallybrass point out that
this early modern understanding about clothes ‘undoes the opposition of inside
and outside, surface and depth’.95
Accordingly, assuming identities through dressing in the early modern period
was not simply a masquerade-like external play with superﬁcial roles, but
instead involved deeper questions of personal identity. These early modern
ideas of identity and clothing still inﬂuenced the discourse of proper dress in the
eighteenth century. This is one reason why women’s masculine apparel was
particularly strongly condemned; even if eighteenth-century writers no longer
wholly believed that dressing in the opposite sex’s clothes could result in a
permanent change of an individual’s sex, as in previous centuries, they were
nevertheless deeply concerned about the ‘unnatural’ and ‘unsexing’ eﬀects of a
manly garb worn by a woman.96 Similarly, internalist writers’ claims that dress
reﬂected unerringly the inner self can be seen to rise from these early modern
notions, where there was no clear division between the internal and the external,
but fashioning the exterior eﬀectively constructed the self within.
Of course, the abundance of reproachful comments on women’s indecorous,
dishonest, and in other ways unsuitable dress indicates that women of polite
society did not always adhere to the dress code deemed proper and natural in
didactic literature. Indeed, not all fashion was polite, and not all gentlewomen
dressed according to the rules of polite decorum and propriety. The more
secure a woman’s membership in polite society was—established through rank,
family, money, or other such means—the freer she was to break the rules of
polite dress. Accordingly, Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire could aﬀord to
appear in the park, observed by Fanny Burney, with one shoe ‘down at Heel’,
86 Hypocrisy and Strategic Dissimulation
her cap ‘awry’, her cloak ‘rusty & powdered’, and the trimming of her coat ‘in
some places unsewn’ with no damage done to her polite reputation.97 Persons
of rank and consequence could similarly garb themselves in excessive ﬁnery
despite its connotations with immorality and vulgarity. In fact, in many cases,
the dictates of fashion women followed were speciﬁcally contrary to the ideals
of polite decorum—as in James Gillray’s satirical print criticising the unseemly
revealing cuts and sheer fabrics of ladies’ fashion (Figure 3.1).
Women’s interest in fashion was a paradoxically fraught issue; simulta-
neously ‘natural to them, inherent in their very femininity, it is also something
that must be zealously monitored by men’, as Shawn Lisa Maurer argues.98
Women’s ties to dressing were tighter and more manifold than men’s. Women
were (then as now) thought to have a natural aﬃnity to dress; therefore, a
woman ‘may be fairly allowed a little more attention to ornament, than would
be pardonable in the other sex. Nature, through all her works, has lavished
more external brilliancy, colouring and plumage on the female’, according to
John Bennett.99 Despite its naturalness, women’s interest in fashion was also
considered highly problematic. As Lawrence Klein notes, eighteenth-century
periodicals represented women as slaves to fashion, in need of being ‘saved
from their obsession with fashion and ornament’.100 Klein argues that this fear
of fashion reﬂected a more general anxiety over luxury and consumption, highly
problematic especially for both the men and women of the growing middle
classes, for whom consumption was simultaneously a status symbol and a
moral dilemma.101 Women’s role in debates over luxury was central—as well as
ambiguous—since they were regarded as both the emblems of the nation’s
morality and the engines of its economy.102 Even though excessive ﬁnery was a
problem for men as well—as demonstrated by the caricaturisation of the
eﬀeminate macaroni and dandy—because of women’s essentialised association
with fashion, attacks on the sumptuousness of dress can be interpreted as
simultaneous attacks on the female sex, and as attempts to discipline women
into social and moral conformity.103
Women were stereotypically represented spending immoderate amounts of
both money and time on their clothing, which was both wasteful and morally
detrimental. According to Aileen Ribeiro, it was a common belief that immo-
derately fashionable women would also be inclined to a life of general frivolity
and immorality. Indeed, the ‘folly’ of fashion was thought to ‘produce many
other follies, an entire derangement of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of
duties, bad mothers, a general corruption of both sexes’.104 Accordingly, the
moralist Catherine Talbot dutifully reproached herself for spending almost two
hours in such frivolous exercise—‘Dressing from 1 to 2 ¾. Fie upon Dress!’—
which made her ‘[v]exed not a little at being as usual a ¼ too late’. And yet, as
she continued, she was comforted that her eﬀort made her mother pleased with
her dress; ‘she does not love to see me awkward & attending to this Idle (Yet
not unnecessary) Matter is obeying Her. Well then is not that Time well spent?
Is it not my Duty?’105 Talbot’s ambivalent relationship with dress reﬂects the
complexity of dress as a female accomplishment on a more general level.
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Figure 3.1 James Gillray, Ladies Dress, As It Soon Will Be (London: Hannah Humphrey
1796). Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University
Elegant appearance was the sign of polite reﬁnement, but the eﬀort that went
into acquiring it should be carefully hidden behind a sort of moralist sprezzatura.
Mary Delany excelled in this skill perhaps better than anyone. In her friends’
eyes, ‘dress and the adorning of the person that takes up so great a part of that of
most of our sex, only employs so much of hers as the exactest neatness requires’,
leaving her ample time to cultivate her numerous virtues—and yet, in reality, her
letters reveal that dressing took up a signiﬁcant part of both her time and inter-
est.106 Studied and fantastic clothing was not only an indication of lacking
sprezzatura, but it also signalled an immodest desire to be watched, which was
problematic for many internalist writers, who were concerned about women’s
visibility. As James Fordyce explained, the ‘love of ﬁnery naturally prompts the
passion to be seen, that is, to be admired; for between these two a conceited
young creature makes no distinction’.107 Therefore, women were advised to garb
themselves with modest manners instead of ﬂashy clothes.108
Sensibility and Politeness
Her pure and eloquent Blood
Spoke in her Cheeks, and so distinctly wrought,
That one would almost say her Body thought.
The Spectator (1711)109
The cult of sensibility, one of the most dominant cultural trends of the latter
half of the eighteenth century, was perhaps the most extreme manifestation of
the problematic of the transparent, speaking body.110 As John Mullan has
argued, sensibility was a language of feeling that was communicated ﬁrst and
foremost through the body—and that body was manifestly a female one, as
women were characterised as the naturally soft and emotional sex.111 According
to the sentimentalist ideal, the body of a woman could be read as a book,
conveying the signs of her sensibility. For example, The Female Quixote (1752)
presented a woman telling a story by ‘every Change of [her] Countenance; […]
[her] Smiles, Half-smiles, Blushes, Turnings pale, Glances, Pauses, Full-stops,
Interruptions; the Rise and Falling of [her] Voice; every Motion of [her] Eyes;
and every Gesture [she has] used’.112 Sensibility could thus not be displayed by
words—it was to be acted out through the body. As John Bennett asserted, an
ideal woman ‘never harangues upon, or vaunts a superior sensibility, but fre-
quently displays no inconsiderable share of it, by involuntary emotions’.113
Sensibility was thought to operate through the nervous system, and its most
important signs were thought to be spontaneous tears, sighs, palpitations,
trembles, and faintings. In Anti-Pamela, the vocabulary of sensibility is descri-
bed in a woman whose ‘Colour would come and go, her Eyes sparkle, grow
Languid, or overﬂow with Tears, her Bosom heave, her Limbs tremble; she
would fall into Faintings, or appear transported, and as it were out of her-
self’.114 Since these kinds of bodily acts were supposedly involuntary, they were
thought to reﬂect genuine feminine sensibility.115 In this sense, the theory
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behind sensibility was based on the assumption that the body was, indeed, a
transparent entity, truthfully reﬂecting a person’s inner emotions. Women were
thought to have a natural tendency towards sensibility, since their bodies were
frailer than men’s bodies—and, following the principles of transparency, a
sentient body equalled a sentient soul.116 Then again, the rule applied also the
other way around; a woman could not be considered ideally feminine, if her
body did not display her deep sentiments.
The heyday of sensibility has often been set to the years 1760 to 1790, but the
movement inﬂuenced early eighteenth-century culture particularly through its
close links to politeness. Contemporaries both acknowledged the culture of
sensibility and saw it as radically diﬀerent from previous times. ‘The present
age may be termed, by way of distinction, the age of sentiment, a word which,
in the implication it now bears, was unknown to our plain ancestors’, explained
Hannah More in 1777.117 Sensibility had, however, longer European-wide roots.
As Jukka Sarjala has argued, already during the seventeenth century the Eur-
opean elite had begun to emphasise the importance of displaying certain emo-
tions as an indication of reﬁnement.118 Conceptions of emotions, their origin,
and their proper mode of expression changed during the eighteenth century,
giving birth to the age of sensibility. The seventeenth-century idea that bodily
humours caused uncontrollable aﬀects was partly replaced by a less mechanistic
and more reﬁned theory of sentiments, bringing forward a more subtle and
delicate scale of emotional expression. Emotions became very personal and, in a
sense, also internal—in a way that diﬀered considerably from early modern
aﬀect theories. An individual was now thought not only to be able but also to
be responsible for controlling and reﬁning their own emotions. Uncontrollable
passions came to be seen as disorders, or even illnesses.119 In other words, the
culture of sensibility brought forward a new ideal of individualised emotional
expression, based on control, propriety, and reﬁnement—or, very much on the
ideals of eighteenth-century politeness. This new ideal was discussed in novels
and conduct books from as early on as the 1710s; Joseph Addison, for example,
deﬁned modesty in The Spectator as ‘exquisite Sensibility’, or ‘a kind of quick
and delicate Feeling in the Soul’.120
Women’s assimilation with sentiment was also an eighteenth-century devel-
opment. Early modern aﬀect theory had regarded women as naturally less pas-
sionate than men, because of their naturally cool bodies; ‘nature hath
befriended women with a more cool and temperate constitution, put less of ﬁre
and consequently of choler, in their compositions; so that their heats of that
kind are adventitious and preternatural’, claimed The Ladies Calling from
1673.121 In the new sentimental system, however, women became the emotional
sex—and, accordingly, also the more moral (and, therefore, more polite) one;
women’s natural sensibility automatically made them act pleasantly, modestly,
and pleasingly in a company.122 In fact, by the 1760s, sensibility was thought to
be an essential feminine characteristic, complementing politeness; without
‘charming sensibility’, claimed Hannah More, ‘though a woman may be worthy,
yet she can never be amiable’.123
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Sensibility had much in common with politeness. According to Philip Carter,
late eighteenth-century writers often even used the terms sensibility and politeness
as synonyms.124 Paul Goring has argued that the development of politeness in
eighteenth-century Britain involved a ‘positive valorisation of somatically dis-
played passions’, and that politeness was as much a performance of sensitivity
and emotions as civil manners.125 Sensibility was commonly associated with
gentleness, sympathy, obliging spirit, and general good-will towards others, and
linked to politeness through the pleasing of others; since polite persons should
regulate their behaviour to please their present company, they required the ability
to read their companions’ thoughts and feelings in order to assimilate themselves
to them. This was thought to be possible through sensibility and the ability to
sympathise that came with it. Since sensibility was deﬁned as inner goodness and
sympathy towards others, it was closely linked to morality, as well. David Hume
thought that morality was an eﬀect of sentiment; if a person could feel compas-
sion towards others, their behaviour would automatically be moral.126 Thus,
sensibility shared much with the ideals of inward politeness in terms of morality,
inner goodness, and gentleness; then again, it was closely bound to the aims of
external politeness through the desire to please, as well. Moreover, sensibility
served to sharpen the gender division of politeness. Even though sensibility had a
crucial impact on notions of ideal masculinity, Jane Rendall and Rosalind Carr
have emphasised the importance of self-command for the man of feeling, while
John Dwyer has, in addition, demonstrated the perseverance of older polite vir-
tues, such as courage, stoicism, and public spirit.127 For women, sensibility
brought about the valorisation of soft and tearful femininity which made them
pleasing as women rather than polite individuals.
However, sensibility’s links to politeness are more complicated than scholars
have generally recognised. The complexity arises from issues connected to
truthfulness and is, therefore, particularly visible in women’s politeness that
had a fraught relationship with honesty to begin with. Even though sensibility
and inward politeness were tightly intertwined through ideas of morality and
inner goodness, their relationship was muddled by the fact that sensibility was
also a set of established practices that started to drift apart from their original
ideological frame, and began a life of their own as status symbols of ‘true
femininity’. The original idea was that the bodily signs of sensibility would be
produced automatically by the sentient body; however, given their high status
as emblems of true womanhood, women often imitated them in order to pro-
duce the appearance of ideal femininity. Thus, the controversy between truth-
fulness and dissimulation played a key role in the display of sensibility. ‘The
emotions of the mind often appear conspicuous in the countenance and
manner,’ Mary Wollstonecraft wrote in her early conduct book: ‘These emo-
tions, when they arise from sensibility and virtue, are inexpressibly pleasing.
But it is easier to copy the cast of countenance, than to cultivate the virtues
which animate and improve it’.128 Indeed, outward signs could be deceiving;
The Spectator warned that ‘nothing is so fallacious as this outward Sign of
Sorrow, […] this Faculty of Weeping’.129
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Hannah More was convinced that faked sentimentality corrupted women’s
morals, since it encouraged women to adopt debauched manners and opinions
and hide them under a cloak of false sentiments:
Sentiment is the varnish of virtue to conceal the deformity of vice; and it is
not uncommon for the same persons to make a jest of religion, to break
through the most solemn ties and engagements, to practise every art of
latent fraud and open seduction, and yet to value themselves on speaking
and writing sentimentally. But this reﬁned jargon, which has infested letters
and tainted morals, is chieﬂy admired and adopted by young ladies of a
certain turn, who read sentimental books, write sentimental letters, and
contract sentimental friendships. 130
Practically minded, externalist conduct books were, once again, blamed for
setting the example for dishonest sensibility. Another, much more dangerous
source of false sensibility were novels. Hester Chapone, for example, was per-
suaded that sentimental novels corrupted the minds of young girls, making
them imitate the unnatural habits of novel heroines:
I think the greatest care should be taken in the choice of those ﬁctitious
stories that so enchant the mind; most of which tend to inﬂame the pas-
sions of youth, whilst the chief purpose of education should be to moderate
and restrain them. Add to this, that both the writing and sentiments of
most novels and romances are such as are only proper to vitiate your style,
and to mislead your heart and understanding. […] the admiration of
extravagant passions and absurd conduct, are some of the usual fruits
of this kind of reading; which, when a young woman makes it her chief
amusement, generally render her ridiculous in conversation, and miserably
wrong-headed in her pursuits and behaviour. […] I am persuaded that, the
indiscriminate reading of such kind of books corrupts more female hearts
than any other cause whatsoever.131
Hannah More agreed with Chapone, deﬁning true sensibility as ‘the enthusiasm
which grows up with a feeling mind, and is cherished by a virtuous education;
not that which is compounded of irregular passions, and artiﬁcially reﬁned by
books of unnatural ﬁction and improbable adventure’.132 Novels, however, did
not only serve to set a bad example, but also criticised false sentimentality quite
sharply. Jane Austen, for example, as a rule ridiculed women such as Mrs
Bennet (Pride and Prejudice) and Isabella Thorpe (Northanger Abbey) for
faking the symptoms of sensibility. Fanny Burney did the same in Evelina,
where an aﬀected lady received no sympathy for languishing on the sofa, grabbing
her salts, and being ‘nerve all over!’.133
False sentimentality was claimed to make real-life self-appointed romantic
heroines laughable in the eyes of polite society. Nature, insisted Hester Chapone,
was the best guide of feeling:
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There is nothing in which this self-deception is more notorious than in
what regards sentiment and feeling. Let a vain young woman be told that
tenderness and softness is the peculiar charm of the sex, that even their
weakness is lovely, and their fears becoming, and you will presently
observe her grow so tender as to be ready to weep for a ﬂy; so fearful, that
she starts at a feather; and so weak-hearted, that the smallest accident quite
overpowers her. Her fondness and aﬀection become fulsome and ridicu-
lous; her compassion grows contemptible weakness; and her apprehensive-
ness the most abject cowardice: for, when once she quits the direction of
Nature, she knows not where to stop, and continually exposes herself by
the most absurd extremes. Nothing so eﬀectually defeats its own ends as
this kind of aﬀectation: for though warm aﬀections and tender feelings are
beyond measure amiable and charming, when perfectly natural, and kept
under the due control of reason and principle, yet nothing is so truly dis-
gusting as the aﬀectation of them, or even the unbridled indulgence of such
as are real.134
Thus, aﬀected or excessive sentimentality could be antithetical to politeness,
despite the close ties between the two. Girls weeping uncontrollably, having
constant ﬁts, or fainting on every turn were tiresome company, more interested
in attention-seeking than in considerate pleasantness. Even real but excessive
sensibility was deemed inconvenient, as Hannah More stipulated, for ‘this
dangerous merit […] is very apt to lead those who possess it into incon-
veniencies from which less interesting characters are happily exempt’.135 True
sentiment, then, was thought to show itself without any special eﬀort. Mary
Wollstonecraft, for example, was convinced that all feeling ‘will appear if gen-
uine; but when pushed forward to notice, it is obvious vanity has rivalled
sorrow; and that the prettiness of the thing is thought of’.136
Therefore, to maintain polite sociability, sentimentality was to be, not
smothered, but regulated.137 Passions needed to be moderated to avoid giving
pain to fellow human beings—who, according to conduct writers, entered into
the distress of their companions through sympathy—and sentiments had to be
transformed into socially acceptable ones, expressed in a socially accepted
mode and volume.138 Indeed, as Barbara Rosenwein has inﬂuentially argued,
people live in cultural, social, and historical ‘emotional communities’ which
share particular norms of emotional expression and value.139 In eighteenth-
century England, the ideals of polite society discouraged rampant emotionality
in favour of reﬁned and controlled expressions of sentiment. Accordingly, the
ideals of sensibility needed to be reconciled with the dominant discourse of
behaviour—politeness. Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility (1811) is a good
example of this. Marianne Dashwood is the paragon of uncontrolled sensibility,
whereas her sister Elinor is politeness personiﬁed. Throughout the novel there is
a clearly stated struggle between these two types of conduct; Marianne follows
her excessive sentiments in everything, often breaking the codes of polite dec-
orum, whereas Elinor hides her true feelings to maintain her polite and pleasing
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exterior. In Austen’s words, ‘Marianne was silent; it was impossible for her to
say what she did not feel, however trivial the occasion; and upon Elinor there-
fore the whole task of telling lies when politeness required it, always fell’. In the
end, Elinor is pronounced the winner of the two, while Marianne, after nearly
literally killing herself by her uncontrollable emotions, reforms her character
after her sister’s model: her ‘feelings shall be governed’ and her ‘temper
improved’ through ‘rational employment and virtuous self-control’.140 Indeed,
the need for control was further heightened by the fear that indulging passions
could lead to disability or even death—a possibility that was often introduced
in sentimental novels, where pining heroines quite literally made themselves
fatally ill by indulging their excessive sentiments. The belief that ungoverned
feelings could lead to sickness or death was entertained in real life by, for
example, Fanny Burney, who asserted in her journal that dying of grief was
‘indeed […] a Death but too possible’, and was seriously concerned that her
friend Hester Lynch Thrale, madly in love with her children’s Italian music
tutor, Gabriele Piozzi, would ‘die of a broken Heart’.141
The requirement of emotional control was a problematic ideal. On the one
hand, it was needed to reﬁne the sentiments to suit the proper polite code of
expression. On the other hand, control could be used to produce dishonest signs
of sensibility, so dangerous to the aﬀections of men and, therefore, to the whole
patriarchal social order. Thus, well-managed bodies made it possible for
women to assert some power over men—and thereby their own lives as well.
They could advance their goals or secure their polite and social status by
channelling their true sentiments to approved emotional expression—or choose
to produce artiﬁcially the signs of sentient, ideal femininity. Either way, the act
of bodily manoeuvring was enabling and empowering—and therefore poten-
tially subversive. Then again, too good of a control over one’s feelings was
deemed unfeminine, as well. Falling an involuntary victim to one’s feelings was
a sign of true femininity. Sentimental illnesses, such as hysterics, vapours, and
melancholy, were such privileged signs of a frail physical frame that they have been
described as—often feigned—status symbols of reﬁned femininity in the eighteenth
century.142 The idea of transparency entailed a correspondence between the inner
and the external: a delicate (feminine) mind was thought to live in a delicate
(feminine) body. As John Gregory warned, men ‘so naturally associate the idea of
female softness and delicacy with a correspondent delicacy of constitution, that
when a woman speaks of her great strength, her extraordinary appetite, her ability
to bear excessive fatigue, we recoil at the description in a way she is little aware
of’; therefore, ‘though good health be one of the greatest blessings of life, never
make a boast of it, but enjoy it in grateful silence’.143
Power through Tears? Sensibility and Dissimulation
While the ideal of the soft and tearful woman was lauded in didactic literature,
women like Montagu, Talbot, Delany, and Burney tended to adopt a more
cautious attitude towards abundant sentimentality in their everyday lives.
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Bluestockings and other learned women were aspiring to break free from emo-
tionalised female stereotypes by asserting their rationality and, therefore, gen-
erally focused on the importance of self-restraint and respect towards the
conventions of sociability.144 Their critical views of sensibility were inﬂuenced
by the practical aspects of women’s lives as subordinate, which made trans-
parent sensibility less than desirable; instead, a certain degree of opacity was
required for successful manoeuvring in polite society. As Mary Wollstonecraft
wrote, the ‘being who can govern itself has nothing to fear in life’, while a
woman ruled by the tyranny of emotions is easily enslaved.145 The normative
ideal of sentimental femininity did not, however, leave these women wholly
untouched; Fanny Burney, for one, believed that delicacy of feeling was an
important female quality, and advocated this view in her sentimental novels.
Indeed, as with other polite virtues, women could pay lip service to the ideals of
sensibility to secure their social reputation while cautiously avoiding being led
astray by their sentiments in their everyday lives. They also ridiculed excessive
and false sentimentality as hypocritical, thus distancing their own, ‘truthful’
and ‘natural’ sensibility from accusations of dissimulation.
For Catherine Talbot, sensibility appeared a violation against propriety,
rather than a sign of ideal femininity. ‘That excess of sensibility is what no
Object in the World can render justiﬁable; be it Friend, Daughter, Lover, Lap
dog, every inclination is reasonable in its proper degree, & every one has its
bounds beyond which it is ridiculous or blame worthy’, she mused; ‘Those
violent emotions, those strong attachments, those eager impatiencies, those
tender indulged recollections struck me as something exceedingly wrong, &
unsuitable to human life’.146 Indeed, Talbot thought that the requirements of
politeness needed to be adhered to at all times, instead of giving way to unsui-
table and awkward displays of sentiment. When Bishop George Berkeley died,
Talbot commended his daughter Julia’s attempts of self-restraint: ‘It aﬀected
me extreamly to see the sweet girl whose passions are extremely lively […]
trying to conceal her Emotion, struggling with it to no purpose & the tears
trickling down her cheeks all the while she sat at dinner’.147 Julia’s visible fail-
ure to hold back her tears in the face of a real tragedy signalled, of course, also
the sincerity of her feeling. Talbot herself battled to overcome her recurring
gloom which she thought unprompted and, therefore, absurd—for ‘[i]n such a
World as this one should not by overreﬁned sensibilities make miseries where
there are none, but pass over all such feelings as lightly as one can’.148 Elizabeth
Carter she advised to ‘arm all your good sense and resolution to conquer the
worst enemy I know of’—a ‘nervous’ complaint (by which she meant a sensi-
bility-related disorder).149 ‘Spirits that have any thing of delicacy are easily and
strongly aﬀected, and inﬂuence the body so as to make it a very troublesome
companion, and I know nothing one would not do to avoid being nervous’.
Against this terrible fate Talbot recommended physical exercise ‘with a due
proportion of triﬂing and even merry idleness’.150
To minimise the risk of getting weighed down by her emotions, Talbot
carefully avoided dwelling on ‘aﬀecting Subjects’ or sentimental literature:
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‘Apres tout Je n’aimè pas trop les Tragedies, elles donnent trop aux Passions,
elles les representent trop importantes—elles alterent la belle Tranquillité—elles
font ressouvenir des plus desagréables Moments de la Vie’.151 Another one to
view sensibility as a result of immoderate reading habits was Elizabeth Mon-
tagu. ‘Miss C. you know thinks very abstractedly, free from all Interested
Considerations upon the aﬀairs of Love; see the Bad Consequences of studying
Romances more than Arithmetick’, she commented to the Duchess of Portland
on their mutual acquaintance—thus reﬂecting the widely held belief that
romantic novels spoiled young women’s character and sense of reality.152 Thus,
both Talbot and Montagu saw sensibility as something to be checked and
avoided rather than indulged. Indeed, as Felicity Nussbaum argues, the blue-
stocking circle attached great importance to governing one’s passions as an
attempt to escape the emotional female stereotype and strive towards morality
and rationality; one who ‘does not follow Virtue as by law establish’d, but
despises forms and follows sentiment’, remarked Montagu, operates according
to a ‘dangerous guide’.153
For Montagu, sentimental reading was connected to the wider case of
women’s rational education; she ﬁrmly believed that ‘[i]t is much better for a
young Lady to read the Characters of the Lucretius & Portias, than to deform
her mind with paragraphs of Crime: love: elopement etc.’154 In fact, Montagu
was a severe critic of women’s education, which she thought ‘too frivolous’ and
too focused on external accomplishments:155
The men laugh at us for our study of triﬄes when they are guilty of making
us turn our thoughts that way by never commending us for any thing else.
As our business is to please we should be elegant in triﬄes but to look
upon ‘em as accomplishments, but not as Virtues they should be rather the
Ornament than the Furniture of the mind.156
In a letter to the Duchess of Portland, she analysed the behaviour of a woman
who had ‘excellent sense and wit, but a want of softness in her manners’. In
Montagu’s opinion, ‘[t]his is of great consequence for a woman to keep oﬀ
disagreeable manners, for the world does not mind our intrinsic worth so much
as the fashion of us, and will not easily forgive our not pleasing’. Thus, Mon-
tagu’s opinion of a woman’s place in society comes close to Wollstonecraft’s,
who wrote of a woman being regarded as the ‘toy’ and ‘rattle’ of man. 157
Montagu continued:
The men suﬀer for their levity in this case, for in a woman’s education little
but outward accomplishment is regarded. […] I think it is much to the
credit and honour of untaught human nature that women are so valuable
for their merit and sense. Sure the men are very imprudent to endeavor to
make fools of those to whom they so much trust their honour and happi-
ness and fortune, but it is in the nature of mankind to hazard their peace to
secure power, and they know fools make the best slaves.158
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In short, Montagu criticised women’s education for only focusing on external
features, such as accomplishments and good manners, and leaving their intel-
lectual capacities untouched. The ultimate reason for this was, in Montagu’s
opinion, the patriarchal order of society, which allowed men to ‘secure’ their
‘power’ by leaving women uneducated and appreciating them only by their
external merits. In this sharp analysis, Montagu indeed comes close to such
proto-feminists as Mary Astell, Judith Drake, or Mary Wollstonecraft. The fact
that also Hannah More—another bluestocking but also an avowed con-
servative—voiced similar views on female education testiﬁes to the breadth of a
shared critical stance amongst intellectual women towards girls’ education.159
Montagu herself did not perform on the harpsichord or paint vases and thought
it ‘an unreasonable thing of people to expect me to be handy’.160 Instead, she
prided herself in her own, unusually ‘serious’ education, which gave her the
opportunity to think, write, and converse rationally.161
While Fanny Burney’s novels promoted feminine sensibility unashamedly, her
private views on the matter were more ambiguous. She was conscious of the
popularity sensibility was enjoying among the fashionable, and assessed it in an
ironical manner. She once joked with her friend, Samuel Crisp, about writing a
ﬂighty ‘Treatise upon politeness’ for the ediﬁcation of the masses, containing
‘all the newest fashioned regulations’:
‘In the ﬁrst place, you are never again to Cough. […] it [is] as much a mark
of ill breeding as it is to Laugh, which is a thing that Lord Chesterﬁeld has
stigmatized.’ […]
‘And pray,’ said Mr Crisp, making a ﬁne aﬀected Face, ‘may you
simper?’
‘You may smile, Sir,’ answered I. ‘But to laugh is quite abominable.’ […]
‘But pray, is it permitted,’ said Mr Crisp, very drily, ‘to Breathe?’
‘That is not yet, I believe, quite exploded.’ answered I, […] I shall only
tell you in general, that whatever is Natural, plain or easy, is entirely ban-
ished from polite Circles.’
‘And all is sentiment & Delicacy, hay Fannikin?’
‘No, Sir, not so,’ replied I, with due gravity, ‘sentiments & sensations
were the last fashion; they are now done with—they were laughed out of
use, just before laughing was abolished. The present Ton is reﬁnement;—
nothing is to be, that has been; all things are to be new polished, & highly
ﬁnished.’162
After thus mocking the fashion of sensitivity and delicacy, Burney nevertheless
described herself as sensitive and delicate. For her, though, there was a clear
distinction between true and faked sentiments. Burney saw herself, quite natu-
rally, as a representative of honest and artless sensibility; when she was sus-
pected of aﬀected delicacy, running away from a scene where a dog was
punished by beating, she became highly vexed and ‘took the trouble to try to
clear myself,—but know not how I succeeded’.163 Other women, however, she
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thought commonly guilty of exaggerated and downright fabricated sensibility.
Burney wrote down a penetrating analysis of the unauthentic delicacy of a new
acquaintance, one Miss Weston: ‘I was regaled with a Character equally ludi-
crous [as Miss Lewis’s], but much less entertaining,—for nothing would she talk
of but dear Nature, & nothing abuse but odious aﬀectation! She really would be
too bad for the stage, for she is never so content as when drawing her own
Character for other people’s as if on purpose to make one sick of it’. For Burney,
‘the extreme delicacy of Miss Weston’ made it ‘prodigiously fatiguing to converse
with her, as it is no little diﬃculty to keep pace with her reﬁnement in order to
avoid shocking her by too obvious an inferiority in daintihood & ton’.164
Burney was also well aware of the role sensibility played in women’s self-
fashioning, and how it brought them visibility. She observed some young ladies’
behaviour at a play:
Two Young Ladies who seemed about 18 sat yet above us, where [sic] so
much shocked by the Death of Douglas, that they both burst into a loud ﬁt
of roaring, like little Children,—& sobbed on afterwards for almost half
the Farce!—I was quite astonished […] but I suppose, […] they mean now
to attract the notice by way of bringing themselves into the World, & as
they are very young they think the best way to begin is by shewing their
sensibility. 165
A highly illustrative example of fabricated sensibility in Burney’s journals is
the case of Sophia Streatfeild (1755–1835). Streatfeild was a widely recog-
nised beauty and a member of Hester Lynch Thrale’s circle of friends. Thrale
soon had reason to be jealous of Streatfeild, as her husband, Henry Thrale
(1728–1781), became infatuated with her. Thrale wrote in her journal that
‘Mr Thrale is fallen in Love really & seriously with Sophy Streatﬁeld’—
but there is no wonder in that: She is very pretty, very gentle, soft &
insinuating; hangs about him, dances round him, cries when She parts from
him, squeezes his Hand slyly, & with her sweet Eyes full of Tears looks so
fondly in his Face—& all for Love of me as She pretends; that I can hardly
sometimes help laughing in her Face. A Man must not be a Man but an It
to resist such Artillery.166
Thrale’s opinion of Streatfeild as an artful woman who manipulated her looks
and manners for her own beneﬁt—mainly to gain admiration—received wider
recognition when, one afternoon, Hester Thrale urged Streatfeild to cry for no
other reason than to demonstrate to the company that she ‘had Tears at Com-
mand’.167 And indeed, this proved to be the case: ‘Now for the wonder of
wonders’, Burney wrote with astonishment, ‘two Crystal Tears came into the
soft Eyes of the S.S.,—& rolled gently down her Cheeks!—such a sight I never
saw before, nor could I have believed;—she oﬀered not to conceal, or dissipate
them,—on the contrary, she really contrived to have them seen by every body’.
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According to Burney, Streatfeild’s spectacle of voluntary tears was ‘stared, &
looked & re-looked again & again 20 Times ere we could believe our Eyes’.
Streatfeild herself, however, calmly wiped her eyes ‘as if nothing had happened’;
Burney wrote that ‘the S.S.’, as the Thrale crowd called her,
seemed, the whole Time, totally insensible to the numerous strange, &,
indeed, impertinent speeches which were made, & to be very well satisﬁed
that she was only manifesting a tenderness of disposition that encreased her
beauty of Countenance. At least, I can put no other construction upon her
conduct, which was, without exception, the strangest I ever saw!168
Indeed, the response of the observing crowd to Sophia Streatfeild’s sang-froid
was less than admiring. Hester Lynch Thrale despised Streatfeild calculated
softness and willingness to ‘shew how beautiful she looked in Tears’, and for
her male guests, such serene and artiﬁcial demonstration of allegedly authentic
signs of true sensibility was disconcerting. ‘[I]f it was not for that little Gush’,
Burney recorded the playwright John Delap saying, ‘I should certainly have
taken a very great fancy to her,—but Tears so ready—O they blot out my fair
opinion of her’.169 In fact, the men, for whose beneﬁt Streatfeild produced her
tears in the ﬁrst place, thought her either ‘rather too tender Hearted’ or
designing as a result.170 Besides, even though sensibility was discursively repre-
sented as an indispensable quality for a woman, a tearful wife appeared to these
men as tiresome. Even though they thought that Streatfeild was capable of
insinuating herself into any man’s heart, her being ‘niether bright nor deep in
respect to parts’ would make a man ‘devilish tired of her […] in half a Year’.171
Sophia Streatfeild did, in fact, remain unmarried till her death.
Interestingly enough, Fanny Burney was the one who was presented by
Hester Lynch Thrale and the rest of the little group as the sincere opposite of
Streatfeild’s false tears:
‘Would you cry, Miss Burney, said Sir Philip, if we ask’d you.’
‘Lord, cried Mrs. Thrale, I would not do thus by Miss Burney for ten
Worlds!—I dare say she would never speak to me again. I should think she’d
be more likely to walk out of my House, than to Cry because I bid her.’
‘I don’t know how that is, said Sir Philip, but I’m sure she’s gentle
enough.’
‘She can cry, I doubt not, said Mr. Seward, on any proper occasion.’172
Indeed, as Burney herself wrote on many occasions, she was—unlike Sophia
Streatfeild—far from keen to draw eyes on herself: ‘I could, however, so soon
bite oﬀ my own Nose as stand forth to perform, at demand, any thing that I
previously knew was to draw all Eyes upon me’.173 Moreover, Burney under-
lined her inability to control her countenance, and thus positioned herself as the
direct opposite of the crafty Streatfeild. ‘Nobody, I believe, has so very little
command of Countenance as myself!’, Burney exclaimed, much like a heroine of
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a sentimental novel. However, the unforgiving transparency of her body, ideally
honest and feminine as it was, did little to aid Burney’s manoeuvring in polite
society. When teased by her friends over her supposed admirers, she cursed her
expressive face: ‘in spite of my utmost eﬀorts to seem to take the Conversation
as general, I presently felt my whole Face on Fire! […] I am actually shocked
that I should thus tacitly have marked my consciousness of their meaning by
that vile Colouring’, she complained.174 In fact, Burney’s transparency was one
of the reasons she had such trouble with the concept of visibility, an omnipre-
sent aspect of women’s politeness. She lacked the ability to hide her emotions
convincingly, and gave her true thoughts away too easily in her outward
appearance. In Fanny Burney’s case, there was indeed ‘no diﬀerence between
saying & looking’, as one of her gentleman friends claimed—but contrarily to
conduct book views, transparency was hazardous for women.175
Scholars have argued that transparency was a central aspect of utopian
Enlightenment thought that fuelled the French Revolution. Michel Foucault has
described a transparent society as the Rousseauist dream of Enlightenment,
‘visible and legible in each of its parts’ with no more ‘zones of darkness’.176 The
ideal of transparency was a particularly strong framework for the Scottish
Enlightenment, epitomised by Adam Smith’s conceptualisation of sympathy,
which required full transparency of the actor to the spectator.177 This focus on
the spectator and transparency was then collated into the emphasis on inner
virtue and the importance of inward politeness that, as Rosalind Carr has
argued, was so paramount for Scottish politeness thought—and, through that,
also found its way to conduct manuals read widely in England.178 In practice, of
course, complete transparency was unattainable, and statements such as Mary
Wollstonecraft’s gloriﬁcation of feminine transparency in the words of
Hamlet—‘Seems! I know not seems!—Have that within that passeth show!’—
remained utopian and fanciful.179 Most of all, feminine transparency was
impracticable. Opaqueness was a crucial strategy for women as subordinate
subjects in polite society, and Fanny Burney’s unfortunate transparency brought
her little more than mortiﬁcation and anxiety. In this sense, women’s practices
of power were incompatible with the Enlightenment ideal of transparency.
Utopian transparency and the visibility it presupposed also created an ethical
dilemma. Charles Griswold argues that the impossibility of full transparency
inevitably leads into self-falsiﬁcation. Because full Smithian transparency and
sympathy are impossible, ‘nobody ever really understands anyone else’, Gris-
wold writes, adding that this realisation is ‘inscribed both into the state of
nature, where we are each solitary, and into those socialized states of being in
which we are still alone but pretend not to be’.180 Moreover, Griswold main-
tains that the pretence ensuing from a false hope of sympathy through trans-
parency necessarily requires various oppressive mechanisms of social control
(since the individual cannot be relied on in this), which opens up a line of cri-
ticism that can be traced all the way from Rousseau to Marx and beyond—
Foucault himself being, of course, a culmination of this tradition.181 Indeed, as
Theresa Levitt argues, with the dream of transparency gone, ‘visibility became a
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form of discipline’, and who was allowed to see what became ‘inseparable from
issues of control and authority, seated at the nexus between power and
knowledge’.182 It is to this power play of visibility that we turn to next.
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4 Playing with Public and Private
The problematic of internality and externality was, in many ways, central to
women’s politeness. The dichotomy between the two was most manifestly
visible in questions of moral and honest internal politeness versus dissimulative
and hypocritical external politeness, which were deeply gendered and featured
heavily in discussions of feminine politeness. However, the interplay of internal
and external also opened up potential for individual resistance and freedom.
One way of looking at the division is making an analytical elision between
internal—private and external—public. It was common to view one’s private
self as the seat of authenticity, while the external self was thought as the public
persona put on for the sake of other people. In this way, many aspects of the
public/private juxtaposition operate on the same dichotomy as the external/
internal. The public sphere—that is, venues of public sociability—was, due to
its visual nature, a place for the stylisation of the external self, whereas con-
temporary commentators and conduct writers described the private domestic
sphere in terms of authenticity and openness. These divisions were also deeply
gendered in normative politeness discourse. However, women’s autobiographical
representations of public and private operate to reproduce these delineations only
occasionally; more than anything, their writings blur the distinction between the
private and public sphere. Indeed, women could and often did stretch the limits
of normative polite femininity by blurring the diﬀerence between public and pri-
vate; through clever utilisation of semi-public sociability, described in their auto-
biographical texts, as carefully positioned in the interplay between private and
public, they could expand their sphere of inﬂuence and modes of acceptable
conduct. The use of autobiographical writing was, in itself, simultaneously a
means of theatrical self-representation and mirror of authentic interiority. My
goal is to show that the ambivalence surrounding the internal/external dichotomy
provided women with possibilities for destabilising gendered conduct expecta-
tions, while still operating within the framework of politeness and retaining their
polite reputation.
Deborah Heller argues in an article on the bluestocking Elizabeth Vesey’s
subjectivity that the widely accepted view of eighteenth-century women as pas-
sively constructed by the ‘discourses of femininity, domesticity, and the civiliz-
ing arts’ is inaccurate; instead, she claims that there existed a notion of an
‘ungendered, autonomous self’ that provided a resource for women’s ‘practices
of freedom’. For Heller, this ‘unbound’—that is, ungendered, autonomous, and
authentic—subjectivity oﬀered ‘strategic possibilities for resisting the dominant
ethos for women, especially through the notion of interiority or indecipherable
depth in the self’.1 This is an important observation that I pick up and develop
further in this chapter; women could and did use the notion of an autonomous
interiority as a rhetorical justiﬁcation for their subversive conduct. However, it
should be noted that this autonomous subjectivity was not as antithetical to the
discursive self as Heller claims. While the very process of internalising identity
through performativity produces a feeling of authenticity for the individual,
there is no ‘internality’ of the self, but the subject is always constituted within a
network of power/knowledge which determines its conditions of possibility.2
Moreover, the techniques of the self that the subject utilises in shaping herself
as an ethical and autonomous subject ‘are not created or freely chosen’, as
Johanna Oksala points out; rather, they are ‘culturally and historically intelli-
gible conceptions and patterns of behaviour that subjects draw from the sur-
rounding society’.3 Therefore, the internal self of an eighteenth-century subject,
however free and autonomous she may have felt it to be, was nevertheless
thoroughly discursively constituted.
This does not mean, of course, that eighteenth-century people did not have a
notion of interiority, nor that invocations of sincerity and authenticity could
not be successfully used to justify unfeminine or impolite modes of behaviour,
as Elizabeth Vesey did in Heller’s analysis. However, in my reading, performa-
tive externality in the form of dissimulation and hypocrisy oﬀered women far
more possibilities for subversive conduct and freedom than any (false) idea of
authentic interiority. Of course, by its essence, politeness was nothing more but
an external performance, masked by rhetoric of internal authenticity. According
to Erving Goﬀman, this is what all human interaction is ultimately about; his
well-known claim is that social encounters are performances where people act
the roles they ascribe for themselves in dynamic interaction with others. Accord-
ing to Goﬀman, individuals engage in performances to abide by social norms; by
manipulating their appearance, manner, and setting, they bring forward desired
impressions and, in this way, construct the ﬁctional self they deem appropriate
for a speciﬁc situation and portray it to their audience.4 In fact, recent studies
have emphasised the theatrical aspects of early modern social identities, and
analysed them as both individual and group-related performances.5
Of course, politeness was not only performed but also performative, which
further complicates the internal/external problematic. Judith Butler writes that
‘[a]cts, gestures, and desire produce the eﬀect of an internal core or substance,
but produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying
absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a
cause’.6 If individuals actually constituted the imagined internal identity they
were supposedly expressing by their performances of politeness, that eﬀectively
merges the external and the internal into the one-surface Möbius strip depicted
by Grosz. In other words, external is internal, and internal is external.
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Female Bodies and the Polite Spectacle
‘Now I must look at you, Fanny,’ said Edmund, with the kind smile of an aﬀec-
tionate brother, ‘and tell you how I like you’.
Jane Austen, Mansﬁeld Park (1814)7
Politeness was a culture that had a strong visual aspect, and the body was the
means of communicating polite identity.8 Politeness was thought to reveal itself
in multiple ways of standing, walking, gesturing, dressing, and facial expressions,
up to a point where a person’s level of politeness could supposedly be evaluated
merely by looking. As Will Honeycomb, one of the characters of The Spectator
stated, women’s external appearances were thought to speak volumes of their
inner self, their politeness, virtue, and character, so that ‘the whole Woman [is]
expressed in her Appearance! Her Air has the Beauty of Motion, and her Look
the Force of Language’.9 The female body was on display, and the urban setting
of politeness oﬀered speciﬁc venues for the execution of this display.
England’s urban renaissance and its links to the culture of politeness have
been thoroughly scrutinised; it will suﬃce to say that the new urban sociability
was acted out in respectable public and semi-public space, where polite society
gathered to see and be seen. Members of the social elite spent their leisure time
mingling in parks, streets, and parlours during the day, and going to assemblies,
balls, theatres, and amusement parks at night. Bath, Brighton, and other leisure
towns competed with London in providing amusements for the polite elite.10
Many scholars have also drawn attention to the problematic separation and
gendering of public and private sphere, questioning women’s aﬃliation with the
private and domestic, and, indeed, the dichotomist juxtaposition of public and
private in the ﬁrst place.11 Some have even argued that the early modern world
consisted solely of semi-private/semi-public space, or meta-space, and that any
imposition of a public/private distinction is fundamentally anachronistic.12 The
public or private nature of any social arena could also be regulated by limiting
or increasing their availability and inclusiveness. The elite home, it has been
demonstrated, was not a private but a semi-public sphere, and worked as a
stage for polite sociability, hosting tea tables, dinners, concerts, and balls.13 To
this eﬀect, women were reminded that they should be constantly vigilant and
prepared to be watched even in their own homes. ‘Do not conﬁne your atten-
tion to dress to your public appearances’, warned John Gregory; ‘[a]ccustom
yourselves to an habitual neatness, so that in […] your most unguarded hours,
you may have no reason to be ashamed of your appearance’.14 The semi-public
role of the home was particularly important in the countryside, which oﬀered a
smaller number of public venues for polite sociability than the town.
Appearing and socialising in public and semi-public space was essential for
politeness in many ways. Not only did it make sociability possible to begin
with, but it enabled the very construction of an individual’s polite identity.
Observing other members of polite society was a crucial part of an individual’s
education in the codes of politeness, as Katharine Glover has pointed out.15
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However, even more important was the acknowledgement of an individual’s
mastery of that code by established members of the polite elite. Much has been
written about identities as social identiﬁcations or performances that are tar-
geted to an audience for validation. In addition to Goﬀman, Jürgen Habermas,
for example, has claimed that the paradox of the development of subjectivity as
‘the innermost core of the private self’ is that it is ‘always already oriented to
an audience’, while many postmodern thinkers contend that identity is, in fact, an
entirely fabricated, performative construction, and that an individual becomes a
subject through the recognition of others.16 In other words, there was no polite
identity without a polite audience to socially and visually reaﬃrm it.
The body of the polite woman was thus on constant display. Elite women
grew up knowing that polite society observed their every move, every piece of
lace on their gown, and every nod of their head, and they were also taught to
constantly observe themselves in order to appear to their best advantage. The
Lady’s Preceptor (1743) reminded women that they always had a part to play:
When you are at a Play I wou’d not have you fancy that, because you are in
a Place where People go only for Diversion, you may be under less
Restraint than any where else; not that I am against your appearing pleased
and diverted […] only take care to remember the Part you ought to per-
form yourself; indulge a lively Mirth for a while if you please, but without
Clamour or Extravagance, taking care at the same time that Purity and
Modesty always appear to be your governing Principles.17
Polite women’s bodily display appears, in many ways, to reproduce the modern
disproportionately gendered system of looking. Feminist theory asserts that the
act of looking is a masculinised event—even when the person doing the looking
is a woman. Men are stereotypically deﬁned as the active lookers, whereas
women become passive objects to be observed.18 Thus, looking is inscribed by
an unsymmetrical relation of power. To look is to judge, or, to assume a role of
deﬁning authority. Similarly, while women are in constant need of the correc-
tive male gaze, for men becoming an object of the gaze is an untenable and
emasculating position.19 In a similar way, eighteenth-century women were cer-
tainly seen as the natural objects of the gaze—and the gaze was often repre-
sented as an authoritative male one. The constant surveillance of women was,
in many ways, critical for the workings of polite society and a central aspect of
it. Emma Major and Mary Poovey have argued that ‘judgemental spectatorship’
is essential to eighteenth-century didactic literature. Fanny Burney’s novels are a
case in point; they are constructed around a ‘rather sinisterly everpresent’ cri-
tical observer, and ‘the appearance and misinterpretation of the heroine’s
behaviour’ is a key plot device.20 Shawn Lisa Maurer and Angela Rosenthal
have argued that eighteenth-century elite women were positioned as a natur-
alised object of (male) investigation with the object of asserting a dialectical
gender diﬀerence. Rosenthal writes that female bodies were anxiously policed
by conduct books and social commentaries because they were the crucial means
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for holding sexual diﬀerence—as well as class positions—in place. The female
body, ‘squeezed into shape with corsets and ensconced in hyperbolic hoop-
dresses’, was ‘clothed, molded, and adorned in accordance with notions of
social order and physical ideals’.21 In fact, many of the eighteenth-century
didactic writers were men who openly announced their ‘Design to keep a
watchful Eye over every Part of the Female Sex, and to regulate them from
Head to Foot’, as ‘Nestor Ironside’ of The Guardian did in 1713.22 The eva-
luative power of the male gaze is aptly demonstrated by the 1802 print where
‘Country Gentlemen’ are guided into categorising women as objects—in this
case, vessels—according to their external appearance. (Figure 4.1)
However, the power dynamics of eighteenth-century female bodily display
were far less straightforward than simply men asserting an evaluative and
desiring gaze over women. For one thing, women were doing the watching as
well. Indeed, women of polite society actively and vigorously patrolled the
boundaries of acceptable female behaviour, and could, indeed, be each other’s
keenest and strictest critics. This is, of course, an example of the practical
manifestations of patriarchy, where women are taught to observe themselves
and each other through masculine spectacles. Sandra Lee Bartky writes that a
woman, knowing that ‘she is to be subjected to the cold appraisal of the male
Figure 4.1 British Vessels. Described for the Use of Country Gentlemen. (London:
T. Williamson 1802). Retrieved from the Library of Congress, https://www
.loc.gov/item/94504614/
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connoisseur and that her life prospects may depend on how she is seen’, learns
to ‘appraise herself ﬁrst’. In other words, the objectiﬁcation of women creates a
duality in feminine consciousness, where the ‘gaze of the Other is internalized’
and a woman becomes simultaneously a seer and a seen.23 In fact, the undis-
guised goal of women’s conduct manuals—written by men and women alike—
was to teach women how to fashion themselves as pleasing as possible to the
imagined male eye—or, to ‘read Men, in order to make yourselves agreeable’,
as James Fordyce put it.24 John Gregory explained this explicitly in the opening
pages of his conduct book: ‘While I explain to you that system of conduct
which I think will tend most to your honour and happiness, I shall, at the same
time, endeavour to point out those virtues and accomplishments which render
you most respectable and most amiable in the eyes of my own sex’.25 This
female (self-)surveillance and self-fashioning was done because women’s life
prospects very concretely depended on their ability to catch men’s attention
with their pleasing shape and, thus, to secure a proﬁtable marriage for them-
selves.26 In other words, the ‘natural femininity’ that was propagated for
women was deﬁned by what men were imagined to ﬁnd pleasing, proper, and
sexually alluring.
The ability to observe, not only others but especially oneself and to aim at a
constant, objective self-surveillance was thus a crucial aspect of politeness. To
be recognised as members of polite society, individuals needed to ﬁt their
appearance, manners, and actions to the social world surrounding them. For the
most part, this self-surveillance and self-adaptation was done unconsciously; as
Pierre Bourdieu writes of habitus—a concept which aptly captures the dialec-
tical construction of identity as an interplay between social control and indivi-
dual action—an individual’s manner of being in the world is ‘embodied history’
which is ‘internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history’.27
The ability to watch oneself and to aim at a constant, objective self-surveil-
lance was the prerequisite of politeness. Based on constant surveillance, of both
others and the self, the operating principles of polite society can be compared to
Foucault’s famous panopticon from Discipline and Punish, understood in a
broad sense—not as a disciplinary prison but as a basic mechanism in which
societies operate and produce normative group identity. Like the panopticon,
polite society was ‘a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the
automatic functioning of power’.28 Polite society was based on individuals’
relentless self-monitoring brought on by the sheer state of constant visibility;
the awareness of constant peer supervision made polite individuals their own
supervisors. Like the panopticon, polite society also ultimately aimed at training
and correcting individuals. It was a self-monitoring, self-repairing, and self-
suﬃcient system of creating normality and imposing it eﬃciently on indivi-
duals.29 However, the functioning of polite society was not fuelled by force.
The rules of politeness were, of course, discursively deﬁned and aﬃrmed by
social pressure, or even a threat of being ostracised, but, unlike in a classic
panopticon, there were no institutional punishments if the rules were neglected.
The goal of polite power was not to coerce bodies into proper attitudes; rather,
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the aim was to create desirability, correctness, and truth to the extent where
there was no possibility for subjectivity outside polite norms. In this sense, it
operated very much like Bourdieu’s habitus, which ‘tends to generate all the
“reasonable”, “common-sense”, behaviours (and only these) which are possible
within the limits’ of a particular set of societal rules, and are therefore ‘likely to
be positively sanctioned’. At the same time, Bourdieu writes, ‘“without vio-
lence, art or argument”, it tends to exclude all “extravagancies” (“not for the
likes of us”), that is, all the behaviours that would be negatively sanctioned
because they are incompatible with the objective conditions’.30 Moreover, indi-
viduals could also resist the normalising tendencies in multiple ways—some of
which are the topic of this book.
Women were thus supposed to police themselves and each other. They were
expected to consciously mould their bodies according to masculine desires; to
be ‘sensible that they are the Objects of Love, and born to be admired’, and,
therefore, to be ‘ever changing the Air of their Faces, and the Attitude of their
Bodies, to strike the Gazer’s Heart with new Impressions of their Beauty’.31
Since women were ‘born’ to be watched, they needed to be aware of the best
methods of showing themselves to their advantage. At the same time, however,
consciously seeking attention and deliberately fashioning the body to please was a
sign of vanity and immodesty, especially for the advocates of inward politeness.
According to John Burton,
To be admired, seems, indeed, the peculiar priviledge of your Sex; but this,
if not properly understood, may lead you into fatal mistakes. […] If you
make it your chief study to be admired, you will not only lose your aim,
but become the dupes of your own designs. Real Merit will discover itself
without any ostentatious parade; and it will not be overlooked by those,
who are capable of discerning it.32
Thus, even though women needed to provoke admiration from men in order to
be truly feminine, they should not aspire towards this goal with conscious
design. Women seeking to be admired were thought to attract only the atten-
tion of unprincipled rakes who were planning to take advantage of their vanity.
Instead, honourable husband material was to be attracted by doing precisely the
opposite—by not showing one’s body oﬀ with visible intention, since true
excellence would attract the attention of the worthy by its own merit. Steele’s
Mr Spectator, for example, ‘could not keep [his] Eyes oﬀ’ a woman wholly
unconscious of her own loveliness; she ‘did not understand herself for the
Object of Love, and therefore she was so’.33 In other words, self-display was
acceptable, as long as it was—or at least seemed to be—unconscious: an innocent
by-product of unpretentious sociability.
Another thing that obfuscates the neat modern hierarchical power dynamic
of the eighteenth-century female spectacle is the early modern notion of the
power the object supposedly held over the gazing subject. Thomas King has
suggested that early modern notions of the gazer/gazed-relationship were much
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more complex than simply men regulating women by their gaze; instead, they
often emphasised the ‘nonmastery of the adult, gentle, male spectator before the
spectacle, a masculine submission to the object of sight’.34 Thus, the association
between masculinity and visual mastery was not a given in the seventeenth
century, and remained contested and under construction during the eighteenth
century. Indeed, in the early modern rationale of the spectacle, the object was
deemed to possess all power, while the looking subject was reduced to a passive
and involuntary receiver. Women’s bodies were thought capable of ‘mortally
wound[ing]’ male spectators by their beauty, thus blurring the power structure
of the spectacle.35
Indeed, women of the eighteenth-century polite society were often accused of
usurping power through their role of the object of the gaze. In Fanny Burney’s
Camilla, Edgar is drawn to Camilla against his will; in Burney’s rhetoric, ‘he had
no power to keep away from any place where he was sure to behold Camilla’.36
Indeed, watching women was supposedly inscribed in men’s nature, so that artful
women could easily abuse their partiality. An indignant man wrote to The
Spectator, complaining of a type of young lady who, with their ‘Hands, Eyes, and
Fan’, intentionally capture the gaze of innocent men attending service at church:
As I stood utterly at a loss how to behave my self, surrounded as I was,
this Peeper so placed her self as to be kneeling just before me. She displayed
the most beautiful Bosom imaginable, which heaved and fell with some
Fervour, while a delicate well-shaped Arm held a Fan over her Face. It was
not in Nature to command ones Eyes from this Object; […] I frequently
oﬀered to turn my Sight another way, but was still detained by the Fasci-
nation of the Peeper’s Eyes, who had long practised a Skill in them, to recal
the parting Glances of her Beholders.37
In this way, women’s gaze was also represented as enticing, not judgemental,
and thus stripped from the authority men’s gaze held.38
This is not to deny that women had the ability or chance to watch men with
a discerning eye; Manushag Powell has, among others, noted that also men
were expected to behave as if women were watching them. Indeed, as we
remember, the women of polite society were seen as ‘civilizing agents’, forcing
men to reﬁne their behaviour.39 Thus, masculine polite identity was created
through a dialectical relationship with feminine polite identity—or, as Powell
puts it, ‘men regulate the women who will regulate the men’.40 It could be even
argued that the objectives of the regulating gaze were ultimately more stereo-
typically ‘feminine’; aiming at soft-spoken reﬁnement and compassionate
agreeableness, the normative politeness it aimed to exert was habitually deemed
to be better suited for women’s ‘naturally’ soft character than men’s supposedly
more aggressive one. Indeed, eﬀeminacy was a danger always lurking behind
the corner of men’s politeness.
Thus, the act of looking was wrought with ambivalence. Thomas King goes
as far as to claim that seeing and being seen became a reciprocal, assented event
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in the eighteenth century; he professes that the spectacle was a conscious, dia-
lectical act of constructing gender, rather than a demonstration of male power
over female objects. Instead of patriarchal regulation of the gender diﬀerence,
what supposedly emerged was a practice of ‘gendered complementariness’—
that is, both sexes observing each other—that was, according to King, primarily
class-based rather than founded on gender; the ‘gendered self-presentation’ of
the ‘conscious woman’ drew, not the ‘gaze of the rabble’, but the knowing eye
of the gentleman, who by watching her recognised her as socially signiﬁcant.41
This notion of mutually acknowledged consciousness recognises the inherent
hypocrisy of the polite display. Unawareness, or, at least, assumed unawareness of
the gaze was discursively presented as the greatest virtue of female self-display—or,
indeed, as the principle that made the display possible and acceptable. Meanwhile,
female self-display needed to be acted out according to meticulously described rules
of propriety, making it a necessarily conscious act on the women’s part. King sug-
gests, then, that polite display was a make-believe game, where both parties were
aware of the artiﬁcial nature of the spectacle.
However, the production of gender cannot ultimately be viewed as mutual
spectatorship. In my interpretation, King greatly exaggerates women’s power of
spectatorship over men’s self-display by implying that the gender roles were, in
this respect, symmetrical. As Shawn Lisa Maurer states, eighteenth-century
didactic writers dominantly represented watching as ‘an unseemly position for
women, whose construction as pleasing objects allows them only to be viewed’,
while for men, ‘to be an object is itself wrong’.42 Women’s gaze was habitually
described as alluring, not judgemental or authoritative; in this way, a woman
watching a man was given a sexualised interpretation and thereby put back into
her place as the object of the gaze.43 Moreover, watching was recognised to be a
form of exerting and misusing masculine power, as Richard Steele notes in The
Spectator, where he labels men’s staring at women as ‘an Oﬀence committed by
the Eyes, and that against such as the Oﬀenders would perhaps never have an
Opportunity of injuring any other Way’. Steele writes indignantly that—
this Family of Starers have infested publick Assemblies: And I know no
other Way to obviate so great an Evil, except, in the Case of ﬁxing their
Eyes upon Women, some Male Friend will take the Part of such as are
under the Oppression of Impudence, and encounter the Eyes of the Starers
wherever they meet them. While we suﬀer our Women to be thus impu-
dently attacked, they have no Defence, but in the End to cast yielding
Glances at the Starers. 44
Thus, watching could almost be an act of violence, against which women had
no way of defending themselves.
Furthermore, despite women’s consciousness of display, and the power that
lay in the body-spectacle over the spectator, women would have had little
power over the actual event of the spectacle; they had only limited means of
controlling who could, was allowed, or did watch them. Even if meaningful
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watching was aimed at elite men, who is to say that servants, shopkeepers, or
other lower-rank men necessarily present in polite venues did not exercise their
masculine prerogative by sneaking a peak? Thus, even though the polite spec-
tacle necessarily constructed class, the gendered power structure was the pri-
mary force operating in the event of watching and, indeed, constructing the
whole event in the ﬁrst place.45 Within the framework of the spectacle, woman
was the object, and, therefore, primarily gendered, and only secondarily a
representative of her class.
Constructing the Feminine Body
The life of a young lady […] too much resembles that of an actress; the morning
is all rehearsal, and the evening is all a performance.
Hannah More, Strictures (1799)46
Since the female body was the object of the evaluative gaze and the canvas
through which feminine politeness was to be displayed, moulding and rehear-
sing the body to portray the discursive norms was an important aspect of
assuming a polite feminine identity.47 The precise practices of the female body
were the means through which women fashioned themselves after the softness,
modesty, and grace of ‘natural femininity’. Accordingly, the matter of proper
polite, feminine appearance was endlessly discussed in didactic literature. Pages
and pages were dedicated to ponderings on the perfect way to speak, dance, or
look elegant, and the advice given to women on this score could be anything
from vague recommendations to extremely speciﬁc step-by-step guidance. All
conduct books agreed, however, that since appearances revealed a woman’s degree
of reﬁnement, women should constantly observe their external presentation and
spend time practicing and improving it. Even those advocates of inward politeness
who believed that the external frame would automatically settle into perfect
politeness through the cultivation of inner virtue proceeded to give advice on
external pruning of the body just as eagerly as the externalist branch of writers.
Thus, despite their rhetoric, the internalists were keenly aware of the importance
of producing perfect bodily performances. For example, Hannah More recom-
mended that ‘the exterior be made a considerable object of attention’ in girls’
education, as well as ‘the graces be industriously cultivated’ and ‘the arms, the
head, the whole person be carefully polished’—of course adding in the same breath
that even though rehearsing the exterior was important, the interior should not be
neglected.48 There was thus no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two branches of
didactic writers; both shared the view that gracefulness and ease of movement was
necessary for the ideal woman, and both agreed that this gracefulness could be
reached only through speciﬁc training. Both also emphasised that even though
the female body had to be thus consciously worked on to produce femininity, the
impression of naturalness was to be preserved at all times.
Much of eighteenth-century politeness education for both sexes revolved
around habituation, ‘the conscious repetition of an action, a habit of study, or
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of reﬂection’.49 According to Locke, habitual behaviour worked to instil cus-
toms as ‘the very Principles of [a person’s] Nature’, thus freeing men from the
trouble of everyday moral or social decisions and freeing their capacity for
more reﬁned intellectual pursuits. In other words, its goal was to make custom
‘as natural’ to the individual ‘as breathing’.50 As Brandi Lain Schillace argues,
in women’s case habituation was considered especially important, as ‘constant
Custom’ that required ‘no Thought, no Reﬂection’ was thought to be best
suited for educating the notoriously irrational women.51 Adopting mechanical
habits is, of course, the very same process that Judith Butler calls performativ-
ity—internalising certain habits and appearances through iteration. Thus, con-
duct books sought to imprint in the minds of women the need of constant
observation of the norm, and the continuous repetition of it, in order to create
polite female bodies. These polite bodies would then be recognised as such by
other members of polite society.
Gentlewomen’s education was a controversial topic in the eighteenth century,
inﬂuenced by debates on children’s nature and the human nature in general, the
nature of society, and the beneﬁts of public versus private education. As Susan
Skedd has demonstrated, the establishment of commercial schools in the
seventeenth century and their expansion and growing popularity during the
course of the eighteenth century gave, for the ﬁrst time, girls the opportunity of
an extensive public school education as an alternative to a private home edu-
cation. While elite girls still mostly received their education at home, especially
girls of the middling sort, aspiring towards politeness, were sent to these
schools oﬀering a mixture of ‘useful subjects’ (reading, writing, arithmetic) and
polite accomplishments, either as boarding or day students.52 Even girls who
still received their education at home from their mothers or fathers, govern-
esses, and tutors, could be sent to commercial schools to ‘ﬁnish oﬀ’ their edu-
cation especially regarding polite skills—even though there remained a morally
wary attitude towards boarding schools throughout the century, as well. Boys
generally received not only a more public but also a decidedly classical educa-
tion, whereas girls were brought up with a much narrower curriculum.53 As
Deborah Simonton and Vivien Jones have argued, women’s education in the
eighteenth century was targeted towards maintaining a hierarchical social
system, where knowledge was potentially hazardous and could lead to social dis-
ruption. Arguments about whether, how, and to what extent women should be
educated, were part of larger political questions about inequality and hierarchy
and tied to notions of sexual politics and gender diﬀerence.54
The most common view of female education was that women, as the weaker
vessel, could not endure intellectual training similar to men. However, since
women had a duty to bring up moral and chaste children, they could not be left
wholly uneducated, since a mind left to its natural state was prone to immor-
ality, vanity, and luxury.55 Thus, women should receive enough education to
safely contain such disruptive forces as their ‘curiosity’ or ‘imagination’,
according to, for example, François Fénelon, whose treatise L’Education des Filles
(1687) was highly inﬂuential in England, as well.56 Educated into self-restraint and
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morality, women could then bring up their children soberly into either responsible
citizenship (boys) or motherhood (girls).57 By imprinting women’s minds with
stern moral values and humble piety, religion also played a considerable role in
women’s education. In Hannah More’s words, girls’ hearts were ‘naturally more
ﬂexible, soft, and liable’ to incorporate the principles of religion, and, since they
did not receive a classical education, their ‘feeble minds are not obliged at once to
receive and separate the precepts of christianity, and the documents of pagan phi-
losophy’.58 In this way, education was not only a female tool of empowerment, but
also a means of controlling women. An uneducated or natural woman was con-
sidered to be potentially dangerous, since she disrupted the patriarchal custom by
having no code of proper order imprinted on her.59 As Fénelon argued, ‘Revolu-
tions in State have been all caused merely or chieﬂy by the Irregularities of
Women’; therefore, many conservative eighteenth-century educationalists chose to
advocate girls’ training through habituation rather than encourage them to develop
themselves as rational creatures.60 This didactic view was also heavily criticised.
Mary Astell, for example, asserted that to ‘be able to repeat any Persons Dogma
without forming a Distinct Idea of it […] is not to Know but to Remember’.61
Astell’s pioneering critique was echoed a hundred years later by Mary Wollstone-
craft, who addressed the problem of women’s education in A Vindication of the
Rights of Woman (1792), claiming that women should be taught to become
rational individuals, instead of being deliberately kept in a state of ignorance and
subservience.62 Moreover, as the existence of bluestockings and their sisters in let-
ters proves, discursive ideas of women’s education could diﬀer drastically from
real-life educational practices.
Bluestockings emerged in a period of expansion and change in girls’ educa-
tion. According to Vivien Jones, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, few
girls had any formal education, whereas during the latter half of the century,
providing an education for the women of polite society became something of a
norm.63 Claire Boulard Jouslin has further argued that early eighteenth-century
female education concentrated largely on accomplishments, whereas an educa-
tional reform—linked directly to the rise of inward politeness and supported by
such writers as Richard Steele or Charlotte Lennox—widened the scope of
women’s education towards moral and intellectual improvement.64 In fact, the
changes in conceptualisations of politeness and the birth of moral, inward
politeness had a direct impact on women’s education. As Steele wrote in The
Spectator, in addition to bodily training, women should train their minds as well:
The general Mistake among us in the Educating our […] Daughters [is
that] we take care of their Persons and neglect their Minds: […]. Thus her
Fancy is engaged to turn all her Endeavours to the Ornament of her Person,
as what must determine her Good and Ill in this Life […] the Management
of a young Lady’s Person is not to be overlooked, but the Erudition of her
Mind is much more to be regarded. […] The true Art in this Case is, To
make the Mind and Body improve together; and if possible, to make Gesture
follow Thought, and not let Thought be employed upon Gesture.65
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To make women ﬁt for their role as emblems of politeness and improver of
men’s manners, they needed to be suﬃciently educated to take part in polite and
informed conversation.66 Accordingly, gentlewomen’s education commonly
included not only instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic, but also his-
tory, literature, geography, and modern languages—and sometimes even such
rarer subjects as classical mythology or natural philosophy.67 Nevertheless,
many commentators complained throughout the long eighteenth century that
the majority of women’s education still rested on superﬁcial talents and such
trivial issues as dress or manners—in short, the exterior shell.68 For example,
Hannah More complained in 1777 that—
I am at a loss to know why a young female is instructed to exhibit, in the
most advantageous point of view, her skill in music, her singing, dancing,
taste in dress, and her acquaintance with the most fashionable games and
amusements, while her piety is to be anxiously concealed, and her knowl-
edge aﬀectedly disavowed, lest the former should draw on her the appella-
tion of an enthusiast, or the latter that of a pedant. In regard to knowledge,
why should she for ever aﬀect to be on her guard, lest she should be found
guilty of a small portion of it? […] for, after all the acquisitions which her
talents and her studies have enabled her to make, she will, generally
speaking, be found to have less of what is called learning, than a common
school-boy.69
In other words, the importance of learning external accomplishments persisted,
along with the theatrical vision of politeness, throughout the eighteenth century.
The exterior shell continued to receive plenty of attention in women’s edu-
cation because it was ultimately the means through which polite femininity was
constructed. The goal of female education was not only to cultivate the mind in
polite knowledge, but to prepare the female body for the appraising gazes of
polite society by making women internalise certain modes of being and behav-
ing, which were then labelled ‘natural’ for them. However, how those naturally
feminine bodies should behave, exactly, proved diﬃcult to pin down, to the
extent that they were most often described with the ambiguous phrase ‘je ne
sais quoi’.70 In the words of John Bennett—
The manner of Louisa ﬁnishes her character. It is a beautiful bordering to
all her graces and her virtues. It is impossible for me to deﬁne, (what I
mean by,) manner; yet no one can be, half an hour, in the company of this
lady, without feeling its astonishing eﬀects. […] She embellishes, in a
wonderful manner, a look, a gesture, an attitude, nay even silence itself.
She confers a grace on the most common civility. […] The best deﬁnition
I can give of this quality must be imperfect. I should call it, however, a
quick discernment of what is graceful, directed by an exquisite sensibility,
and saying in an instant, to airs, gestures, features, looks, come with
corresponding energy.71
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Figure 4.2a ‘Walking’ in The Polite Academy (London: R. Baldwin
and B. Collins 1762). © The British Library Board
(Shelfmark Ch.760/41)
Figure 4.2b ‘The Courtsie’ in The Polite Academy (London:
R. Baldwin and B. Collins 1762). © The British
Library Board (Shelfmark Ch.760/41)
Figure 4.3 ‘Dancing’ in François Nivelon, The Rudiments of Genteel Behavior
([London?]: [s.n.] 1737). © The British Library Board (Shelfmark 1812.a.28)
The certain something that distinguished a gentlewoman was thus a speciﬁc
bodily quality, described in the feminised terms of gracefulness and elegance.
The rehearsing of the body to produce these qualities was started from such
basic skills as walking, standing and sitting. As The Polite Academy (1762)
declared, much could be read from a simple erect pose: ‘Where we see a young
Lady standing in a genteel Position, or adjusting herself properly, in Walking,
Dancing, or Sitting, in a graceful Manner, we never fail to admire that exterior
Excellence of Form, and regular Disposition, suited to the Rules of Decency,
Modesty, and good Manners.’72 Therefore, the conduct book continued, a
‘young Woman of Virtue and good Sense, will never think it beneath her Care
and Study to cultivate the Graces of her outward Mien and Figure, which con-
tribute so considerably towards making her Behaviour acceptable’.73 The Polite
Academy also instructed the ladies very thoroughly in the art of curtsying,
receiving objects, dancing and, as the example below illustrates, walking:
1. Hold up your Head without any stiﬀness. 2. Keep your whole person
upright. 3. Let your shoulders fall easily. 4. Drop your Arms easily and
gracefully down to the waist. 5. Then place the Hands on one another,
with the Palms turning upward, and a little inward. 6. Take short steps and
do not lift up your Feet too high. 7. Let the Foot that was up, be brought
down slowly, and with an easy Motion.74
This advice, addressed ‘Directions for young ladies to attain a Genteel Car-
riage, with a Graceful Air, and easy Motion’, was also complemented with
pictures of the correct postures (Figure 4.2). This kind of detail was most
commonly found in the practically oriented conduct books focused on external
politeness, while writers praising internal politeness usually tended to be less
detailed, but by no means less dedicated.
The recurring idea behind all such advice was the ideal that all female acts
and gestures should be easy and natural. Indeed, the ideal of natural politeness
dominated didactic notions of desirable behaviour and movement throughout
the long eighteenth century. Slightly paradoxically, conduct writers also
recommended various physical exercises, such as walking and horseback-riding,
for women to attain this goal.75 Dancing was a particularly important form of
exercise towards acquiring a graceful way of moving (Figure 4.3). As The
Spectator declared, ‘so much of Dancing at least as belongs to the Behaviour
and an handsome Carriage of the Body, is extreamly useful, if not absolutely
necessary’.76
Dancing was also thought to expose the female body to the male gaze in its
most ﬂattering condition.77 The ballroom was an arena of looking, and dancing
was an approved means of bodily display. In fact, The Polite Academy
straightforwardly announced that dancing ‘not only furnishes the fair sex
(whose sphere of exercise is naturally more conﬁned than that of the men,) with
a salutary amusement, but gives them the best opportunity of displaying their
natural graces’.78 Indeed, the ballroom was not only an important stage of
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mixed sociability but also a sort of a marriage market, where the sexes could
appear to watch and to be watched.79 Dancing exempliﬁes the extent to which
the rehearsing of the female body was motivated by the desire to please the
male eye. Richard Steele’s ironic description of girls’ education in The Spectator
might be caricature, but it nevertheless highlights the matrimonial goal that so
often guided women’s life and, therefore, education, as well as the importance
of correct bodily appearance in this project:
When a Girl is safely brought from her Nurse, before she is capable of
forming one simple Notion of any thing in Life, she is delivered to the
Hands of her Dancing-Master; and with a Collar round her Neck, the
pretty wild Thing is taught a fantastical Gravity of Behaviour, and forced
to a particular Way of holding her Head, heaving her Breast, and moving
with her whole Body; and all this under Pain of never having an Husband,
if she steps, looks, or moves awry.80
Ann Bermingham has gone as far as to argue that women eﬀectively commo-
diﬁed their bodies by turning them into objects of ‘eroticized, aestheticized, and
marketable’ art. The polite marriage market was constituted by an economy of
consumerism and commodiﬁcation of women; accordingly, women were mar-
keting themselves not only as speciﬁc ideas of culture, but as cultural objects an
sich. 81 This power dynamic did not limit itself to the workings of the polite
marriage market or single women; rather, as Peter Borsay has noted, the mar-
riage market merely exempliﬁed the commercialised functioning of urban public
space, where polite cultural arenas operated as ‘markets’ in which wealth,
breeding, and cultural capital could be exchanged for status.82 Even though the
female body was the privileged commodity of this market, women’s public
display was nevertheless greeted with anxiety and ambivalence, as we shall
discover next.
Women’s Self-conscious Spectacle
We walked in the park to-day, all the world there.
Mary Pendarves to Anne Granville, 28 March 172483
According to conduct writers, women had a particularly important role to play
in public sociability as the shining examples and catalysts of social and moral
virtue and reﬁnement of taste.84 Being seen in public venues was thus a key
aspect of politeness, and in many ways, an inseparable part of all elite women’s
lives. Despite this, being watched was considered to be also highly problematic for
women, and women’s actual practices of sociability were often a contested
matter.85 Women’s venturing to public space was ridiculed, and their alleged end-
less craving for public amusement was a popular topic of satire. Richard Steele
complained that elite women ‘live in a Circle of Idleness, where they turn round
for the whole year, without the Interruption of a serious Hour; […] The Spring
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that brings out Flies and Fools drives them to Hide Park. In Winter they are an
Incumberance to the Theaters, and the Ballad of the Drawing-Room.’86
The anxiety concerning women’s public self-display stemmed from various
sources. One of these was the rising tide of eighteenth-century domesticity, which
advocated the notion that public display was incompatible with ideal feminin-
ity.87 Public pleasures were thought to produce immodest, artiﬁcial coquettes,
whereas ‘the blushing fair one’ was to be found, not in ‘Crowds or Assemblies’,
but in ‘the sequestered walks of domestic retirement’.88 The critics of public dis-
play presented femininity as essentially private, thus masculinising public display.
John Gregory, for one, criticised women’s self-display as too masculine:
By the present mode of female manners, the ladies seem to expect that they
shall regain their ascendancy over us, by the fullest display of their personal
charms, by being always in our eye at public places, by conversing with us
with the same unreserved freedom as we do with one another; in short, by
resembling us as nearly as they possible can. —But a little time and
experience will show them the folly of this expectation and conduct.89
Public exposure was also thought to corrupt women’s morality, and public women
were, as Gary Kelly points out, ‘easily associated with prostituted women’.90
The critics of public display concentrated on the modes, amounts, means,
venues, and audiences of that display. Public exposure was something to be
taken only in careful, small doses; as James Fordyce stated, a face ‘hackneyed in
the public eye, how striking soever when ﬁrst seen, […] loses much of its power
to please’.91 Thus, too much public display was thought to wear out a woman’s
worth, and according to Richard Steele, the ‘ladies grow cheap by growing
familiar, and cheap is the unkindest word that can be bestowed upon the sex’.92
When women then would show themselves out in public, it needed to be done
discreetly and with proper care. Women needed chaperones who controlled
their self-display, making sure that the spectacle was acted out in the right
place, to the right audience, and in every way according to the ideals of polite
femininity.93 Elizabeth Montagu’s use of her maid as a chaperone highlights the
multifaceted nature of the female spectacle. When Montagu was returning to
London from Newcastle she gave a ride to a young Tom Pitt and his friend to
Durham. As it was not proper for a lady to travel alone, Montagu wrote in a
letter to her sister that ‘as Mr Montagu has now left us I have taken ye fair
Susan into ye Coach, which I fancy my young Men do not much dislike as she
is a good object for a vis a vis’.94 In other words, Montagu made her maid into
an object of lustful male gaze, while shielding herself from improper public
exposure by using her as a chaperone. The lower-class female body was thus a
rightful target for uninhibited viewing, which reversely made exposing a genteel
female body to unrestrained male gaze an act of insolence and disrespect.
Controlling audiences was of crucial importance for the polite spectacle,
since a gentlewoman’s body was not to be shown to anyone and everyone.
Thus, the more select the audience, the more acceptable the self-display.
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Accordingly, places of general amusement, such as pleasure gardens and
watering places which were open to a wide variety of crowds, were deemed
more harmful than more selective and exclusive scenes.95 Masquerades were the
epitome of suspicious inclusiveness; since there was no way of ascertaining the
identity of the company, they were widely looked upon as dangerous ‘scenes of
lewdness and debauchery’—which naturally made them wildly popular
amongst amusement-seeking urban crowds—and they lived in the popular
imagination through fantastic stories of kidnapping and sexual assault.96
Women’s public display was connected to broader questions of space, visibi-
lity, and power. Marjo Kaartinen argues that public and private can be seen as
expressions of power relationships in space, eﬀectively making the exclusion of
women from public space an assertion of patriarchal power.97 Indeed, didactic
writers did their best to warn women of the dangers embedded in the act of
showing oneself in public spaces—and yet, as Amanda Vickery argues, women
‘traﬃcked numerous public venues without the least criticism and used simple
strategies to protect their reputations at more risqué diversions’.98 It certainly
appears that many women chose to ignore the moralist warnings and, instead,
showed oﬀ their expressly honed polite bodies in the sociable arenas of the
town. As Anu Korhonen reminds us, individuals are not passive end results of
their culture, but they actively shape that culture by their every act.99 Therefore,
eighteenth-century women’s public appearances should not be reduced to indi-
viduals’ random outings to pursue amusement; instead, the act of appearing in
public can be taken as an attempt to redeﬁne the norms of gendered propriety and,
thereby, to tilt the power equilibrium, if ever so slightly. The same thing applies
also to the controversial roles women assumed in public spaces, positioning
themselves as spectators rather than objects of the gaze, for example.
Women could and did embrace the public sphere with self-conscious glee.
Elizabeth Montagu, for example, described herself humorously ‘raking in town’
and enjoying its ‘operas and delight’ without the smallest remorse.100 More-
over, the growing inﬂuence of domesticity as a feminine ideal seems to have had
little eﬀect on women’s public self-display—quite the contrary. In the 1750s, the
novelist Samuel Richardson complained of the continuing degeneration of
female morals, noting with reproof that ‘Women are not what they were’ and
that ‘modesty, humility, graciousness, are now all banished from the behaviour
of these public-place frequenters of the sex’.101 According to Richardson, these
‘wild pigeons of the sex’ that crowded ‘Ranelaghs, Vauxhalls, Marybones,
assemblies, routs, drums, hurricanes, and a rabble of such-like amusements’ had
forgotten that they were supposed to be the sex ‘in which virtue, modesty,
sobriety ought to characteristically be found, in order to save a corrupted
world’.102 Women were also well aware of the visibility they encountered in
public places, and their role as the object of the gaze. Elizabeth Montagu
described London sociability in terms of ‘seeing and being seen’; she was
diverted at the opera by the audience, or, rather, ‘the Spectators, for they came
to see and not to hear’.103 She also made sarcastic comments about female
beauty’s main objective being to catch the admiring male eye, and laughed at
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society beauties’ sad situation in Bath—for ‘they are ill provided with beaus, so
that it is scarce worth their while to be so handsome’.104 Similarly, a surly-
looking belle amused her at Tunbridge: she ‘seems miserable here. What is
beauty and what are graces where there are none to admire them? […] A beauty
and a keeper of a toy shop, are always unhappy in an empty season, at
Tunbridge’.105
Women were not only conscious of the critical eye they were being appraised
with in public places; they were also usually quite skilled in handling the so-
called public sphere and their own performances in it. Propriety in public per-
formances was determined by circumstance; diﬀerent scenes and audiences
required diﬀerent clothes and demeanour, and the ﬂippant repartee that
charmed a salon could be grossly misplaced in an assembly. Similarly, a
woman’s social and marital status played a considerable role in determining the
propriety of the spectacle. Mary Delany, for one, felt this acutely during her
seven-year marriage to Alexander Pendarves, who was compulsively jealous of
any attention his wife received, forcing her to be overly cautious in her public
appearances. Delany thus became skilled in meticulous image-control early on.
For example, while staying in Windsor with her husband, she soon found it ‘too
public a place for me to live in with any comfort […] when I went out I was
embarrassed with more company than was either agreeable or proper for me to
allow’. Therefore, she voluntarily made herself ‘a close prisoner’ in her own
house to keep up modest appearances for her husband.106 After Alexander Pen-
darves’ death, she had signiﬁcantly more freedom to go out as she chose, and
became, indeed, one of the ‘wild pigeons’ Richardson so severely disapproved of,
cheerfully frequenting Marylebone Gardens and Ranelagh.107
However, women were not merely objects of the gaze, but also actively
adopted the role of the spectator in public space. Fanny Burney, for example,
had reason to be especially pleased with her box in the opera; it was ‘the most
delightful Box in the House, from not being so much in sight as to render very
much Dress necessary, yet enough to have, every convenience of seeing both
performers & company’, thus oﬀering her the ideal position of the spectator.108
Being discovered appraising her fellow audience members was, however,
enough to cause her acute embarrassment: ‘[Mr Jerningham] said to me “pray
were not you the lady that used the Glass the other Night at the Play?” Here I
was quite shocked,—but could only defend, not deny,—protesting, with great
truth, that I only used it for the Performers’.109 Female spectators were, after
all, stepping outside the gender roles deﬁned by the politeness discourse by
adopting the active, evaluative stance traditionally reserved for men. In all
fairness, Burney was extremely short-sighted, and needed visual aids to indeed
make out anything of great distance.
The connection between patriarchal power and publicity is clearly visible in
Samuel Richardson’s attempt to discourage the public outings of Anne Don-
nellan, the daughter of an Irish peer and a prominent member of London
society. In his letter to Mary Delany, Richardson complained that unmarried
women, such as Donnellan (who was one of Delany’s closest friends), tended to
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behave in an intolerably independent manner, not having a husband to control
them. ‘[T]hese single ladies—Upon my word, Madam, I do think it is not so
very much amiss sometimes, that control—but no more on this subject’,
Richardson concluded his slightly incoherent rant on the failure of single
women to bow to male authority as they should.110 Delany replied to Richardson
with a mischievous air:
I am very sorry Mrs Donnellan was not controllable on the point of going
into the sharp air of Hampstead, for which I doubt she has suﬀered. Your
dash after control is a challenge; I turn you over to the single ladies, they are
numerous enough, and some, I am sure (particularly of your acquaintance)
able enough to defend their own cause.111
Thus, Delany recognised that Richardson’s frustrated wish to exert manly con-
trol over Anne Donnellan was a ‘challenge’ of power, and she not only advocated
women’s right to go out as they chose, but also believed in their intellectual
capability to ‘defend their own cause’ against men like Richardson.112
In other words, women’s self-conscious parading in public spaces can be seen
as a means of asserting their autonomy against the gendered conduct norms
that deﬁned public display as dangerous and harmful for women. Mary Delany
herself is a glaring example of a woman who embraced public amusements with
both hands and urged others to do the same. She wrote to her sister Anne that
their elderly aunt Stanley was ‘very much pleased at your going to the Bath […]
She gives her service to you, and charges you to put on all your best airs and
graces’. In addition to passing her this ﬂippant advice, Delany equipped her
sister with her ‘Brussels night-clothes, which I desire you will wear, and tear if
you please, as long as you ﬂaunt it at the Bath’.113 Delany herself was an inde-
fatigable partaker of polite amusements. ‘To-morrow we go to a concert of
music, on Saturday to the poppet-show, on Monday to the ridotto’, she summed
up her engagements in London; she ﬂirted nonchalantly at balls and masquer-
ades, and self-consciously dressed herself in her ‘best array, borrowed my Lady
Sunderland’s jewels, and made a tearing show’ at the Queen’s birthday.114
Not everyone was as comfortable with being looked at as Delany, who was,
indeed, something of a specialist when it came to clever management of
appearances. Fanny Burney, for one, had continuous problems with public
sociability, caused partly by her growing fame as a novelist, but also by her
general shyness and inability to control her exterior appearances with due dili-
gence. When she went to Brighton with Hester Lynch Thrale in 1782, shortly
after the publication of her second novel Cecilia, she was the object of every-
one’s attention. ‘[M]ost violent was the staring & whispering as I passed &
repassed’, she described her visit to the assembly rooms; ‘I shall certainly escape
going any more, if it is in my power’.115 To her father she wrote:
We do here very toll[erably]: the place is still pretty full: but we go little
into public, & twice that I have been has quite satisﬁed me for the season,
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for I seem as much a shew to all the folks as Omiah could be, & they stare
with as much curiosity, as they would at him; though they whisper with
rather more caution.116
Burney’s willingness to hide from the public gaze was a determining feature of
her personality, and she generally avoided situations that would make her con-
spicuous. For the same reason she avoided public dancing as far as possible,
being painfully aware of the public exposure it brought on women. A dancing
woman was considered a rightful object of public scrutiny; therefore, Elizabeth
Montagu, for one, thought that a girl should never ‘dance Minouets at the ball
till she was quite perfect in it’.117 For Burney, dancing posed endless horrors: ‘it
is so long since I have Exhibited, that I am a Poltroon’, she complained upon
going to a ball; ‘besides, I see plainly I should be Watched & commented upon
in a most scrutinizing manner,—for that, I have some reason to believe I am
without Dance-ing,—& therefore I think I am most safe—& know I am most
easy—in resting a quiet spectator’.118
Fears of being exposed to looks held little sway over Mary Delany, however,
who described a particularly ‘rakish’ ball to her sister:
I told you we were to have a ball, and a ball we had; nine couple of as
clever dancers (though I say it that should not) as ever tripped. The knight
[Sir Thomas Pendergast] and I were partners, we began at seven: danced
thirty-six dances with only resting once, supped at twelve, every one by
their partner […] At two we went to dancing again; most of the ladies
determined not to leave Plattin till day-break, they having three miles to go
home, so we danced on till we were not able to dance any longer.119
Yet, even Delany was careful in picking the events she showed herself at and
the amounts of exposure she deemed appropriate, and emphatically did ‘not
dance in every crowd’.120 As Amanda Vickery and Hannah Greig have
observed, there were sharp hierarchical diﬀerences between public places and
amusements, dictated by their exclusiveness and fashionableness; it was con-
sidered bad form to mingle without discrimination in every public ball avail-
able.121 Therefore, when Fanny Burney and Hester Maria ‘Queeney’ Thrale
refrained from dancing at the last ball of the season in Bath, this gesture was
packed with implicit meaning. As Betty Rizzo notes, the Thrale party was
expressing ‘its high tone in Bath by not mingling in the Pump Room and by
avoiding the subscription balls; and although they have attended this last ball
from curiosity, they maintain their superiority to the notoriously mixed assem-
bly by refusing to dance’.122 Similarly, in Delany’s mind, exclusiveness made a
ball appropriate for a lady of reputation to attend:
[T]here is to be another entertainment barefaced, which are balls. Twelve
subscribers, every subscriber pays ten guineas a night, and is to have three
tickets to dispose of, two of them to ladies and the other to a gentleman,
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that will make up four-and-twenty couple. […] Some prudes already have
attacked the reputation of those ladies that will accept of the tickets, but as
all the subscribers are men of the ﬁrst quality, and most of them married
men, I don’t see what scandal can ensue, only spiteful people make harm of
everything. There are to be no spectators, nor tickets to be sold.123
Thus, even though Delany never shied away from public amusements in fear of
losing her reputation for feminine modesty, as didactic writers threatened, she
acknowledged that successful public performances required great skill, and the
boundaries of appropriateness should never be too blatantly violated.
However, even an expert like Mary Delany could encounter awkward situa-
tions in public places. Her experiences at a concert are a reminder that women
could control the public spectacle they put on only to a limited degree. At the
concert in question, a certain Monsieur Fabrici, a Hanoverian minister, shame-
lessly kept on gaping at Delany. ‘He stared at me the whole night, and put me
so much out of countenance, that I was ready to cry’, complained Delany; ‘he
soon checked all my pleasure at the entertainment, the music sounded harsh,
and everything appeared disagreeable. I showed all the signs of discontent I
could, enquired if my chair was come, and looked at my watch twenty times’—
to no avail.124 Delany was thus subjected to the ‘Family of Starers’ Richard
Steele described in The Spectator, who used their eyes as a means of asserting
power that women had little means to resist.125 Thus, since the spectacle
involved both the object and the audience, deﬁant public display could also turn
against its intended purpose.
It should also be remembered that not all women viewed public display
through its subversive potential, or even in a neutral light. For some, public
space appeared threatening and morally corrupting. Catherine Talbot, a known
moralist, was afraid of losing precisely those emblems of femininity—‘virtue’,
‘modesty’, and ‘sobriety’—that Samuel Richardson (who, incidentally, was a
close acquaintance of Talbot’s and inﬂuenced greatly her notions of ideal fem-
ininity) and other didactic writers held so dear. Therefore, for Talbot, seeing
and being seen posed deep moral dilemmas. She recorded in her journal
attending a concert given by her friend, Marchioness Grey which, despite the
pleasure it gave her, also brought on a desire to shine in company which she
deemed impious:
Soft Musick in a Noble Room where it seem’d every bodys business to
appear the best they could, disposes one (till recollection sets it right) to see
this World its Vanities & Pleasures in too Considerable a Light, & to think
that being Nobody in it is an Evil. I know it is not.
Despite these musings, she went to the concert and indulged herself in the
morally suspicious sociability, ‘sat & chatted easily & Cheerfully with every
body that came in my way & came away in excellent spirits. Why should I
not?’, she concluded deﬁantly.126 On a similar occasion, she wrote to
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Marchioness Grey that she would accept her invitation, but would only sit in
an ‘obscure corner’ to avoid the temptations of luxurious sociability that were
in danger of making her forget her shamefaced modesty. Indeed, Talbot’s
letter is a curious mixture of self-important moral rectitude and intentional
self-deprecating humility:
According to your Invitation Dear Lady Grey I attend you this Evening &
partake your Concert. But I shall place myself on a Seat behind all the Settees at
the very Upper End of the Room, where I can have the full pleasure of seeing &
hearing without being heard & seen. A pleasure vastly more unmixed than the
other, where to idle minds as Mine half the attention to everything that
deserves it is taken oﬀ by bestowing it upon ones undeserving self; but in this
Obscure corner my Crimson Stuﬀ Gown made by a Cuddesden Manteau
Maker will be no discredit to your Pompous Room.127
One might also reasonably question how inconspicuous Talbot would have
actually been in a bright crimson gown.
Talbot’s anxieties arose partly from her heavily religious ethos, but also, in
all likelihood, from her diﬃdence and social anxiety that made polite sociability
diﬃcult for her to master. This was apparently the case for many a reticent
woman of polite society. For example, Hannah Greig has described the adver-
sities the ‘cripplingly shy and deeply depressive’ 25-year-old Gertrude Savile
faced trying to inﬁltrate the glamorous London society, despite her ﬂawless
pedigree, abundant wealth, and prominent connections. Indeed, as Greig points
out, the inability to perform satisfactorily in the polite sphere caused severe
anxiety in elite women, and in a very concrete way narrowed down their
opportunities in life.128 Thus, even though public display oﬀered women possi-
bilities to question the conduct ideals linked to domesticity and female modesty,
not all embraced these possibilities. Some viewed public amusements through a
critical lens, and their excursions into public spaces were tinted with moral
anxiety, as well as fear of performing deﬁciently.
Beauty and Power
‘Far be it from me,’ said Lord Orville, ‘to dispute the magnetic power of beauty’.
Fanny Burney, Evelina (1778)129
Beauty can be examined as a case study of sorts that illustrates practically all
the problematic issues that revolve around the polite spectacle, gendered gaze,
and visibility. Anu Korhonen has described beauty as the conceptual tool that
‘fashioned what people saw, and how they looked at others’; it was ‘an essen-
tial discursive tool for envisioning femininity and masculinity, and indeed
women’s visibility’ in the early modern European urban landscape. Thus,
beauty functioned as a means of ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ gender through the
practices of seeing and being seen. Beauty was used to naturalise the gendered
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positions of the subject and object of the gaze; however, it also underlines the
ambiguousness of the relationship between the beautiful (female) object and the
gazing (male) subject. As Korhonen writes, beauty was ‘a practice, both obser-
vatory and participatory’, in which both parties had their own powers—albeit
those powers were not symmetrical ones.130
Beauty was a complicated issue with many reference points to politeness and
ideal femininity. It was one of the most important characteristics a woman had;
it was the emblem and ultimate sign of femininity, and, as such, a primary
gendering feature. According to Korhonen, ‘men were beautiful as exceptional
individuals, whereas women were expected to be beautiful in kind’. Indeed,
according to The Ladies Calling, ‘Nature’ itself made a distinction between the
sexes through ‘the beauties of their outward form’.131 Thus, a woman who did
not ﬁt the category of ‘beautiful’ was of suspicious gender. Beauty was also an
important means of gaining visibility, since it was imagined as naturally meant
to be looked at. A beautiful woman thus had a right to receive attention; in fact,
she could not help doing so, since beauty was thought to capture the eye natu-
rally and unavoidably. This notion was commonplace enough to provoke
humour, as in the case of a man who wrote to The Spectator on his encounter
with a great beauty on the street: ‘As I was this Day walking in the Street, there
happened to pass by on the other Side of the Way a Beauty, whose Charms were
so attracting that it drew my Eyes wholly on that Side, insomuch that I neglected
my own Way, and chanced to run my Nose directly against a Post’.132 Thus,
beauty’s inescapable allure proved fateful for the poor man’s physical well-being.
Beauty also highlights the sexual tension that was always present in the act of
watching and, indeed, one of the reasons behind the anxiety felt over publicity’s
immoralising eﬀect.133 Early modern understandings of emotions that took
passions to be automatic reactions to external stimuli still shaped eighteenth-
century ideas of beauty—and ‘the passion that beauty produced was love’.134
Thus, beautiful women were thought to provoke desire in men just by letting
themselves be seen. Men were described to be powerless in the face of great
beauty, which made it possible for women to use a certain amount of power
over men. Korhonen argues that women who forced their looks on others were
active and had authority; they ‘controlled not only their own actions but also
the sensations and emotions of others’.135
Beauty itself was not a passive quality a woman either did or did not possess.
It did not consist only in an ‘oval face’, ‘skin transparent’, ‘ﬁrm [and] vermil-
lioned’ cheeks, ‘moderately large’ eyes, and a small bosom, as The Lady’s
Magazine stipulated; instead, beauty was a bodily practice that was fabricated
‘by clothes, cosmetics, and gestures’—by women’s own ‘actions, skills, and
eﬀorts’.136 Accordingly, women habitually used external enhancements to
increase their beauty, despite much voiced criticism that denounced the use of
cosmetics as dissimulation and dishonesty, as well as unnatural or ungodly.137
John Bennett, for example, advised women to ‘blush’ at such ‘unseemly practices’
as ‘powders, perfumes, pomatums, cosmeticks, essence of roses, Olympian dew,
artiﬁcial eyes, teeth, hair’:
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Be content to be, what God and nature intended you: appear in your true
colours; abhor any thing, like deceit, in your appearance, as well as your
character. What must sensible men think of a woman, who has a room,
ﬁlled with a thousand preparations and mixtures to deceive him? What
money, what time must be given to this odious, insuﬀerable vanity! Under
such unnatural management, how diﬀerent must be the female of the evening
and the morning!138
The use of cosmetics had well-known immoral connotations through its asso-
ciation with prostitutes and Frenchwomen, but, above all, ‘painting’ went
against the polite ideal of transparency, since a woman’s true feelings were
impossible to discern under a coat of red and white.139 As Mary Wollstonecraft
complained, a painted face was not ‘mind-illumined’, and ‘[t]ruth is not expec-
ted to govern the inhabitant of so artiﬁcial a form’, and warned that a man who
‘marries a woman thus disguised, he may chance not to be satisﬁed with her
real person’.140 Indeed, Thomas Rowlandson’s caricature from 1792 reﬂects the
fear that even the smoothest skin and rosiest cheeks could turn out to be com-
pletely artiﬁcial (Figure 4.4). Nevertheless, since beauty was represented as an
intrinsic part of femininity, women often aspired towards it with extreme
means. Fanny Burney even reported a death in her circle of acquaintances
resulting from a cosmetic-induced lead poisoning. The local doctor’s opinion
was that a young girl, one Sophy Pitches, ‘killed herself by Quackery,—that is,
by cosmetics, & preparations of lead or mercury, taken for her Complection,
which, indeed, was almost unnaturally white—he thinks, therefore, that this
pernicious stuﬀ got into her veins, & poisoned her!’141
Transparency formed an important context for eighteenth-century under-
standings of beauty. As the external body was imagined to be directly linked to
the internal self, a beautiful body was thought to reﬂect a beautiful mind. In
Camilla, Melmond, the eager admirer of Indiana Lynmere, reads from Indiana’s
beautiful countenance all her inner qualities:
‘[S]he is beauty in its very essence! she is elegance, delicacy, and sensibility
personiﬁed!’ ‘All very true,’ said Lionel; ‘but how should you know any-
thing of her besides her beauty?’ ‘How? by looking at her! Can you view
that countenance and ask me how? Are not those eyes all soul? Does not
that mouth promise every thing that is intelligent? Can those lips ever move
but to diﬀuse sweetness and smiles?’142
This rationale was translated into a rhetoric where ‘no Woman is capable of being
Beautiful, who is not incapable of being False’; since ‘Pride destroys all Symmetry
and Grace, and Aﬀectation is a more terrible Enemy to ﬁne Faces than the Small-
Pox’, as The Spectator insisted, beauty was thought to tell its unerring tale of a
woman’s morality and good nature.143 The transparency of the body could also be
applied the other way around; if a woman did not fulﬁl the requirements of vir-
tuousness, moderation, and goodness, she could never achieve true beauty—for it
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‘is Virtue and Goodness only, that make the true Beauty’.144 However, despite the
implicit connection between beauty, goodness, and transparency, beauty, too,
could be put on as a ‘beautiful mask’ to gild the ‘otherwise deformed vice of
impurity’ with the help of artiﬁcial enhancements.145 Equating beauty with mor-
ality was little more than a rhetoric tactic to frighten women into conformity by
threatening that unfeminine behaviour would wither their beauty. Even Mel-
mond’s panegyric on Indiana’s beauty in Camilla reveals itself to be, more than
anything, a derision of the blind belief in physiognomic correspondence between
inner goodness and outer beauty, since the reader knows perfectly well that Indi-
ana’s spoilt character by no means lives up to her good looks. Indeed, since beauty
played such an important role in ideals of polite femininity, it was widely used as
a discursive whip, forcing women to discipline themselves into propriety and
morality in order to preserve their good looks.
Beauty was also an important means of polite self-deﬁnition. Hannah Greig
has demonstrated that beauty should not be seen as conﬁned to bodily prac-
tices, but instead as a social category—an ‘objective acknowledgement of [a
woman’s] social status and public proﬁle’.146 Thus, beauty was a means of
articulating social diﬀerence; women of polite society were routinely char-
acterised as ‘beautiful’, and beauty was connected to women’s social, ﬁnancial,
mental, and educational features as well as to their physical attributes.147
Indeed, The Spectator declared that a woman ‘who takes no care to add to the
Figure 4.4 Thomas Rowlandson, Six Stages of Mending a Face (London: S. W. Fores
1792). Courtesy of the Lewis Walpole Library, Yale University
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natural Graces of her Person any excelling Qualities, may be allowed still to
amuse, as a Picture, but not to triumph as a Beauty’.148 Therefore, even though
physical beauty enticed men, falling for mere ‘unintelligent’ beauty with no
education, ﬁnesse, or endowment was considered foolish.149 However, because
physical beauty was such an alluring power, beautiful women could also use
their good looks to compensate for lowly social or economic status. Beauty was
seen as a woman’s commodity that could be exchanged for wealth or rank in
the form of a good marriage or a mistress arrangement, occasionally even
against the poor victim’s better judgement.150 Thus, beauty could be extremely
dangerous for the male gazer. It posed a danger to the beautiful object, as well,
since it supposedly attracted lustful men and endangered a woman’s chastity.151
Accordingly, Mary Delany wished her niece to have beauty only as much ‘as is
necessary to give a pleasing impression—not a rapturous one, for that may
prove more to her unhappiness than happiness’.152 Ultimately, beauty was a
disruptive force; it shook the foundation of the patriarchal order by forcing
men to abandon their rationality and self-control, and especially by giving
women active agency and power over men’s feelings and actions. Beauty also
threatened to crumble the borders of the polite elite, making it possible for
anyone to enter that sphere by the force of their looks.
For these reasons, polite society greeted beauty with anxious feelings. Despite
its granted importance in delineating femininity, beauty was always presented
as a characteristic secondary to moral and mental excellence. Elizabeth Mon-
tagu complained to William Friend that ‘it is the misfortune of many women to
place their vanity upon their beauty & then it will not make one eﬀort towards
worthiness’; therefore, Montagu wrote, ‘tis of great consequence a girl should
not look upon beauty as a meritorious thing but only esteem it as a lucky
accident’.153 Her husband perhaps saw beauty in a more advantageous light;
Elizabeth Montagu wrote to her sister how Mr Montagu was so angry at her
brother William ‘for marrying a Woman with so little beauty I believe if he was
his son he wd disinherit him’:
You wd dye with laughing if you was to hear him express his astonishment
& disdain, & when I laugh at what he says he concludes, I wish it may end
well. I endeavour in vain to convince him that a handsome wife is not one
of ye necessities of life, & when I have molliﬁed him as to ye face he begins
on ye shape.154
Montagu also considered beauty to be dangerous; when a Mrs Pope eloped
with a Mr Hamilton, Montagu professed being ‘sorry for the woman, as her
beauty has been her ruin’:
She is extremely handsome and foolish; her vanity ruined her circum-
stances; and pride, poverty, and beauty, are ill advisers, ill suited to con-
duct safely through a world like this, where the temptations without are
suﬃcient dangers, without the seduction within the mind.155
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Slight of build and often sickly, Montagu herself was no great beauty, and
aware of it: ‘my countenance has never wounded any man, and heaven forbid it
should make a lady miscarry!’ she humorously wrote to the Duchess of Port-
land.156 Therefore, she was used to compensating her lack of captivating beauty
with her wit and learning—qualities that, she harangued, were ‘not absolutely
needful’ when a woman had ‘a good complexion’.157 Nevertheless, even Mon-
tagu paid constant attention to her looks, trying diﬀerent remedies from bath-
ing to rouge to make her face look less like ‘a memento mori’.158 Indeed, even
though modesty and virtue were celebrated as the characteristics that set Eng-
lishwomen apart from their continental counterparts, English polite society still
took an immense pride in the international reputation Englishwomen had for
their physical beauty.159
Female Accomplishments: Capturing the Gaze?
Women had other warrants for capturing the polite gaze besides beauty. They
could also have recourse to various accomplishments. In a well-known passage
in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, the haughty and condescending Miss Bingley
claims that, in order to be truly ‘accomplished’—
A woman must have a thorough knowledge of music, singing, drawing,
dancing, and the modern languages, to deserve the word; and besides all
this, she must possess a certain something in her air and manner of walk-
ing, the tone of her voice, her address and expressions, or the word will be
but half-deserved.160
As this passage shows, a good education was ideally compiled of a careful but
extensive selection of bodily practices that included not only that ineﬀable
gracefulness of movement discussed in the previous section, but also a wide
range of speciﬁc skills such as singing, drawing, or dancing, which were called
elegant or ornamental accomplishments. Even though the protagonist Elizabeth
Bennet then replies to Miss Bingley that, in reality, few if any women fulﬁl all
these requirements, this was nevertheless the didactic ideal that women were
expected to pursue. The speciﬁc selection of these accomplishments, which formed
the bulk of women’s education, varied slightly from writer to writer, but most
commonly included singing, playing the harp, pianoforte, or harpsichord, draw-
ing, painting, needlework, and other kinds of handicrafts, as well as dancing and
modern languages.161 Hester Chapone condensed the list in 1777 into ‘[d]ancing
and the knowledge of the French tongue’, which ‘are now so universal, that they
cannot be dispensed with in the education of a gentlewoman’.162
Ann Bermingham has argued that there was a growing emphasis on accom-
plishments in women’s education during the long eighteenth century, deriving
from the slow shift in customs of display within the workings of the polite
marriage market.163 In fact, with the growing commercialisation of leisure,
public polite venues started to ﬁll up with a more varied and heterogenous
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crowd—despite attempts to regulate the participants of polite pleasures by
various measures, such as imposing entrance fees.164 This increasing inclusive-
ness led to moralist fears over the degenerative dangers of public places with
their increasingly vulgar audiences. According to R. H. Sweet, late eighteenth-
century writers started to increasingly deﬁne politeness ‘against the vulgarity of
Fanny Burney’s Branghtons, rather than Sir Roger de Coverley’s rusticity’. The
countryside thus started to acquire connotations of unspoiled purity, unreserved
openness, and ideal politeness, ‘undeﬁled by the vices, social emulation and
corruption of urban life’.165 Populous urban centres became increasingly asso-
ciated with theatrical politeness for their lack of transparency and openness—
contrarily to their early eighteenth-century idealisation. Writing in the 1760s,
James Fordyce complained that ‘the heart cannot be unfolded’ in public places,
where ‘all is reserve, ceremony, show […] put on to deceive’, and John Gregory
did not think ‘public places suited to make people acquainted together’, because
people ‘can only be distinguished there by their looks and external beha-
viour’.166 By 1799, Hannah More wanted to rescue women from ‘vapid
common places, from uninteresting tattle, […] from false sensibility, […] from
a cold vanity, from the overﬂowings of self-love, exhibiting itself under the
smiling mask of an engaging ﬂattery, and from all the factitious manners of
artiﬁcial intercourse’.167
In terms of polite amusements, then, there was a growing valorisation of
the selective, especially during the ﬁnal decades of the eighteenth century.
While visiting Vauxhall or Bath remained popular amongst the elite as well,
there was both a rhetorical and practiced preferment of exclusive socia-
bility—subscription balls, private concerts, and restricted clubs—as the seat
of reﬁnement and good company.168 This development also inﬂuenced
didactic notions of what was deemed appropriate female self-display. Ber-
mingham suggests that the idealisation of the private sphere put an
increased emphasis on women’s accomplishments as a means of display that
was supposed to take place in the conﬁnes of the drawing-room, neatly
resolving the moral problem of parading one’s body around the town for
the vulgar masses to see.169
Indeed, elegant accomplishments were meant for making women visible.
Young unmarried ladies were supposed to show oﬀ their skills in the minuet or
behind the pianoforte during assemblies and dinners and, in this way, capture
the attention of the fashionable audience—and the eye of potential husbands.170
Jane Austen described sardonically in the unﬁnished Sanditon (1817) two young
ladies who, with ‘the hire of a Harp for one, & the purchase of some Drawing
paper for the other’, meant to become universally admired—
[The] two Miss Beauforts were just such young ladies as may be met with,
in at least one family out of three, throughout the Kingdom; […] they were
very accomplished and very Ignorant, their time being divided between
such pursuits as might attract admiration, […] the object of all, was to
captivate some Man of much better fortune than their own.171
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Then again, the very fact that accomplishments brought women visibility made
them simultaneously controversial, since female visibility was, as we recall, a
matter of great ambivalence. Therefore, Michèle Cohen notes that even though
‘the term “accomplishment” was on the tip of every moralist and educational-
ist’s pen, there was less agreement than one would therefore expect regarding
not only what counted as an accomplishment, but whether accomplishments
should be censured, tolerated or approved’.172 Even if accomplishments were, as
Ann Bermingham argues, a means to mitigate the problematics of the spectacle
in the sense that they provided women a means for deliberate self-display while
masking the fact it was actually happening, and allowed men to disguise their
erotic desire as aesthetic interest, the display they enabled was by no means
uncomplicated. The proper means and amounts of female self-display were
policed in assertions of politeness, tastefulness, and propriety, and seeking
attention and praise was deemed to be gauche: ‘Should you exel in any parti-
cular accomplishment, or in any branch of knowledge, it is a disgusting Vanity
to be always displaying them, in order to extort the praises of others’, warned
John Burton; instead, ‘Modest merit will never want for admirers’.173 Accord-
ingly, the accomplished woman was a deeply ambiguous ﬁgure in the long
eighteenth century.174
Accomplishments also had an important role as cultural signiﬁers. As
Katharine Glover writes, being able to master the pianoforte or speak impec-
cable French was not only a demonstration of skill but, more signiﬁcantly,
‘access to a culture that only the polite had time or money to acquire’, bought
with money from tutors, governesses, dancing masters, and boarding schools.175
Accomplishments were thus statements of social status and wealth, and oper-
ated as a part of a shared cultural language of taste, ﬂuency in which bought
women an access to polite society. They were also diﬃcult skills that required
years of diligent practice; therefore, a technical expertise in these ﬁelds would
indicate not only a high level of education but also a character of industrious
meticulousness—a most practical characteristic for a good wife. Indeed,
accomplishments supposedly exhibited those feminine skills that promised a
happy marriage; especially skills in handicrafts indicated that a woman was
diligent, hard-working, disciplined, and well-versed in household chores.176 An
ideal woman did not loll around idly, but was constantly busy with one chore
or another; as Hester Chapone declared, ‘[a]bsolute idleness is inexcusable in a
woman, because the needle is always at hand for those intervals in which she
cannot be otherwise employed’.177 In other words, the mastery of accomplish-
ments was directly related to a woman’s virtue. A woman incapable of staying
at home, content within herself and her accomplishments, was seen as morally
suspicious and, accordingly, unfeminine, especially by moralist writers.178 On
the other hand, the connection accomplishments were thought to bear to inner
virtue also made them an anxiety-provoking skill. Like beauty, a crafty display
of accomplishments could supposedly help designing women to dupe men into
marrying them under false pretences, and thus provided women subjective
power in the marriage market.
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As Ann Bermingham stresses, accomplishments were meant to be amateur
skills, aimed at ‘ﬁnshing-oﬀ’ the artistry of others rather than initiating original
art.179 However, women could use them subversively as a means of artistic self-
expression and subjectivity. Mary Delany is a case in point, as scholars have
recognised her landscape gardens, handicrafts, and especially her cut-paper
collages as works of art in their own right, showing original creative genius.
Delany certainly took her work very seriously. Accounts on her various art
projects occupied a lion’s share of her letters, and she had, in Lisa Moore’s
words, ‘a punishing work ethic’.180 ‘I have worked like a dragon this week at
my [shellwork] lustre’, she reported to her sister; in another letter, she wrote
having been occupied all week with ‘painting three pictures’.181 Delany tried to
schedule her working hours so as not to be interrupted by common everyday
sociability; ‘as soon as Lady Chesterﬁeld has made her visit I shall set about
painting again, but I don’t care for interruptions when I am at that employ-
ment’.182 Delany’s skills were also noticed by others. Her aristocratic friends
ordered paintings, shellwork, and needlework from her to adorn their homes,
and Sir Joshua Reynolds was reportedly ‘astonished’ by the force of her crayon
drawings.183 Mary Delany was thus an example of a woman who eﬀectively
used accomplishments as a means to perform her subjectivity through certain
forms of art allocated for women.184 However, using accomplishments rather
than ‘serious’ art as an outlet of female creativity and artistic aspirations ulti-
mately served to further subjugate women into the role of the decorous and
ornamental rather than allowing them freedom to become professional artists.
Indeed, as scholars have pointed out, women’s artistry in these ﬁelds has been
systematically marginalised and ridiculed; accordingly, Delany’s exquisite ﬂoral
art has until recently been labelled as ‘quaint’ or compared with ‘samplers’.185
Interestingly enough, Delany was the only one of the four women discussed
in this book to be truly ‘accomplished’ in Miss Bingley’s use of the word.
Catherine Talbot had a skill with the crayon and the needle and Fanny Burney
with the harpsichord, but their self-display was severely hampered by their
diﬃdence. Elizabeth Montagu, the most celebrated and idealised of the four,
emphatically never displayed any elegant accomplishments, but her skills were
those of the mind and tongue only. As much didactically emphasised as
accomplishments were, then, a lack of them could be compensated with other,
especially conversationalist means—such as a knowledge of literature or a witty
tongue. In fact, these women are good examples of the ways in which women
could use their education subversively—not towards its supposed end of cap-
turing a husband and becoming diligent wives and mistresses of a family, but to
gain private satisfaction from learning and scholarly as well as artistic pursuits.
Even the accomplished woman, such as Mary Delany, can be seen as an
active agent, especially when she pursued her accomplishments after marriage.
Ann Bermingham argues that ‘the accomplishment, which before marriage was
intended to signal future connubial bliss, becomes after marriage a source of
domestic irritation’, suggesting that married women were supposed to settle
into the role of the wife, mother, and ‘prudent domestic manager’, not to waste
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their time practicing skills that had already fulﬁlled their aim.186 The Spectator
presented a warning example of a married woman who ‘sings, dances, plays on
the Lute and Harpsicord, paints prettily, is a perfect Mistress of the French
Tongue, and has made a considerable Progress in Italian’, and, furthermore, is
‘excellently skill’d in […] Embroydering, and Needleworks of every Kind’—in
short, excels in ‘all those Accomplishments we generally understand by good
Breeding and polite Education’. The problem was that this excellent wife had
now allowed these accomplishments to take over her life:
You are not to imagine I ﬁnd fault that she either possesses or takes delight
in the Exercise of those Qualiﬁcations I just now mention’d; tis the immo-
derate Fondness she has to them that I lament, and that what is only
design’d for the innocent Amusement and Recreation of Life, is become the
whole Business and Study of hers.187
This ﬁctional woman resembles uncannily Mary Delany, who excelled in all
these arts and continued to dedicate herself to these accomplishments during
both her marriages. Her second husband’s particular ‘approving of my works,
and encouraging me to go on, keep up my relish to them’, Delany wrote to her
sister.188 Patrick Delany not only approved of her works, but took pride in
them, praising her ‘habit of industry’ and particularly her ‘study and practice of
painting, in which she singularly excelled, insomuch that she never copied a
picture from any master in which she did not equal, and often outdo, the ori-
ginal’.189 Of course, for Delany—as for the eighteenth-century leisured woman
in general—elegant accomplishments had also important practical uses. The
scope of women’s lives was much narrower than men’s, and especially women
living in the countryside spent most of their time at home in the company of
their immediate family and closest neighbours. Therefore, being able to amuse
oneself with various occupations was a matter of not only ideal femininity but
simply of passing the time agreeably. ‘[I]t is of great consequence to have the
power of ﬁlling up agreeably those intervals of time, which too often hang
heavily on the hands of a woman, if her lot be cast in a retired situation’, wrote
Hester Chapone on music and drawing.190 Nevertheless, the professional extent
to which Delany took her skills suggest that she was using accomplishments as
independent self-expression, as well as a means of acquiring pleasure, knowledge,
and expertise.
The domestic aspect of female accomplishments also made them morally
problematic. The home was, on the one hand, increasingly rhetorically fash-
ioned as the retired scene of female modesty and subservience. On the other
hand, the accomplishment, meant to be performed within the conﬁnes of the
genteel home, made it a stage for women’s commercialised self-display. Indeed,
as Judith Lewis, Amanda Vickery, and others have demonstrated, the genteel
home was a crucial stage for semi-public performances of politeness and
reﬁnement.191 This controversy was a continuous source of anxiety for moralist
didactic writers. In fact, simultaneous to the growing importance of female
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accomplishments, there was also an emerging trend of domesticity in women’s
didactic literature which promoted the domestic setting as a woman’s primary
sphere of life. The domestic woman was ﬁrstly a good wife, aﬀectionate
mother, and a meticulous housewife, and only secondly a sociable subject. An
antithesis to the luxurious, morally corrupt aristocrat, an ideal domestic
woman was diligent, frugal, modest, composed, disciplined, and chaste. She
would submit to her husband’s will and strive to enhance his fortune and hap-
piness by dexterous management of the household.192 However, even though
there was thus a discursive move towards the reiﬁcation of the domestic sphere,
Amanda Vickery and Robert Shoemaker have shown that women of the long
eighteenth century were, in practice, far from being imprisoned in their
houses.193 The language of domesticity intermingled in many ways with the
discourse of politeness during the latter part of the long eighteenth century,
inﬂuencing especially internalist readings of politeness—particularly their con-
ceptions of public places as deceptive and morally corrupt, as well as the home
as the haven of authenticity, honesty, virtue and sincerity.
The most notable diﬀerence between the accomplished woman and her
domestic counterpart was, as Nancy Armstrong has argued, that a domestic
woman was not on display.194 The apostles of domesticity—mostly moralists
like Hannah More—declared that, in More’s words, ‘[t]his world is not a stage
for the display of superﬁcial talents, but for the strict and sober exercise of
fortitude, temperance, meekness, faith, diligence, and self-denial’.195 Accord-
ingly, the ideal woman was not supposed to show herself in public amuse-
ments but to contentedly cherish her family at home. Therefore, amusements
entering the domestic sphere posed a moral dilemma. Hester Chapone’s
answer was to encourage women to exert their talents mainly for the beneﬁt
of their immediate family:
If you have any acquired talent of entertainment, such as music, painting,
or the like, your own family are those before whom you should most wish
to excel, and for whom you should always be ready to exert yourself; not
suﬀering the accomplishments which you have gained, perhaps by their
means, and at their expense, to lie dormant, till the arrival of a stranger
gives you spirit in the performance.196
Then again, even the act of refraining from bodily display was just another
form of display. Hannah More made it clear that the signs of ideal domesticity
might not display themselves as clearly as ﬂashy accomplishments, but were
nevertheless available to the keen eye—thus calling for an even closer scrutiny
of the female body:
To an injudicious and superﬁcial eye, the best educated girl may make the
least brilliant ﬁgure, as she will probably have less ﬂippancy in her manner,
and less repartee in her expression; […] But her merit will be known, and
acknowledged by all who come near enough to discern, and have taste
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enough to distinguish. It will be understood and admired by the man,
whose happiness she is one day to make, whose family she is to govern,
and whose children she is to educate.197
The full weight of domestic ideals was targeted at married women. After
achieving the goals set for showing oﬀ their polished bodies, married women
were expected to partly replace polite sociability, based on self-presentation,
with a more domestic set of polite ideals. However, women by no means
abandoned their role as active socialites after their marriage; as Amanda Vick-
ery has highlighted, married wives did not spend the rest of their lives cooped
up in their private homes, but instead continued their public performances in
polite society.198 Polite sociability could even be easier for a married woman
than for an unmarried one, since a married woman rarely needed a chaperone,
but, instead, was able to chaperone others. An unmarried woman was con-
stantly being evaluated by polite society, whereas a wife or an engaged woman
could mingle with much more ease and relative freedom.199 Then again, even
married women needed to be ‘attentive, by their exemplary conduct, to render
the nuptial state, honourable and of good repute’, since ‘the Husband feels
himself disgraced, even by the breath of rumour, where the reputation of his
Wife is concerned’.200
Women’s relationship with public attention was constantly debated within
the discourse of politeness, because it highlighted many of the inconsistencies of
the culture of politeness. What complicated women’s self-display was the fun-
damental duality of women’s social role. On the one hand, women played an
important public and civilising role that subjected them to the theatrical
expectations of sociability and exposed them to the gazes of polite society. On
the other hand, women’s private role as daughters, wives, and mothers required
modesty, reserve, and privacy, making public exhibitionism a threat to their
domesticity and chastity. In other words, women’s public and private roles
were in constant conﬂict. A woman’s body was subjected to two sets of
demands: it needed to be all at once on display and hidden away, visible and
invisible, public and private, polite and demure. The balance between these
roles was constantly discursively redeﬁned, which made it diﬃcult to pin down
on an individual level. Too much publicity could ruin a woman’s reputation,
while too little could make her an old maid.
Rural and Urban Sociability
As my Summer passd like a pleasant dream, & the London life is a busy kind of
delirium, I am glad to insert between them that sober solidity of things which one
ﬁnds at ones Home in the Country.
Elizabeth Montagu to Elizabeth Vesey, 6 October 1769201
As Lawrence Klein, Philip Carter, and R. H. Sweet have discussed, urbanity
was one of the most characteristic features of eighteenth-century politeness; the
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modern free and easy town politeness was contrasted with country manners,
represented as rustic, boorish, unpolished, and old-fashioned.202 Fanny Burney’s
description of a Brighton dinner party, ‘consisting of Mr. & Mrs. Shelley of
Lewes, who are very civil, good sorts of people; 2 of their Daughters, who, like
most other Country misses, are immoveably silent before the Elders, &, rudely
free before the Youngsters’, reﬂects the prejudices felt towards uncouth country
manners.203 Similarly, when Catherine Talbot took a scholar visiting Oxford to
see the traditional local Rural Games, she recorded him showing absolutely no
‘enthusiasm about the Country’; rather, the ‘poor Man […] was scandalised at
the raggedness & awkward boldness of our shepherdesses & the unpoliteness
of our Youths I cannot express’.204
Indeed, the division between town and country deﬁned politeness in many
ways. According to Philip Carter, the spread of the new egalitarian and infor-
mal urban culture of politeness rendered stiﬀ country manners old-fashioned
and ridiculous.205 However, despite often-voiced conceptions of urban reﬁne-
ment and countryside boorishness, scholars have shown that the diﬀerence
between town and country manners in England was, in fact, much less steep
than elsewhere in Europe. According to Paul Langford, the uniformity of Eng-
lish manners and customs was a common observation made by continental
travellers. What separated Britain from its neighbours was the uniquely perva-
sive inﬂuence that London with its fashions exerted over even the most distant
corners of the kingdom. As a result, Langford concludes, not only were there
comparatively few diﬀerences between diﬀerent counties, but also ‘the country’
as a place where one would not meet town people hardly existed.206 Moreover,
this delineation between town and countryside was full of controversies and,
therefore, far from clear-cut. Countryside could be depicted as the ideal dwell-
ing-place of honesty and sincerity or the Rousseauian cradle of natural man-
ners, while urban culture stood for vice, corruption, and unhealthfulness. If
anything, the countryside was in danger of getting spoiled by urban foppery, as
Mary Delany complained:
I am very sorry to ﬁnd here and everywhere people out of character, and
that wine and tea should enter where they have no pretence to be, and
usurp the rural food of syllabub, &c. But the dairymaids wear large hoops
and velvet hoods instead of the round tight petticoat and straw hat, and
there is as much foppery introduced in the food as in the dress, the pure
simplicity of ye country is quite lost. 207
The meanings that the town and countryside acquired were also heavily,
albeit ambivalently, gendered. On the one hand, honesty and sincerity were
feminised qualities, and the peace and quiet of country living was considered
to be the ideal frame for domestic female existence, whereas business and
public matters called for men’s presence in the busy town. On the other hand,
urban sociability was deﬁned by women’s attendance and conversation
between the sexes.
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On a much more concrete level, the juxtaposition of the town and the
countryside played a central role in elite women’s lives. In fact, the often
very regular seasonal shifts of physical location between urban and rural
dwellings set the pace of women’s everyday lives. Those members of the
rural elite, who had the wealth and means, rented a house or an apartment
in Bath or Brighton for the season, running roughly from October to May,
or went to stay in London for a few weeks or months with their relatives or
friends. Similarly, urban gentlewomen retired to country estates for the
summer, either their own or their families’ or acquaintances’. Those who
lacked the ability to follow this seasonal rotation were forced to make do
with the amusements, urban or rural, they had at hand throughout the year,
or to join in only occasionally.
Women’s environment very much determined their everyday way of life. In
fact, women’s rural existence diﬀered radically from their town life. Country
life was stereotypically linked to domesticity, sedentariness, and lack of social
obligations, whereas the constant buzz of amusements and social engagements
characterised women’s urban living. Elizabeth Montagu used humour to high-
light the stereotypical diﬀerences between country and urban life upon leaving
for London:
Next Sunday I quit the peaceful groves and hospitable roof of Bullstrode,
for the noisy, turbulent city; my books and serious reﬂections are to be laid
aside for the looking-glass and curling-irons, and from that time I am no
longer a Pastorella, but propose to be as idle, as vain, and as impertinent as
any one.208
Indeed, compared to the non-stop hustle and bustle of the Town Season,
country life was signiﬁcantly quieter in terms of social obligations. However,
it was not wholly without them; instead, as Amanda Vickery has shown, the
scope of rural entertainments expanded signiﬁcantly in the early 1700s, and
privileged eighteenth-century women’s days in the countryside were often
ﬁlled with non-stop visits from neighbours, various small tea parties and
dinners, charity balls, rides and hunts, races and fairs, and other local
events.209 The intellectuals and witlings of polite society often sneered at this
enforced rural sociability. Elizabeth Montagu derided what she called ‘the
stupidity of a winter in the country’, emblematised by continuous visits from
neighbours and their ‘very dull’ country sociability. ‘[M]irth here is reckoned
madness, gaiety is idleness, and wit a crying sin’, she complained to the
Duchess of Portland.210 By these complaints, Montagu also wanted to
emphasise her own urban bon goût and fashionable reﬁnement. ‘If the coun-
try would aﬀord a few reasonable companions, or burthen us with none that
are not so, it would really make life a diﬀerent thing’, she grumbled to the
Duchess; ‘but for me, who have not any sociable instinct, to lead me to
creatures merely human, and, I think, scarce rational, it is really not a place
of uninterrupted felicity’—
144 Playing with Public and Private
I do hourly thank my stars I am not married to a country squire, or a beau,
for in the country all my pleasure is in my own ﬁreside, and that only when
it is not littered with queer creatures. One must receive visits and return
them, such is the civil law of the nations […] In London, if one meets with
impertinence and oﬀence, one seeks entertainment and pleasure only, but
here one commits wilful murder on the hours, and with premeditated
malice to oneself becomes felo de se for whole days.211
Women could also greet the rural season as a welcome respite from the urban
humdrum and, therefore, view excessive country sociability as a disturbance
rather than entertaining. It was considered to be the time for self-improvement,
diligent work, and education—in short, when in the country, women were to
acquire the skills and learning they could then show oﬀ in the sociable arenas of
the town. ‘[T]his Winter of Retirement & leisure is the time in which You
should sow & cultivate the seeds of every valuable Quality every amiable
Accomplishment’, Catherine Talbot reminded her young protégé Julia Berke-
ley.212 For, as Montagu sighed, ‘L’embaras de Londre […] really leaves one no
leisure for any thing right reasonable friendly & comfortable’.213 Regional
towns were no better, as Montagu complained in Newcastle, as the ‘desire of
pleasure & love of dissipation rages here as much as in London. Diversions here
are less elegant, & conversation less polite, but no one imagines retirement has
any comforts’. Montagu dutifully attended all these ‘visits, concerts plays &
balls’ in order not to appear haughty, even though she considered them ‘unin-
dear’d, joyless society’ that scarcely could ‘pay one for the loss of hours which
might be spent in the improvement of virtue & knowledge & the quiet plea-
sures of contemplation’.214 Similarly, Mary Delany sacriﬁced her Monday on
the altar of social obligations and ‘made visits in Dublin’ with her friend Letitia
Bushe, ‘furiously drest out in all our airs’.215
Indeed, women’s engagements in town, especially in London, could be
considerable. Fanny Burney, for example, recorded visiting eight friends
during a single afternoon.216 The constant demand to be either ‘eternally
Dressing & visiting, or appear impertinently ungrateful’217 eventually caused
Burney to vent her feelings to her sister, and to come up with a plan to reduce
her engagements:
I begin to grow most heartily sick & fatigued of this continual round of
visiting, & these eternal new Acquaintances. I am now arranging matters in
my mind for a better plan,—& I mean, hence forward, never to go out
more than three Days in the Week; […] I really have at present no pleasure
in any party, from the trouble & tiresomeness of being engaged to so
many. […] For my own part, if I wished to prescribe a cure for Dissipa-
tion, I should think none more eﬀectual than to give it a free course. The
many who have lived so from year to year amaze me more than ever, for
now more than I [sic] ever I can judge what Dissipation has to oﬀer. I
would not lead a life of daily engagements even for another month.218
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Burney’s intentions never came to fruition, however, as she continued to visit
her acquaintances, attend balls, and go to the opera on a daily basis—and
drawing no insigniﬁcant amount of pleasure from these activities, almost
enough to question her sincerity in condemning urban dissipation.
In other words, the juxtaposition of town and country was entwined with the
problematic of public and private. Women’s attitudes towards town and coun-
tryside also reﬂected connotations of public/private in various ways. They often
consciously made use of the moral implications that the diligent domesticity of
the countryside had long carried against the leisured and luxurious town. Mary
Delany—a London society darling if there ever was one—vaunted her rural
inclinations to Jonathan Swift in a self-conscious letter, commenting Princess
Anne’s wedding: ‘All the beau monde ﬂock to London to see her Royal High-
ness disposed of; but I prefer my duty to my mother, and the conversation of a
country girl, (my sister), to all the pomp and splendour of the Court. Is this
virtue, or is it stupidity? If I can help it I will not go to town till after Christ-
mas’.219 Similarly, when Catherine Talbot fretted over the dullness of her
journals she took comfort in the fact that the ‘pleasantest & Happiest Life is
not that which describes the best. Draw an Inference from this if You please
that the quietest & most uniform Life is the happiest’.220 Indeed, the town
made the ‘Mind more dissipated, time more hurried, engagements multiplied’
for Talbot, and only a retreat to the country, ‘free from the Persecution of
wretched Triﬂes, of Unmeaning Impertinents’ provided the ‘Wearied Mind’
some release. ‘I breath’d, I lived anew When I got into the Sweet the Quiet
Country’, sighed Talbot.221 What is more, town and country received also
gendered meanings in eighteenth-century conceptualisations, where the ‘inno-
cence and simple virtues of country people’ were typically expressed through
the ‘simple, unaﬀected sentiment of women’ according to Ludmilla Jordanova,
whereas the reﬁnement of city culture was perceived as a symbol of a masculine
capacity for intellectual genius.222 This gendered division of urban and rural
space naturally contributed to the conﬁguration of the public/private juxtapo-
sition through the assimilation of the feminine to privacy and, correspondingly,
the masculine to publicity.
However, women’s representations of the town/public and country/private
dichotomies follow no straightforward pattern; rather, their writings reﬂect a
continual play between the diﬀerent connotations of the two. As especially Eli-
zabeth Montagu’s letters show, they presented themselves as joyous pastorellas
just as easily as spectators of the urban world, and picked and utilised the
meanings that seemed most suitable to diﬀerent ends. In their life writing,
women both criticised and embraced the privacy and moral domesticity of the
countryside, depending on the audience and agenda of a particular text. In fact,
Montagu and her friends also recognised the unmodish connotations that the
countryside carried, and openly ridiculed the boorish manners of country squires
and the narrow parochialism of country ladies in their mutual letters. Thus, even
if customs were more uniform in England than in its continental neighbours,
there was nevertheless a clear distinction between urban fashionability and rural
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uncouthness in the minds of these learned ladies. Mary Delany deliberately
maintained a distance between herself and her country neighbours at Delville,
noting that ‘I may be thought too reserved in our village, but I choose rather to
be censured for that, than expose myself to the interruption and tittle-tattle of a
country neighbourhood’.223 Elizabeth Montagu similarly derided ‘a strange kind
of animal called a country beau and wit’, who had sunk her ‘into stupidity’ by
his conversation: ‘Had you seen the pains this animal has been taking to imitate
the cringe of a beau, and the smartness of a wit, till he was hideous to behold,
and horrible to hear, you would have pitied him; he walks like a tortoise, and
chatters like a magpye’.224 In another letter, she abused the gentry for their lack
of intellect and conversation:
We are quite alone here; I am not sorry for it, for I do not like, as some
good folks do, every creature that walks on two legs, with a face to look up
to heaven or down on the earth, and yet understands neither; an animal
that has missed of instinct, and not lit upon reason; one that thinks by
prejudice, speaks by rote, and lives by custom; that dares do no good
without an example, but dares do evil by precedent, whose conversation is
composed of more remnants than a tailor’s waistcoat, who snips oﬀ every
man’s superﬂuous observations to the patching of one sentence […] I had
rather have the dead palsey than such a companion. Any impertinent lively
creature is better than these gentry.225
In fact, Montagu often complained how her yearly retirement to the country-
side oﬀered her no expectations of ‘conversationes’ or ‘woof of philosophy’.226
The picture she drew to the Duchess of Portland of a winter in the country was
nothing short of desolate:
I am a very swallow, and cannot abide the country in winter. I love peace
with pleasure; but I have such a tendency to dulness, that I am afraid of
mere tranquillity.—I love to be a spectator of the rapid world […]; the
actions and passions of others keep me awake, without so far disturbing
the constant mood of my calm thoughts, as to make me uneasy; but the
lullaby of conversation that one’s country visitors entertain one with,
aﬀects me with a very intolerable drowsiness […] I assure you it is won-
derful, to see people so little admirable so much admired. By the courtesy
of Yorkshire, every one is wise and good-natured.227
Even if country sociability was intolerable to the reﬁned taste of Elizabeth
Montagu, the solitary domesticity of rural existence was hardly a better
option. Even though Montagu despised her gentry neighbours, the dullness of
a solely domestic Yorkshire life made her miserable, as well: ‘I cannot boast
of the numbers that adorn our ﬁre-side; my sister and I are the principal ﬁg-
ures’, she complained to the duchess; ‘besides, there is a round table, a square
skreen, some books, and a work-basket, with a smelling-bottle when morality
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grows musty, or a maxim smells too strong, as sometimes they will in ancient
books’.228
In short, despite all her pretensions of enjoying ‘rural pleasures’, living in the
country meant ‘sleeping with one’s eyes open’ for Montagu.229 Even Catherine
Talbot with all her moralist doctrines of self-improvement had an ambiguous
attitude towards the countryside. On the one hand, she celebrated the peaceful,
hard-working rural life—but on the other hand, all work and no play could
prove exhausting, even to a woman with as strong a work ethic as Talbot. ‘The
days are never long enough. Not but I am generally weary & sleepy before I go
to bed, but still there is some Bottom not wound up, some book unﬁnished, or
some ﬁgure untraced or some Needlefull unworked that came into my days
Scheme’, she complained to Marchioness Grey, and revelled in thoughts of soon
departing to London and being able to ‘be as idle as the day is long’.230 More-
over, the solitary peace of the countryside also often appeared dull and depres-
sing to her, and when low-spirited, she was not able to make full use of the
abundant leisure. Therefore, town excursions could provide welcome refresh-
ment: ‘In short this rural Life will make me the idlest gadder in the World &
the veriest lounger, so I shall go to the Races next Week to see if they will
reform me’, Talbot wrote to Marchioness Grey.231
Close reading of women’s autobiographical writings thus reveals that they
used the contradictory nature of the public/private juxtaposition to their
advantage in clever and ﬂexible ways, adopting the language of rural virtue
when appropriate, while capable of transforming themselves to urban belles if
need be. This chameleon-like ﬂexibility of identity was essentially a hypocritical
practice; it allowed women to hide their true feelings and put on pleasing masks
to advance their goals. Ultimately, this was, of course, what politeness was all
about—adapting oneself to diﬀerent audiences and settings. In the following
ﬁnal section of this chapter, I will show that women’s attitudes towards the
semi-public sociability of the salon reveal a similar play with meanings, result-
ing in the blurring of the public/private dichotomy.
Sociability and the Blurring of the Public/Private Dichotomy
In 1783, Fanny Burney noted down in her journal that ‘Mr. Pepys read to us
Miss More’s Bas bleu again’.232 The poem, written in 1783 and published three
years later, celebrated Elizabeth Vesey, Frances Boscawen, and Elizabeth Mon-
tagu as the ‘Enlighten’d spirits’ who had ‘prevented the triumph of bad taste in
society by instituting elegant conversation’.233 Polishing men’s manners and
their conversation was, as we recall, one of the most important tasks set for
women in the discourse of politeness. The bluestocking circles seemed to be
formed for this purpose. ‘We enjoy the delicacies of Life: reﬁn’d Friendships,
agreeable Conversation & rational amusement’, wrote Elizabeth Montagu of
her coterie, where conversation was aimed at ‘pleasing & instructing’.234
Indeed, the bluestockings were generally hailed for the rationality of their
discourse as opposed to ‘women’s talk’ in general which was perceived to be
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frivolous and empty. Indeed, many women that came to be known as blue-
stockings professed a profound fatigue over conventional feminine sociability
with its tea table gossip and continual round of visiting. Elizabeth Montagu, for
example, criticised the general course of London sociability, complaining that
she was ‘running from house to house, getting the cold scraps of visiting con-
versation, served up with the indelicacy and indiﬀerence of an ordinary, at
which no power of the mind does the honours; the particular taste of each guest
is not consulted, the solid part of the entertainment is too gross for a delicate
taste, and the lighter fare insipid’.235 She deplored the amount of ‘nothingisms’
that made up much of so-called ‘polite conversations’; for ‘repetition is a sign of
emptiness, yet there are living echoes, where dwells sound without sense or
intention’.236 Therefore, she was resolved to be guided ‘by the light of reason to
the company I like’ rather than by custom and ‘the blaze of wax-lights to the
house I do not’, and to dedicate her time to rational conversation rather than
conventional female frivolity.237
This rational conversation was to be had in mixed company, as it was generally
agreed that men’s conversation furnished women with rationality, while women
provided men with complaisance and agreeableness. The places where this
mutually beneﬁcial mixed sociability was to happen were, by deﬁnition, semi-
public; the salon and the ball ‘bridged the divide between the individual and the
public domain’ and, thus, obscured the distinction of public and private.238 Con-
duct writers made a clear distinction between public and private amusements.
James Fordyce, for example, warned women of public balls, but heartily approved
of private ones—that is, ones ‘consisting chieﬂy of friends and relations’.239 In other
words, private sociability was a space where public and private merged—not open
to the indiscriminate presence of everyone, but still not private in the strict, modern
sense of the word. In this sense, private sociability shares many of the aspects of
letter-writing in terms of public exposure—both were ambiguously hovering
somewhere between public and private. Cynthia Lowenthal argues that the letter,
‘because it occupies an indeterminate status between public and private’, allows a
woman ‘to cultivate and capitalize on her literary skills without transgressing the
boundaries of her class and gender’.240 According to Deborah Heller, the liminal
space that the personal letter occupies was crucial for women’s subversive beha-
viour; women were able to operate more freely ‘in the middle spaces between the
public and private domains, where women’s proper role and terms of participation
had not yet been rigidly deﬁned’.241 I want to suggest that, in a similar way, the
ambiguous position of private sociability enabled women to distance themselves
from normative gendered conduct expectations.
Scholars have criticised any clear gendered dichotomies that existed between
the public and the private sphere, as well as the very terms ‘public’ and ‘pri-
vate’. However, the fact remains that the eighteenth-century social world was
not gender-neutral. Even though there were no distinct ‘separate spheres’, some
putatively ‘public’ arenas, such as clubs and coﬀee-houses, were nevertheless more
exclusive and generally not accessible to elite women in any large numbers.242
Moreover, women’s actions even in mixed-gender public space were policed much
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more vigorously than men’s. Therefore, the grey area of the private assembly or
the literary salon oﬀered women a sphere of freedom where the elision of the
public and the private blurred gendered conduct expectations by mixing the
participants’ public and private roles.
The social life of Elizabeth Montagu illustrates the complex workings of
private sociability and the possibilities it oﬀered for women. Montagu was a
person who thrived in mixed company and had plenty of close male friends. She
was particularly pleased with the sort of free sociability amongst literary
women and ‘men of reading’ that was to be had in such popular watering-
places as Tunbridge Wells.243 ‘[T]here is more easy and unrestrained conversa-
tion in a ball-room at a water-drinking place than in visits in town’, she wrote
to Elizabeth Carter in 1759. For Montagu, London sociability had
a certain visiting tone, and few dare strike above it: the most fashionable
fool in the company sets the tune to the key of their own voice […]; and it
is no matter what is the strength and power of your organs, you are to
strain till you scream, or mutter till you are hoarse, as pleasures the leader
of the chorus.244
In watering-place society, Montagu was more in her element. She coquetted
playfully with men of learning and consequence, and her correspondence with
them was often tinted by half-earnest amorous tones—at least on their side.245
Montagu also expected to receive rationality from her male friends in
exchange for humorous ﬂash talk, thus positioning herself in the role reserved
for women in polite conversation. She looked up to her cousin, William Freind,
for advice on proper reading, was guided by Gilbert West in religion and lit-
erature, and lamented the departure of her husband, for, as she wrote, ‘[m]y
sister and I shall be a little at a loss for conversation, not that I shall on my part
want words, but, like school-boys when they are about their exercises, I may
want to borrow a little sense now and then’.246 She rejoiced at the possibility of
‘tast[ing] the pleasure’ of the poet Edward Young’s learned conversation ‘in its
full force’, and beneﬁted from the scholarly guidance of Lord Lyttelton, who
performed the function of something of a mentor for Montagu, discussing her
literary ideas and coaxing her to study further.247 How much of this humble self-
positioning under the guiding light of masculine understanding was conscious
self-fashioning for ulterior motives is diﬃcult to say.
Montagu also represented herself in her letters performing the feminine role
of soothing men’s passions. She wrote to Elizabeth Vesey how she loved to
‘spread friendships and to cover heats’.248 Indeed, Emma Major has noted that
Montagu was widely hailed for her ‘humanising’ eﬀect on men’s manners, as
well as her ability to reconcile disputes between men.249 She also commended
Vesey for her feminine pacifying eﬀect:
I delight already in ye prospect of ye blue box (alias Drawing Room) in
which our Sylph assembles all the heterogeneous natures in the World, &
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indeed in many respects resembles Paradise, for there ye Lion sits down by
the Lamb, ye Tyger dandles the Kid; the shy scotchman & ye [illegible]
Hibernian, the Hero & Maccaroni, the Vestal […], the Mungo of Ministry
and the inﬂexible partizans of incorruptible Patriots, Beaux esprits & ﬁne
Gentlemen all gather together under the downy wing of the Sylph, & are
soothed into good humour: were she to withdraw her inﬂuence a moment,
discord wd reassume her reign, & we shd hear ye clashing of swords, the
angry ﬂirting of fans, & St Andrew & St Patrick gabbling in dire confusion
in the diﬀerent dialects of ye Erse language. Methinks I see our Sylph
moving in her circle, & by some unknown attraction keeping the whole
system in due order.250
The role of the humaniser and soother of men was traditionally reserved for
women in mixed society. Not solely a polite task, it was also tinted with reli-
gious and political rhetoric; the Protestant idea of English patriotism was
directed at the progress of society towards a ‘thousand years of peace’ and
civility, and elite women played an important part in this process. Through
their pacifying inﬂuence, women could forward political consensus and thus
participate in politics, albeit indirectly—as, for example, Elizabeth Montagu did
by allegedly sweetening the uneasy relations between the Earl of Shelburne and
George III.251
Thus, in many ways, Elizabeth Montagu performed the traditional feminine
role in polite sociability, both by her ﬂirtatious coquetry, soothing inﬂuence,
and her willingness to be guided by men’s rational conversation. Then again,
her intellectual aspirations also exceeded the limits of traditional polite femi-
ninity; she corresponded with deans and bishops, conversed with such celeb-
rities as Lord Kames and David Hume, and published a literary critique of
Shakespeare. What enabled her to play this double game was the ambiguous
position of private sociability as a middle space between public and private.
Montagu’s unfeminine intellectual exchange of thoughts took place speciﬁcally
in the arenas of mixed private sociability, whereas the female chatter over a tea
table or more undiscriminating public forms of sociable activities ﬁlled her with
impatience and boredom. Moreover, Montagu also employed the private letter
as a similar medium of crossing traditional gender boundaries, and her long
letters often bear close aﬃnity to philosophical studies. Thus, her skilful utili-
sation of the liminal middle space between public and private was behind her
social and intellectual fame as a brilliant conversationalist, scholar, and critic.
Another bluestocking, Catherine Talbot, shared Montagu’s distaste for the
humdrum of regular London sociability. For Talbot, the ‘Societé, Visites, Mes-
sages, un Tourbillon perpetuel’ were frivolous compared to rational company,
and she fantasised about hours of conversation with her dearest friends without
‘any ﬂuttering engagement to hurry them away or any impertinent interruption
to break in on the conversation’.252 She wanted to ‘Athenianise, Philosophise,
Criticise, Debate, Discourse & Laugh’ with her female friends rather than
repeat empty nothingisms.253 Indeed, all-female rational sociability appealed
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greatly to Talbot, whereas—contrary to Montagu—mixed sociability caused
her grave anxieties. When seated for some hours with a visiting Samuel
Richardson, she was ‘really ashamed of having tied down (as it happen’d by his
great Civility) so remarkable a Genius to sit Tete a Tete with poor Me for three
hours’.254 Talbot was plagued by fears of performing badly, probably partly
brought on by her subordinate position in the authoritarian Bishop Secker’s
household. Rhoda Zuk argues that Talbot was demoralised by ‘relegation to a
round of unvalued employments’ at Secker’s, and that her narrow scope of life
was the cause of her disproportionate horror of censure.255 ‘I can argue You see
most triumphantly when no body contradicts me’, she wrote in her journal,
‘[b]ut in an actual debate I am so afraid of betraying a good cause by weak
arguments, or of disgracing it by talkativeness or an appearance of Obstinacy
that I say very little, & that little very ill’.256
The main root for Talbot’s anxiety over mixed sociability, however, was the
blurring of the distinction between public and private. Talbot clearly felt con-
fused about the qualities that her company expected of her; she was constantly
measuring herself against the conventional domestic model of a polite woman,
quiet and meek, and found it diﬃcult to reconcile with the more ﬂashy socia-
bility of a literary salon. In other words, for Talbot, diﬀerentiating between a
woman’s private and public roles proved problematic, thereby making her set-
tling into her (semi-)public role laborious and awkward. This diﬃdence was
reﬂected in her un-bluestocking-like reluctance to gain reputation for her body of
work; she was notoriously averse to circulating her writings even amongst her
friends, and her works were published only posthumously by Elizabeth Carter.
Talbot’s fear of appearing unfeminine caused her to generally shirk away
from conversation: ‘I am a poor disputant, & too ready to recede from a right
cause for fear of hurting it by Obstinacy that might be misunderstood’, she
complained, thus indicating that, even in situations of polite conversation where
female speech was welcomed or even sought after, Talbot clung to the domestic
ideals of silence and submissiveness.257 In fact, Talbot criticised another young
lady severely for the readiness of speech and opinion she herself lacked:
We dined & drank Coﬀee quite alone, but afterwards had two sets of
Company at diﬀerent hours. In one a Young Lady of 19 Just come out into
the World & a little too much her own Mistress. Very Pretty, Tall Slender
ﬁnely shaped, ﬁne eyes, genteel, & ready to ﬂy out of her ﬁne Skin. So
ready to give her Opinion unasked about every thing—such a Critick—
talked of Sir Charles with so little feeling—Poor Girl—that She knew how
heartily I pity her!258
Rather than endeavouring to shine in mixed conversation, Talbot spent her time
and energy contemplating on the ways ‘to keep just the right medium & make a
tolerable part of any Company one respects without saying a word too much’.259
And yet, Talbot, as many bluestockings, was keenly aware of her civilising task.
‘I must give a Portion of my Time to […] such Things as may make me amiable,
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and engaging to all whom I converse with, that by any Means I may win them
over to Religion and Goodness’, she wrote in Reﬂections on the Seven Days of
the Week; ‘For if I am always shut up in my Closet, […] I shall be looked upon
as morose and hypocritical, and be disregarded as useless in the World’.260
However, since the ideal polite role to be assumed in the private sociability of a
mixed company was not strictly a public one, but also far from private, it is
understandable that Talbot found it diﬃcult to know what was expected of her
and, accordingly, had problems adapting to a suitable polite role.
In short, the ﬂuidity between public and private could bring women freedom
from conventional roles of gendered conduct. Especially the liminal space of
private sociability permitted subversive conduct on the part of elite women,
who were carefully policed in public space and domesticated in private space.
However, the play between public and private, as indeed polite performances in
general, required skill—skill that Elizabeth Montagu proved to have in abun-
dance, and Catherine Talbot struggled to master. On a larger scale, the blurring
of the distinction between public and private was a part of the project of
undermining the evaluative meanings of the interior and the exterior and thus
challenging the idea of authentic or natural female identity. Making use of the
opportunities for freedom provided by semi-public space is thus linked to the
practices of opaque dissimulativeness and hypocrisy, discussed in the previous
chapter, as well as to assuming multiple identities, which will be discussed in the
next chapter. Indeed, the ability to perform to the company’s satisfaction required
the acknowledgement of women’s multiple social roles to begin with, and a con-
scious departure from conduct-book idealisations of domestic femininity. Thus,
being able to participate appropriately in private sociability, or even to fulﬁl the
ﬁrst and foremost task appointed to women in the culture of politeness—that of
civilising men—was, paradoxically, to be achieved only by renouncing the idea of
natural femininity, the key thesis of didactic conduct literature.
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5 Multiple Identities
Despite enthusiastic didactic attempts to deﬁne polite femininity, politeness was
not a monolithic regime of identity. Instead, women could choose diﬀerent
polite roles to suit their diﬀerent needs and situations—from diﬀerent phases of
life to diﬀerent times of the day. As Amanda Vickery has shown, mixed urban
sociability provided women with a growing number of identity positions
through such developments as the rapidly expanding culture of female literari-
ness, and the sheer explosion of sociable activities and venues, for example.1
Thus, the scope of respectable female life expanded considerably during the
eighteenth century, oﬀering elite women polite roles as salonnières, novelists,
women of letters, women-about-town, patrons of art and music, and much
more, in addition to the traditional roles of the wife, the mother, and the mis-
tress of the family. The emerging culture of idealised domesticity can be seen as
a response to this, an attempt to keep women at home, away from the enticing
and ever multiplying pleasures of urban sociability. Women were, however,
adept in manipulating representations of their behaviour to their own advan-
tage; as Ingrid Tague has noted, women of polite society used the rhetoric of
politeness in a creative way as a means of making their ambitions appear
legitimate and achieving their targets, such as social power.2 In this chapter, I
will take this argument further by showing that women could also assume dif-
ferent kinds of subject positions within the polite sphere—that of a dutiful
mother, patriotic wife, fashionable lady of town, and so forth—and swap them
according to diﬀerent situations in order to facilitate their navigating in the
polite social world.
In other words, politeness oﬀered women a possibility of ‘plurality of the
self’—a chance of multiple identities which could be tried on and put aside at
will.3 They could be caring mothers, eﬃcient housewives, or dutiful daughters
at home during the day, only to change into the roles of fashionable socialites
or queens of the ball in the evening.4 ‘You will then have attained the perfection
of your character’, wrote John Bennett, ‘when you can, one night, be dis-
tinguished at a ball, and the next, want no other entertainment, than what the
shade, your family, a well chosen book or an agreeable walk are able to
aﬀord’.5 Women could thus use politeness ﬂexibly, adapting themselves to dif-
ferent situations of life by negotiating diﬀerent politeness ideologies and ideals.
As we shall see later in this chapter, these ﬂexible adaptations of identity could
also be potentially anarchistic, little by little redeﬁning the line that separates
the normal from the abject. In this way, adopting multiple polite identities and
switching between them ﬂexibly and creatively also provided women potential
for freedom.
Subversive use of politeness through assuming multiple identities was, of
course, using politeness against the grain. The manifest goal of politeness was
to produce normative female subjectivity—and despite acts of resistance,
women were permeated with its power. In this sense, politeness engaged
women in a Butlerian process of performative gender identity construction that
was focused around iterative bodily practices. However, as I discussed in the
previous chapter, politeness cannot be separated from voluntary theatrical per-
formances either; individuals used politeness willingly and strategically to indi-
cate their status as gentlewomen and to enforce a diﬀerence between the polite
and the non-polite. Politeness thus showcases how performance and performa-
tivity eﬀectively leak into each other in all human practices of identity construc-
tion. How is an act of curtseying, for example, neatly categorised as one or the
other, when it is impregnated with both conscious meanings of politeness and
social identity as well as subconscious meanings of gender, both expressed in
terms of gracefulness, elegance, and easiness? Thus, when individuals chose to
perform politeness to distinguish themselves as members of social elite, they
simultaneously engaged in an involuntary process of constructing a gendered self.
This process of negotiating polite femininity can be traced through women’s
journals and letters, which operated as textual means for trying out diﬀerent
polite roles, playing with them, and also inevitably working to internalise them.
This discursive polite femininity did not, of course, remain stable during
the long eighteenth century. Old aristocratic modes of politeness declined
slowly throughout the century, and started to seem dated and decadent in the
eyes of the post-1789 generation. Similarly, the cult of sentimentalism and the
rise of domesticity both worked together with the idea of inward politeness to
shape ideas of what it was to be a polite woman—increasingly so during the
latter half of the century. Despite these historical shifts, the goalposts of
women’s conduct norms were not moved as much as one might expect from
the massive conceptual changes that were going on in philosophical, medical,
and scientiﬁc thought, let alone the political landscape of Europe. Rather than
signiﬁcant redeﬁnitions of polite femininity, the long eighteenth century wit-
nessed new ways of justifying old norms and ideals. What had once been
God’s will was now increasingly framed as a dictate of nature, and notions of
gendered personal qualities relied more and more on men’s and women’s
fundamental incommensurability instead of their diﬀerent humoural balance.
Moreover, there were always those who, even in the early 1800s, found the
ﬁnesses of external politeness à la Chesterﬁeld more appealing than inward
politeness, sincerity, sentimentality, or taciturnity—or preferred to spend their
days in search of public amusement rather than discreetly managing their
children at home.
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Autobiography and Identity
Politeness operated through a continuous interplay between naturalness, trans-
parency, and honesty on the one hand, and artiﬁciality, opaqueness, and dis-
simulation on the other. Women’s multifaceted ties with naturalness made their
politeness particularly precariously balanced between these extremes. This pro-
blematic juxtaposition was perhaps most clearly materialised in the discourses
and practices of female self-discipline, and the way in which women’s self-
fashioning needed to be carefully hidden from sight. Indeed, politeness can be,
and often has been, seen as a disciplinary system that creates normative iden-
tities and forces people to fashion themselves according to these identities.
However, constructionist and feminist criticism has recently focused increas-
ingly on the fact that identities are not constructed solely through a normalising
power that imprints passive individuals with its codes; their main criticism has
been that this model does not take the construction of identity from an indivi-
dual’s perspective suﬃciently into account. Felicity Nussbaum, for example,
deﬁnes subjectivity as not only ‘the way an individual being is […] subject to
someone else’s control and, within limited freedom, positioned within authority
relations’, but also as the way this individual then ‘becomes subject to its own
identity, held within a given self-knowledge—believing that it is free, respon-
sible, and the agent of its own actions’.6 Thus, politeness can also be seen as an
enabling set of practices that an individual uses to create her own ethical and
responsible selfhood. In Foucauldian terms, it is a technology of the self that
requires a speciﬁc kind of working on oneself that is not meant to bring one’s
conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself
into the ethical subject of one’s behaviour.7 So, the polite self-fashioning that
women perform is not merely disciplinary; rather, it is also a practice that
enables forms of individuality. It brings individuals a feeling of control over their
own identity, and a sense that the identity they create is, in fact, a manifestation
of their true inner self, instead of an external, normative one.
Women’s letters and journals played an integral part in the process of creat-
ing an ethical selfhood. They provided a locus for gathering knowledge,
reﬂecting on that knowledge, and integrating it into an individual’s subjectivity.
In fact, Nussbaum has argued that eighteenth-century women’s auto-
biographical writing can be seen as a Foucauldian ‘technology of the self’, or, a
‘way of regulating interiority’ with the end of the constitution of oneself.8
Nussbaum parallels autobiographies with hypomnemata—‘notebooks’ which
Foucault deﬁnes as ‘a material memory of things read, heard, or thought, thus
oﬀering these as an accumulated treasure for rereading and later meditation’, as
well as ‘raw material for the writing of more systematic treatises in which were
given arguments and means by which to struggle against some defect’. Foucault
writes that hypomnemata are ‘explicitly oriented to the care of oneself, toward
deﬁnite objectives such as retiring into oneself, reaching oneself, living with
oneself, being suﬃcient to oneself, proﬁting by and enjoying oneself’, and, as
such, a part of training of oneself by oneself in order to gain self-control and to
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become an ethical subject.9 In other words, women’s autobiographical writing
can be interpreted as a moral technology of the self that constitutes and trans-
forms the subject’s ‘thoughts, behavior, body, and “self”’ as individuals submit
themselves to a subjectivity-forming authority—of divine agency in Nussbaum’s
argument, and in mine, the culture of politeness.10 In other, less theoretically
oriented historical research, autobiographical writing has generally been viewed
as a way of creating narratives of the self and, in that way, constructing a
coherent selfhood.
Politeness has not been previously studied as a Foucauldian technology of the
self; in this sense, this book is treading on pristine ground. Felicity Nussbaum’s
research focuses on the use of autobiography as a technology of the middle-
class self and, as such, does not address politeness. Lawrence Klein touches on
the subject of Foucauldian self-care—albeit not in explicit terms—within the
context of politeness in Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness, where he
describes the troubles the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1670–1713) had when
trying to overcome his doubts and diﬃculties about becoming a polite subject.
Shaftesbury’s problem was the conﬂict between the autonomous self and the
sociable self; he was afraid of letting his desire to please others steer him away
from his true self. Shaftesbury was torn between the requirements of politeness
on the one hand and the obligations to the self on the other; he often worried
that self-love would make him sacriﬁce his autonomy and turn himself into a
polite display.11 As a solution, Shaftesbury proposed the enhancement of one’s
moral autonomy through the expansion of the self’s interiority—or in other
words, he saw his interior space as a sphere of control and wanted to ﬁlter,
examine and appraise every outer inﬂuence through that sphere. The result of
this process would be a truly internalised new kind of politeness—rational
sociability—that would not be based on external impulses, but on a stable core
of the rational self.12
In Foucauldian terms, what Shaftesbury proposed to do was a process of
self-formation; with careful self-examination, self-knowledge, and vigorous
training, he aimed to make himself an ethical polite subject rather than acting
either out of external pressure or the uncontrolled passion of self-love. This
was not to be done because of a disciplinary system forcing its ideals on
individuals; it had to be done in order to resolve the problem of the self—to
live truthfully and to become a moral subject instead of a hypocritical actor.
And yet, the aim of the process was not self-discovery, but self-fashioning;
Shaftesbury was all the time aware that he was ‘replacing an untoward dis-
position with another more advantageous one’.13 To achieve this end, Shaf-
tesbury kept notebooks that he named aske-mata, ‘exercises’, where he
meticulously wrote down his thoughts and doubts about politeness, subjectivity
and becoming an autonomous individual. Klein calls these notebooks a part of
the therapeutic process that was aimed at advancing moral transformation
through self-reﬂection.14
Practically all eighteenth-century elite women—as well as men—kept some
kind of journals. It could even be said that the ethos of polite society strongly
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recommended journalising.15 These journals and their forms vary a great deal,
and they mostly do not use the explicit language of self-care that Shaftesbury’s
aske-mata do. Journals were often merely short memoranda of family events or
places visited; sometimes they included lists of books read or plays recom-
mended. Then again, hypomnemata as Foucault describes them were not even
supposed to be intimate diaries, but merely aides-memoire where people would
enter quotations, events, and reﬂections they wanted to contemplate later.16
Many of the journals I use as sources in this study are rich documents that
depict their authors’ keen observations on the people they meet and their con-
versations, moral and philosophical musings on their behaviour and actions, as
well as aesthetic evaluations of books, plays, and music. In other words, they
very much serve the purpose of classical hypomnemata.
In addition to autobiographies, diaries, and journals, letters were an equally
important means of ‘writing the self into existence’.17 The diﬀerence between
a letter and a journal or an autobiography was often blurred in the eighteenth
century. In many cases, women actually wrote their journals in the form of
letters to their relatives or friends—such is the case with Fanny Burney and
Catherine Talbot, for example. Mary Delany addressed her autobiography to
the Duchess of Portland, maintaining that the duchess’s express request was
the sole motivation behind the project in the ﬁrst place. Elizabeth Montagu’s
long, often philosophical letters resemble journals in their intimate soul-
searching overtones. Letters, as well as journals, are also noted for their
ambiguous stance between revealing and masking the self. Notions of auto-
biographical writing as a window to one’s genuine self persist, even though
letters and journals are recognised to be ﬁctive reworkings of an individual’s
life, thoughts, and experiences. As self-conscious narratives that ‘neither
guarantee self-knowledge nor prevent self-deception’, they have been seen to
oﬀer means of creating multiple identities as masks.18 In its most basic form,
the conscious use women made of their letters in their self-fashioning is dis-
played by their handwriting. For example, Elizabeth Montagu clearly had the
option of choosing between diﬀerent hands depending on the purpose and
recipient of her letter. Edward Montagu often received everyday scrawls,
while letters to Gilbert West or Lord Lyttelton were carefully planned and
copied out several times, possibly partly by companions, before the ﬁnal ver-
sion being written in her most elaborate hand (Figure 5.1). Similarly, Mary
Delany confessed that she reserved her small handwriting—in order to ﬁt in
most subject matter—to her sister Anne, who was her closest friend and
favourite correspondent, while her more distant acquaintances had to make
do with ‘three sides’ of a quarto written ‘in my large hand’.19
For eighteenth-century polite women, assuming diﬀerent masks was a soci-
able commonplace. ‘What farces, what puppet-shows do we act!’ exclaimed
Elizabeth Montagu, describing a morning visit characterised by a carefully
hidden mutual dislike between the visitor and the visitée. ‘Madam, contrary to
her usual manner, acted the part of the obliging; I, as much against my former
sentiments, personated the obliged’, she ironically wrote to her sister; ‘some
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little machine behind the scene moves us and makes the puppet act Scrub’.20
Montagu’s acknowledgement of her dissimulative behaviour becomes contrasted
with the straightforward honesty with which she admits it to her sister; indeed,
as she wrote later to her friend, William Freind, she believed that in her private
letters she could shed her masks and reveal her true self:
Figure 5.1a Elizabeth Montagu’s letter to Gilbert West (a, b, c), 16 January 1754, MO
6712; and to Edward Montagu (d), 8 August 1757, MO 2335. Elizabeth
Robinson Montagu Papers, The Huntington Library, San Marino, California
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I don’t know whether it is not conceited to imagine, you will like me better
while I am most myself, than when I am moulded by fashion into other
people’s form; […] I have always accustomed myself to appear to you
without those disguises which we wear as ornaments with our acquain-
tance, and as armour with our enemies. But amongst friends, truth may
appear with no other clothing than la bienséance.21
However, the privacy of letters was questionable, to say the least. Letters and
journals were rarely read solely by the people they were addressed to; instead,
they were commonly circulated amongst family and friends. Fanny Burney often
Figure 5.1b (Continued)
168 Multiple Identities
felt exasperated by the little regard her family and friends showed for her
privacy by allowing neighbours and casual acquaintances to read her intimate
thoughts; ‘I am very concerned, nay & hurt & half angry that this lady, whose
name it seems is Lee, should have seen any of my Letters,—It is not fair, & I
am sure it is not pleasant’, she complained to her sister upon encountering a
total stranger in Bath who had been allowed to read her journal-letters.22
Moreover, women’s correspondence could be liable to being inspected by their
guardian—father, mother, or husband. Elizabeth Montagu speciﬁcally assured
the Duchess of Portland that they could be free in their words, since, contrary
to custom, her husband allowed her letters to pass uninspected.23 Thus,
Figure 5.1c (Continued)
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women’s letter-writing did not consist of opening one’s true self to a private
and discreet friend; instead, it was a form of sociability that required adopting
masks, assuming diﬀerent identities, and often hiding one’s true feelings and
opinions. In this way, letter-writing was consistent with the practices of polite
sociability, where polite identities were not uniform but multiple, and assuming
diﬀerent masks, roles, and identities was an essential part of politeness.
In short, journalising and letter-writing played an integral role in the self-
constitution of the individual. Moreover, these textual practices were com-
plementary to and inseparable from social and bodily practices.24 Since we
cannot witness the bodily performances these women engaged in, our only
sources through which to track them are these letters and journals. Therefore,
they are more than textual devices for writing the self; they are also documents
Figure 5.1d (Continued)
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that describe, in written form, the constitutive bodily practices that formed
these women’s subjectivity.
Fanny Burney’s Self-fashioning
[Mr. Twiss asked:] ‘Don’t you love Dancing, Ma’am?’
‘Me, Sir?’ said I—‘O, I seldom Dance—I don’t know—’
‘What Assemblies do you frequent, Ma’am?’
‘Me, Sir?—Lord—I never Dance—I go to none!—’
Journal of Fanny Burney (1774)
the Ball [at Gloucester assembly room] proved very lively & agreeable. We did
not break up till near 2 o’clock, & then we went Home in Chairs two abreast
[…] It was 2 o’clock in the morning ere we sat down to supper. Mr. Berkeley &
Captain Coussmaker were of our party. We were all in prodigious spirits, & kept
it up till near 5 in the morning.
Journal of Fanny Burney (1777)25
Fanny Burney’s autobiographical texts provide an exceptional window into the
practice, negotiation, and assimilation of the many, often contradictory roles
the women of polite society played in their social lives. Burney kept a journal
for most of her life; in fact, her journals, often written as long ‘letter-paquages’
to her sister Susan, can be seen as her main body of literary work.26 Burney
used her journals to write down her thoughts about books, people, anecdotes,
or events. These thoughts were closely connected to polite society and her place
in it; they touched upon women’s relations towards men, ideal femininity, the
proper modes of entertainment and leisure, and maternity and ﬁliality, among
other things. Burney’s journals oﬀered her a place to reﬂect on diﬀerent polite
roles and to construct herself a true polite identity—or, in fact, many identities.
Throughout her extensive journal-letters, Burney can be seen musing on several
diﬀerent idealisations of polite femininities. Indeed, Burney used her journals as
a means of identifying diﬀerent polite roles, negotiating the roles into her own
identity, observing her success at performing these roles, and disciplining herself
into a more thorough internalisation of the proper polite identity. Moreover,
through her journal-letters she also actively reﬂected that identity to others, and
created the sort of image of herself she wanted others to see.
Burney most often presented herself in her journals as a domestic, chaste, and quiet
young woman. In other words, she seems to have been inclined to assume the ideal
feminine character promoted by such noted moralist conduct writers as, for example,
Hannah More or James Fordyce.27 As a true Fordycean female, Burney often mused
on her aversion of public amusements and preference for domestic pleasures:
To be sure I am not frequently from Home, on the contrary, I seldom quit
it, considering my Age & opportunities; but why should I, when I am so
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Figure 5.2 Charles Turner after Edward Francisco Burney, Fanny Burney (1840). ©
National Portrait Gallery, London.
happy in it? I never can want employment, nor sigh for amusement—we
have a Library which is an ever lasting resource when attack’d by the
spleen—I have always a suﬃciency of work to spend, if I pleased, my
whole Time at it—musick is a Feast which can never grow insipid—& in
short, I have all the reason that ever mortal had to be contented with my
lot—and I am contented with, I am grateful for it!28
Thus, Burney presented her ideal self in her journals as hardworking, well-read,
and accomplished—a true domestic treasure.29 Being born in to a music family,
she was especially fond of music and a decent harpsichordist, but she
acknowledged the conﬂict between the shy, domestic feminine ideal and the
competing polite ideal of an outgoing socialite, accustomed to attention.
Because of her shyness, Burney was unable to perform publicly. She abhorred
drawing attention to herself and having people look at her, as she often com-
plained in her journals. Nevertheless, she still recognised the sociable role that
polite society presented for elite women, and the need to be able to assume the
role of female musical entertainer, and tried to push herself to overcome her
fears. Accordingly, she wrote of a dinner party:
Mr Lattice & the Russian most furiously attacked me to play—I really
recollect with pain the earnest entreaties of the latter. Yet I could not—I
did not dare to comply. […] From the moment I entertained the slightest
idea of playing, my knees shook under me, so much that I could hardly
support myself. […] such extreme hipishness—I can use no better word—
as mine serves only to make myself troublesome to others & uneasy to
myself—however, I take all the pains I can to overcome it.30
Excessive shyness seems to have been more generally a problem for Fanny
Burney. Indeed, her father described her in his notebook as ‘silent, backward,
and timid, even to sheepishness’ when in company.31 Burney herself acknowl-
edged this, and tried to reason with herself to conquer it. In fact, she was con-
stantly afraid that her silence and timidity would cause her friends to dislike
her. Especially after the publication of her ﬁrst novel, Evelina (1778), her sen-
sitivity turned into an acute problem, since she became something of a celebrity.
When her name appeared in a pamphlet as the authoress of the novel, she noted
having been, ‘for more than a week, unable to Eat, Drink or sleep for vehe-
mence of vexation’—and having also been ‘furiously Lectured’ for her folly.
Therefore, she wrote, ‘I have […] struggled against it with all my might, & am
determined to aim, at least, at acquiring more strength of mind.—Yet, after all,
I feel very forcibly that I am not—that I have not been—& that I never shall be
formed or ﬁtted for any business with the Public.’32
Burney negotiated also other feminine identities in the pages of her journals.
One of her roles was the dutiful daughter; another, the aﬀectionate sister.33 She
generally presented herself being very reserved with men, as the morally guar-
ded woman of the moralist conduct book should be. She referred to herself as a
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‘known prude’, and, as moralist conduct writers generally did, assimilated
absolute sexual purity of thought and deed with femininity. For example, when
she was writing The Witlings for the London stage in 1779, her friend Samuel
Crisp warned her that writing comedies could be very risky for a woman, since
they very easily compromised her reputation. Burney replied that she would ‘a
thousand Times rather forfeit my character as a Writer, than risk ridicule or
censure as a Female. I have never set my Heart on Fame, & therefore would not
if I could purchase it at the expence of all my own ideas of propriety’. She
concluded: ‘You who know me for a Prude will not be surprised, & I hope not
oﬀended by this avowal’—and indeed, The Witlings was never performed.34
Burney also continually expressed her concern of being inadvertently seen in
what she considered a compromising situation—mostly meaning that she was
entertaining a private conversation with a man, no matter on how innocent a
subject. Maidenly demure and chaste appearances were, according to many
conduct writers, essential for women’s honourable reputation, and Burney
indeed seems to take this very seriously.
In fact, Fanny Burney can be seen on the pages of her journals to separate
herself from all amusements that could be interpreted as indelicate for a
woman. She made a point of never playing cards, danced seldom, and when
her stepmother—who was socially quite unsophisticated, which often dis-
tressed Burney—made her go to Ranelagh, the famous pleasure garden, she
haughtily wrote that ‘I saw few People there that I knew, & none that I cared
for’.35 Moreover, she often pointed out how she could have no connection
whatsoever with any women of questionable character, in order to avoid
risking her own reputation. For example, she was extremely hesitant whether
she should meet the singer-actress Jane Barsanti in private, just in case Bar-
santi would lose her chastity, as so many actresses did.36 Burney often
addressed the issue of Barsanti’s reputation, writing that ‘really she continues
so good a Girl, living wholly with her mother & being almost always at
Home, except when obliged to be at the Theatre, that I think she deserves
calls, the attention & kindness which can be paid to her, & upon this con-
sideration, I have at length given up my former delicacy of not visiting her
privately’.37 In other words, Barsanti had not, in fact, committed any kind of
indiscretion, but her profession alone was enough to put Burney on her guard.
Later on, Burney records an encounter with Miss Lalauze, a notorious actress,
in the park:
We also saw poor Miss Laluze […] we Walked on, wishing to avoid
speaking to her: but when we were at Spring Garden Gate, she just touched
my shoulder, as she came suddenly behind us, & said ‘Miss Burney! —how
do you do, Ma’am?’ I answered her rather coldly—& Hetty turned from
her abruptly. I was afterwards very sorry that I did not speak with more
kindness to her, for Sukey says that she looked greatly disappointed. It is,
however, impossible & improper to keep up acquaintance with a Female
who has lost her character, however sincerely they may be objects of Pity.38
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This extreme cautiousness can, at least partly, be explained through the pre-
carious social status of the Burney family. Fanny Burney’s father, Dr Charles
Burney, was a musician and music historian who earned his living, among other
means, by teaching music to the children of the fashionable and the rich.
Therefore, as the Burney family was just about ‘struggling to enter the situation
of the middling sort’, the Burney girls would have felt a heightened need to
compensate for their social status by a meticulous adherence to the norms of
politeness and decorum, because they had few other resources to maintain their
status among polite society. As Betty Rizzo argues, without money and birth,
Burney had to ‘exhibit moral virtues’ instead to enter the new meritocratic class
system.39 Moreover, Charles Burney’s livelihood depended on the patronage of
the social elite, and therefore required an impeccable reputation. Since women
were especially burdened with the task of maintaining the family honour by
their own sexually untarnished reputation, Fanny Burney may have felt the
added constraint this put on her behaviour.
Despite these scruples and her prudery, shyness, and preference for domes-
ticity, Burney could, and often did, assume the role of a socialite, salonnière, or
a cosmopolitan woman of letters. She could occasionally party through the
night, and she often recorded conversing deftly with celebrated social ﬁgures on
polite subjects, and in diﬀerent languages. Samuel Johnson, for example, was
her close friend. Indeed, she often noted being praised for her conversation, as
well as her knowledge of French and Italian.40 She described a dinner party
with some French and Italian guests, writing how ‘very good friends’ they all
immediately became, ‘& talked English, French & Italian by commodious
starts’.41 This is somewhat striking when we consider that a couple of years
earlier she had actually declared, very much in the train of moralist conduct
writers, that she had taught herself French only ‘for the sake of its bewitching
authors’, and that she would certainly ‘never want to speak it’. Indeed, she had
taken pride in her father calling her ‘Fanny Bull’ for this reason.42 These kinds
of inconsistencies show Burney trying on diﬀerent identities and choosing the
ones she then deemed to be the most advantageous or appropriate for diﬀerent
events or situations in life. If individual identity is not taken to be a stable entity
but a site of contest and multiplicity, it is possible to read Burney’s journals, as
indeed any autobiographical writing, as a ‘textual location’ where women pri-
vately and publicly ‘experiment with interdiscourses and the corresponding subject
positions to broach the uncertainties of identity’.43
Negotiating diﬀerent feminine roles also included assessing other women’s
personae with a critical eye. In her journals, Fanny Burney analysed the beauties
of virtue and politeness as well as the eﬀects of a vulgar address, a sullied
reputation, or bad personal hygiene in the women she met.44 External appear-
ance, being indeed the foremost fortiﬁcation of a woman’s polite persona, was
constantly under her scrutiny. For example, when Burney saw the famed public
ﬁgure Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire in the park, ‘walking in such an
undressed & slaternly manner’ with her hair and dress untidy, she wordily
declared feeling ‘quite sorry she should be so foolishly negligent of her
Multiple Identities 175
Person’.45 Indeed, whenever Burney observed women straying from polite femi-
nine ideals, she looked on them with a critical eye—and strove to avoid such mis-
takes herself. A Miss Fitzgerald earned her disapproval by laughing ‘louder than a
man’, poking ‘her Head vehemently’, dressing ‘shockingly’, and having ‘a carriage
the most ungain that ever was seen’.46 Then again, another miss was condemned
for being exactly the opposite: wearing a dress too modish, having too aﬀected
manners, and, in short, being altogether too fashionable.47 Her own polite suc-
cesses Burney noted down carefully. She recorded with complacency the universal
approval of her own dress, and kept her family well informed of the praise her
behaviour received in the salons of the beau monde, writing how her ‘manners’
were deemed ‘extraordinarily pleasing, & her Language remarkably elegant; that
she had as much virtue of mind, as knowledge of the World; that with all her skill
in human nature, she was at the same Time as pure a little creature’.48
Besides criticising women falling short of polite femininity, Burney often also
expressed her admiration for those who appeared to her to have successfully
internalised the polite feminine norms. More interestingly, though, she also
approved of many women who in diﬀerent ways stretched the deﬁnition of
ideal femininity. Most notably, she had boundless admiration for Hester Lynch
Thrale, who was, in many ways, antithetical to moralist notions of acceptable
femininity; Thrale was known for her forwardness, sharp wit, and lack of tact.
In fact, Burney saw Thrale’s immoderate amount of wit as her worst fault—
which did not, however, prevent her from idolising Thrale.49 Witty women
were, indeed, generally considered unfeminine and frightening. Another such
character was Frances Bowdler, whom Burney met at Teignmouth. Bowdler
was known for her complete lack of attention to appearances, and seems to
have acted in everything according to her own fancy with no consideration of
other people’s opinions. As such, she was a character quite opposite to Burney
herself, and also, in this sense, something of a social rebel. Burney writes:
I was also Introduced […] to Miss Bowdler, a young Woman who bears a
rather singular Character: she reckons herself superiour to the opinion of
the World, & to all common Forms & Customs, & therefore lives exactly
as she pleases, guarding herself from all real Evil, but wholly regardless &
indiﬀerent of appearances. […] she ﬁnds the Company of Gentlemen is
more entertaining than that of Ladies, & therefore without any scruples or
punctilio, indulges her fancy: she is perpetually at Mr Crispen’s, notwith-
standing a very young man, Mr Green, Lives in the same House; not con-
tented with a Call, she very frequently sups with them: […] she does this in
the fair face of Day, & speaks of it as openly & commonly as I should of
Visiting my sister.50
Despite this very unfeminine lack of propriety, Burney and Bowdler surprisingly
became lifelong friends.
In fact, Burney had an ambiguous relationship with moralist ideal femininity.
She occasionally recorded herself engaging in unfeminine activities, and used
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her journals to reason her behaviour to herself, and others, within the matrix of
politeness. Despite her avowal never to play cards she, in fact, did so quite
often—but, as she explained, only in private. She also forbade her friends from
making her card skills public knowledge.51 When Burney’s friends reproached
her—the self-professed paragon of domesticity—for her ‘incessant’ social
engagements, she blamed the ‘visiting system’ of polite society that simply
forced her to spend all her waking hours either visiting or preparing clothes for
visiting.52 Moreover, as her journals show, Burney herself was a critic of a
remarkably sharp wit, which she justiﬁed by her desire to be femininely honest
and transparent in her opinions. In this way, Burney used her journals to
negotiate controversial roles into her identity. She assumed diﬀerent kinds of
subject positions within the polite sphere and swapped them pragmatically
according to diﬀerent situations in order to facilitate her navigation in her
changing social surroundings; she could be a domestic daughter in the morning
at her father’s house, a witty bluestocking visiting Hester Lynch Thrale’s salon
in the afternoon, and a belle of the ballroom during the night.
Elizabeth Montagu’s Play with Masks
Elizabeth Robinson Montagu was a woman of many faces. In Emma Major’s
words, she played the roles of ‘fashionable lady, polite paradigm, brilliant
conversationalist, scholar, critic, Amazon, Minerva, sibyl, muse, apothecary,
educator, literary and religious patron, philanthropist, farmer, hostess, business
partner, coalmine owner, literary witch, Lady Bountiful, Queen, literary and
political hostess, landowner and land developer, interior designer’ more or less
successfully during her life, which spanned almost the entire eighteenth cen-
tury.53 Other roles, such as moralist, ﬂirt, and pious Anglican, might be added
to the list. Montagu is thus an extreme example of the versatility of social roles
women could or needed to adopt during their life.
Ever since her childhood, Montagu was deeply aware that diﬀerent situa-
tions of life and surroundings required diﬀerent approaches. After returning
from gay London to her family’s estate in Kent, the 20-year-old Elizabeth
wrote to her friend:
I arrived at Mount Morris rather more fond of society than solitude. I
thought it no very agreeable change of scene from Handel and Gaﬀarelli, to
woodlarks and nightingales; it seems to me to be something like the dif-
ferent seasons of youth and age; ﬁrst, noise and public shew, and then after
being convinced that is vanity, retirement to shades and solitude, which we
soon ﬁnd to be vexation of spirit. […] the one succeeds the other, as
darkness does light, and especially in the women; the young maid is all
vanity, and the old one all vexation.54
Indeed, in her letters, Montagu acknowledged her play with masks and the need
to adapt the self to diﬀerent social roles and situations. She wrote to Elizabeth
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Carter in 1761 that through the mere change of location she had shed her urban
self and taken on a pastoral identity:
I told you in my last that I was going to take a ﬂight into Berkshire; & here I
have been ever since Friday evening, leading a pastoral life in the ﬁnest
weather I ever saw. Tho the most sage Horace says we change our climate
without changing our disposition, I must be of another opinion, for by only
the diﬀerence of latitude and longitude between Hill-street and Sandleford, I
am become one of the most reasonable, quiet, good kind of Country Gentle-
women that ever was. In the days when misses employ’d their crimping and
wimpling irons upon cheesecakes and tarts, not on ﬂounces and fur-belows,
and Matrons used no rouge, but a little cochineal to give a ﬁne colour to a
dry’d neats tongue; they could not be further from the temper, qualities &
conditions of a ﬁne Lady than your humble Servant at this present writing.55
When she was then travelling in France with Carter she wrote to Elizabeth
Vesey to describe the ‘metamorphosis of Mrs Carter’: the famous scholar ‘now
began to consider Greek was a dead language, & that french words, & a little
coquettry, would do better at Spa’. Accordingly, ‘with the same facility with
which she translated Epictetus from greek into english, she translated her native
timidity into french airs, & french modes; bought robes trimmed with blonde
[illegible], Colliers, bouquets, des engageantes & all the most labour’d orna-
ments of dress’ and proceeded to parade around in the best manner of ‘that
agreeably frivolous nation’.56 Montagu was thus both amused and pleased with
the manner in which her learned friend adapted herself into her new environ-
ment. In another letter, Montagu spelled out her thoughts on social adaptability
quite clearly. ‘Happy the animal that can live in all elements, though it dig-
niﬁes, or is digniﬁed by none!’, she declared, for ‘they are at liberty to add
themselves to a gay assembly, a philosophical lecture, be present at a reason-
able conversation, or go with the crowd to see Harlequin in a bottle’.57 In
other words, Montagu saw sociability as an exercise of chameleon-like adap-
tation of the self to a series of changing scenes, all of which were to be met
with uniform easiness and pleasantness, and none of which were to be given
the power of transforming the innermost core of the self.
Accordingly, Montagu despised ‘persons of delicacy’ who could ‘be pleased
only with some particular system of life’; for her own part, she writes, ‘I have
endeavoured always to move easily and chearfully on the sphere I am placed
in’.58 As the wife of a wealthy Whig landowner and a member of the Parlia-
ment, she indeed often found herself in spheres not of her own choosing, or to
her own liking. Elizabeth Montagu’s—as any married woman’s—daily life was
dictated by her husband’s engagements and fancies. She was, for example, often
obliged to join her husband on his business trips to his coal mines in North-
umberland. Even though she thought the Northumbrians ‘little better than
Savages’, she nevertheless adapted herself to her role as a ‘Cole owner’ and
found satisfaction in it:
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Cold & raw the north doth blow,
and all the Hills are coverd with snow.
Such is my sad ditty, & I beg you to set it to melancholly musick, & sing
it pathetically till I come & sing, London is a ﬁne Town &c. I hope
to set forward tomorrow sennight but my other half is as pleased here as
if he was in the Garden of Eden fanned by zephyrs & incensed by
Flora.59
Montagu was also often forced to spend the winter months alone in her
country estate, generally with no other company than servants and books, while
her husband took care of his business responsibilities elsewhere. Even when she
had the company of her husband, she could ‘pass seven or eight hours every day
entirely alone’ while he worked or studied.60 Edward Montagu did not enjoy
the fashionable leisure towns, but instead preferred the privacy of Sandleford,
his country estate. This often gave Elizabeth Montagu cause to grumble to her
friend Gilbert West:
You cannot imagine that I should not be glad to come to Tunbridge,
where I have always improved my stock of health, and have acquired such
valuable friends; the manner of life there too, was very agreeable to me,
but Mr. Montagu is happier here, and I ought to make his happiness my
principal object. My constitution is not so strong, that it would not
receive beneﬁt from the waters, but I cannot say I am ill, and must con-
tent myself with the advantages of air and exercise which this situation
aﬀords. […] I am to go to Hatchlands to Mrs. Boscawen, on Thursday,
and shall stay a week; you may suppose I am very happy to have leave for
this expedition.61
To some extent, then, the adaptability of the self was a necessity of elite
women’s life; having little say in their everyday actions and whereabouts,
women needed to be ﬂexible in order to manage their lives and ﬁnd content-
ment. Elizabeth Montagu’s scholarly abilities, for example, were necessary to
help her through long solitary Berkshire winters; ‘[f]ive months are to pass,
before I return to the land of the living, but I can amuse myself in the regions of
the dead: if it rains so that I cannot walk in the garden, Virgil will carry me
into the Elysian ﬁelds, or Milton into Paradise’.62 As she wrote to her father,
‘ye love of reading is hardly so necessary for [Men] as for Women, to whom
retirement is always safe, & sometimes necessary. As they are not to chuse
where or how they will live, it is happy to have a taste that may be gratiﬁed in
any situation or any circumstances’.63 Then again, a quite diﬀerent set of
polite skills were required in the sociable urban life in London, where Mon-
tagu was required to assume the roles of a polite society ﬁgure, an urban wit,
and a literary hostess.
Montagu’s letters highlight her skilful play with masks. She used her letters
to show herself to her correspondents in diﬀerent roles, according to her
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respective needs and aims. She could be serious with the serious, learned with
the learned, and nonsensical with the nonsensical. To the Duchess of Portland
she wrote merry letters, displaying her wit; to her cousin, Reverend Freind,
sober and philosophical letters, showing her capacity for pious reﬂection. To
her husband, she wrote in the role of a respectful and subordinate wife; and to
Lord Lyttelton, as a scholar and a woman of reason. As Emma Major notes,
she balanced her luxurious urban lifestyle by rhetorical means—by emphasising
her preference for simple country life.64 For example, Montagu claimed in a
letter to the author Gilbert West to ‘have for many years had a taste for rural
pleasures, which people seldom ﬁnd during their youth and gay season of life’.65
Her true sentiments, however, seem to have been almost entirely the opposite.
She often complained how the dullness of countryside ‘sunk [her] into stupid-
ity’, and complained in a straightforward manner to the Duchess of Portland of
having to repress her gay and witty self to adjust to the country decorum:
It is not usual to have […] sudden occasions of joy in the country; if we are
a little brisker than what is called very dull, it is suﬃcient; mirth here is
reckoned madness, gaiety is idleness, and wit a crying sin. The parson
preaches to its annoy, and much in its contempt; the justice magisterially
condemns it, the young squire, like a true Briton, hates it as foreign […]
the witty, they carry such a dangerous spleen they are not to be suﬀered in
a civil society.66
In other words, Montagu told her correspondents what she thought they wanted
to hear, revealing her true sentiments only occasionally, and, in this way, acted as
a true disciple of Lord Chesterﬁeld. Montagu was thus, in practice, a prime
example of someone applying external politeness in her social behaviour. Whe-
ther she saw herself as insincere in her adaptations of the self, is another matter.
She certainly portrayed herself as someone who abhorred all deceit in herself, and
condemned hypocrisy as an ‘abominable vice’.67 Indeed, appearing without ‘dis-
guises’ amongst true friends can be seen as one of her many social roles, which
she could very well have assumed with the utmost sincerity.
Montagu’s skilful role play payed oﬀ, and she was universally hailed as a
model of polite female excellence. However, as Emma Major has pointed out,
Montagu started to lose her unquestionably admired status amongst the polite
during the 1790s, when her ostentatious politeness started to feel dated. The
same goes for Montagu’s ﬂexible play with diﬀerent social masks; according to
Major, Montagu’s ‘diversity, her chameleon changes of epistolary and sociable
personae’ were relegated ‘to an old eighteenth century, one of shallow polite-
ness and corruption’.68 The theatricality of identity was, as Dror Wahrman has
argued, a feature of an early modern conceptualisation of identity and self, and
thus a part of a system of thought that was slowly getting replaced by modern
ideas of authentic selfhood.69 Both theatrical politeness and the easy multiplicity
of identity were thus being rejected as examples of old-fashioned and insincere
external politeness.
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Phœbus in Petticoats: Elizabeth Montagu’s Breeches Roles
In the light of Elizabeth Montagu’s reputation as the paragon of ideal polite
femininity, it is noteworthy that many of the roles Montagu adopted were tra-
ditionally considered masculine. She had long taken an interest in her husband’s
business aﬀairs, and after Edward Montagu’s death in 1775 she took on her
new responsibilities as the heiress of his estates. She embarked on a programme
of improving the grounds and buildings at Sandleford, her primary country
estate, and travelled to Yorkshire and Northumberland to inspect her tenants
like ‘a Country Gentlewoman of ye last Century’.70 She also took pleasure in
‘the practices and proﬁts of a savvy entrepreneur’, as Elizabeth Childs argues.71
Montagu was a talented scholar, knew Latin, and wrote treatises on art and
morality; she also corresponded with many of the most learned men of her time
over questions of religion and philosophy. She had a reputation for being a
great wit—an allegedly dangerous and unpopular quality for a woman to pos-
sess. Thus, many of Montagu’s interests were unquestionably considered unfe-
minine from the perspectives of discourses of politeness; furthermore,
Montagu’s utilisation of theatrical politeness was, according to didactic writers,
in itself a masculine mode of conduct, whereas femininity was associated with
the sincerity and naturalness of inward politeness. Curiously enough, Montagu
herself emphasised her masculine traits and roles. She deliberately represented
herself to her correspondents as a woman doing men’s work; according to
Major, she described herself in her letters as a ‘Farmeress’, a ‘learned lady’, and
‘great she schollard’, sometimes underlining her words for emphasis, and was
‘conscious of the ways in which her roles might conﬂict with or balance one
another’.72 Many of these depictions were written in a playful or ironic tone, as
if to soften the message, which further indicates that Montagu was aware of the
exceptional nature of her masculine activities.
Such deliberate posing in masculine positions seems surprising when held up
against the discursive ideals of soft and submissive femininity, which depicted
masculine women as horrendous, unnatural Amazons. Even more surprising is
contemporary opinion, which uniformly celebrated Montagu as the jewel of her
sex despite such deviations from discursive femininity.73 To be sure, Montagu
was, in many ways, an exceptional woman in an exceptional social position. She
was wealthy and inﬂuential; accordingly, the passionate admiration shown for
Montagu by various conduct writers could have been inspired simply by her role
as their patron. However, the fact that their opinion was shared by many people
who were wholly independent of Montagu’s ﬁnancial support seems to suggest,
at the very least, that masculine traits could be overlooked if the subject had
suﬃcient status and power. More importantly, as I will argue below, Montagu
also took care to balance her masculine roles with feminine ones, which were
often inﬂuenced by discourses of piety and chastity besides politeness.
Elizabeth Montagu distinguished herself especially as an erudite and a scholar—
one of the most controversial positions for a woman to inhabit in the eighteenth
century. In fact, unfeminine erudition was what the bluestockings were eminently
182 Multiple Identities
known and celebrated for, despite the fact that conduct writers unanimously
categorised ‘Learned women’ as ‘a proverb of reproach, feared by their own sex,
and disliked by ours’.74 Keen intellects and good understanding were considered to
be masculine characteristics, whereas the sphere of imagination was a privileged
feminine territory.75 Therefore, a woman scholar broke the traditional gender ste-
reotype of a weak feminine mind, thereby making her femininity questionable. A
woman’s intellectual superiority was threatening to the patriarchal system on
which society was organised; therefore, men were thought to ‘look with a jealous
and malignant eye on a woman of great parts, and a cultivated understanding’.
Women were thus advised to keep their learning ‘a profound secret’.76 Learning
was also thought to distance women from their natural domestic and emotional
sphere, as well as to make them vain and insuﬀerably superior company.77 In fact,
conduct book writers acknowledged that women were faced with a dilemma: how
to act to ‘avoid the imputation of pedantry on the one hand, and ignorance on the
other’. For, even though female erudition was considered to be formidable, women
were also commonly accused of being ‘so ignorant, frivolous and insipid, as to be
unﬁt for friendship, society or conversation; that they are unable to amuse, enter-
tain or edify a lonely hour, much more to bless or grace that connexion, for which
they were principally formed’.78 For John Bennett, there was ‘a narrow, middle
path betwixt these extremes’. To avoid becoming ‘viragos in their knowledge’,
women should concentrate their learning on feminine subjects and cultivate ‘such
studies, as lie within the region of sentiment and taste’. In this manner, they should
let their ‘knowledge be feminine, as well as [their] person’. For, as Bennett
reminded his readers, it was men’s task, with ‘solid judgement and a superior
vigour’, to ‘combine ideas, to discriminate, and examine a subject to the bottom’,
whilst women existed in the world to ‘give it all its brilliancy and all its charms’.79
Bennett then proceeded to recommend the study of natural history, botany, and
astronomy as particularly suitable for women, whereas ‘Machiavel, Newton,
Euclid, Malebranche or Locke’ were to be avoided, since they ‘would render you
unwomanly indeed’ and ‘damp that vivacity and destroy that disengaged ease and
softness, which are the very essence of your graces’.80
Then again, there were also more benevolent reactions towards female eru-
dites. Some writers even recommended the study of Latin for girls on the
grounds that it would make the lonely hours at home which were a necessary
part of an elite woman’s life more pleasant.81 Nevertheless, politeness had, in
the end, a strong generalist ethos, the spirit of the amateur as opposed to pro-
fessionalism and erudition.82 This inﬂuenced especially ideas of female excel-
lence, since breaches of normative gender roles were deemed particularly
appalling for women. ‘But after all this recommendation of diﬀerent studies, do
not mistake me’, wrote John Bennett; ‘I do not want to make you a ﬁne writer,
a historian, a naturalist, a geographer, an astronomer, a poet, a painter, a
connoisseur, or a virtuoso of any kind’.83 Elizabeth Montagu, however, mana-
ged to reconcile precisely these masculine roles with her feminine exemplarity.
Especially her Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakespear (1769), directed
against Voltaire’s critique, was, in Elizabeth Eger’s words, an ‘intervention in a
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public and nationalist literary debate’ that demonstrated her ‘appropriation of
masculine cultural authority’.84
Montagu was not only keen herself to engage in masculine activities—she
also encouraged other women in them. When Elizabeth Carter was con-
templating publishing a book of poetry, Montagu wrote to her to coax her on:
‘so, my dear Urania, away with your lamentations, sit down, revise, correct,
augment, print, and publish’. Montagu especially delighted in the idea of Carter
displaying her natural intellect, deemed a masculine trait: ‘My inferior soul will
feel a joy in your producing such proofs of genius to the world; let it see that all
your advantages are not derived from study. The envious may say you brought
your wisdom from Athens, your wit is your own.’85 Similarly, she benevolently
teased Carter for showing oﬀ her wit in Bristol: ‘I suppose by this time you are
famous there for the ﬂuency of your small talk, the pertness of your repartee,
and the ﬂippancy of your dialogue; nay, for what I know, you may shine in
equivoque and double entendre.’86 To the Duchess of Portland, Montagu
described in an approving tone a visit she made to a local female erudite:
I have been petrifying my brain over a most solid and ponderous perfor-
mance of a woman in this neighbourhood; having always loved to see
Phœbus in petticoats, I borrowed a book written by an ancient gentle-
woman skilled in Latin, dipped in Greek and absorbed in Hebrew, besides
a modern gift of tongues. […] really I believe she is a good woman, though
but an indiﬀerent Author. She amuses herself in the country so as to be
cheerful and sociable at threescore, is always employed either reading,
working or walking; and I don’t hear that she is pedantic. What use she
makes of her Hebrew, I cannot tell; but it is a strange piece, not of female,
but of male curiosity, to learn it.87
Then again, all modes of masculine behaviour in women were not tolerable in
Montagu’s eyes; she commented on Laurence Sterne’s sister who had ﬁnally
become ‘quite well behaved’ after having abandoned her deplorable ‘Hoyden’
manners.88 Moreover, Montagu also often denounced mixing of genders. She
thought that a military career was ‘excellent in making our Men less eﬀeminate’,
but, judging from ‘ye military air & dress of many of ye Ladies’ sociably involved
with the oﬃcers, she feared that ‘they make our Women more masculine’,
meaning that ‘the male & female character which should ever be held distinct
will be more [similar] than they have been’.89 Thus, there clearly was a diﬀerence
in Montagu’s mind between acceptable and improper masculine behaviour in a
woman—and it seems to have been tied to women’s intellectual abilities.
Indeed, Montagu limited her positive appraisal of women’s masculine roles
to bluestockings, wits, and other women of intellect. For women falling outside
these limits, she advocated traditional female roles. She took a keen interest in
her young niece’s education and future, but focused her attention on the girl’s
domestic tendencies; ‘I think I see in her disposition all the elements of which a
good Daughter, Wife, Mother, Sister, Mistress of a family, are composed, &
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from whence I prognosticate, that she will make others happy & be so herself’,
Montagu reﬂected in her letter, thus naming the traditional female roles as the
source of a woman’s general happiness.90 Apparently Montagu’s niece lacked
the intelligent brilliance Montagu thought was required from a woman wishing
to act successfully outside discursive femininity; to her, her niece seemed ‘to be
a sensible amiable girl, & to have the disposition & qualities which render
domestic life peaceable & chearfull’.91 Thus, Montagu arguably believed that
women could choose controversial masculine roles over traditional feminine
ones, but only if they had the mental capacity to support them.92 Elizabeth
Montagu herself had lived through a short period of domestic bliss, prompted
by the birth of her son in May 1743. During this time, her thoughts seem to
have been turned towards adopting a more traditional female role:
I hope I shall ﬁnd happiness in acquitting myself justly of the humble duties
of a private family; I shall aspire to no higher character than that of a good
woman. Those who endeavour to reconcile the good wife with the reputa-
tion of a beauty, a toast, a wit, and I know not what, have the art of
bringing together things in their natures contrary. To be very serviceable to
one’s family, with spending only the hours of sleeping in it, may be above
my art; my heart will always be open to my friends, my house to the
agreeable, and I will take a moderate share of diversion abroad; but my
attention is to my own ﬁre-side, and this, I assure you, is merely my own
inclination; for though Mr. Montagu does every thing that can make my
home agreeable, he has never by the least hint recommended to me to stay
in it.93
These domestic aspirations were extinguished by the death of Montagu’s son in
September 1744. Montagu never had more children, and she turned her ambi-
tions to her social, intellectual, and economic pursuits.
Even in cases where wit and genius were bountifully supplied, the life of a
female wit was a constant balancing act. Montagu expressed such thoughts in a
letter to Lord Lyttelton, who lamented that his daughter was ‘not a beauty and
a genius’. ‘[D]id you know the vexations of vanity, and the languors of pride in
retirement, you would thank the gods for not having given her too many
charms, and too many pretensions to admiration’, Montagu remonstrated; ‘I
have known very few women in my life whom extraordinary charms and
accomplishments did not make unhappy’.94 In a later letter she praised Miss
Lyttelton for her traditional domestic virtues:
Your Lordship’s account of Miss Lyttelton rejoiced me on your account
and hers. I congratulate you that your son is ﬁt to grace public life, your
daughter to bless domestic. Your Lordship’s forming care will polish her
virtues, till they are smooth and soft, and never idly wish to make them
bright and dazzling. Extraordinary talents may make a woman admired,
but they will never make her happy. Talents put a man above the world,
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and in a condition to be feared and worshipped; a woman that possesses
them must be always courting the world, and asking pardon, as it were, for
uncommon excellence.95
Montagu seems to speak with a vengeance; perhaps she had personally come to
notice that extraordinary talents and breaking traditional feminine roles, which
she herself always seemed able to manage successfully, could nevertheless be
taxing. Therefore, Montagu herself was cautious in her display of unfeminine
qualities, and carefully selected the audience to whom she could express them:
There is a mahometan Error crept even into the Christian Church that
Women have no Souls & it is thought very absurd for us to pretend to read
or think like reasonable Creatures; & therefore not to appear pre-
sumptuous I wou’d not, till I was very intimate with a person, own to them
I had ever read any thing but my Grand mothers receipts for puddings &
Cerecloths for sprains with just as much housewifery & quackery as my
capacity might be capable of receiving.96
Similar reserve seemed necessary to Fanny Burney, who, for fear of being
thought ‘studious, or aﬀected’, instead of ‘making a Display of Books’, always
tried to ‘hide them’ and avoid being caught reading. As Sylvia Myers has
shown, many learned women shared similar fears of being thought aﬀected, and
advised their friends and relatives not to educate their daughters for the fear of
social condemnation—despite the pleasure they themselves received from their
learning.97 Indeed, as Hester Lynch Thrale noted, a female wit needed to take
inﬁnite care not to be thought ‘Bookish’; for, as she explained to Burney, ‘you
will be watched, & if you are not upon your Guard, all the misses will rise up
against you’.98 Thus, not only men, but also women were eager to chastise
those women not conforming to polite feminine norms.
Montagu’s success in gaining public approval for her masculine endeavours
was greatly based on her chameleon-like persona; her skilful use of external
politeness enabled her to become the emblem of polite feminine perfection in
her contemporaries’ eyes despite her masculine traits. In fact, Montagu’s ﬂex-
ible adaptation of diﬀerent roles can be seen as clever image-control in addition
to pragmatic manoeuvring. She balanced her unfeminine activities with a care-
ful display of religious piety, wifely submission, and other such characteristics
labelled properly feminine.99 External politeness thus oﬀered women more
possibilities than inward politeness—not least because of the intimate links that
existed between inward politeness, domesticity, and the rising middle-class
gender roles.
Mary Delany’s Image Control
Like Montagu, Mary Delany was deft in playing diﬀerent roles during her long
and eventful life. She cheerfully distinguished herself as high society belle, pious
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widow, ingenious female artist, femme fatale, industrious housewife, loyal
friend, ﬂippant gossip, and most of all—independent woman. She managed to
make the most of various diﬃcult circumstances, all thanks to her ability to
deftly perceive what was expected from her and to act accordingly. In fact, her
life is a testament to what an intelligent woman could achieve with skilful
image control. Her dissimulative skills enabled her to overcome her ﬁrst hus-
band’s sullen jealousy, his housekeeper-sister’s antipathy, and her own aunt
Lady Lansdowne’s troublesome attempts to set her up with a lover.100 Her
clever application of politeness and endeavour ‘to be very civil to all’ soon
gained her Pendarves’s family’s favour, ‘who were not at ﬁrst inclined to receive
me well’.101 Because of Alexander Pendarves’s compulsive suspiciousness, she
was extremely cautious of showing herself outdoors and socialising with men,
guarding the image of herself as the pious, chaste, and devoted wife. Her strict
image control was successful: Delany noted that Pendarves seemed to be ‘very
happy and well satisﬁed with my behaviour’, and indeed, she managed to
ingratiate herself well enough to her disagreeable husband as to make him
promise to make her his heir—only for him to die the night before signing his
new will, thus leaving her practically penniless.102 Regardless, she considered
her release as a blessing, as it restored her to ‘a state of tranquillity I had not
known for many years’ with a fortune that, even though ‘very mediocre’, was
‘at my own command’.103
Thus, like Elizabeth Montagu, Delany became independent when her hus-
band died; the only diﬀerence was that she had a signiﬁcantly smaller fortune to
practice her new-found freedom with. She was thus again confronted with less
than ideal circumstances. However, she rallied once more; making the most of
her limited ﬁnances, she resided mainly with her female friends, Duchess of
Portland and Anne Donnellan, as well as her brother Bernard ‘Bunny’ Gran-
ville, cheerfully attending the Court, theatre, opera, and other London amuse-
ments. Wiser for her early experience with matrimony, Delany seems to have
spent, in the words of Janice Farrar Thaddeus, the next twenty years of her life
‘toying with love and resisting marriage’.104 Instead of accepting any of her
many aristocratic suitors, Delany contentedly claimed that ‘I live just as I could
wish to do; have much business, many amusements, a pleasant house, charming
ﬁelds, and a companion that […] crowns all by his friendly and agreeable
manner’—meaning her brother.105
During this time, probably around 1740, she wrote an autobiography of her
early life and marriage with Pendarves. The autobiography was written in let-
ters to the Duchess of Portland—and probably circulated around her circle of
friends—and is a powerful demonstration of Delany’s skill in controlling her
public and private image. Janice Farrar Thaddeus draws a link between Dela-
ny’s autobiography and the canon of so-called scandalous memoirists, who by
publishing their side of their story wanted to present themselves as many-sided
personalities and, in Felicity Nussbaum’s words, ‘disrupt conventional para-
digms of [the] female character’.106 In other words, through her autobiography
Delany wanted to rewrite her image—particularly, it seems, to fend oﬀ
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suspicions of duplicity, dissimulation, and hypocrisy. She assured the Duchess
that the autobiography was entirely truthful: ‘I promised not to disguise any
part of my conduct or even my sentiments from you; and I will rather run the
hazard of losing some part of your good opinion, than hide myself from you,
under the veil of any kind of deceit’.107 Similarly, throughout her account,
Delany emphasises her open and plain dealings with her detested husband,
claiming that she only deceived him in the extent of her repulsion towards him
by hiding her tears of despair—and that even this dissimulation was ‘painful’ to
her sincere nature.108 She assured that her ‘honest heart’ would let her show ‘no
delight in being in his company’, which she compensated for by taking care ‘he
should have no reason to accuse me of preferring any other to it’.109 Never-
theless, a number of men seem to have gone crazy with love for the young and
beautiful Delany—apparently with no encouragement on her part. Indeed, she
paints a picture of herself as the innocent victim of their debauched advances.
Yet, her character obviously was a ﬂirtatious one, and after Pendarves’s
death she was toying with several men’s (and possibly women’s as well) love
simultaneously.
Delany also put on a cloak of sensibility. Even though Pendarves’s death in
1724 came as a joyous release from her ‘jailor’, she claimed that it nevertheless
shocked her sensibilities profoundly and adamantly denied being ‘hypocritical
in the concern I showed’.110 After his death, Delany displayed what Janice
Farrar Thaddeus calls well-honed ‘eighteenth-century double-think’ by looking
back with compassion and reproaching herself for her ‘ingratitude’ in ‘not
loving a man, who had so true an aﬀection for me’; indeed, Delany claimed that
this was ‘a most painful reﬂection, and has frequently added to my anxieties’.111
In addition to her autobiography, Mary Delany also had two written ‘char-
acters’ drawn of her by her friend Anne Donnellan and second husband Patrick
Delany, which shed some light into her deft image control. Even though these
descriptions share many characteristics—both acknowledge her exceptional
accomplishments and industry—they also have interesting diﬀerences, which
reﬂect the diﬀerent roles Delany assumed at diﬀerent stages of her life, but also
the diﬀerent ways she chose to retell her history to these two people. Written in
1742, Anne Donnellan’s account is revealingly named ‘Aspasia’s Picture’, refer-
ring to Delany with the name of Pericles’s mistress which she had adopted
amongst her friends, fully aware of the erotic connotations of the name.112
Donnellan portrays Delany as someone who had ‘naturally a great deal of
vivacity and liveliness of temper’ and even a ‘tendency towards gaiety’, although
this was checked by ‘innate modesty and early prudence’. However, Donnellan
is quick to note that Delany’s modesty was ‘not that unbecoming bashfulness’
but ‘the modesty of the mind’ which, instead of causing awkward behaviour,
‘adds a grace to everything that she says or does’. Neither did Delany’s pru-
dence consist ‘in formality or reserve’, but left her behaviour easy and uncer-
emonious. To avoid portraying Delany as a downright fun-loving, popular ﬂirt,
Donnellan then thought it prudent to add that ‘the easiness of her behaviour
proceeds from the purity of her heart, not the levity of her mind’.113
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Patrick Delany’s portrait from 1755, originally written to be published in his
periodical The Humanist under the title ‘Maria’, paints a much more modest
and retiring picture of the young Mary Delany before and during her ﬁrst
marriage. He describes her as ‘bashful to an extreme, […] even blameably so’.
Delany’s utmost diﬃdence supposedly prevented her from ever dancing in
public, ‘where she would be the distinguished object of observation’:
The case was the same in her playing as in her dancing, for though she had
confessedly the ﬁnest hand and execution that ever was heard, she never let
anybody but her intimate acquaintance hear it. She could not bear the
attention of others to her, and whenever she found she was attended to in a
very extraordinary manner, she blushed and ﬂuttered herself into a confusion
which quickly forced her to give over.114
Regarding the abundant male attention Delany attracted, D.D. asserts that her
native dignity ‘kept all admirers in awe, insomuch that she was the woman in the
world to whom that ﬁne description of Solomon could best be applied: fair as the
moon clear as the sun, but terrible as an army with banners’. The interval
between Delany’s two marriages which she, based on her letters, seemed to spend
in light-hearted amusements and toying with various suitors, is in Patrick Dela-
ny’s account acquitted with a single sentence, stating that she employed it ‘in
various works of genius, particularly in the study and practice of painting’.115
D.D.’s characterisation of Delany was, of course, originally intended for
publication in a moralist periodical and, therefore, written to a very diﬀerent
audience from Donnellan’s version, which was for the eyes of Delany and her
friends only. There are also more than ten years between the two accounts.
However, Donnellan’s more gay portrayal of Delany bears a much closer
resemblance to the Mary Delany we meet in her own letters—fun-loving, ﬂir-
tatious, high-spirited. As Janice Farrar Thaddeus notes, Delany was born ‘at
the beginning of the century, and formed by its looser mores’, which made her
‘much less inhibited than her younger friends’.116 Especially D.D.’s claims of
Delany’s extreme diﬃdence and wish to avoid attention seem—even though
supposedly describing her youth—particularly implausible characterisations of a
woman who boasted about going to ‘the ball at St. James’s’ and the attention her
art and accomplishments drew from the Viceroy of Ireland.117 And yet, Delany
certainly also relished her domestic pleasures. She enjoyed playing the mistress of
the house, preserving relishes and pickles, supervising workmen, sprucing up her
home and garden, and administering medicines to her family, servants, and
friends. This was partly a natural consequence of aging; as she wrote to her sister,
it is very happy that as our season of life changes our taste for pleasures
alter. In the spring and summer of life we ﬂutter and bask in the sunshine
of diversions—it is true we run the hazard of being tamed and seldom
escape it; in the autumn and in the winter of life we by degrees seek for
shade and shelter.118
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The glaring discrepancies between these two accounts—both idealising Delany
in their own ways—demonstrate the ease and skill with which Delany played
diﬀerent polite roles. What was commendable for the single and carefree 32-
year-old Mary Delany diﬀered from the role that was required from the mar-
ried 45-year-old matron of the house. To what extent either of these portrayals,
or her autobiography, capture the ‘true’ Mary Delany, remains questionable.
Identity and the Self
The multiplicity of social roles, masks, and identities women such as Elizabeth
Montagu and Mary Delany routinely assumed calls attention to larger questions
of identity’s genuineness and internality as opposed to external inﬂuence and
theatricality. Eighteenth-century understandings of identity have been under
some recent scholarly scrutiny. Much of this work has challenged views of the
Enlightenment subject as a fully centred, uniﬁed individual with a core of
stable, continuous identity. Instead, eighteenth-century identity has been pre-
sented as something that was perceived as multiple, changeable, and malleable,
to be assumed and shed at will according to the requirements of polite socia-
bility. Indeed, several scholars have argued that eighteenth-century identity
construction should be understood instead as a social masquerade that allowed
individuals to ‘be in some degree whatever character we choose’, as James
Boswell asserted.119 For this reason, as Kathleen Wilson notes, ‘personal iden-
tity could seem for some to be as much a product of choice as of birth’.120
James Boswell himself with his chameleon-like persona has been portrayed as a
case in point. Felicity Nussbaum has argued that Boswell’s autobiographical
texts, portraying him with various and contradictory identities, reﬂect con-
temporary ‘linguistic and cultural confusions about ideologies of self’, where an
idea of ‘an essential self’ competed with ‘an equally dominant one that identity
is perpetually in ﬂux’.121
Here, however, lies a problem. Most scholars, like Nussbaum or Wilson, do
not conceptually diﬀerentiate identity from the self—thus justifying Brubaker
and Cooper’s critique of the loose use of these concepts.122 Yet, an individual’s
identity and self were not necessarily understood to be synonymous in eight-
eenth-century England, even if they were sometimes used interchangeably. Dror
Wahrman has oﬀered a detailed analysis on the development of the relationship
between identity and self in the eighteenth century. His argument is that the
early modern understanding of identity as ‘mutable, assumable, divisible, or
actively malleable’ was quickly replaced in the 1780s and 1790s by the modern
idea of identity-as-self—immutable, internalised, and essential.123 In other
words, identities collapsed into the self and became truthful emanations of an
individual’s internal, uniform reality. Wahrman argues that, in early modern
understanding, there was no conception of a ‘true essential self’, and that any
attempt to discuss early modern personal identity in such terms is inevitably
anachronistic. Indeed, Wahrman claims that what made views about multiple
and migrating identities possible in the ﬁrst place was a ‘non-essential notion of
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identity that was not anchored in a deeply seated self’.124 This is exempliﬁed by
the literalness with which dress was thought to make identity, rather than
merely signify its preceding existence.125 As Wahrman writes, the assumed
power of clothes to permeate and shape their wearer’s identity indicates that
‘the ancien régime of identity lacked that key characteristic of the modern
understanding of self, its depth’. Accordingly, early modern personal identity
cannot be ﬁtted into the surface/outside versus depth/inside scheme that shapes
modern thinking about an essential, constant self. For Wahrman, if the modern
‘self’ is inwardly turned, the early modern ‘self’ appears as ‘outwardly or
socially turned’—but, as Wahrman quite correctly asks, is it then still a ‘self’?126
If we are to accept Wahrman’s account, the emergence of inward politeness
can be seen as a phenomenon directly related to this gradual shift in con-
ceptualisations of identity from theatrical to essential. The idea of internal
politeness also represents a view where identities—in this case, polite iden-
tities—are transformed from multiple and volitional to singular and unavoid-
able, the body reﬂecting one’s essential self transparently and truthfully. This
also oﬀers a possible explanation for the change in perceptions of Elizabeth
Montagu’s feminine exemplarity that occurred in the 1790s; her utilisation of
multiple identities can be seen as an early modern polite tactic which clashed
with the emerging modern ideals of a uniform self. In fact, the conceptual
change Wahrman proposes would mean that women’s possibilities to man-
oeuvre in polite society with the help of multiple polite identities became
increasingly narrower the further the long eighteenth century progressed. As the
tide then turned more and more to favour ideas of a uniform self and, respec-
tively, inward politeness, women would have found it increasingly diﬃcult to
perform their various roles in a socially accepted manner. Thus, what was a
regular feature of early eighteenth-century politeness—that is, assuming diﬀerent
identities as social roles, masks, or personas—would have become a hypocritical
practice by the end of the period.
Wahrman’s account is insightful, but also leaves some questions unan-
swered—especially concerning early modern ideas of the self. If the notion of an
essential self only appeared quite late in the eighteenth century, why does the
OED then show that the term then used already in 1670s to denote ‘A Secret
self I had enclosd within, That was not bounded with my Clothes or Skin’?127 It
would appear that either the shift Wahrman outlines had started gradually
already at the end of the seventeenth century, or the early modern under-
standing of malleable identity also included some sort of conception of an
internal self. While Wahrman’s timeframe is certainly much too narrow and the
shift should rather be seen as a gradual change where both models of thought
coexisted alongside each other from at least the end of the seventeenth century,
the latter option is also plausible.128 In fact, John Jeﬀries Martin has suggested
that the importance attached to self-presentation, performance, and theatricality
in early modern conceptions of the self does not necessarily rule out the possi-
bility of an individual self-consciousness about interior experience or inward-
ness, or the tension between the two. According to Martin, a certain experience
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of inwardness can even be seen to be a crucial cultural and intellectual early
modern development. Even though Renaissance men and women had little sense
of the self as a neatly bounded or well-demarcated thing—indeed, Martin
argues that they experienced the self as highly ﬂuid, at every moment ready to
change its shape or to slip through the porous body—they still had an acute
sense of interiority.129 Of course, this interior self was not essential in the
modern sense; in fact, Martin emphasises that the early modern self should not
be approached as a thing (such as the soul or the mind) but rather as a relation
between the individual experience of inwardness and externality, where the
body as the ‘privileged frontiere’ between the two plays an integral role.130
Even if women such as Elizabeth Montagu embraced the multiplicity of
identity displayed by Boswell, they appear nevertheless to have thought that,
underneath all polite role-playing, there remained a stable, unchanging, non-
discursive core of self. This is visible, for example, in Montagu’s letter to
William Freind:
I am now resolved to write you a long letter while I am your plain down-
right country cousin before I have breath’d the London air or have lost the
least part of my Arcadian sincerity & sobriety. I don’t know whether it is
not conceited to imagine you will like me better when I am most my self or
when I am moulded by fashion into other peoples form.131
Montagu appears to think that the roles she assumes are not her ‘true’ self, but
something that is added on top of it by polite adaptation to a changing social
environment. Thus, it would seem that, at least for Montagu, changing iden-
tities were not thought to interact with one’s self, and it was always possible to
return to one’s true, authentic subjectivity after a polite play with identities.
Early modern understanding of the exact nature of identity itself is another
interesting question. Identity could be—and often was—seen, in Dror Wahr-
man’s words, as ‘the mutable and non-essential nature of what can be assumed
or shed at will’, and identities were thus understood as performed—that is, as
deliberately assumed and changed. However, even though identities were easily
exchanged, they were, at the same time, also deeply inhabited; just as clothing
was easily put on or taken oﬀ, it was nevertheless thought to very literally make
identity. Therefore, identities, multiple and exchangeable as they were, were
perhaps not only superﬁcial masks to be picked up and put down lightly; instead,
they can be seen to have, to some extent, interacted with an individual’s inner self
and shape the self or some part of it, if only temporarily. Indeed, as Elizabeth
Montagu writes above, her understanding of assuming an identity literally means
being ‘moulded by fashion into other peoples form’; what exactly she means by
this in terms of the integrity of the self remains unclear.
The long eighteenth century thus stands, again, in the midst of a confusion of
old and new ideas; in the words of Isabel Karremann, the eighteenth century
saw the emergence of both ‘the notion of an essential, inner self and the notion
of a self as a bundle of perceptions retrospectively labelled “I”’.132 Early modern
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understandings, still inﬂuential during the eighteenth century, included a notion
of inwardness, if not strictly a self. However, doubts have also been raised
about the supposedly unchangeable nature of the emerging Enlightenment idea
of the self, as well as the whole existence of a uniform ‘Enlightened selfhood’
altogether. In fact, according to Udo Thiel, the eighteenth century harboured a
number of discordant philosophical views of the origin and nature of ‘personal
identity’, mostly dependent on interpretations of the nature of the human mind.
Most immaterialist philosophers of the mind argued that personal identity—or,
the self—consists in the ‘identity of a mental substance’ and that ‘the identity of
a mental substance is a direct consequence of its immaterial nature’; therefore,
because of its immateriality, the mind—and, thus, personal identity—‘is not
subject to change and remains the same through time’.133 Materialist philoso-
phers typically placed personal identity in consciousness or memory, and their
attitude towards the possible changeability of the self is more ambivalent.
Locke’s theory of personal identity being based on consciousness left open the
possibility of the self being changed through time and life experiences; an even
more radical stance was adopted by David Hume, who, as Thiel claims,
thought that a person’s inner experience reveals that ‘the self or person is not
identical through time’.134 In fact, Hume maintained that the mind was ‘noth-
ing but a bundle or collection of diﬀerent perceptions, which succeed each other
with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual ﬂux and movement’; and
that ‘there is properly no identity’ of the mind at diﬀerent times.135 Thus, for
Hume, the fact that people have a natural tendency to ascribe unity and stabi-
lity to the self was caused by the imagined causal connections of one’s percep-
tions, preserved by memory. These causal connections ‘lead the imagination to
“feign” an identical self to which those causally related perceptions belong’.136
Accordingly, as Hume wrote, ‘the identity, which we ascribe to the mind of
man, is only a ﬁctitious one’.137 Incidentally, Hume’s ideas resonate powerfully
with postmodern understandings of identity and selfhood. Foucauldian theorists
hold the idea of an authentic interiority as purely ﬁctional, since all subjectivity
is produced, or at least enabled, by discursive power. The self is seen as end-
lessly performative, birthed through unceasing citational identiﬁcations. From
this point of view, the eighteenth-century play with identities can be seen as a
superﬁcial phenomenon in the face of a more comprehensive understanding of
(personal) identity as a non-volitional performative ﬁction. The subject can
choose to perform diﬀerent mask-like identities in order to adapt herself to
diﬀerent contexts in life; those performances, however, take place within a
matrix of power that preforms and conditions them. Therefore, they are always
partly non-volitional—and, moreover, they always also profoundly constitute
the individual as a subject that imagines herself to be autonomous and to have a
stable, internal core of a self.
Eighteenth-century practices of the self can also be seen to be targeted
towards shaping an individual’s personal identity, thus indicating that the
members of polite society did not necessarily see the self as an unalterable
entity. As I will discuss in the ﬁnal chapter of this book, the practices of self-
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care, self-knowledge, and self-discipline that polite individuals engaged with can
be viewed as an attempt to solve the problem of hypocrisy embedded in
politeness; through internalising polite normativity as an authentic part of the
self, individuals aimed to become autonomous, ethical subjects instead of
hypocritical actors.138 As I will show, Catherine Talbot embarked on a strict
regime of self-control with precisely such a target in mind—an ethical and
moral transformation of her personal identity. The eighteenth-century idea of
the self as an object of control and ethical self-fashioning sits uneasily with the
belief that the self was somehow authentic, but becomes perfectly under-
standable if we take early modern and eighteenth-century conceptualisations of
the self to be, as Michael Schoenfeldt has aptly written, ‘a vibrantly inconsistent
but brilliantly supple discourse of selfhood and agency’ rather than a homo-
genous entity.139 Double feeling and malleability of the self certainly were terms
often used in deﬁnitions of eighteenth-century conceptualisations of personal
identity. The eighteenth-century understanding of the human nature still relied
in great part on a ‘dualist concept of a split human nature that is paradoxical
and even inconsistent’; indeed, according to Charles Taylor, the notion of
authenticity was a child of the Romantic period, born out of criticism towards
the disengaged rationality of the eighteenth century.140 Therefore, in many
eighteenth-century conceptualisations, ‘inconsistency is necessarily Man’s lot: to
expect consistency from him is to deny by implication the paradoxical dualism
that makes him a man’, as Paul Fussel claims.141 To many eighteenth-century
polite subjects, then, not only were identities malleable, but even the inner core
of the self could be fashioned, at least to some extent.
Ironic Citations: Politeness as Camp
Camp, by focusing on the outward appearances of role, implies that roles, and, in
particular, sex roles, are superﬁcial—a matter of style. Indeed, life itself is role
and theater, appearance, and impersonation.
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Assuming diﬀerent roles and masks was thus an everyday practice for polite
women. However, the utmost consciousness and deliberation with which these
roles are sometimes put on almost generates a parodic impression. For example,
when Fanny Burney describes how ‘Susan Thrale had just had her Hair turned
up, & powdered, & has taken to the Womanly Role’, and how ‘Dr. Johnson,
sportively gave her instructions how to encrease her consequence, & to take
upon her properly’, the reader is struck by the make-believe feeling of the
scene—as if everyone present is consciously acting and conscious of everyone
else’s acting, including Burney, later reporting the incident.143 Many of Burney’s
journal entries describing the polite roles she assumes share a similar ironic tint.
‘Mr. Pepys & I then began a mutual ﬂash, I assure you, & wondrous sprightly
we were’, she writes of a ‘Blue’ party.144 Similarly, many of the descriptions
that Elizabeth Montagu gives about her actions and roles are delivered from a
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decidedly ironical distance. For example, her account of her transformation into
‘the most reasonable, quiet, good kind of country gentlewomen that ever was’
by a change of location betrays a distinctly ironical attitude, as do her many
similar self-categorisations, quoted earlier in this chapter.145 Also Catherine
Talbot’s letters reveal openly satirical tones, displayed deliciously by her
description of her visit to the court:
You perhaps [do not] suspect how peculiarly well I am cut out for a
Courtier. I have contrived to have in that one day no less than two private
Audiences of the Heir Apparent, & beside that, have eat Royal Cake &
drank royal Caudle (& very excellent indeed) in Public with universal
Approbation. ’Tis prodigious how young I am grown & how Gay. […]
Shall I accept the place of a Maid of Honour if it should be oﬀer’d me
when any of the present set Marries oﬀ? I like the loitering in a Drawing
room of all things, & was pull’d out of it at last by meer Compulsion
before I had seen half enough of a Scene so new & so amusing to me. Lady
Egremont was diverted beyond measure to see me so Girlishly earnest to
stay to the last minute.146
Such open irony seems to make the performances of some of the polite feminine
roles that Burney, Montagu, and Talbot engage in deliberately parodic.
Parody is a powerful strategy of subversive repetition of normative social
roles, as Judith Butler, among others, argues. Subjectivity or identity cannot be
taken as genuine expressions of an individual’s stable core; instead, they are
constituted through self-representative practices, both textual and bodily. In
other words, the individual experience of genuine inwardness is a fabrication.
There is no authentic interiority of polite femininity—only a discursive repre-
sentation where women’s supposed internal features control the ways in which
their bodies act. The discursive creation of a natural interior serves a purpose;
according to Butler, ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ are ‘tenuously maintained for the purposes
of social regulation and control’. Their juxtaposition constitutes a ‘binary dis-
tinction that stabilizes and consolidates the coherent subject’—or, in other words,
creates normative identities and produces docile bodies.147 However, as Butler
notes, individuals can resist this process of normalisation by shaking the author-
ity of this inside/outside-division in diﬀerent ways—for example, by means of
parody. For Butler, performing gendered identities from an ironic position reveals
the naturalised authenticity of these identities to be ﬁctive.148 Thus, parody is a
tool for destabilising existing conduct expectations; as such, it can be analysed as
a practice of freedom elite women used in the context of eighteenth-century
politeness. Women can be observed to use politeness in self-conscious and ironic
ways to question and challenge the gendered conduct expectations the politeness
regime set them. This parodic citationality is also a deﬁning feature in camp—
and, indeed, such uses of politeness bear some resemblance to camp.
Even though ‘camp’ is a twentieth-century term and, as such, obviously not
used by eighteenth-century subjects, I want to argue that, as an analytical
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concept, camp reveals to us something important about eighteenth-century
politeness. Camp, as an adjective, goes back to at least 1909, when it was
deﬁned as ‘actions and gestures of exaggerated emphasis’149 or ‘pleasantly
ostentatious or, in manner, aﬀected’.150 Since then, it has picked up an aﬃnity
to homosexual aestheticism and irony, recognised by, for example, Susan
Sontag in her famous essay ‘Notes on “Camp”’ (1964), the ﬁrst text to analyse
camp as a cultural phenomenon. In recent scholarship, camp has been examined
as a critical aesthetic and political practice for gay men and, lately, increasingly
also for lesbian and straight people. Camp has become an especially important
tool for postmodern deconstructions of gender, sex, and identity, due to its
ability to both legitimate and subvert that which it parodies.151
Camp, when deﬁned loosely as a postmodern practice based on deliberate
parody and self-acknowledged theatricality, rather than an essentially gay sensi-
bility, is generally understood to build on irony, aestheticism, and theatricality.
Firstly, the irony of camp is born out of an incongruous contrast between an
individual and her context; it is constructed on the oppositional play between
‘appearance’ and ‘essence’, revealing the ﬁctive nature of the inside/outside juxta-
position.152 Camp is a ‘form of ironic representation and reading’ of the incon-
gruity present in conduct norm—such as the contrasting of masculine/feminine,
youth/old age, or high/low status.153 Irony is thus understood as a consciously
distancing attitude towards a norm, whereas an ironic performance of the norm
construes as parody. Secondly, camp is deﬁned by its privileging of aesthetics over
substance, or style over content; it relies largely upon ‘arrangement, timing, and
tone’, and, as such, is based on fashioning the exterior. It cultivates the aesthetics
of the exaggerated, the ostentatious, and the outrageous, which render it a spec-
tacle.154 Thirdly, camp is essentially theatrical; it embraces the idea of ‘life-as-
theater’ and highlights the juxtaposition of ‘being versus role-playing’, or reality
versus appearance. By focusing on the outward appearances of role, camp
implies that roles are ‘superﬁcial—a matter of style’.155 These three aspects are
also prominently present in the conscious performances of politeness produced
and recorded by Montagu and other women examined here.
Elizabeth Montagu was a queen of subtle parody. She wrote to Elizabeth
Carter, who was ‘ﬂaunting it’ in Bristol, a letter appropriate for someone
appearing in the role of a ‘Bristol belle’:
I hope you will write to me soon, and pray tell me whether you like pom-
pons or aigrettes in the hair; if you put on rouge, dance minuets and cotil-
lions, that I may describe and deﬁne you in your Bristol State. I ask a
thousand pardons for detaining you so long from the pump room, but I
hope it will make you some amends if I tell you Lord Northampton had a
ﬁne suit for the birth-day. The waistcoat silver and gold, the coat gold and
silver. These must be interesting subjects to a Bristol belle.156
Montagu also wrote sardonically of her own need to assume the proper
appearance for an urban lady when arriving at the metropolis; ‘I look like a
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country Joan, and I must not shew such a jolly countenance at London, lest it
should be thought that I am too grossière ever to have […] had the vapours’.157
When in country, she would adopt the role of an ‘antiquated Dowager’ with a
mock sincerity: ‘I have improved upon Lady Grale’s plan of doing every [thing]
soberly, I have been serious & solemn, & retired, & have sat as quietly at my
ﬁreside as any antiquated Dowager when her quadrille party was gone’.158
Mary Delany’s autobiographical embracing of the theatrical came close to
camp, as well. Janice Farrar Thaddeus has examined Delany’s epistolary prac-
tices as a means of controlling her own image through assuming various masks.
Delany had a habit of adopting pet names both for herself and her friends—
often with piercing accuracy, as naming her uncle ‘Alcander’ or the Honourable
Henry Hervey ‘Apollo’s Imp’ shows. Delany herself adopted the name ‘Aspasia’
after the beautiful and accomplished ‘center of Athenian literary and philoso-
phical life’; however, as Aspasia was also Pericles’s mistress, the name was
open for a less spiritualised interpretation.159 Moreover, Delany’s letters and
especially her autobiography are characterised by self-dramatisation that makes
them read like ﬁction. Her use of novel-like dramatic devices, such as ﬁctional
(and intertextual) names and dialogue eﬀectively serve to position herself as the
innocent heroine and to inform her reader of the trope her adventures are to be
contextualised with. The most glaring ﬁctional allusion is her representation of
Alexander Pendarves’s courtship, which, as Thaddeus observes, bears uncanny
similarities with Clarissa Harlowe’s experiences in Clarissa (1748). It is possible
that Delany even revised her original account after the publication of Richard-
son’s novel.160 Even though the easiness with which Delany moved in and out
of ﬁction in her self-representation was particularly pronounced, Thaddeus
claims that it was nothing unusual for the early eighteenth century.161 Indeed,
the ancien régime of identity suggested that the self was a mask to be fash-
ioned and a trope to be enacted. It is noteworthy that the two women who
seem to have embraced the theatrical and parodic opportunities available in
politeness with particular rigour and skill, Montagu and Delany, are the ones
who were brought up in the early decades of the eighteenth century and had
also the closest connections to the high society and its courtly, dissimulative
politeness tradition.
The theatricality of a campish parody resonates deeply with eighteenth-cen-
tury conceptualisations of identity and formulations of external politeness.
Moreover, the aestheticizing attitude towards the body, a central feature of
camp-like parody, is something that, as we remember, was a fundamental
operating principle of politeness. Politeness was based on the stylisation of the
body, executed through exercising, fashioning, and disciplining the body into
normative appearances and manners. As Elizabeth Montagu’s sarcastic
description of the role of ‘a pretty sort of a woman’ shows, women were well
aware of this:
If any one wishes to assume that character, they have only to pervert their
sense, distort their faces, disjoint their limbs, mince their phrases, and lisp
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their words, and the thing is done. Grimaces, trite sentences, aﬀected civility,
forced gaiety, and an imitation of good nature, complete the character.162
The privileging of style over content was also a dominant feature of external
politeness, which, as I have argued, was paramount for women who wanted to
use politeness ﬂexibly to navigate in polite society in a successful way.
Camp also oﬀers a model for critique of gender roles. When understood as
parodic mimicry or feminine masquerade, it functions as a form of gender
parody. Accordingly, consciously ironic enactments of polite feminine roles can
be interpreted as denaturalising normative representations of women; they can
be seen to have the potential of revealing to the subject that not only are paro-
dic roles ﬁctive fabrications, but the polite feminine models they are constructed
on are no more natural or essential, and that the ‘self’ of the polite subject is
always a construction. The masculine roles Elizabeth Montagu assumed, as well
as the emphatically feminine roles she balanced them with, can be seen as a
form of this kind of campish parody. Joan Riviere’s essay ‘Womanliness as a
Masquerade’ (1929), which has been taken up in feminist theory as a ‘divining
rod pointing to the “performative status”’ of the feminine, describes intellectual
women who take on a masculine identity to ‘perform in the intellectual sphere’,
and then put on a ‘mask of womanliness’ as a defence to ‘avert anxiety and the
retribution feared from men’.163 This resonates with bluestockings’ adoption of
the feminine role as a compensation for their literary ambitions. By masquer-
ading as the obedient wife or the innocent pastorella, Montagu can be under-
stood to have appeased the potential consternation she feared her intellectual
pursuits would cause in the polite public. At the same time, however, Mon-
tagu’s play with roles also demonstrates to us that the womanliness she por-
trayed was no more authentic that the masculine roles she took on; in the
masquerade, ‘the woman mimics an authentic—genuine—womanliness but then
authentic womanliness is such a mimicry, is the masquerade’.164 Performances
of exaggerated femininity, such as Montagu’s ‘Bristol belle’ letter to Carter,
form a critical, self-conscious distance between Montagu’s self and the stereo-
typical role she assumes; when Montagu parodies herself through the role she is
expected to assume in earnest, she demonstrates her recognition of herself as a
trope. By the parodic excessiveness of her performance, she underlines the ‘dis-
crepancy between gesture and “essence”’, making the allegedly natural suddenly
appear unnatural.165
This is not to say that politeness was always or essentially parodic. Instead, I
want to suggest that politeness was based on such features as theatricality and
the aesthetics of the exterior, central in camp, which enabled the occasional
parodic citations of politeness. Women’s deliberate and parodic performances
of polite feminine roles could, then, oﬀer them a way out of the essentialising
and naturalising rhetoric of the politeness discourse by questioning the whole
juxtaposition of internal/natural/essential and external/aﬀected/performed. As
David Bergman writes, ‘the hyperbolic, parodic, anarchic, redundant style of
camp is the very way to bring heterosexist attitudes of “originality”,
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“naturalism”, and “normality” to their knees’.166 Therefore, even though these
women’s polite performances were certainly not ‘camp’ in the sense that they
themselves would have called them such, these theatrical, self-consciously
parodic performances of polite roles, reminiscent of camp, can be seen as an
individual strategy of freedom. It is certain that these women recognised the
roles they were both acting and that were expected of them, and often approa-
ched them from an ironical distance. As such, parodic polite performances chal-
lenge ideas of a uniform, internalised identity and, as such, operate in line with
eighteenth-century conceptualisations of ﬂexible identities. Furthermore, parodic
uses of politeness also undermine the ideals of openness and transparency that
were regularly promoted as essential characteristics of the female nature.
However, the subversive and freedom-providing potential camp-like parody
oﬀers is, in the end, limited. Like self-discipline, self-care, and other practices of
the self, parodic performances of polite gender identity operate to simulta-
neously reinforce gendered behavioural ideals while undermining them. They
reveal the performative status of gender identity, but cannot eﬀectively dis-
mantle that gender identity.167 Judith Butler’s analysis of drag applies also to
other forms of parodic masquerade of gender roles; like drag, they are sub-
versive only to the extent that they reﬂect on the ‘imitative structure by which
hegemonic gender is itself produced and [dispute] heterosexuality’s claim on
naturalness and originality’.168 Ironic citations of the norm are, in the end,
citations all the same, and therefore reinstate the norm.
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6 Discipline and Subversion
In addition to active practices—dancing with grace, walking with poise, con-
versing with ease—a membership of polite society required also passive
restraint. The ideal polite woman was supposed to suﬀocate her anger, mortify
her lust, and curb her appetite through a strict regime of self-control. In other
words, the culture of politeness was essentially built on individuals’ self-mon-
itoring and self-discipline, targeted at limiting unwanted bodily characteristics
and practices and hiding them from sight. This requirement of self-discipline
was a central but ambivalent feature of politeness. On the one hand, all
politeness was fundamentally constructed on controlling certain (natural)
impulses while cultivating others. On the other hand, the all-embracing ideal of
easy naturalness, free from eﬀort and restrictions seems to suggest that dis-
cipline was, in some ways, deeply antithetical to the ideals of politeness.
Women had a particularly troubled relationship with self-discipline. Invoca-
tions of ‘female nature’ and its capability to self-restraint were glaringly con-
tradictory. There was a long tradition of seeing women as incapable of rational
self-control, at the mercy of their wandering womb or, later on, defenceless
against their strong sensibilities, which to some extent persisted throughout the
long eighteenth century. At the same time, the female body could also be
described as naturally more passive and temperate than the male body, and
therefore more easily governed. Questions of women’s capability of self-control
were further complicated by the requirements of their national identity and
social status. Didactic writers praised English women for their propriety,
restraint, and sexual self-control which supposedly set them apart from their
continental sisters (let alone non-European women), and self-mastery was cru-
cial for the self-deﬁnition of polite classes.1 Elite women were thus trapped
between three contradictory sets of ideals—those of gender, nation, and class.
The juxtaposition of naturalness (or, the construction of natural-seeming
gender roles) and control (or, individuals acting out these gender roles) was a
core feature of women’s politeness, and the ensuing ambiguity unravelled itself
in constant anxieties over female dissimulation and hypocrisy, as we have seen.
Even though politeness thus had a strong disciplinary aspect, this chapter will
underline the fact that discipline was not solely a repressive regime, but also an
essential means to acquire autonomy and freedom. Michel Foucault describes
the enabling and freedom-providing potential of discipline in his later work,
especially in the last two parts of History of Sexuality. Indeed, according to
Foucault, self-discipline could be used by an individual as a means of self-
knowledge, independent identity, and freedom. Similarly, the self-control
required by everyday practices of politeness oﬀered women freedom within and
from the matrix of ideal polite femininity—both through a feeling of self-mas-
tery and autonomy, and in the form of actual social power. A woman who
knew the rules of propriety and politeness could bend them fairly extensively
without actually stepping over the line and becoming impolite. In this way,
women who were skilled in politeness could use it for their own ends and gain
relative freedom from the restrictive idealised femininity.2 Moreover, such con-
crete skills of the body as dancing a graceful minuet or playing the piano,
reﬁned through diligent practice and self-discipline, brought women not only
feelings of satisfaction, mastery, and achievement, but also wielded concrete
results in the form of securing and elevating one’s status within polite society.3
Thus, self-discipline gave women power over their own lives; it was, at least to
some extent, a means of taking control of their own future. Accordingly, this
chapter examines the potential for freedom that is inherent in practices of self-
discipline. Through an analysis of the forms of control women used in regulating
their emotions, food habits, speech, and sexuality, I aim to show that by abiding
by polite norms in certain areas of life, they could acquire freedom in others. Thus,
it was possible to compensate breaches of feminine decorum—such as immoderate
talking or love of food—through rigorous self-discipline in, say, chastity or dress.
Moreover, by closely analysing Catherine Talbot’s careful, almost morbid self-
monitoring, I examine the close connections between discipline and freedom in
eighteenth-century thought, arguing that care of the self could bring the individual
possibilities to gain power and control over her identity and life.
Discipline and Gender
The very ﬁrst thing I should recommend […], as absolutely essential to your
private comfort, is self-government in the fullest sense of the word.
John Bennett, Letters to a Young Lady (1789)4
Ever since Norbert Elias famously formulated his theory of the civilising pro-
cess around the hypothesis of increasing self-control, self-imposed discipline has
rightfully played a central role in analyses of the development of manners and
politeness.5 Indeed, discipline remained, in many ways, a central element of
politeness throughout the long eighteenth century. The Lady’s Preceptor (1743)
aptly described the adoption of a polite identity: ‘There are Rules for all our
Actions, even down to Sleeping with a good Grace. Life is a continual Series of
Operations, both of Body and Mind, which ought to be regulated and per-
formed with the utmost Care’.6 Self-control had long roots in early modern
thought. As Anna Bryson has noted, early modern literature on manners
emphasised the discipline of the self that was needed to ‘transform the natural
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into the social being’. Discipline was especially needed in bringing up young
children to ‘break their natural rudeness and stubbornness’ and thus to ‘mould
them into some form of civility’. During adult life, discipline took the form of
self-regulation and self-improvement.7 The Hobbesian view of men and women
as naturally unsociable creatures lay at the core of the requirement of discipline;
Bernard Mandeville’s deﬁnition of vices as natural human appetites, and virtues
as the control of those appetites, made discipline and polite sociability practi-
cally synonymous.8 However, the requirement of regulation was by no means
unfamiliar to the anti-Mandevillean proponents of inward politeness. The Earl
of Shaftesbury, for example, shared Mandeville’s ideas of passions and appe-
tites that needed to be conquered; as Lawrence Klein points out, Shaftesbury’s
aim was an ‘inward Economy’, or ‘right Discipline, Conduct & Economy’, that
he meant to achieve by regulating his ‘governing Fancys, Passions, and
Humours’.9 Thus, despite views of men’s and women’s natural sociability, they
were still prone to anti-social vices, or, undesirable modes of conduct, which,
left uncontrolled, would make them impolite.10
Politeness could be seen in terms of the mind’s battle over the body, where
the mind represented all that was civil, reﬁned and controlled, and the body
received savage, barbaric, and unlawful epithets.11 Therefore, controlling bodily
desires was the duty of every civilised subject. On the other hand, mind and
body were but rarely distinctively separated in polite thought; instead, they
were often seen to be intricately linked. This belief was founded on the Galenic
conception of the body, where temperament depended on the composition of
the body and its ﬂuids. A good character was thus thought to be largely a result
of a healthy and balanced body—and a bad one, likewise, a consequence of a
corrupted body. This meant that one’s character could be improved through
bodily discipline; as John Burton acknowledged, a ‘good temper is not always
constitutional: And though some have more favourable propensities than
others, yet every disposition is susceptible of improvement. A bad temper may
be reformed by seasonable discipline: And a good one may be corrupted by
neglect.’12 As a consequence, those ‘who are desirous of acquiring and preser-
ving a good [Character], must regulate their temper in early life; and bring the
mind to habits of virtue and goodness’.13
Even though the requirement of self-discipline as the cornerstone of polite-
ness was mandatory for both sexes, it was often represented to be of particular
importance to women. For example, John Burton claimed that since ‘social and
domestic happiness so much depends on the tempers and dispositions of the
female Sex’, it was ‘a duty particularly incumbent on them to order their
aﬀections aright’.14 Indeed, even though many of the principles of self-control I
discuss in this chapter were, as such, advocated in men’s conduct literature as
well, the authorising rhetoric behind the requirement of female self-discipline
was deeply gendered, drawing from such notions as ‘the female nature’—
whereas undisciplined women were often linked to beasts. Since women were
seen ﬁrst and foremost as representatives of their sex, instead of being repre-
sentatives of their social status, wealth, or rank like men were—let alone
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individuals—the requirements of self-control for women were, as a rule, based
on their gender.15 Women’s so-called natural essence could be negotiated in
multiple ways to legitimise the demands of female discipline. On the one hand,
women were seen to be naturally of a passionate constitution and, therefore,
more prone to idleness, dissipation, and luxury than men—and therefore in
more need of conscious discipline.16 On the other hand, the completely opposite
Galenic view that nature had ‘befriended women with a more cool and tem-
perat constitution, put less of ﬁre and consequently of choler, in their compo-
sitions’ and thus made them naturally virtuous and regulated was equally
popular, making women’s lapses of discipline ‘adventitious and preternatural’
and uncontrolled women ‘despised and abhor’d’.17
Women’s subordinate position in society called for special self-control, as
well. Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued in Émile (1762), which was widely read in
England as well, that girls should be ‘early subjected’ to ‘habitual restraint’ in
order to avoid dissipation, levity, and inconstancy, and to be able to submit
entirely to the will of their future husband. Learning to ‘lay a due restraint on
themselves’ was to be ‘inseparable from their sex’.18 For Rousseau, as for so
many English writers, female restraint was needed ﬁrst and foremost for
women’s domestication. This sort of reasoning became more inﬂuential during
the second half of the eighteenth century through the growing inﬂuence of
domesticity. The domestic ideals were heavily inﬂuenced by Protestantism,
many of the domesticity enthusiasts being clergymen or moralists.19 These
writers placed a considerable emphasis on the domestic woman’s moral char-
acter. Morality and discipline were thought to be mutually productive: high
morals were seen to both make bodily control possible and be the result of that
control. In Camilla (1796), for example, Mrs Berlinton’s lack of ‘any practical
tenets either of religion or morality’ was given as the reason for her having ‘no
preservative against what was wrong’ and consequently sinking into immoral
liaisons and gambling.20 In other words, morality was thought to produce the
capacity to discipline. Then again, the writer of The Lady’s Preceptor (1743)
thought that ‘[a]s we bring along with us into the World an inﬁnite number of
Weaknesses and Defects, we should endeavour to conquer them by means of a
good Education, and the Eﬀort which Reason makes to throw them oﬀ’, claiming
it to be the way how ‘a good Disposition, or Temper of Mind, is acquired, which
is the Foundation of all the moral Virtues and Devoirs of Civil Life’.21 That is to
say, bodily discipline was simultaneously thought to form the basis of morality.
Women were seen as particularly well formed for piety and morality by their
nature; their minds were ‘more aptly prepared in their early youth for the
reception of serious impressions than those of the other sex’, and their hearts
‘naturally more ﬂexible [and] soft’.22 Moreover, women’s position in the
society, by allowing them ‘fewer opportunities, fewer temptations to sin’, made
them ‘most eminent for religion and virtue’.23 Thus, women of polite society
were told that there were ‘moral distinctions between the sexes’, and that theirs
was the more moral one, by reasons of both nature and society.24 Women’s
moral discipline was also thought to have broader consequences. The domestic
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woman had a duty to her husband and family to bring up her children into
responsible citizenship or pious housewifery, to set an example to her servants
and guide them in their religion, and to manage the household with frugality
and diligence. Therefore, as the whole English nation was thought to rely on
women’s moralising eﬀect, unblemished morality became practically a civic
duty for all elite women, as well as a natural quality. As The Lady’s Preceptor
put it, a ‘young Lady without Piety’ was ‘a kind of Monster in the World’.25 In
reality, however, these monsters arguably populated the polite society, since
conduct book writers repeatedly expressed hopes that elegant ladies would pay
more attention to their religion and morals, and proceeded to threaten women
with the much-used argument that no man would want to marry an impious
woman, since piety was the only guarantee of women’s faithfulness and sub-
servience to their husbands.
If exercising the body in polite accomplishments can be deemed an active
practice, discipline can be described as a passive practice of politeness. Com-
pared to active practices, discipline was more about abstaining from improper
activities and movements. In terms of eighteenth-century economy of gender,
women were seen as the passive sex, whereas men were viewed as the active
ones; therefore, women could be claimed to have a natural aﬃnity to self-
control. Hester Chapone informed women that the ‘same degree of active
courage is not to be expected in woman as in man; and, not belonging to her
nature, it is not agreeable in her’; instead, women should aspire to achieve
‘passive courage—patience, and fortitude under suﬀerings—presence of mind,
and calm resignation in danger’.26 Many critics also resisted such gendered
views of the female character; for example Mary Wollstonecraft attacked in A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) popular gendered dichotomies
where women were only expected to have ‘negative virtues’, such as ‘patience,
docility, good-humour, and ﬂexibility’. Wollstonecraft also famously criticised
Rousseau for his views of female restraint, claiming that mere unintelligent
habitual restraint was ‘not the true way to form or meliorate the temper’, and
that all true discipline should be applied through rational reﬂection.27
Thus, bodily discipline was entwined with discourses of morality, piety,
domesticity, and passivity, which were all predominantly associated with the
feminine sphere of life, or at least deemed especially appropriate, important,
and useful for women. In this way, discipline can be said to have been parti-
cularly expected from women. Nevertheless, discipline was also often viewed
from a completely opposite angle—as decidedly unfeminine or masculinising in
a woman. Especially the kind of rational discipline advocated by Mary Woll-
stonecraft was traditionally seen to be an essentially masculine domain, whereas
automatised habitual restraint was perceived as more suitable for women’s
feeble minds. Women with rational capacity were called viragos with ‘mascu-
line understanding’.28 Women were, after all, dominantly seen as the senti-
mental sex, naturally prone to both emotional and physical weakness.29 Even
women’s very capacity for self-discipline in the ﬁrst place was often questioned.
Eighteenth-century physiological understanding still partly retained—though
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framed with a new interest in nerves—the early modern notion of the female
body as dominated by the uterus, a mysterious organ full of toxic fumes that
caused hysteria and excessive sensibility. Since the uterus could, at any moment,
release these fumes and take control of the female body, thus making the
woman incapable of any rationality, women were seen as unpredictable and
inconsistent by their very nature, under the control of their ungovernable and
irrational bodies.30 Therefore, complete self-control in a woman would, in fact,
make not only her gender but also her sex questionable. In other words, even
though women were told to regulate themselves, it was, at the same time,
implied that total control was not desirable. For ideal femininity, too much
bodily control was just as big a faux pas as too little.
The concept of discipline within the discourse of politeness was thus loaded
with deeply rooted and gender-based ambivalence. The contradictory norms of
ideal femininity also proved diﬃcult to reach on an individual level, thus leading
to potential disruptions between discursive ideals and reality—or, in other words,
dissimulation and hypocrisy. As Mary Wollstonecraft argued, recommending
gentleness to a creature ‘whose natural disposition admitted not of such a ﬁne
polish’ would only produce aﬀectation. Therefore, Wollstonecraft claimed that
forging naturalised and universal feminine norms was a practice that forced
women to sacriﬁce ‘solid virtues to the attainment of superﬁcial graces’.31 Woll-
stonecraft was thus amongst the ﬁrst writers to denaturalise the passive and
gentle ‘feminine’ character and to reveal it as artiﬁcial. According to Jenny
Davidson, during the eighteenth century ‘the most popular and persuasive argu-
ments in favor of dissimulation, including forms of politeness that might be
alternately labeled “address,” “tact” or “self-command,” would increasingly come
to apply primarily, indeed almost exclusively to women’. Thus, discipline was, in
itself, a form of dissimulation, eﬀectively making politeness a practice of dis-
honesty. Furthermore, Davidson suggests that this dissimulation/discipline was
mainly allocated to women. In fact, she claims that ‘by mid-century, women had
come to be seen to bear the chief burden of self-restraint’.32 In other words,
women were expected to regulate themselves in order to achieve ideal polite
femininity, but, at the same time, that regulation was deeply problematic, since it
could be seen as dissimulation. The same goes, of course, for active rehearsing of
the body, which basically was just a means of transforming the appearance of the
body from its ‘natural’ state towards a discursively deﬁned norm. The rhetoric of
naturalness was an eﬀective means to mask the demands of disciplining or
rehearsing the body. Moreover, appealing to nature made it possible to chide
women for both their lack of discipline and their practice of it.
Passions and Reason
Nature will indeed always operate, human desires will be always ranging; but
these motions, though very powerful, are not resistless; nature may be regulated,
and desires governed.
Samuel Johnson in The Rambler (1751)33
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Didactic literature discussed women’s self-discipline at length, telling women
exactly how to control their urges, regulate their behaviour, and refrain from
bodily gestures or deeds they deemed unfeminine or impolite. Even though dis-
cipline was authorised through diﬀerent means and linked to multiple discus-
sions—the most important ones relating to morality, piety, domesticity, and
passivity—speciﬁc disciplinary ideals remained notably similar throughout the
long eighteenth century. The province of the mind was the ﬁrst area of regula-
tion, serving as a foundation on which all discipline of the body was to be
based. Especially the proper control of feelings, sentiments, and passions was
deemed crucial for women as the more emotional sex. Therefore, the proper
control of women’s imagination (which was associated with producing and
manipulating emotions), temper, and aﬀections were exhaustively discussed by
conduct writers.34 Their dictates also had real-life signiﬁcance. Reading the
letters of Mme de Staël, Elizabeth Montagu, for example, confessed herself
unable to ‘love Madame de Staal well enough to pity her so much as her mis-
fortunes deserve; adversity mends her head, but not her heart; her reason is
improved, but not her temper’. Montagu herself claimed to be ‘a severe critic in
temper’—for, as she wrote, ‘all people have it in their power in a great degree
to mitigate the faults of temper; the wise should do it that they may be loved,
the foolish that they may be endured’.35 In other words, Montagu subscribed—
or at least claimed to subscribe—to the discursive requirement of women’s
emotional self-regulation.
Didactic writers warned that women were ‘under the impulse of aﬀections,
either judiciously regulated, or immoderately indulged’, and that ungoverned
passions were not only injurious to the society but utterly incompatible with
ideal polite femininity.36 Anger was most of all to be avoided, since it was
deemed incompatible with female softness and meekness; a ‘ruﬄed, angry,
scolding woman is so far vulgar and disgusting, and, for the moment, a sort of
virago’, wrote Bennett.37 Passions needed to be controlled to maintain polite
sociability and reciprocal pleasing—and anger in a woman was apt to ‘set on
ﬁre, the Tongue, that unruly Member’ and destroy pleasant conversation.38
Many writers found appealing to women’s vanity an eﬀective argument: a ‘sour
or an angry look is more destructive to female charms, than a high scorbutick
ﬂush, or the small pox’, claimed one writer, while another assured that he
‘never knew an angry Woman preserve her beauty long’.39
Not only anger, but practically all negative emotions were deemed inap-
propriate for women, whose natural character was described in terms of gen-
tleness, softness, and cheerfulness.40 Accordingly, caprice, sullenness, ‘ill-
humour’, and melancholy were strictly denounced. Indeed, Bennett claimed that
a ‘gaiety of heart, equally removed from a thoughtless levity or a moping
gloom, is a most desirable quality in women. Men are perplexed with various
anxieties of business and ambition, and are naturally more thoughtful, pro-
found, and melancholy; women certainly were formed to sooth and to enli-
ven’.41 These qualities were so essential for women that if they did not come as
naturally as could be wished, they needed to be habituated. ‘Endeavour that
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Chearfulness, Sweetness, and Modesty be always blended in your Countenance
and Air, and let them be so habitual to you, that there mayn’t appear any thing
of Aﬀectation in it’, advised one writer.42 Femininity was constructed within
these texts as an opposite to masculinity, thus setting women in a context of
peaceful, domestic pleasures that were contrasted with the bustle and stress of
men’s presumed sphere of business. As Thomas King argues, heterosocial
eighteenth-century society was based on the idea of gender complementariness,
which was epitomised in the ideal of companionate family, where husbands and
wives would—in the words of The Spectator—act as ‘Counterparts to another,
that the Pains and Anxieties of the Husband might be relieved by the Spright-
liness and good Humour of the Wife’.43 Within this framework, women’s place
in society called for diligent control of unwanted emotions, and an eﬀort to
replace those emotions with correct ones, deﬁned as feminine.
Betraying uncontrolled passions was not only unfeminine, but also unlady-
like, since lack of control was associated with the lower ranks. A polite woman
needed to separate herself, not only from the opposite sex, but also from those
below her. Bennett urged women to hide their discontentment, since it would be
‘a pitiful condescension in a woman of fortune’ to make a racket of ‘every little
cause of complaint’.44 In The Spectator, Richard Steele advised elite women to
nurse their infants themselves, instead of giving them to a wet-nurse of lower
social status, since he was afraid that the nurse would transfer ‘her Qualities
and Disposition’, including her ‘Passions and depraved Inclinations […], as
Anger, Malice, Fear, Melancholy, Sadness, Desire, and Aversion’.45 Then again,
lower ranks were not the only ones to be reproached for their lack of discipline—
for the aristocracy had become a notorious symbol of luxury, lewdness, and
absence of moral control.46 As The Lady’s Preceptor cautioned, ‘[m]ost part of
your People of Quality, both Men and Women, are above being under any Con-
straint, or keeping up nicely to the Rules of true Politeness in their Behaviour’47.
Therefore, proper regulation of the body was also perceived as a trait of modern
urban politeness as a distinction from courtly norms of conduct.
Reason, sense, and rationality were promoted as the guardians against unruly
passions—even though some conservative or otherwise misogynist writers (such
as Rousseau) continued to present women’s very capability of rational thinking
as doubtful. Sense was important also in understanding and accepting the limits
patriarchal society set on women’s behaviour and the restraint they required;
‘[g]ood sense’, Camilla’s sage father advised his daughter in Fanny Burney’s
Camilla, ‘will talk to you of those boundaries which custom forbids your sex to
pass, and the hazard of any individual attempt to transgress them. It will tell
you, that where allowed only a negative choice, it is your own best interest to
combat against a positive wish’.48
Women of polite society were, on the one hand, thus discouraged from
showing negative or enthusiastic emotion while, on the other hand, encouraged
in display of extensive sensibility. Therefore, what was called for was the
channelling of passions and emotions towards an acceptable emotional lan-
guage—the language of soft sensibility instead of raw emotion. As John Bennett
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explained, ‘[t]rue feeling […] even when it is most genuine and poignant, it will
never be a guide, safely to be trusted, till it is governed by reason, checked by
discretion, and moulded by […] religion’.49 Bennett also presented his readers
with a parallel of two ladies:
Flavia lies in bed till noon; as soon as she rises, she opens a novel, or a
play-book; weeps profusely at imaginary distress, sips strong tea, till she is
almost in hysterics; concludes, that sensibility is all her own, and is perpe-
tually complaining how her feelings are shocked with such a room, or such
a prospect, the coarseness of this character, and of that conversation, and
how the sight of a poor beggar gives her the vapours.
Emily never says a word about her feelings, rises with the dawn, endea-
vours to fortify her body with air and exercise, and her mind with devo-
tion; is oftener seen with her bible, than any other book; seems pleased
with every person and every object about her, and puts on a cheerful smile,
when her bosom is really throbbing with pain, for the distresses of her
fellow-creatures.50
Of these two characters, Emily, with all her conscious bodily exercises and reg-
ulation of feelings, portrayed the perfect model of a polite woman, whereas Flavia
caricaturised the dangers of luxury and self-indulgence. Strengthening the body,
indeed, was an important method of gaining control over one’s passions. Not only
did exercise balance the humours that gave birth to passions in the ﬁrst place, but
there was also the deep-seated belief in the correlation between the mind and the
body to be considered.51 Thus, strengthening the body would have similar eﬀects
on the mind, whereas a weak body could not be expected to regulate itself.
Temptations of the Tea-table
Regulation of the mind was only one aspect of the bodily discipline demanded
from elite women. There were also other areas of control, more connected to
actual manners and behaviour. The area of food and drink was particularly
much discussed from a regulatory point of view. Scholars have argued that
women have had throughout history a particularly complex relationship with
food. Women and their bodies have been seen, for many reasons, ‘inescapably
implicated in a cycle of production and consumption’ and connected to the
production, preparation, and rationing of food.52 Moreover, as Caroline Bynum
has inﬂuentially shown, there is a long tradition of imagining the female body
itself as food and the female nature as ﬂeshy; this view translates directly into
the traditional dichotomy where the feminine symbolises the ‘physical, lustful,
material, appetitive part of human nature’, while the masculine stands for the
‘spiritual, or rational, or mental’.53 Women’s aﬃnity to food has been inter-
preted in diﬀerent ways, and it has served as a source of both empowerment
and subjugation for women in diﬀerent times and contexts.54 Women’s eating,
however, has always been a particularly complicated and much debated issue.
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Eighteenth-century didactic writers certainly advocated a regime of careful
regulation of women’s eating habits. Gluttony was commonly seen as one of
the grossest forms of lack of control that a woman could be guilty of. ‘The
luxury of eating’, John Gregory wrote, ‘is a despicable selﬁsh vice in men, but
in your sex it is beyond expression indelicate and disgusting’.55 Thus, again,
gender was employed as the organising principle of regulation, and the other
way round: regulation was used to construct an ideal picture of a polite
woman, who would keep her lust for food strictly under control. Eating
involved many aspects perceived as hazardous to politeness and discipline,
which were all discussed in conduct literature. Immoderate eating was con-
nected to reprehensible luxury, not to mention that gluttony was, of course, one
of the seven deadly sins. Since eating was linked to luxury, it was, interestingly
enough, often coupled with dress in the conduct literature. Women were for-
bidden from spending too much time ‘in eating and dressing’, since ‘[m]oderate
food and apparel distinguished the ﬁrst Christians’.56 Advice was oﬀered in the
proper way of setting up a table, as well as sitting at it. A genteel table was
decorated with ‘propriety and neatness, or, if your state demands it, elegance,
rather than superﬂuous ﬁgure’; indeed, according to Hester Chapone, to go
‘beyond your sphere, either in dress or in the appearance of your table, indi-
cates a greater fault in your character than to be too much within it’.57 While
sitting at a dinner table, the utmost decorum was to be exercised not to appear
greedy or otherwise not in control of one’s appetite:
Being at the Table in your due place, observe to keep your Body strait, and
lean not by any means with your Elbows, nor by ravenous Gesture discover
a voracious Appetite: Knaw no Bones, but cut your Meat decently with the
help of your Fork; make no noise in calling for any thing you want but
speak softly to those that are next, or wait to give it […] take not in your
Wine or other Liquor too greedily, nor drink till you are out of breath, but
do things with decency and order. […] be not over desirous of Sawce, nor
of another sort of Meat, before you have dispensed of what is on your
Plate. Put not both your Hands to your Month [sic] at once.58
Neither was it appropriate to ‘speak at the Table, unless you are asked a
question, or there be some great occasion’, especially for a young woman, and
talking about food in general could be deemed unsophisticated.59
In fact, every excess regarding food—be it either consuming it or talking
about it—was suspicious, since it indicated a mind prone to luxury and lacking
control, therefore directly producing a non-disciplined, licentious body liable of
being seduced to every other sin as well. The Ladies Library saw a direct con-
nection between eating and immorality, concluding that a ‘spare diet, a thin
coarse table, seldom refreshment, frequent and real fastings, are of some proﬁt
against the spirit of fornication’.60 Thus, as in the Christian abstinence tradi-
tion, disciplining the body was seen to have a direct impact on the discipline of
the mind.61 Furthermore, not only was bodily discipline thought to beneﬁt the
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soul, but it was seen to have direct beneﬁcial eﬀects on the body itself.
According to early modern ideas, temperance in food was a matter of life and
death, since immoderate indulgence in eating could impair the balance of the
body.62 A well-disciplined body would be healthy, energetic, and beautiful,
whereas an idle and dissipated body would lose its good looks and be prone to
all kinds of illnesses.63
Much like in the present day, failure to keep in moderation in one’s eating
was condemned particularly harshly in women’s case. Fanny Burney described
to her sister a tea party where a certain Miss Boone was invited ‘purposely that
I might see her’. Miss Boone was reduced into such a remarkable spectacle by
her friends because of her food habits:
you may want, therefore, to know what is her particular attraction,—why
simply & merely SIZE!—She is so Tall, so fat, so large, that she might be
shewn for the great Woman at any Fair in England. […] In regard to
Character, she is as much a Female Falstaﬀ, as she is in regard to Person,—
for she loves nothing so well as Eating & Drinking.64
In other words, Miss Boone was invited solely to ‘divert’ Fanny Burney ‘as
some thing strange & preposterous’; her exceptional size and appetite were
enough to make her a curiosity. While Burney found Miss Boone ‘very hand-
some’ and ‘so sensible & so intelligent, that the diversion she gave me was all
such as redounded to her own Honour’, she seems to have been in the minority.
Hester Lynch Thrale described her as ‘a strange Woman, fat, sensual & gross’,
and recorded that ‘the Men […] as I am told now—call her Baboon’. Intrigu-
ingly, though, Miss Boone seems to have used notable self-discipline in other
areas of her life to compensate for her size. Burney openly admired her for her
accomplishments: ‘She is also very ingenious,—Draws, paints, takes likenesses,
& cuts out Paper Figures & devices remarkably well’, and even Thrale was
forced to admit that Miss Boone was ‘accomplished enough as to painting,
Working, making Wax Models &c: and is surprisingly handsome too, her
immense Magnitude considered’.65 Accordingly, her disciplined practice in
female accomplishments brought her the admiration of polite society, even if it
was grudgingly given.
Then again, women could describe their food habits in terms of excess while
still maintaining their idealised polite femininity. Mary Delany, who so often
transgressed the bounds of normative femininity in a ﬂippant and self-conscious
manner—by, for example, admittedly being ‘too gay’ or ‘too lively and
unruly’—managed to politely outdo herself in eating, as well.66 ‘On Tuesday
we had a party […] to my gout’, she wrote to her sister from Dublin in 1732.
After dancing the evening away, Delany’s party proceeded to a friend’s house,
where they—around 2 am—‘devoured as much as possible […] cold fowl,
lamb, pigeon pye, Dutch beef, tongue, cockells, sallad, much variety of liquors,
and the ﬁnest syllabub that ever was tasted’.67 In another letter, she humorously
described ‘a petite assembly’ where ‘at ten o’clock we have a very pretty tray
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brought in, with chocolate, mulled wine, cakes, sweetmeats, and comﬁts; cold
partridge, chicken, lamb, ham, tongue,—all set out prettily and ready to pick
at’.68 She often gave in her letters to her sister—and after Anne Dewes’s death,
to her niece—detailed accounts of the courses of the dinners she had either
given or eaten.69
For Delany, liberty—not missish rules of decorum—was ‘the great happiness
of society’, and she rejoiced whenever being able to follow her whims in this
respect and to devour ‘chocolate, tea, coﬀee, toast and butter, and caudle, &c
[…] without mercy’.70 Of course, the very fact that she meticulously followed
the norms of polite femininity in other areas of life allowed her these occasional
freedoms regarding food; similarly, her high social status enabled her to take
more liberties than would have been possible for, for example, someone like
Fanny Burney or her family, whose status in polite society was already precarious
due to her father’s imprudent second marriage.
If inconsiderate eating was thought to be unfeminine and linked to sins of the
ﬂesh, intemperate drinking was the height of female indelicacy. Richard Steele,
for example, upbraided those ‘she-bullies’ who, in their attempts to imitate
men, took up the masculine vice of drinking, ‘a vice detestable in all, but pro-
digious in women’, and by this means ‘put a double violence on their nature,
the one in the intemperance, the other in the immodesty’. For Steele, as for so
many other writers, nothing human was ‘so much a beast as a drunken
woman’.71 Drinking was not only detrimental in itself, but, as it led to the
loosening of senses, it served as the gateway to all immoral behaviour. For
women, this was especially dangerous, since it was a direct threat to their
chastity—the most valuable quality a woman was said to possess. ‘She who is
ﬁrst a prostitute to wine will soon be to lust also’, warned The Ladies Library;
‘she has dismist her guards, discarded all the suggestions of reason as well as
religion, and is at the mercy of any, of every assailant’.72 Fictional educational
examples of licentious and debauched women were as a rule presented as
enjoying their drink, whereas a ﬁne lady was supposed to ‘have a weak head’,
not being ‘accustom’d to drink any thing strong’.73
In addition to the imminent danger of lost virtue, drinking was seen to
inevitably lead to every kind of moral and domestic lewdness; ‘its eﬀects must
be extremely injurious; because the domestic government of a family must, by
such a practice, be totally deranged—waste, extravagance and ruin must inevi-
tably follow’.74 This fear was not limited to drinking alcohol—indeed, other
stimulants were accused of enervating women, as well. Tea was one of the
drinks most keenly linked to luxury, dissipation, and bad habits. John Bennett,
for example, lamented the poor state of luxurious women’s feeble nerves which
could be cured by ‘cautiously abstain[ing] from tea, particularly in mornings’,
since ‘[h]owever agreeable this beverage may be, it is, doubtless, the source of
weak nerves, hysterical and hypochondriack aﬀections, and of half those
dreadful, paralytick symptoms, which have lately become so general and
alarming’.75 Chocolate was associated with excessive sensibility and danger of
losing control, as well; in the famous issue of The Spectator on the Month of
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May, playfully advising women on sexual abstinence despite the annual
springtime craze, Mr Spectator urged women to be ‘careful how they meddle
with Romances, Chocolate, Novels, and the like Inﬂamers’, which could rouse
their passions.76 The tea table was, as scholars have recognised, not only an
especially feminine venue of sociability, but an epitome of female dissipation,
connected with gossiping, scandal, slander, and other decisively feminine
vices.77 A typical caricature of a useless, overly ﬁne, non-domestic woman was
one who got up at noon, spent the whole afternoon visiting her friends’ tea
tables, and the evening going to the theatre or the masquerade. This kind of life
was labelled ‘most useless and insipid’, and tea parties were only to be tolerated
to a limited extent as a means of meeting ‘people of fortune’.78 Thereby, all-
female sociability was, by the association of the tea table with luxury and
enervation, presented in a questionable light, as a possible danger to women’s
morality and self-control, whereas heterosocial sociability was promoted as the
source of self-improvement and morality. As Bennett explained, the ‘generality
of men are so much undomesticated, […] that they are but seldom to be met
with in these [tea] parties’; therefore, as ‘it is, I conceive, in mixed companies
alone, that conversation has its proper interest, ﬂavor or improvement’, tea
parties did not aid the progress of politeness.79
The question of tea, or indulgent eating and drinking in general, can be seen
as a part of more general arguments against luxury and bodily comfort. Despite
politeness’s close ties to urban leisure, many conduct writers nevertheless criti-
cised modern ways of urban life as artiﬁcial, unhealthy, and detrimental to
morality. Urban dissipation was thought to be especially harmful to women’s
constitutions, since they, as domestic creatures, had a narrower range of
opportunities to take them abroad in a meaningful and healthy way. John
Bennett was one to express his concern on ‘ﬁne, enervated ladies’ of the present
age who spoiled their constitution by inactivity and over-indulgence: ‘We
almost dissolve in hot, carpeted rooms, instead of continually exposing our
bodies to the open air. We go to sleep, when we should be rising. We invent
artiﬁcial methods of provoking an appetite, which can only be excited, in a
proper manner, by labour and application’. Thus, Bennett saw such quintessen-
tially feminine illnesses as hysteria or weak nerves as a result of urban luxury,
not as an automatic result of female bodily frailty. As weaker creatures, women
needed to resist luxury and return to more natural ways of (non-urban) life by
taking disciplined care of their bodies—for if they allowed their ‘nerves’ to get
relaxed, their spirits could not ‘fail to be aﬀected in proportion’. Bennett’s solu-
tion to curing female hysteria included a versatile program of bodily discipline
and exercise, of which abstaining from drinking tea was only one aspect:
You must not dissolve on downy pillows, till your frame is almost thrown
into convulsions. You should rise with the dawn, and exercise gently, in the
open air, particularly, on horse-back. […] Above all, if you wish a removal
of your present indisposition, you must cautiously abstain from tea, parti-
cularly in mornings. […] Instead of languishing in elegant rooms, you
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should frequently be strolling into the ﬁelds or garden […] Your diet
should be simple and moderate, conﬁned to one dish, and that rather
animal, than vegetable. You should eat sparingly, but often, and ‘use a
little wine for your stomach’s sake, and your, often, inﬁrmities’.80
However, as so often in the discourse of politeness, there were limits, even to
regulation. Even though abundance of heavy food and strong drinks was
thought to be extremely harmful to the body, excessive discipline could be just
as injurious—or even more so, as The Polite Lady (1760) pointed out:
I don’t mean to recommend to you too great an abstinence, which doctor
G—, our physician, has frequently told me is still more dangerous than a
little intemperance: for, though the latter naturally tends to load and over-
charge the body with a superﬂuity of bad humours, yet these he says, […]
may be easily carried oﬀ by physick and a proper regimen: whereas the
former deprives the body of its natural nourishment, dries and shrivels up
the ﬁner vessels for a want of a proper supply of juices, and wastes and
emaciates the whole habit to such a degree, that, he assures me, it is almost
oat [sic] of the power of medicine to apply an eﬀectual remedy.81
Within the Galenic framework, getting rid of excess humours brought on by
indulgence was a much easier task than trying to re-invigorate a body shrivelled
as a result of too diligent abstinence. Thus, moderation was, again, the key to
proper politeness, proper discipline, and proper balance of humours.
Disciplining the Female Tongue
Certain it is without Speech no Society can subsist […] If you cannot Discourse
well, or want a good Utterance, either be silent, or know what Company you
speak in.
The Lady’s Delight [1740?]82
Speech occupied a central place in the imagery and articulation of politeness.
Speaking was intimately linked to conversation—the primary forum of polite
sociability. Lawrence Klein has argued that conversation was ‘the paradigmatic
arena for politeness’, and words possessed a special importance in polite socia-
bility.83 As Michèle Cohen’s study on fashioning masculinity through language
has shown, speaking was also an important means of constructing gender
identity; Cohen uses the double meaning of tongue as both the language and the
organ of the speaker to emphasise the multiple ways in which speaking and
non-speaking shaped images of elite identities.84 The tongue of a gentlewoman
was a complex and contested site, since it served as a meeting place for dis-
courses of gender, nationality (and race), social status, and politeness. Hence,
questions of normativity were often addressed through the language of the
tongue; in which tongues should women converse, how should they formulate
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their thoughts, or should they, indeed, hold their tongues altogether and remain
silent? Thus, the problematic surrounding the tongue(s) is one of the central
aspects of politeness, and also one of the most complex and ambiguous ones.
Conversation was regarded as not only a source of amusement, refreshment,
or relief; it was also essential in improving one’s manners and character, and
‘absolutely necessary to form a sound understanding’.85 Like acts, gestures, and
appearances, conversation was also a direct indicator of an individual’s level of
politeness, as well as their social status and gender. As The Lady’s Preceptor
noted in 1743, ‘Conversation is not only the Cement and Soul of Society, but it
is likewise the Touchstone of Merit, Wit, and Judgment’, which was why it
was paramount for women never to ‘appear speechless and disconcerted, like
your young Creatures just come to Town from a Country Boarding School,
who resemble Birds got loose from a Cage, that know not where they are, or
how to dispose of themselves’.86 A truly polite conversation consisted of myr-
iads of little details, such as pronunciation, vocabulary, tone and volume of
voice, manner of speech, and choice of subject. The most important principle of
good conversation was mutual complacency. Accordingly, conversation needed
to be easy, natural, free of constraints, formality, or specialist jargon; most of
all, it needed to please.87 Women were supposed to possess these traits natu-
rally, which is why their conversation was so beneﬁcial for men, who were
thought more prone to pedantry, coarseness, or taciturnity. Therefore, women’s
conversation was often hailed as the epitome of urban heterosociability. Eliza-
beth Montagu recommended the inimitable conversation of Anne Pitt to her
friends as a universal remedy for leisure town boredom:
I must […] desire you to take the ﬁrst opportunity to present yourself to a
most amiable and valuable friend of mine, who by this time is at Bristol; I
mean Mrs. Pitt. […] the only fault I have found in her, is, that when one is
accustomed to her conversation, one knows not how to part with it, or
change it for others. You will be afraid of her because she is a court lady.
Her manners indeed are of a court, her sentiments still of higher extraction,
and for wit, I doubt whether all the academies of belles lettres in the world
can furnish so much. But it is your fault if you perceive it is wit; for my
part, I always think I should have said what she did, if she had not by
accident spoke it ﬁrst; and she will say in three words what would ﬁll a
volume. Pray take her for your health and pleasure, she will revive you.88
Women were also thought to possess natural submissiveness that made them
avoid the sort of egoism and wish to show oﬀ one’s personal brilliance that
made conversation unbearable.89 According to Richard Steele, to be ‘always
talking in company is assuming an insuﬀerable superiority over it’.90 Indeed, the
ability to stay quiet was as important for a polite conversation as the ability to
speak well. The ‘great art of pleasing in conversation’ was, not only to please
others, but to make ‘the company pleased with themselves’—and this was
sometimes most eﬀectively done by silence.91 Therefore, a good conversation
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required constant self-discipline; besides being able to remain silent, an indivi-
dual needed to check all impolite impulses in order not to shock, embarrass,
displease, or oﬀend her company when actually opening her mouth.92
Even though women were supposed to be naturally perfect conversationalists,
there was a wide array of advice and regulations speciﬁcally targeted for
women. Even though women’s gender was thought to bring them many
advantages in conversation, it was paradoxically also the source of some of the
grossest violations of the rules of polite decorum. Womankind was simulta-
neously seen as essential for good conversation and a danger to it. Indeed, the
volume, tone, and quantity of women’s speech were often seen to be in need of
adjusting. The Ladies Calling (1673) asserted that a woman’s tongue ‘should
indeed be like the imaginary Music of the spheres, sweet and charming, but not
to be heard at distance’, while The Accomplished Ladies Rich Closet of Rarities
(1687) advised women not to ‘Tautologies or aﬀected words or lispings; neither
[to] speak with a Tone’.93 Excessive talkativeness was a particularly stereo-
typical feminine ﬂaw; women were constantly displayed in the discourse of
politeness as endless talkers, gossiping frivolously around the tea-table, and
monopolising the conversation in a most impolite manner. ‘What words can
express the impertinence of a female tongue let loose into boundless loquacity?
Nothing can be more stunning’, reproached James Fordyce.94 Even though the
popular stereotype of female loquaciousness has age-old roots, scholars have
emphasised that claims of women’s frivolous wordiness do not necessarily tell
us anything of women’s actual speech, the seriousness of its subject matter, or
its amounts; rather, they tell us about the cultural meanings attached to
women’s talk. Anu Korhonen has argued that female speech was interpreted as
a display of female independence in early modern times—and, as such, a
rebuttal of the patriarchal order.95 Therefore, men felt threatened by women’s
tongues; according to Bernard Capp, women’s talk was stigmatised as gossip
not because it diﬀered in character or volume from men’s, but because ‘it was
perceived as the subversive behaviour of subordinates’.96 In the early modern
imagination, the tongue was perceived as an essentially feminine organ, and its
association with the feminine was central to its subsequent association with
unruliness.97
In fact, as the civilising agents of polite sociability, women’s speech was
considered simultaneously deeply meaningful and ultimately frivolous.98
Women’s tea table talk was a popular topic of satire, and gossiping was a
characteristically feminine vice, especially associated with spinsters.99 While
women’s idle prattle was criticised, it was, however, simultaneously seen as a
trait so characteristically feminine that it was not only tolerated, but even
expected of women as their innate quality. In James Fordyce’s words, gossiping
was ‘a weakness which cannot be justiﬁed, but which perhaps must be, in some
measure, forgiven to your sex’.100 The female role in polite sociability was to
provide men with easy, cheerful, and light conversation, whereas men were the
ones of whom a certain amount of gravitas was required. According to Hannah
More, women were well aware of this and even tried to ‘make [men’s] court by
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lending themselves to this spirit of triﬂing; they often avoid to make use of
what abilities they have; and aﬀect to talk below their natural and acquired
powers of mind’.101 Thus, in More’s opinion, women were well capable of
rational talk, but pretended otherwise to ﬁll the stereotypical feminine role
reserved for them.
The anxiety surrounding women’s speech arose also from the fact that the
act of speaking was an active procedure that commanded attention; it was a
spectacle, meant to make a woman visible and audible. Simply by taking part in
a conversation, a woman would step out of her supposedly natural sphere of
humbleness and modesty, and enter an arena of active subjectivity, traditionally
reserved solely for men. Indeed, as Korhonen points out, speech was considered
indicative of a person’s mind and identity; therefore, allowing women the right
of unimpeded speech would have come dangerously close to recognising them
as rational subjects whose words and opinions carried weight and meaning.102
The fact that polite conversation took place in public venues, often in front of
strangers, emphasised the audacity of a woman who dared not only to let her-
self be seen in public, but also demand attention by speaking. Accordingly,
women’s speech was ridiculed, condemned, and silenced. As Michèle Cohen
asserts, women’s conversation was ideally represented as ‘a disciplined, a con-
tained tongue’.103 Polite discipline of the tongue was constructed by creating
gendered dichotomies; women’s loud speech and laughter were condemned as
too masculine—‘an unnatural Sound’ that ‘looketh so much like another Sex,
that few things are more oﬀensive’.104 Clamorous women were called ‘speaking
brutes’ and compared to barking dogs; their tongues were referred to as ‘the
feminine weapon’, always ready to cause trouble and molest men’s ears.105
Wrong mode, tone, volume, or topic of speech was also connected to the lower
classes; ‘boisterous kind of Jollity’, for example, was considered ‘a course kind
of quality, that throweth a Woman into a lower Form, and degradeth her from
the Rank of those who are more reﬁned’.106
Didactic writers emphasised women’s need to pay particular attention to
controlling the topics of their (and others’) conversation; especially all indelicate
topics were strictly forbidden from women, who ‘should hear […] nothing, that
can call forth a blush’, and who supposedly had ‘a thousand ways to turn oﬀ
the conversation’.107 Grave subjects, such as politics and religion, were also
prohibited from women, as well as frowned upon generally within the context
of polite sociability.108 Especially politics was, as a particularly heated subject,
thought to be especially incompatible with feminine delicacy. ‘Engaging in
political Controversies is apt to produce an Eagerness and Sourness both of
Temper and Expression, which are Opposites to that delicate and dispassionate
way of Converse so requisite in your Sex’; therefore, the ‘State of Publick
Aﬀairs, and the Characters of publick Persons, are Subjects very improper for a
young Lady’s Conversation’, stated The Lady’s Preceptor. 109 Religion was a
similarly contested topic; on the one hand, to ‘talk or act like a Missionary, or
an Enthusiast’ was zealous and impolite.110 Then again, religion was a central
and revered aspect of the eighteenth-century gentlewomen’s life, and as such,
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part of their polite identity.111 Therefore, moderate conversation on Christian
morals, carefully avoiding all fanaticism, was encouraged. Other serious sub-
jects, such as philosophy, were more ambiguous; on the one hand, such writers
as Hannah More—a moralist and a bluestocking—encouraged women to raise
the standards of conversation by engaging in the topics of art, literature, phi-
losophy, religion, or even natural philosophy—as long as this was done without
any show or pedantry. On the other hand, even More acknowledged that ser-
ious conversation could not be women’s only resource, since too rational a
woman would be branded an unnatural, unfeminine pedant by polite society.112
Indeed, a learned and serious conversation was, in its essence, a masculine
prerogative. John Gregory went as far as to advise women to carefully conceal
any good sense they might have when conversing with men, since a woman
displaying her rationality would be seen as assuming ‘a superiority over the rest
of the company’.113
The twist is, of course, that Hannah More and her fellow bluestockings were
eminently known and widely celebrated precisely for their trespassing practi-
cally all the discursive borders of female speech. Elizabeth Montagu thought
that an apprehension for ‘uttering idle words’ would be ‘unnatural [in] a girl’
and, accordingly, gleefully represented her propensity for abundant speech one
of her distinguishing features.114 Having been struck ‘dumb with a sore throat’,
she reported being ‘quite low spirited’ till her ‘tongue could ﬁdget’ and her
‘voice pronounce ten thousand words in ﬁve minutes’—in short, being ‘at last
restored to the substantial bliss of talking all day long’.115 The bluestocking
salons hosted politicians, philosophers, poets, and bishops, with whom these
women of letters had unfemininely learned conversations. Their company was
sought because of their sharp reasoning, clever harangue, and ‘overwhelming
torrent’ of wit.116 The bluestockings were especially well-known for their wit—
didactically represented as the most dangerous talent a woman could possess.
Conduct book writers agreed that even though wit was arguably ‘perfectly
consistent with softness and delicacy’, they were ‘seldom found united’.117 The
general attitude towards female wits can be seen to undergo a subtle change
during the eighteenth century; the emergence of bluestockings and literary salon
culture and women’s prominence as both writers and readers of novels created
an atmosphere where a certain amount of quick sense was, if not straightfor-
wardly lauded in an elite woman, at least acceptable.118 In literary and intel-
lectual circles, female wit was admired, and it could bring women such as
Elizabeth Montagu or Hester Lynch Thrale reverence and visibility. The crucial
point is that wit, like female conversation in general, was acceptable within the
semi-public space of the literary salon, where—as I argued in Chapter 4—social
gender roles were blurred and more ﬂuid than in domestic or public spaces.
However, ever in the refuge of the salon, unregulated or malicious wit could
easily turn women into sharp-tongued shrews who were hated ‘not only by all
the World’, but even by their ‘own Children and Family’.119 Therefore, wit
needed to be ‘guarded with great discretion and good-nature’.120 Even though
the judicious use of good wit was regarded as the crown of good conversation,
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it posed risks for women, to whom ‘humility, if not the most brilliant, is the
safest, the most amiable, and the most feminine’ qualiﬁcation for polite
conversation.121
The ambiguous reputation wit had, even amongst intellectual circles, made
witty women assume cautious approaches towards their own ﬂow of repartee.
Elizabeth Montagu, for example, took turns to disavow and own her wittiness.
On the one hand, she consciously emphasised her reputation as a wit in her
letters; she claimed that ‘to make my friends laugh is all I wish; I do all I can
for that purpose; I am inconsistent, whimsical, and all that mirth and ridicule
can desire’, and dared them by all means to ‘believe that I could be extremely
witty if I dared’ even when circumstances (such as general want of interesting
events) made her seem dull.122 On the other hand, she could also settle into a
more sober-minded role when needs be. After making her initial acquaintance
with the scholarly Elizabeth Carter, she wrote her to assure her tongue was not
as sharp as her reputation might suggest: ‘I can perfectly understand why you
were afraid of me last year, […] you had heard I set up for a wit, and people of
real merit and sense hate to converse with witlings; […] I am happy you have
found out I am not to be feared’.123 Montagu could also moralise on other
women’s displays of wit. When reading Laetitia Pilkington’s recently published
scandalous Memoirs (1748), she noted, referring to the author, that—
wit in women is apt to have other bad consequences; like a sword without
a scabbard it wounds the wearer, and provokes assailants. I am sorry to
say the generality of women who have excelled in wit have failed in chas-
tity; perhaps it inspires too much conﬁdence in the possessor, and raises an
inclination in the men towards them, without inspiring an esteem; so that
they are more attacked and less guarded than other women.124
Women’s wit, as well as women’s speech in general, was interpreted and valued
diﬀerently from men’s. Wit and satire were considered to be privileged arenas
of masculine intellect in medieval and early modern times; therefore, words that
were considered clever and witty out of a man’s mouth were often interpreted
as abusive and defamatory when uttered by a woman.125 Accordingly, women
who demanded immoderate attention with their unruly wit stepped into a tra-
ditionally masculine sphere and thus disrupted the social order. Moreover, wit
demanded attention in a most unfeminine manner.126 Women’s role in con-
versation was to ‘please, sooth and enliven’, not to show oﬀ their piercing
intellect or verbal superiority.127 Therefore, according to many writers, ‘the
attempt at wit, or saying smart things, is, by no means, to be encouraged’.128
While bluestockings such as Elizabeth Montagu succeeded in asserting their
intellectual dominance through their skilful manipulation of semi-public space,
wit remained a controversial and dangerous gift, since it enabled women to step
out of their appropriate role in conversation—and (polite) society in general—
by becoming the centre of attention. Indeed, female wit showcased the sub-
versive potential of women’s speech in general; it was feared and ridiculed,
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since it threatened the naturalised gender roles that were crucial for sustaining
the patriarchal social system.
Women’s speech was thus policed in multiple ways in polite society. This
policing was not only didactical, but an everyday practice that elite women
themselves partook. Even bluestockings were acutely aware of the controversial
positions their tongues could put them in, and often worried about treading too
close to the line of acceptability. Fanny Burney, for one, had scruples about
coming oﬀ unfemininely intimidating and learned while attending a salon:
The Conversation, however, grew so very Bookish, I was ashamed of being
one in it, & not without reason, as every body, out of that party, told me
afterwards they had been afraid of approaching me, I was so well engaged;
[…] This is just the sort of stuﬀ I wish to avoid, & as far as I can, I do
avoid.129
Hannah More had a practical as well as a moralist solution to this problem—
that of full silence. She quoted Cicero’s notion of silence being ‘so important a
part of conversation, that “there was not only an art but an eloquence in it”’ in
her Strictures, pointedly observing ‘how peculiarly does the remark apply to the
modesty of youthful females!’. Instead of ‘inconsequent ﬂippancy’ and ‘voluble
rashness’, More encouraged women to display ‘the silence of sparkling intelli-
gence’. This did not mean that women should not take part in conversation—
only that they should do it through their speaking bodies, not tongues:
And an inviolable and marked attention may shew, that a woman is
pleased with a subject, and an illuminated countenance may prove that she
understands it, almost as unequivocally as language itself could do; and this,
with a modest question, is in many cases as large a share of the conversation
as is decorous for feminine delicacy to take.130
Hannah More was by no means the only moralist writer to advocate women’s
all but total silence.131 A discipline of the tongue so comprehensive was justiﬁed
as an indication of feminine modesty and, thereby, a natural feminine inclina-
tion and a proof of true femininity, especially in the case of young, unmarried
women. Even a requirement of complete silence was not seen as contradictory
to the ideals of polite sociability by these writers, for, as John Gregory wrote,
‘[o]ne may take a share in conversation without uttering a syllable’.132 The
rationale behind this surprising statement was the internalist and sentimentalist
belief in women’s essentially transparent bodies, which gave their countenance
the force of words. Women were said to have particularly speaking miens, and,
therefore, their ‘silent Language of the Eyes’ together with their ‘Countenance,
vermilioned over with an innocent Bashfulness’ would supposedly be ‘more
eloquent than any Expressions’.133 Moreover, The Lady’s Preceptor encouraged
women ‘always to shew, by [their] Silence’ when they were not pleased with the
subject of conversation—especially since the conversation of ‘the Beau Monde,
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runs too often upon Calumny and Detraction’.134 Therefore, since some topics
were deemed too indelicate for women to converse on, they needed to rely on
their expressive bodies to fulﬁl their civilising and moralising duties by expres-
sing either their approval or condemnation of the tone, mode, or subject of the
conversation. The concept of a speaking body enabled the simultaneous rea-
lisation of the moralist demand of female silence and the ideal of female parti-
cipation in polite sociability. The civilising tasks of a woman’s tongue were
delegated to the other parts of her body, so that when the tongue was being
disciplined, the body could resume the act of speaking. In this way, the problem
of the unruly and subversive female tongue was neatly resolved. The silent
language of the body also moved the focus of communication from listening to
women to looking at women, which was, in many ways, the governing principle
of the culture of politeness.
Catherine Talbot’s Quest for Self-improvement
If this Summer more is given me with all its usual Delights & Advantages how
shall I improve it so as to be the better for them when Winter Comes? And then
(to look strangely for forward) How After a well spent Rational Winter how
shall I continue to be in still a happier Disposition against another Summer? And
thus to go on thro’ Life how Charming! […] I have got into a strange Careless
Way of losing time. Strict Tasks & Regular Hours I believe must be the way of
mending That.
Journal of Catherine Talbot (1751)135
Catherine Talbot’s journals and letters oﬀer an illuminating view into an intel-
lectual gentlewoman’s mental and bodily self-discipline.136 As in Fanny Bur-
ney’s case, Talbot’s social conditions provide an important context to her self-
formation. Talbot lived her whole life with her mother under Bishop Thomas
Secker’s roof, which meant that the two were ﬁnancially entirely dependent on
Secker. Talbot’s position in the bishop’s household was somewhat ambiguous.
On the one hand, she was not under the direct control of a male relative, but on
the other hand, her situation was, in reality, subordinate. As she grew older,
Talbot assumed the roles of Secker’s housekeeper, personal secretary, and
companion—tasks that were, in Rhoda Zuk’s words, ‘at once absorbing and
dull’.137 She wrote in her journal that being of ‘some use’ and giving ‘some
Cheerfulness’ to Secker and her mother was her ‘only real business’.138 Talbot
was thus in a position where she was nominally independent, but in reality had
very limited control over her own doings and goings; instead, Secker’s activities
and movements dictated many of the everyday minutiae of Talbot’s life. As
Rhoda Zuk notes, in her journals and letters Talbot repeatedly voiced a ‘sar-
donic recognition of her narrow range of choices’.139 For example, she com-
plained to Elizabeth Carter that, even though she had spent several months of
the winter season in London, she had not yet had the chance to ‘suﬀ[er] the
ennui of a four hours oratorio’ or see ‘Garrick one single time’. Therefore, she
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could not amuse her friend with anecdotes of London entertainments, and, as
to her newly acquired love of dancing, ‘I cannot imagine what business I had to
grow fond of amusement that scarce happens in my way twice a year’.140
Talbot’s curious position in Secker’s household was the main cause of her
social and emotional anxiety. As the bishop’s representative, she felt it her duty
to, for example, appear daily in church and, moreover, to set an example to
others by her behaviour. When dining privately at Marchioness Grey’s house
and attending a concert on Easter week, she felt her mind ‘unsatisﬁed with such
an unusual degree of Gayety’ in a week that ‘ought sure to be peculiarly Ser-
ious’—not because she herself thought she did wrong, but because she was
afraid ‘some good body or other would be oﬀended’ at her.141 Secker’s inﬂuence
Figure 6.1 Christian Friedrich Zincke, Catherine Talbot (n.d.). Bonhams
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on Talbot’s behaviour was also considerable; Zuk, for one, argues that Talbot’s
complicated and materially, intellectually, and emotionally dependent relation-
ship with her mentor and protector was a central reason for her feelings of
inadequacy and diﬃdence.142 Secker was apparently a short-tempered man, and
Talbot could brood for days on mistakes which caused him to snap at her.
When she was six minutes late for an appointment with him, she recorded
being ‘Chid as I indeed deserved because Eng:s time is this Month tied to a
Minute, & ought I ever to make Him wait. Inconsiderate Animal! I was rather
vexed with myself, but so foolish, so Childish, that I hate to be Chid, & alto-
gether, being very far from well, was put out of Spirits for all day’.143 On another
occasion, Secker was angry at Talbot for leading him on too long a ride:
We took after Breakfast a Ride rather too long & too Sunny; for Eng: having
left the conduct of it to me[.] Out of a Notion that he would wish to stay
out longer than I shd else have chose, I led him two or three Miles farther
than he liked. I have promised to lay aside this blundering Politeness for the
future, & when it is proper to do so Consider my own health & convenience
without guessing & imagining what will suit other people in which as
he says & I have often experienced I shall generally guess wrong.144
Talbot’s continual feelings of inadequacy regarding social decorum are reﬂected
in this passage. Indeed, Talbot’s social responsibilities gave her endless trouble,
and her perceived failures in polite interaction gave rise to ruthless self-ﬂa-
gellation. ‘My heart is heavy to day’, she wrote, for ‘feeling my own want of
every requisite except peacefulness towards making an Agreeable Companion’.
However, the more she obsessed over her insuﬃciencies, the more unﬁt she felt
herself to become ‘to be tolerable in Society’. ‘There is nothing I dread so much
as being talkative’, she complained:
Yet at my Years one must not sit like a Statue—On these occasions & on
these only I sometimes wish my self back to the other side of Twenty,
when my Ld & Mamma are not with me, & it seems as if I should say
somewhat, yet am so painfully tho’ justly diﬃdent of my self that I had
much rather hold my Tongue. I scarce ever in my Life left a Company that
I valued without feeling great uneasiness from the fear of having shewn my
self unworthy of bearing a part in it.145
In other words, Talbot was not only failing her social responsibilities as a
companion and representative of Bishop Secker, but also falling decidedly short
of the norms of ideal polite femininity that her life as a gentlewoman revolved
around, and, more speciﬁcally, failing in portraying the conversational and
sociable virtues she should have embodied as a bluestocking.
In fact, Talbot’s journals show that she subjected herself to continuous severe
self-criticism. Her journals and letters ‘communicate a morbid anxiety about
her usefulness, and record an arduous, self-imposed regime that included the
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duties of housekeeper and hostess, catechizer of servants, and supervisor of
children, as well as the pursuit of scholarship’, as Zuk notes.146 Talbot
observed herself with an unforgiving and critical eye, and every imperfection
she detected gave rise to a new bout of self-loathing. Especially Talbot’s journals,
mainly addressed to either Marchioness Grey or Julia Berkeley, the daughter of
Bishop Berkeley, draw a disconcerting picture of a woman engaged in agonising
introspection and relentless self-discipline. In her journals, Talbot recorded meti-
culously, almost obsessively her daily routines, with the goal of not losing a
minute to ‘Indolence [and] Laziness’, her ‘most Formidable Enemies’.147 Indeed,
meticulous time management was one of her most important self-aﬄicted duties
and also a key method for self-improvement.148 She started her account of every
day by noting the time she woke up—mostly between 5 and 7 o’clock—and
continued to jot down her activities to a high level of precision:
8 to 9½ as usual. To 12 Read, writ, stated my Julias Account of her
Hours, sorted Papers for Mama, drest, received a short Visit from a good
Old Gentlewoman an old St James’s Neighbour. Till 4 went to Ldy Ansons
& returned, calling by the way at a Shop. Sat & worked with her while she
dispatched an hundred aﬀairs for her self & other people with such liveli-
ness, such Prudence, such Ease & goodnature as made me love her more
than ever. Found my Uncle come to dine with us & sat below till 5½. Till
6: chatted with M[ama]:149
Or—
the good Dss knocked at my Door, & after ¼ running up & down all the
stair cases I could ﬁnd by way of Exercise, I went & read with her in her
Closet Sir Ch[arles Grandison]: till 1 ½. […] Then went into the Drawing
Room, & while I walked for near ¾ read the Psalms for the Day, mused
on some of my own Faults.150
Leaving out Talbot’s social and domestic engagements and examining at her
leisure time—that is, time she was free to dispose as she wished—it is possible
to divide her documented daily activities into four groups: working (painting,
needlework, handicrafts), studying (arithmetic, languages), reading (novels,
plays, and religious material), and ‘moral work’ (philosophising, contemplating
on ‘her evils’). Looking at these, it becomes clear that Talbot’s military regime
of self-control was aimed at personal and moral self-improvement. In a very
straightforward way, her everyday work included honing her education and
practising various accomplishments. She was a decent scholar and worked hard
to improve her skills in French and Italian; in fact, she wrote some of her
journals in French as an exercise. She read sermons and books on morality,
practiced painting ﬂowers for hours on end, and applied herself to arithmetic.
To some extent, Talbot’s practices of discipline were prompted by practical
reasons, as it was necessary for her to have recourse to reading and studying
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during the long lonely months she spent wherever Thomas Secker saw ﬁt to
stay. Rhoda Zuk ascribes her self-policing to the vague paternal governance and
ambiguous social expectations she received from Secker.151 However, I think it
is possible to interpret her regime of self-discipline in a more positive light.
Underlying the immediate goal of improving literary and polite skills, perhaps
prompted by social anxiety, there seems to be an aim of acquiring modest
humility and mental strength in face of life’s aﬄictions, as well as a desire to
wean the body oﬀ luxury and idleness and bend it to the regulation of the will.
Indeed, Talbot’s detailed journals seem to have served primarily the rationalist
goal of self-perfection—a feature that can be connected to the so-called
‘Enlightenment subject’. This Enlightenment project of the self can be tied to
the thought of, for example, John Locke, who forwarded an idea of the subject
as a rational agent who believes that the self is fully within an individual’s
power to perfect through ‘disengagement and rational control’.152 However,
Locke and other propagators of rational selfhood generally excluded women
from their philosophical considerations, since women were thought to be ‘by
deﬁnition irrational beings’.153 Catherine Talbot’s project of rational self-
improvement and her rejection of the gloriﬁcation of sentiment can thus be seen
as a means of taking a part in this supposedly masculine sphere—striving
towards autonomous, moral, and rational subjectivity. Her unfeminine disdain
of public amusement, even if partly prompted by necessity, was a part of the
same project; she believed that ‘one lives to no one purpose of a rational being
all those hours that are spent at the modern assemblies’.154 In this sense, Talbot
can be connected to the same eighteenth-century tradition of proto-feminist
philosophical critique as Mary Wollstonecraft and Mary Astell, who aimed to
establish women as equally capable of rationality and self-control as men.155
To this eﬀect, Talbot engaged in a strict regime of self-discipline. She aimed
at transparent and truthful disclosure in her time-monitoring, feeling an obli-
gation to honestly confess whenever she had been idle; ‘Let me own then that
much of my time has moved heavily & uselessly to day from a stupid lumpish
heaviness & uncomfortableness’, she wrote to Julia Berkeley.156 Talbot did not
only keep a conscientious track of her daily time, but often reﬂected in her
journals on the use she had made of her time during the past month or months.
When looking back to summer 1751, she worried that it had been wasted: ‘I
fear I as usual so broke my time with a thousand little errands & employments
that I did not make the improvement of it I might & ought to have done’.157 A
few years later, she reproached herself for allowing the amusements of London
to tear her away from her project of self-improvement, comparing her idle life
with Julia Berkeley’s rural existence:
Wednesday Octr ye last.
Fare thee well Thou long month. May the next be better improved! Part
of it will I am sure. But Oh the wearisome hours of London! Indeed my
Love yours is on the whole much the pleasanter life since you have it in
your Power by daily agreeable Walks to keep up the Cheerfulness &
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hardyness & Activity that ones Conﬁnement here & hanging over a Fire
side is so calculated to take away, & then with what spirit may you go on
uninterrupted by any thing but this necessary care of Health in a continual
course of improvements!158
To George Berkeley, Julia’s brother, she expressed not only her self-loathing for
her waste of ‘inestimable time!’ but also her fears over ‘the impossibility of ever
improving it better’.159 Yet, by her friends’ estimations, she was more than
diligent with her time; Elizabeth Carter even chided her for being ‘so scrupu-
lously cautious (may I not venture to say, in some instances, so superstitiously
cautious) not to misemploy the least moment’.160
Chastising the body in order to strengthen her character was one of Talbot’s
most important self-appointed tasks. The mere limits of her physique often
prevented Talbot from employing her time to the utmost eﬀectuality; when her
family insisted on her getting seven hours of sleep in a night to keep up her
health, she complained that ‘by this Means I do nothing, have no time’.161 In
fact, Talbot saw her frail human body mostly as a nuisance which demanded
pampering and thus hindered the full developing of her mind: ‘But how Slow
Alas how perpetually interrupted is the Progress of embodied Mind! A Mind
too of so slight a Make, in a Body so liable to weariness, & that makes such
large demands of time for refreshment & amusement’.162 Thus, she endea-
voured to harden her body by various methods. She regularly read standing or
walking in order to better both her mind and body simultaneously, and could
impose unpleasant tasks on herself to strengthen her mind over matter: ‘Walked
absolutely in the Dark & very Cold till 7. & by that time found it grow very
agreeable. Tis the Case of most disagreeable things that are upon the whole
right & good for one: A very little use makes them not unpleasant, a very little
Reﬂexion Delightful’.163
Not only her body, but Talbot’s spirits also regularly failed her in her project
of self-improvement. A particularly gloomy journal entry describes her occa-
sional melancholy: ‘Saturday ready to hang my self. Jaded to Death & almost
ill’.164 She often recorded herself too weary or low-spirited to work eﬀectually,
and was liable to bouts of melancholy and depression, which she however
condemned as an ungrateful weakness that prevented the proper management
of her social duties. She recorded herself feeling dejected in 1752; ‘Wicked Fool!
for does not this hurt & grieve Dearest M[ama]: & is it not unreasonable,
groundless—O Fie Fie! These reﬂections have cost me bitter Tears. I hope
useful ones’.165 Talbot felt the full weight of the social requirement for
women’s constant cheerfulness, which followed from their role in polite society
as the soother of men’s troubles and the light-hearted amuser of the company:
‘I do not believe any body was ever more thoroughly versed in the theory of
cheerfulness, or more convinced of the duty’.166 Accordingly, she did her best to
ﬁght to overcome her unfeminine gloominess.
Compared to her disciplinary journals, Talbot’s letters to her friends paint a
more moderate picture of her everyday life—thus showing her bowing to the
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norms of polite sociability as light and pleasing. ‘Yet what in the World do I do
but eat drink sleep, ride walk visit my neighbours & divert myself?’ she wrote
to Marchioness Grey in a light-toned letter.167 In her letters, she also presented
her quest for improvement in a more detached and even humorous manner. ‘It
is a sad thin[g] to have set up for any particular Character because really it
costs one some pains to keep it up’, she observed; ‘Being Famous for Dressing
up Flower Pots, a pretty Dounesca sort of Fame that I do not at all decline, I
have been forced to spend two whole hours this morning in that employ-
ment’.168 Even if her morbid self-criticism was thus curbed by the rules of polite
letter-writing, she however saw her weekly letters to her friends as a means of
further improvement. ‘I am much obliged to you’, she wrote to Marchioness
Grey, ‘for requiring [an exact Journal of my Life & Conversation], since meerly
out of fear you should chide me I shall certainly do more ingenious & spirited
things than ever would enter my head without such an Inspector’.169 Moreover,
Talbot viewed her letters almost as writing exercises. She complained of her
inability to write entertaining and witty letters and, being afraid that her cor-
respondents would not enjoy her dull compositions, strove to improve her
skills. ‘I am so tired of my old way of writing that I was determined to begin in
quite a new one—but it will not do, I cannot obtain […] familiar ease &
ingenious Politeness’, she bemoaned.170 Thus, as with so many other social
duties, the art of letter-writing did not come naturally to Talbot, but instead
caused her continual anxiety.
There is also a perceivable change of tone in Talbot’s journals from her
youth to old age regarding self-improvement and self-discipline. Talbot saw her
young self as a giddy creature who loitered her days away and allowed her
mind to be ‘full of Vain Anxiety & foolish unhappiness’.171 Only in her thirties
did Talbot properly begin her project of relentless self-improvement, which she
apparently again eased up on somewhat in her later years. She also often
reﬂected on her progress, condemning her ‘Stupid Worthless Vehement’
younger self and expressing gratitude for having been ‘led into Uniform
Rational Happiness & a State of Improvement’ on her more mature years.172
However, Talbot repeatedly regretted wasting the days of her youth in leisure,
and was determined to help her young friend and protégée Julia Berkeley to
avoid making the same mistake. In fact, Talbot took it upon herself to reform
Julia according to her own programme of meticulous journalising and max-
imum utilisation of time. ‘Je m’interesse pour elle, Je l’aime, il me semble que
c’est un de mes Devoirs [illegible] tons ses petits défauts & de les redresser. Elle
m’aimè tant, on a une telle Conﬁance en moi—Est-ce encore ma mêler de ce qui
n’est pas mon aﬀaire?’173 Talbot pondered in 1753, and quickly decided that it
was her duty to help Julia to achieve feminine perfection:
I found my Dear Girl so neatly dress’d, so composed, so reasonable, & so
fond of following her little Plan of Employments, that it has given me
inﬁnite Satisfaction & Thankfulness. Surely I […] owe every Care I can
give to such a Sweet Child as this who seems Providentially thrown under
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my inﬂuence […] Ill should I repay the Esteem I was undeservedly hon-
our’d with by her Father […] if I did not endeavour all I could to form &
sooth this Young Mind Capable of becoming every thing it ought.174
Talbot expected Julia to send her daily accounts of her doings so that she could
superintend whether her time was spent in the most useful way. Talbot soon
had reason to be displeased with her pupil; ‘the Journal was not however by
any means what I wished it’, she complained, for ‘in Tuesday you will see there
are three hours unaccounted for’.175 Julia’s failings grieved Talbot, for she saw
the brief years of youth as the period when a woman’s character and accom-
plishments should be formed. ‘What will become of my Julia if she dreams
away, & in dull unpleasant dreams too, this golden Opportunity of unin-
terrupted leisure with the beneﬁt of Mrs B: & the Governor to assist, regulate,
applaud & delight in her daily improvements’, Talbot bemoaned.176 She
believed ﬁrmly that true happiness was to be found through improvement, not
self-indulgence, and criticised the common empty-headed female way of life and
‘those poor idle Girls who for want of knowing how to amuse themselves at
home are forced to fancy themselves happy in the continual & wearisome
repetition of the same insipid Diversions Day after day till they grow uneasily
conscious themselves that every body else is tired of seeing them’. For Julia’s
complaints of ennui, listlessness, or want of spirits, common enough amongst
elite females, she recommended ‘constant Exercise’ and going on ‘diligently &
regularly with your employments & your Journal’; in this way, these com-
plaints would ‘cease of [them] self’.177 Talbot herself, however, managed to
repel her gloom by cheerful employment only occasionally.
Discipline as Freedom
Talbot’s self-imposed regime of discipline not only bettered her social and
domestic skills and fashioned her as a rational subject, but it also seems to have
brought her an acute sense of private satisfaction.178 Not only did she believe
that ‘Our true Happiness lies not in Enjoyment but Improvement’, but she
seems to have experienced tremendous secret joy out of the thought of, for
example, being able to ‘steal an hour & be[ing] up before 5’, and thus pushing
herself towards the limits of her mental and physical capabilities.179 In other
words, she engaged in self-improvement not only to achieve particular goals,
such as honing her arithmetical skills, but also to experience pleasure and a
sense of achievement. In this sense, Talbot’s project comes close to the enjoy-
ment received from ascetic exercises, such as, for example, dieting. The feminist
philosopher Cressida Heyes suggests in her Foucauldian analysis of modern
dieting that the practices of dieting provide satisfaction for the dieter; they give
the individual an ‘active, creative sense of self-development, mastery, expertise,
and skill’.180 Moreover, Talbot’s self-improvement scheme also highlights the
elision between mastering oneself and caring for oneself in a Foucauldian sense,
suggesting, as Heyes puts it, that ‘the controlled and relentlessly self-disciplined
232 Discipline and Subversion
persona is also the most ethically responsible’.181 Thus, Talbot was essentially
engaged in a project of ethical self-care and self-(trans)formation; she felt that
her regime of self-discipline made her a morally superior person compared to
both her own younger days and to other, idle, ﬂighty females.
Catherine Talbot’s meticulous regime of self-discipline was perhaps extra-
ordinarily diligently executed, but women’s disciplinary time management was
by no means unique.182 For example, Elizabeth Montagu described her life at
Sandleford as ‘monastic’:
I inhabit a convent too, and live by rules, not given indeed by a St. Francis
or St. Benedict, but by myself, merely that I may seem to have a reason for
what I do. I allot seasons for exercise, for reading, writing, &c. &c. that I
may not get into a habit of indolence. As all states have their temptations,
solitude has its dæmon of indolence, the most harmless devil I will allow,
but such as in time, makes great depredations upon the mind, and steps
between us and our best purposes.183
While in her country estate, Montagu adhered to a regular daily schedule—
much like Catherine Talbot. ‘I am walking in the garden before eight, breakfast
before nine, ﬁnd the day too short for my employments, and go to bed at
eleven, because Dr. Monsey says it is wholesome, and because I could not rise
before seven if I sat up later’, she wrote to Monsey.184 To be sure, Montagu’s
disciplinary existence was the result of a must rather than of choice; she was
alone in the countryside out of the wish of her husband, who detested town life.
Montagu made it her goal, however, to ‘keep the same degree of spirits in every
situation’, for she wanted to be of ‘amphibious’ mind, able to ‘subsist in dif-
ferent elements’. Nevertheless, she expressed an ardent wish to quit her solitary
country life after ‘ﬁve months’ at most; ‘I can drink no more of this sort of life
at a draught, it is as much as I can promise to swallow without making wry
faces’.185 In other words, Montagu submitted to a life of solitude out of neces-
sity, and consciously engaged in practices of self-discipline in order to create
meaning into her everyday existence. She declared that one should ‘rather pass
one’s life à faire des riens, qu’à rien faire. Do but do something, the application
to it will make it appear important, and the being the doer of it laudable; so
that one is sure to be pleased oneself’.186 Like Talbot, Montagu thus received
pleasure from her disciplinary practices, even though they were practically
forced upon her.
Self-discipline was not only a source of pleasure for women; it was also a
source of freedom in several ways. In fact, Catherine Talbot’s project of self-
improvement can be interpreted as an aspiration towards autonomy both in
respect to the free and rational ‘Enlightened subject’ as well as in a Foucauldian
sense. Indeed, if reason and rationality were needed in governing one’s passions,
surely the government of those passions was also the means to achieve ration-
ality.187 As we recall, Foucault describes in The Use of Pleasure the care of self
as a practice of freedom, his point being that controlling one’s pleasures makes
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one free from those pleasures.188 Thus, discipline is a prerequisite of freedom.
Such is the case in, for example, the Earl of Shaftesbury’s thinking; for Shaf-
tesbury, expanding the control of the self would bring about a freedom from
external stimuli and inner passions. According to Michael Schoenfeldt, early
modern culture imagined a regime of self-discipline to be a ‘necessary step
towards any prospect of liberation’. Thus, for eighteenth-century subjects, self-
control authorised individuality.189 This, of course, was the underlying principle
of Locke’s formulation of selfhood as a rational endeavour towards self-per-
fection. For this reason, women’s self-control was a deeply ambivalent virtue in
eighteenth-century culture. On the one hand, self-control was represented as
especially important for women, from whom resignation to circumstances,
generally beyond their control, was required as a feminine duty; therefore, the
ability to control their feelings and thus to take control of their own ‘happiness’
was imperative for women.190 For example, Hannah More asserted that ‘A
PASSIONATE woman’s happiness is never in her own keeping: it is the sport
of accident, and the slave of events. It is in the power of her acquaintance, her
servants, but chieﬂy of her enemies, and all her comforts lie at the mercy of
others’.191 Thus, a woman in control of her passions becomes free of both
external and internal stimuli. On the other hand, female self-control was also a
potentially subversive refutation of feminine stereotypes of irrationality and
unruliness through masculine pretentions to rationality. Indeed, Hannah More,
with all her enthusiasm for women’s self-control, nevertheless ﬁrmly believed
that women should aspire only to ‘those virtues’ that were ‘peculiar’ to their
sex.192 As a matter of fact, eighteenth-century proto-feminists seem to simulta-
neously argue for women’s capacity of rational Enlightenment subjectivity
while maintaining a more or less rigid separation between genders and sub-
scribing to both ‘biological’ and social diﬀerences between men and women.
Questions of masculinity and femininity are, in many ways, central for
practices of self-discipline. According to Foucault, freedom acquired through
self-care is essentially power—power that individuals use over themselves, but
also power that they use over others. This is why self-control was, in Foucault’s
analysis, a masculine virtue; it was expected from those who were in charge,
and it was considered to be indispensable for good government.193 The asso-
ciation between control, liberty, and power was common in eighteenth-century
political thought; Edmund Burke, for example, wrote that ‘[m]en are qualiﬁed
for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains
upon their own appetites’.194 Thus, claims that too severe bodily control made
women unfeminine had a political signiﬁcance; presenting the female nature as
naturally prone to vanity, excess, and luxury was a way of excluding women
from political participation by establishing that they were incapable of self-
control.195 The political rights attached to self-discipline also meant that any
display of self-control in a woman was deeply disconcerting and politically
subversive, since it undermined the patriarchal system of power. Therefore,
female self-discipline was labelled unfeminine, something that made a woman’s
gender suspicious. This is why Catherine Talbot’s regime of self-control
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unfolds as an extremely controversial set of acts that bear deep gendered and
power-related meanings. Talbot’s case shows that she not only believed that
women were capable of self-control, but she was also engaged with active
self-formation and self-discipline to become an ethical, autonomous subject.
When self-control was perceived as a masculine trait, the act of exercising
discipline by a feminine self could be seen as an empowering act, a move away
from normative passive femininity towards active masculinity. As Foucault
writes, ‘self-mastery was a way of being a man with respect to oneself,’
whereas ‘immoderation derives from a passivity that relates it to feminin-
ity’.196 There is a long tradition of seeing women as symbols of the ﬂesh—
licentious, gluttonous, unrestrainable. Therefore, women also have a cen-
turies-old tradition of disciplining that ﬂesh in an eﬀort to rise to the level of
spirit and to ‘become, metaphorically speaking, male’.197 In this sense, eight-
eenth-century polite women’s eﬀorts to be self-disciplined resemble, for
example, the extreme fasting of medieval woman saints Caroline Bynum has
researched; they both can be seen as a part of a historical continuum of
women’s ascetic practices, aimed at controlling and bringing down the desires
of the ﬂesh in order to gain spirituality and/or rationality, either in one’s own
eyes or in the face of society.
In fact, self-discipline was used as a strategy to negotiate controversial desires
and freedom from feminised conduct norms in other areas of life. Bynum sug-
gests that medieval women’s fasting was not merely substituting control of self
for control of circumstance; it also gave women actual power over their lives
and made it possible for them to reject traditional feminine duties and roles.
Bynum writes:
[W]omen’s food practices frequently enabled them to determine the shape
of their lives—to reject unwanted marriages, to substitute religious activ-
ities for more menial duties within the family, to redirect the use of fathers’
or husbands’ resources, to change or convert family members, to criticize
powerful secular or religious authorities, and to claim for themselves
teaching, counseling, and reforming roles for which the religious tradition
provided, at best, ambivalent support.198
Similarly, eighteenth-century women’s engagement with self-discipline can be
seen as a strategy of escaping the traditional domestic model of femininity.
Deborah Heller has argued that bluestockings and other female intellectuals
adhered to a strict regime of ‘self-regulation’ that helped them ‘secure liberation
on other fronts’, such as intellectual pursuits.199 Thus, in order to be able to
take on gender-bending roles as wits, poets, and scholars, female intellectuals
disciplined themselves into normative femininity as moral maidens, dutiful
mothers, or chaste wives. Unfemininity in one area of life could be compensated
for by a strict adherence to the norm on another, and too many breaches of
conduct on too many fronts could turn the scale of popular opinion and good
reputation against a woman.
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Thus, self-discipline was a powerful strategy for escaping gendered expec-
tations of proper conduct. However, self-control played also an important
role in forming speciﬁcally feminine eighteenth-century subjectivities. Achiev-
ing ideal politeness and mastering the diﬀerent skills expected from well-bred
women required diligent practice and constant vigilance. ‘Becoming a subject
for women meant subjecting oneself to roles and practices of domesticity and
discipline’, describes Deborah Heller with respect to the dominant under-
standing of women’s identity formation.200 Indeed, this seems to be what
Catherine Talbot was after, in the end; to her, her project of self-improve-
ment was a quest towards responsible femininity. The ideals that Talbot
strove for—such as domesticity and Christian morality—were ideals that
were routinely labelled as feminine within polite society, and Talbot clearly
observed her own performances through the authoritative spectacles of these
dominant discourses. For example, she was very careful not to appear inap-
propriately talkative or erudite in her conversation, carefully concealing her
learning in the best conduct book manner: ‘We had in the Evening a con-
versible Coﬀee drinking, not that I had any share in the Conversation I
assure You for it was a learned one, & tho’ two or three things came into
my Head I had the fear of Harriet & Mr Walden before my eyes’.201 By
mentioning the ‘fear’ that kept her unfeminine impulses in check, she referred
back to a previous entry in her journal, in which she condemned Harriet
Byron’s conversation in Sir Charles Grandison on grounds of its unfemini-
nity; ‘The Gentlemen,’ she wrote, ‘have no patience with Harriets Vanity &
Talkativeness. She does argue too much with Mr Walden. A long sentence
never sounds well out of a Womans mouth’.202
Thus, while Catherine Talbot’s self-discipline enabled her to build herself an
ethical subjectivity, it was not a particularly subversive one in the sense that it
reproduced many of the gendered norms of the discourse of politeness. How-
ever, disciplinary practices aimed at producing normative femininity could,
paradoxically, still provide women with certain kinds of freedom. Even if
Talbot was aiming for the kind of moral femininity described by conduct
books, the process of self-care transformed her aspirations from external coer-
cion into internal selfhood, thus providing her with a sense of autonomy.
Moreover, the skilful mastering of all the polite feminine arts through rigorous
self-discipline could bring women concrete power over their lives; a dexterous
woman could manipulate her surroundings and people in it just as eﬀectively as
Caroline Bynum’s female saints could take an active control of their circumstances
by their food practices.
However, even if working on herself brought Catherine Talbot experiences
of pleasure and freedom, her self-discipline was not enabling in the sense that it
would have provided her with freedom from feminine roles or behaviour. This
is the case, of course, with the sort of self-control bluestockings were com-
mitted to in exchange for intellectual liberation. In fact, many scholars have
argued that the early bluestockings’ eﬀorts were targeted towards an ‘ambig-
uous form of emancipation’, a compromise that served to bind them all the
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more thoroughly to the domesticised norms of female chastity and morality in
their attempt to compensate for their intellectual digressions.203
The case of Hester Lynch Thrale’s second marriage illustrates the extent to
which bluestockings, including Montagu and Burney, emphasised the trade-oﬀ
between self-control and intellectual pursuits—and the vigilance with which
they were committed to policing each others’ behaviour. When Hester Lynch
Thrale’s ﬁrst husband, the wealthy brewer Henry Thrale, died in 1781 after
eighteen years of loveless marriage, she fell passionately in love with her chil-
dren’s Italian singing tutor, Gabriele Piozzi (1740–1809). Despite the desperate
pleas of her friends and family, Hester Thrale married Piozzi in 1784, causing a
widespread scandal due to their diﬀerences of age, class, and nationality. Fanny
Burney, along with other former bluestocking friends of Thrale’s, immediately
broke ties with her—a decision Thrale ascribed to Burney’s famously zealous
concern for her own reputation, musing that ‘Dear Burney […] loves me kindly,
but the World reverentially’.204
For the bluestockings, Thrale’s uncontrolled passion was unacceptable
because it breached their code of self-restraint and was, therefore, an ill-advised
deviation from normative femininity. In their view, Thrale had succumbed to a
low passion against all rational considerations. In fact, Thrale’s behaviour was
condemned as altogether too masculine. Her literary female friends described
her uncontrolled passion for Piozzi as profoundly unfeminine—surprisingly
enough, since sensuousness was commonly seen as a speciﬁcally female ﬂaw,
and criticised as such by, for example, Mary Wollstonecraft.205 However, for
these women, succumbing to sexual drives was to be expected from men,
whereas women were characterised by virtuous self-restraint; as Hester Chapone
insisted, ‘such mighty overbearing Passions are not natural in a “Matron’s
bones”’.206 Similarly, Hannah More’s famous poem The Bas Bleu: or, Conversation
(1786) celebrated the bluestockings as ‘Chaste Wits’.207 According to Felicity
Nussbaum, Thrale’s marriage shook Elizabeth Montagu especially hard, since it
violated her views of ‘contracted virtue’ which went hand in hand with intellectual
brilliance; indeed, Montagu complained to Elizabeth Vesey that ‘female purity dig-
nity and excellence’ were greatly endangered by such ‘base plebean loves, which
wait on some soft hearted Dames to the great debasement of their character and the
honour of the Sex’.208 Montagu was thus afraid that Thrale’s masculine enslave-
ment by her emotions would contaminate the public image of the bluestockings.
Montagu herself abided strictly to the bluestocking code of sexual self-regulation
to gain intellectual freedom. Therefore, unlike Thrale, Montagu succeeded in
combining her many masculine endeavours with public approval.
Women’s entitlement to carnal desire was a controversial topic, since it
reﬂected the ambivalence of the gendered meanings sexuality was given. For
these reasons, and because of the constitutive role women’s sexual control
played in English society, gender-bending roles in the intellectual sphere were
socially more acceptable than those shaking the norms of female sexuality.
Succumbing to sexual passion was simultaneously a masculine prerogative and
a threat to a man’s autonomy, as well as a female ﬂaw of character and a
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subversive female act of sexual equality. By marrying Piozzi, Hester Lynch
Thrale ‘actively deﬁed the self-regulation that other bluestocking women had
insisted upon’ to gain social respect as women stretching gender boundaries,
and chose ‘to follow instead her unrestrained passions’. Nussbaum argues that
Thrale regarded a woman ‘openly following her passions as establishing a new
kind of sexual equality’ and thus established a gender-bending code of conduct
of her own.209 Indeed, as one of the most strictly regulated areas of women’s
life, sexuality also held subversive potential. It is this potential we will examine
in the following ﬁnal section of this book.
Figure 6.2 George Dance, Hester Lynch Piozzi (1793).
© National Portrait Gallery, London
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Hypocritical Chastity and Sexual Power
Chastity [is] the ﬁrst Female Virtue. […]
There is no Charm in the Female Sex, that can supply the place of Virtue.
Without Innocence, Beauty is unlovely, and Quality contemptible, Good-breeding
degenerates into Wantonness, and Wit into Impudence.
The Spectator (1712)210
[T]he reputation of chastity is not so necessary for a woman […] for it is possible
for a woman to be virtuous, though not strictly chaste.
Lord Chesterﬁeld to Philip Stanhope, 8 January 1750211
Hester Lynch Thrale may have breached polite society’s notions of social dec-
orum by her controversial second marriage, but she was still operating strictly
within the bounds of sexual decorum by entering into the wedlock in the ﬁrst
place.212 There were, however, plenty of women whose sexual aﬀairs were not
blessed by the Minister—and this sort of misconduct has in previous scholar-
ship generally been seen as much more detrimental of the two for female repu-
tations.213 However, I would like to claim that chastity, or sexual self-
regulation, was a virtue of ambiguous nature. Discursively, it was represented
as the most important area of polite feminine self-discipline, while in practice
there seemed to be an abundance of ways getting around it.214 Even though
eighteenth-century conduct writers and modern-day scholars alike have routi-
nely tended to present as an essential prerequisite of normative femininity and
women’s social honour, I am suggesting that maintaining chaste reputation in
polite society was a subtle matter and accordingly examine the multiple ways
chastity could be negotiated. As Fanny Burney noted on Mrs Alicia ‘Bad Mac’
Macartney (1716–1804), her godmother Frances Greville’s eldest sister who,
according to Burney, as ‘a Drunkard notoriously, an assistant to the vices of
others, & an infamous Practicer of all species of them herself’ was ‘one of the
worst women Breathing’—even this notorious woman ‘contrived to get Com-
pany to her Mansion, & to be Countenanced by People of Character and Rank’
by keeping ‘a superb House’ and giving ‘most elegant Entertainments’.215
Accordingly, despite general beliefs and didactic warnings, sullied sexual repu-
tation did not lead to an automatic banishment from polite society, but lost
chastity could, in real world, be compensated through a variety of means
focused on maintaining respectable external appearance.
According to conduct writers, chastity was indeed ‘the most necessary and
indispensable’ of all virtues, without which ‘wit, beauty, sense, knowledge, and
every other female accomplishment, are not only useless and insigniﬁcant, but
frequently destructive and pernicious’.216 In other words, abstinence before
marriage and faithfulness thereafter was thought to be an essential character-
istic of the ideal polite woman. As with other ‘indispensable’ signs of true
femininity, there was a forceful attempt to represent chastity as an innate
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female quality. This process of internalisation and naturalisation is most nota-
bly visible in the change in the rhetoric in which chastity was discussed during
the long eighteenth century; as Ingrid Tague has observed, the emergence of the
rhetoric of naturalness in the early 1700s targeted especially chastity, which thus
became, in addition to the moral duty it had always been, a natural female
trait.217 The process of internalisation also changed chastity’s meaning from
simply physical continence to internal purity of the mind. As Ruth Yeazell has
noted, modesty became increasingly synonymous with women’s sexual virtue
and chastity during the eighteenth century.218 Chastity as the female kind of
honour accrued multiple meanings and became entangled with more general
feminine virtues, such as modesty, meekness, and piety.
Even though especially the proponents of inward politeness accordingly
presented chastity as an internalised characteristic, they never thought it
was suﬃcient for a woman merely to be chaste. Instead, chastity had to be
clearly visible to others. Therefore, chastity can be seen not only as a state
of sexual (in)action, but also as a performative identity, which was to be
acted out in the language of modesty. Chastity’s collation with modesty
meant that sexual purity was thought to automatically have a visible inﬂu-
ence on the body. Modesty was thought to steer ‘every part of the outward
frame’ into a chaste appearance and to ‘guid[e] and regulat[e] the whole
behavior’.219 A modest woman would have ‘calm and meek looks’; she
would ‘reﬁne [her] language’ and ‘modulat[e] the tone and accent’ of
her speech.220 Modesty was deemed such an inseparable aspect of female
chastity that an immodest woman was portrayed, again, in bestial and
monstrous terms:
And if we consider Modesty in this sense, we shall ﬁnd it the most indis-
pensable requisite of a woman; a thing so essential and natural to the sex,
that every the least declination from it, is a proportionable receding from
Woman-hood; but the total abandoning it ranks them among Brutes, […]
an Impudent Woman is lookt on as a kind of Monster, a thing diverted and
distorted from its proper form.221
In other words, internalist writers believed that a chaste mind would show
itself in speciﬁc external signs, readable and interpretable by other members of
polite society—and similarly, that an impure mind would reveal itself through
the body: ‘Every indecent curiosity, or impure fancy, is a deﬂowering of the
mind, and every the least corruption of them, gives some degrees of deﬁlement
to the body too’.222 Moreover, these external signs of modesty were thought to
indicate a pure mind and body alike. ‘She who values not the virtue of modesty
in her words and dress, will not be thought to set much price upon it in her
actions’, argued Richard Steele.223 Thus, the idea of the transparent body
played a crucial role in internalist readings of chastity.
The various signs of chastity were endlessly debated and meticulously deﬁned
in didactic literature. A poem circulating around the fashionable crowd in the
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novel Evelina, where an anonymous admirer praises Evelina Anville’s feminine
modesty aptly condenses the external signs of chastity:
See last advance, with bashful grace,
Downcast eye, and blushing cheek,
Timid air, and beauteous face,
Anville,—whom the Graces seek.224
Bashfulness, timid air, and downcast eyes were all important signs of virtue,
but blushing was perhaps considered to be the most requisite one. ‘An unaf-
fected blush is an indication of real modesty. […] They, who have a proper
sense of the dignity of the female character, will regard it as an exterior symbol
of interior purity’, wrote one conduct book writer, and another praised ‘the
graceful blush of modesty’ as an ‘emanatio[n] of a virtuous mind’.225 This, of
course, meant that women supposedly needed to be extremely cautious in
guarding their external looks. The mere appearance of guilt was thought to be
enough to ruin their chaste reputation, as John Burton warned: ‘To avoid the
appearance of evil is as expedient as to avoid the evil itself.’226 Burton
continued:
As the most brilliant Jewel is soonest deprived of it’s [sic] lustre, so is
female reputation the most liable to tarnish. It is obscured even by the
breath of slander. You ought, therefore, to avoid every appearance of evil.
For though your thoughts and intentions may be perfectly pure and inno-
cent, yet from a World, who judge only by externals, […] the most injur-
ious, though groundless inferences may be drawn.227
Burton’s view was echoed by countless other contemporary writers throughout
the long eighteenth century—as, for example, by the Marquis of Halifax (1688)
who warned women against bringing ‘a Cloud upon your Reputation, which
may be deeply wounded, though your Conscience is unconcerned’.228
The importance of external manifestations of chastity also caused deep-
seeded anxiety amongst eighteenth-century writers, as the ever-present danger
of dissimulation made them fear that debauched women would simply imitate
the signs of chastity to hide their loss of virtue.229 Indeed, like the bodily signs
of sensibility, the outward marks of chastity were easily counterfeited. For
example, blushing could be manifested simply by applying rouge or pinching
the cheeks, and nothing was easier than knowingly putting on a modest dress—
enough so as to make many conduct writers complain that these manifestations
of purity were becoming suspicious signs of aﬀectation rather than proofs of
true innocence.230 In fact, the disconcerting fact was that the only way to dis-
tinguish female chastity was through the female body—which, as much as the
internalists gushed about its honest transparency, was a potentially misleading
and devious medium of communication. This, of course, made the performance
of chastity weigh more on the scale than the actual state of sexual (in)activity.
Discipline and Subversion 241
Since ‘it is only by appearances [the world] can judge’, a woman’s virtue was
‘nearly the same, in eﬀect’, as her reputation, as James Fordyce concluded.231
In fact, as Mary Delany complained, polite society seemed more concerned
about women’s indiscretions getting discovered than happening in the ﬁrst place:
[T]he common conversation one daily meets with [turns upon] […] the strange
behaviour of Lady A., and some more of the same character. These are subjects
that would aﬀord very good morals, and be far from displeasing topics in
conversation, if people would give themselves time to make reﬂections; but
instead of that, the woman is pitied—‘poor thing!’ her ‘stars’ are blamed; she
was unlucky, indiscreet not to manage more cunningly, and by the generality of
the world she is more condemned for not hiding her fault than for committing
it. Does not this give one a very sad idea of the virtue of the times?232
Thus, external appearances could make up for actual lost virtue. The impor-
tance of the exterior shell made the performance of chastity weigh more on the
scale than the actual state of sexual activity, meaning that women would, in
theory, have been able to engage in extramarital sexual encounters without
losing their chaste reputation, provided they were able to maintain the external
appearance of modesty and chastity. Mary Wollstonecraft openly criticised this
performative conceptualisation of female chastity. In A Vindication of the
Rights of Woman (1792), Wollstonecraft attacked the dominant conduct book
ideal of female chastity ‘as a “system of dissimulation” that obliges women to
sacriﬁce the substance of morality for the show of it’.233 She speciﬁcally tar-
geted feminine modesty by denouncing it as hypocrisy and, as such, a danger to
the morality of the whole society. Wollstonecraft complained that ‘it is reputa-
tion, and not chastity and all its fair train, that [women] are employed to keep
free from spot, not as a virtue, but to preserve their station in the world’, and
called for a reformation of female manners towards true chastity instead
of false modesty.234 Wollstonecraft’s critique demonstrates that maintaining
chastity in the eighteenth century was ultimately an external performance.
Chastity was, of course, discursively deﬁned as sexual continence, but as Woll-
stonecraft complained, in practice the spectacle of modesty had overtaken
chastity’s ‘true’ meaning. Even more importantly, Wollstonecraft’s critique
highlights the complex relationship between chastity, honour, and social status.
Chastity-as-performance had a considerable impact on a woman’s reputation—
not as its sole component, but certainly an important one. Thus, chastity,
understood as a performed identity, had a signiﬁcant role as a social booster,
which on the one hand made physical chastity relatively unimportant, and on
the other hand made the loss of reputation of chastity potentially extremely
hazardous. Indeed, didactic literature was full of threats over misguided women
being cast oﬀ from their family, friends, and the entire polite society. Maria
Rushworth’s fate in Jane Austen’s Mansﬁeld Park (1814) represents typical
didactic scaremongering. After the married lady elopes scandalously with
another man, she becomes a lost cause as a matter of social routine. Her father
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sends her to live alone with her aunt in a ‘remote and private’ part of England,
never to be admitted to the presence of her family again, for fear of tainting the
whole family with both her social stigma and corrupted morals.235
For these reasons, women were most certainly mindful about their appear-
ances and public excursion. Mary Delany primly explained the precautions she
saw ﬁt to take upon her introduction to the London social scene:
[My Aunt, Lady Stanley] was inﬁrm and unable to go to public places, but
was very careful who I went with: my being young and new, and soon
known to be married to a man much older than myself, exposed me to the
impertinence of many idle young men. It was not my turn to be pleased
with such votaries, and the apprehension of [Mr Pendarves’s] jealousy kept
me upon my guard, and by a dull cold behaviour I soon gave them to
understand they were to expect no encouragement from me.236
Fanny Burney was also extremely conscientious about her public reputation
regarding men, and accordingly avoided socialising with not only most of them
but also with women whose reputation retained even a whiﬀ of potential
scandal. She recorded in her journal an earnest cautioning her elderly acquain-
tance Richard Owen Cambridge gave her regarding the importance of conver-
sing ‘as little as possible with young men!’:
‘There is more danger than you are aware of, in the acquaintance of young
men. They are very apt to do mischief, even when they don’t intend it. But
there are so few that know how to speak of Women, without hurting them,
that you cannot be too cautious. […] In talking with young men, he con-
tinued, there is always some risk, —& it is better to avoid it. They may
often want to know You for no reason but to talk of you. You have a very
large acquaintance, —& your House is very well manned—but young men
coming into it —’
‘Dear Sir, interrupted I, nobody has a less acquaintance of young men!
Scarce any ever visit us!’
‘So much the better! a great deal the better!’
Burney was shocked that her cautious and prudish behaviour had given cause
for such warnings in the ﬁrst place; all this addressed ‘to me, commonly reck-
oned so reserved & shy, quite amazed me’, she complained to her sister.237
However, in reality, the management of sexual reputation was not this
straightforward. First of all, not all conduct writers saw immediate social ruin
as the inevitable result of the loss of chaste reputation. For example, Richard
Steele complained that even though shunning fallen women ‘would have a good
eﬀect on the guilty, who would be ashamed to be thus singled out and dis-
criminated’, this in reality was not done; instead, adulteresses ‘are suﬀered to
mix with the best societies, like hunted deer in a herd’, where ‘they ﬂatter
themselves they are indiscernible’.238 The Earl of Chesterﬁeld even questioned
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the necessity of a chaste reputation in the ﬁrst place; he claimed, in his letters to
his son, that ‘the reputation of chastity is not so necessary for a woman’, since
a ‘slip or two may possibly be forgiven her, and her character may be clariﬁed
by subsequent and continued good conduct’.239 Thus, even though Chesterﬁeld
certainly saw chastity as an important contributor to a woman’s honourable
reputation, it was by no means the only or an irrecoverable part of it. In fact,
rather than a straightforward system that was pivoted around a chaste reputa-
tion, once lost then lost forever, women’s social respectability was constructed
from a set of overlapping pieces, all centred on external appearances. If a
woman succumbed to a sexual indiscretion, it was possible for her to compen-
sate for her slip by carefully managing her external appearances, through hiding
her indiscretion, or through ‘subsequent and continued good conduct’. Fur-
thermore, as Amanda Vickery has argued, the vulnerability of a woman’s social
reputation depended greatly on her place in the social hierarchy. Thus, whereas
the uppermost aristocracy had a wider selection of means through which to
compensate for a loss of virtue through their high rank, inﬂuential family net-
works, and abundant wealth, women below that status would have been those
‘who were not placed so high as to have their actions above the Reach of Scandal’,
but ‘who have Reputations to lose, and who are not altogether so independent, as
not to have it their Interest to be thought well of by the world’.240
The women in the lower spheres of polite society would, then, have found
the rules of honour more binding, and compensating for a loss of chaste repu-
tation more diﬃcult—but, perhaps, not as undoable as it would at ﬁrst glance
appear. Even women with little wealth or connections could, to some extent,
preserve their reputation through a skillful management of appearances—for
the dominance of external appearances over internal virtue facilitated nego-
tiating honour in cases where public reputation was lost. For, as David Hume
wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature, appearances tended to trump even
factual knowledge:
There are many particulars in the point of honour both of men and
women, whose violations, when open and avow’d, the world never excuses,
but which it is more apt to overlook, when the appearances are sav’d, and
the transgression is secret and conceal’d. Even those, who know with equal
certainty, that the fault is committed, pardon it more easily, when the
proofs seem in some measure oblique and equivocal, than when they are
direct and undeniable.241
As The Lady’s Preceptor advised, ‘One who is guilty of all those Transgres-
sions, which we’ll rather imagine than mention, if she will but put on the Mask
of Bashfulness and Modesty, will please at least in this respect, and under that
Veil conceal the Irregularities of her Heart, especially from those who have not
had ﬂagrant Proofs of them’.242 Thus, maintaining honourable appearances
could save a woman’s reputation even in the face of damning evidence. Such
was the case of Mary Cholmondeley (1729–1811), a society hostess and
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daughter of an Irish bricklayer. In spring 1780, Fanny Burney wrote in her
journal that Mary Cholmondeley, an intimate member of Burney’s circle of
friends, was guilty of a sexual ‘indiscretion’, which gave the cautious Burney
cause to avoid ‘publicly associating’ with her.243 However, Cholmondeley’s
indiscretion was carefully hushed up, and her close friend Horace Walpole took
the trouble of supporting her station, never indicating in any way that there
was anything suspicious concerning her reputation.244 Consequently, Chol-
mondeley’s reputation suﬀered no permanent damage. She remained a favourite
in literary circles—and two years later, Fanny Burney recorded having accepted
a dinner invitation at Sir Joshua Reynolds’s expressly to meet Cholmondeley,
and the two continued their friendship as if nothing had happened.245 Indeed,
much depended on the willingness of friends and family to participate in main-
taining the appearance of respectability, but with a careful performance, the
appearance of chastity could be used as a dissimulative mask to fulﬁl the nor-
mative ideal of a polite woman while gaining freedom from the strict regulation
of female sexuality.246
Not only was it possible for women to put on a hypocritical external per-
formance of chastity, but also a public loss of character could be patched up by
a clever fashioning of external circumstances. Contrary to didactic warnings,
even universal knowledge of lost virtue did not necessarily end a woman’s
social career.247 Fanny Burney’s description of her dealings with Alicia
Macartney in Bath shed light on the complex manoeuvering negotiating repu-
tation and respectability within polite society required—and enabled. The
Thrale party saw ‘Bad Mac’ at the lower rooms, where, as Burney sniﬀed, her
mere appearance conﬁrmed her depraved state of morals:
[Her] Face carries an aﬃrmation of all this account,—it is bold, hardened,
snuft, leering & impudent! just such a face as I should Draw for Mrs.
Sinclear—Her Dress, too, was of the same cast, a thin muslin short sacque
& Coat lined throughout with Pink,—a modesty bit [two words blotted
out]—& something of a very short cloak half concealed about half of her
old wrinkled Neck—the rest was visible to disgust the Beholders,—red
Bows & Ribbons in abundance, a Gauze Bonnet tipt on to the top of her
Head, & a pair of Mittens!248
Despite all this, Macartney was dubbed the ‘Queen of Bath’ on account of
her ‘expensive Entertainments’ frequented by ‘People of Character and
Rank’. Even the Thrale company was curious enough to creep up very close
to get a good look at her—upon which, the lady in question ‘addressed
herself to Mrs. Thrale’ to the great horror and vexation of Burney. Appar-
ently Macartney’s blatantly debauched external looks were nevertheless
respectable enough to deceive Hester Lynch Thrale, who—apparently mis-
taking the lady for her respectable sister—immediately began ‘a very inti-
mate conversation with this gay lady’. During this conversation, the Thrale
group procured an invitation to one of Macartney’s famous soirées. After
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Burney then explained to Thrale the details of Alicia Macartney’s reputa-
tion, they ‘agreed that it was totally improper to make such an acquain-
tance, & that some method must be devised to put an end to it without
making the visit’. This, however, proved uncommonly tricky, as ‘it was
indispensably requisite that she should be civilly shirked, as her enmity was
horrible’. In the end, Hester Lynch Thrale decided to call on Macartney
during one morning to let her know ‘she had forgotten when at the Rooms
a previous engagement’ for the night of the soirée, while the rest of the
company staid safely at home in fears of getting associated with such a
dubious character.249 Burney rejoiced in their success at avoiding getting
added to Macartney’s ‘Coterie’, writing she should be ‘perfectly enragée to
have avoided publicly associating with poor Mrs. Cholmondeley, & then to
go to Balls and assemblies at Mrs. Macartneys!—when Mrs. Cholmondeley is
only suspected of one indiscretion, & Mrs. Macartney has been notoriously
guilty of vices innumerable’.250
The intricacies of the Burney—Thrale—Macartney ménage illustrate the
ways in which clever use of polite display could enable women of questionable
reputation to nevertheless retain a standing in polite society, as well as the ways
in which polite decorum worked in their advantage, preventing their open
slighting. Despite Alicia Macartney’s soiled reputation, she nevertheless had
enough social leverage to publicly shame those she perceived had insulted her.
Burney was especially worried that Macartney might lampoon them in the local
paper if slighted—as she was in the habit of doing and had, indeed, recently
done with Sophy Streatfeild for not visiting her.251 Accordingly, even though
Burney was queasy at the thought that ‘one of Mrs. Thrale’s Fame & celebrity
& purity of mind & conduct should countenance a Wretch notorious for all
manner of evil’, they needed to remain polite enough terms to prevent ‘Bad
Mac’s’ retaliation.252 As Ingrid Tague argues, ‘social power and the demands of
politeness vied with the ostensibly unalterable eﬀects of a woman’s lost chas-
tity, and the outcome was far from predetermined’.253 In fact, the obligations of
politeness often prevented precisely the social ruin prescribed to adulterous
women by the discourse of politeness—as when Henrietta Knight, Lady Lux-
borough (1699–1756) forced her acquaintance on Mary Delany’s sister Anne
Dewes. When the Dewes family rented a house close to Lady Luxborough’s
famous coterie in Warwickshire—where the adulterous lady had been banished
by her husband—she ‘obliged’ Anne Dewes to enter her cottage, ‘was most
profoundly civil, and comes to see me this week’, Dewes complained to her
brother.254 While Dewes was ‘not vastly fond’ of the acquaintance of a known
adulterer, Mary Delany saw ‘no reason why her acquaintance is to be declined’
and was, in fact, ‘vastly entertained at your being acquainted with her in spite
of your prudence’:
If she leads a discreet life, and does generous and charitable things, she
ought to be taken notice of, as an encouragement to go on in a right path,
and your conversation and example may be of inﬁnite service to her. She
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has lively parts, is very well bred, and knows the polite world, and you
may, I think, divert yourself with her as much as you can.
Even Delany’s husband, Patrick Delany, a Church of Ireland minister, thought
the acquaintance proper and even ‘meritorious’.255
Thus, not only was sexual honour’s link to social status equivocal; in addi-
tion, the role of opaque image-control and hypocritical fashioning of external
appearances played a crucial role in providing elite women with freedom from
didactic politeness norms. Since external signs were polite society’s only means
of measuring chastity—or, indeed, any form of idealised polite femininity—
there was always a gap between an individual’s behaviour and her actual state
of chastity. Within that gap, women like Mary Cholmondeley, Alicia Macart-
ney, and Henrietta Knight could ﬁnd some freedom of sexual action, otherwise
denied to them. The possibility of performative play on chaste identity also
further blurs the external/internal division; by suggesting that the external self is
malleable and hypocritical, it questions the internalist notion of an authentic
identity that is reﬂected on the external surface of the body, and, instead, sug-
gests that identities are performative. At the same time, the performances of
chastity as citations of the norm, honest and hypocritical alike, of course also
served to maintain and reconstitute the feminine ideal of chastity and its
importance to female honour.
The intensity of public concern over women’s chastity indicates that con-
trolling women’s sexuality was seen as a matter of vital importance for the
entire polite society. Feminine chastity was widely thought to have a crucial
inﬂuence on the morals of the nation. The English patrilineal transmission of
property and the wish to ensure rightful inheritance by female chastity further
enhanced chastity’s social importance.256 Besides, women’s chastity was inti-
mately tied to their husband’s reputation; the image of a cuckolded man was a
general laughing stock, because it represented a pitiable inability to control
one’s wife as a proper head of household should, and thereby violated patri-
archal society’s gender roles.257 Most importantly, sexuality was perceived to be
one of women’s most eﬀective means of getting power, which is why regulating
women’s sexuality was of crucial importance. A discursively disorganised
female sexuality was a disruptive force. The seductive female body could lead
men to abandon all control and rationality, thus endangering the ordered
workings of society. Shawn Lisa Maurer argues that the ‘traditional belief in
women’s power to arouse, confuse, and distract men makes imperative men’s
ability to control women’s use of their sexual desirability’, simultaneously
maintaining that men are dependent upon ‘women’s construction as pleasing
objects in order to make themselves feel and act like men’.258 Thus, the careful
discursive regulation of women was motivated by the urge to keep the anarchic
potential of the female body under control, thereby ensuring the continued self-
control of men. Any female assertion of (sexual) power would not only be
considered as a deviation from polite feminine normativity, but also a threat to
constructions of masculine identity, sexuality, and hegemony.
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258 Maurer, Proposing Men, 109. See also Foucault, Will to Knowledge, 123.
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Epilogue
At the age of 23, Fanny Burney found herself in a peculiar and not altogether
pleasant situation. A Mr Thomas Barlow, an ‘unexceptionable young man with
good prospects’ whom Burney had met only once in a small evening gathering,
unexpectedly proposed to her in 1775. As Burney knew nothing of the man, mar-
riage, in her view, was out of the question. This caused a small-scale uproar in her
family, who were of a quite diﬀerent opinion. To secure her future ﬁnancial
standing, Burney’s closest and most trusted relatives and friends pressured her to
accept the proposal of a complete stranger for the fear of never receiving another.
Burney, however, held her ground, maintaining that matrimony out of solely
ﬁnancial reasons was against her character. Accordingly, after a couple of weeks of
Barlow’s persistent courtship, partly prompted by Burney’s family’s encourage-
ment, she ﬁnally managed to extricate herself from the insistent gentleman.
Burney’s selection of means to cool Barlow’s feelings was limited by polite-
ness and feminine decorum. She was forced to receive his visits, but found
means to indicate his company was not welcomed by, for example, not asking
him to sit down (and thus forcing the poor man to stand through his entire
visit) and determinately ignoring all his attempts for conversation.1 Interest-
ingly, Burney noted down a conversation where she endeavoured to put an end
to Barlow’s interest in her:
[Barlow:] ‘This is the severest decision!—I am persuaded, Madam, you
cannot be so cruel?—Surely you must allow that the social state is what we
were all meant for?—that we were created for one another?—that to form
such a resolution is contrary to the design of our Being?— ’
‘All this may be true,— ’said I; —‘I have nothing to say in contradiction
to it—but you know there are many odd Characters in the World—& I am
one of them.’ […]
‘But surely—is not this—singular? —’
‘I give you leave, Sir,’ cried I, laughing, ‘to think me singular—odd—
Queer—nay, even whimsical, if you please.’2
The choice of words by both Barlow and Burney is thought-provoking. Bur-
ney’s unorthodox decision to refuse a perfectly sensible marriage appears
‘singular’ to Barlow, and she readily admits to being an ‘odd’, ‘queer’, or even
‘whimsical’ character.
Burney’s actions highlight both the repressive force of the culture of polite-
ness and the potential for freedom embedded in it. Polite society’s norms
advocated marriage for women, and, indeed, not to accept an oﬀer from a well-
behaved, wealthy, and respectable suitor was considered to be ‘contrary to the
design of our Being’, and especially against female nature as it was con-
ventionally understood. Polite decorum forced Burney to receive the visits of an
unwelcome suitor and behave with some (though limited) civility towards him.
Moreover, her friends and family leant heavily on her, and women were generally
expected to bow before such authority. This is not to say that refusing an impec-
cable suitor was an incident unheard of, but Burney was certainly swimming
against a particularly strong tide.
Nevertheless, Burney managed to avoid ‘immolat[ing] herself for her father’s
pleasure’ and thus being a ‘slave of decorum’, as Betty Rizzo puts it.3 More-
over, and much more signiﬁcantly, by skilfully using the means that the culture
of politeness provided—such as showing her displeasure through not conversing
with her suitor, which, as she recorded, caused him a ‘good deal’ of agitation,
but ‘what can a Woman do when a man will not take an answer?’—she created
a form of subjectivity that eﬀectively resisted the norms of politeness.4 Thus,
her refusal of Barlow can be seen as an act of challenging the constitutive con-
ditions of polite feminine subjectivity and replacing them with a subversive
one—something which she herself then termed ‘queer’ and ‘whimsical’, fully
aware of its exceptional character. Indeed, an act of resistance would, of
course, appear odd and non-rational from the viewpoint of the hegemonic
regime of power/knowledge. Marianna D’Ezio has similarly argued that Hester
Lynch Thrale’s deliberate embracing of the role of an eccentric enabled her to
establish herself as an individual, an intellectual, and a public writer. Fanny
Burney’s defying her dearly beloved family’s will can be seen as a similar ‘step
towards emancipation and expressive autonomy’.5
This book has examined the complicated interplay between politeness as a
normalising power and politeness as an enabling practice. Burney’s refusal of
Barlow can be read as a microcosm of polite interaction, where individuals’
actions are both bound and enabled by the norms of politeness. Individuals
were not passive victims of the regime of politeness, nor was their identity
inescapably dictated by gendered polite norms. Instead, they could engage in
speciﬁc strategies to deploy the potential for freedom that is embedded in all
regimes of power/knowledge.
While this book has attempted to add to the work done on politeness by
drawing upon theoretical perspectives about performance, performativity, and
identity construction, its goal has been to make also broader arguments con-
cerning the position of the subject as both constructed through discourse and
the shaper of that discourse. Indeed, my research is a part of a wider project of
examining how individual and collective identities are formed through the
interplay of social and cultural structures and individuals themselves. This
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theoretically informed approach is, in part, an attempt to answer to the chal-
lenge Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth argues concerns all historians—that is, the
departure from modernity. As Ermarth claims, our postmodern ‘discursive
condition’ requires us to radically rethink the very tools of thought which we
employ when writing history in order to ‘keep up with ourselves in any vital or
creative way’.6 In this way, I want to open up new views for historical research
and to problematise established research traditions of the history of politeness
in a fruitful way. Moreover, my ﬁndings are applicable to other historical and
cultural contexts beyond the immediate scope of eighteenth-century England,
politeness, or women, for that matter. Foucauldian scholars have been com-
mitted to mapping the creation of subjectivity in its diﬀerent historical stages as
a practice of disciplinary, pastoral, or bio-power. Nikolas Rose, Cressida
Heyes, and Susan Bordo, among others, have emphasised the central role of the
body as an inscriptive surface in this process. For example, Nikolas Rose has
inﬂuentially argued that we currently live in the age of the ‘somatic individual’,
in which the self is ‘discovered’ through working on the body. This argument
resonates powerfully with my analysis on politeness. ‘Selfhood has become
intrinsically somatic—ethical practices increasingly take the body as a key site
for work on the self’, Rose argues, and continues that ‘the corporeal existence
and vitality of the self have become the privileged site of experiments with sub-
jectivity’.7 Moreover, he tracks the history of the embodiment of subjectivity to
the studies, bedrooms, courtrooms, markets, and schoolrooms of seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century Europe—a list where the polite salon or ballroom can be
justiﬁably added.8
Thus, the project of constructing subjectivity through moulding and dis-
ciplining the body is a pressing contemporary phenomenon with historical
roots—and those roots partly draw from women’s practices of politeness in
eighteenth-century Europe. As Cressida Heyes claims, ‘somatic subjectivity’ has
had an especially fraught relationship with gender; as Western feminism has
‘urged women to look inside to ﬁnd the authentic and diverse selves patriarchy
has denied and suppressed, this very gesture of self-discovery has been deeply
implicated in emergent discourses that paradoxically take the disciplined and
conformist body as a site of truth reﬂecting the self within’. Heyes argues that
despite feminist and anti-racist eﬀort to argue that gendered or racialised bodies
do not indicate inferior intellectual or moral character, our present-day society
nevertheless acts as if—even if it does not fully believe that—‘one’s outer form
reﬂects one’s virtues’, and that the ever increasing visual objectiﬁcation of
(especially female) bodies—exempliﬁed by the growing markets of beauty,
dieting, ﬁtness, and cosmetic surgery industries—indicates that the fashioning
of the body is all the time becoming increasingly important to how we under-
stand ourselves.9 Therefore, analysing women’s politeness as a bodily regime of
subjectiﬁcation oﬀers us insight into not only a historically speciﬁc situation but
to the workings of present-day society. By deconstructing the relationship
between the polite performance as volitional theatrical act and performativity as
unvolitional iterative practice through concrete eighteenth-century case-studies, I
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have wished to make an original theoretical contribution that has applicability to
a wide range of disciplines while maintaining an empirical and intelligible his-
torical focus.
I have also wanted to contextualise politeness both historically and geo-
graphically within larger frames beyond eighteenth-century England. This
book has explored the pivotal nature of the eighteenth century through
examining politeness as a culture that simultaneously carries many early
modern beliefs about the body and identity while actively advocating
modern ones. The promotion of mixed sociability is a good example of this,
being ill-advised if gender is conceptualised as ﬂuid but civilising when it
becomes anchored to sex. Similar ambiguity can be seen in conceptualisa-
tions of identity and selfhood, which vary between immense ﬂexibility of
superﬁcial roles, commonly connected to early modern thought, and the sort
of profound immutable internality that has been canonised as ‘the Enlight-
enment subject’. In geographical terms, the modes of self-mastery, self-care,
and self-knowledge politeness required from women was neither limited nor
particularly speciﬁc to England. However, even though the strategies to dis-
ciplining the body into normativity, as well as that normativity in itself,
were marked by strong similarities throughout the European and Atlantic
world, the rhetorical framing of those norms and strategies was deliberately
nationalist.
Moreover, my analysis on the strategies of resistance has contemporary
political signiﬁcance. In his research on the genealogy of subjectiﬁcation,
Nikolas Rose has identiﬁed three ways of relating to the self: epistemologi-
cally (knowing yourself), despotically (mastering yourself), and attentively
(caring for yourself).10 These are the means through which normalising power
is appropriated by the subject as an ethical practice of the self in everyday life,
and can be seen at work in women’s practices of politeness, as well. The tra-
dition of journalising emphasised self-knowledge, and honing the body in
polite accomplishments and appearances required both self-mastery and self-
care. However, Rose emphasises that human beings are ‘not the uniﬁed sub-
jects of some coherent regime of domination that produces persons in the
form in which it dreams’; instead, ‘[t]echniques of relating to oneself as a
subject of unique capacities worthy of respect run up against practices [of]
relating to oneself as the target of discipline, duty and docility’.11 In other
words, resistance is an integral consequence of normalising practices. My aim
in this book has been to discover and analyse some speciﬁc strategies through
which this individual resistance operates—which is something that Rose does
not go into—and thus contribute to the research recently undertaken by
Heyes, Bordo, and Johanna Oksala, for example. The four strategies that
women engaged in to acquire freedom and to resist normalising power—
namely, the practices of hypocrisy, play between exterior and interior, multi-
plicity of identity, and self-discipline—can thus have wider applicability to
other historical and cultural cases where individuals seek to resist normative
power, including the present day.
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